Luigi Mangione's Lawyers Push to Drop State Murder Charges, Arguing Double Jeopardy
Luigi Mangione's legal team has moved to dismiss charges he faces in New York state, arguing that the federal case against him means he faces double jeopardy. In a 57-page filing in New York's Supreme Court, attorney Karen Friedman Agnifilo argued that her client is facing triple proceedings as he is also subject to charges in Pennsylvania, where he was arrested five days after he allegedly murdered UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson in Manhattan on December 4, 2024.
'As a result of unprecedented prosecutorial one-upmanship, Mr. Mangione now faces three simultaneous prosecutions in three different jurisdictions—one of which is seeking the death penalty, while another is seeking life imprisonment—all for one set of facts,' Friedman Agnifilo wrote in the Thursday filing.
The Double Jeopardy Clause, part of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, prohibits the government from prosecuting or punishing a person twice for the same offense. Mangione's three separate legal cases linked to Thompson's killing have 'led to a legal tug-of-war between state and federal prosecutors as they fight for who controls the fate of 26-year-old Luigi Mangione,' the filing said.
Mangione, who pleaded not guilty last week to federal charges of stalking and murder, also faces charges of gun possession and forgery in Pennsylvania as well as charges of first-degree murder in furtherance of terrorism in New York state. He could face the death penalty if convicted.
His lawyers have argued that New York prosecutors are 'trying to get two bites at the same apple' and that police have 'methodically and purposefully trampled his constitutional rights.'
The defense attorney claims her client has been treated unjustly as officers failed to read him his Miranda Rights during his arrest in Pennsylvania. She argues evidence seized at the time should be suppressed, as he was 'surrounded by 10 police officers,' handcuffed, and a search of his backpack was carried out without a warrant. Friedman Agnifilo has previously claimed that private phone conversations between her and Mangione are being listened to.
The state case against Mangione is set to resume in court on June 26, while the federal case against him is scheduled for December 5, one year after Thompson's killing.
The Manhattan District Attorney's Office said it will respond to Friedman Agnifilo's arguments in a court filing.
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