Too Close to Ignore

Ammon

2 days ago

The recent Iranian-Israeli war was not merely another chapter in a long-standing regional conflict. It marked a pivotal moment that compelled neighboring states—foremost among them Jordan—to seriously reassess their national security paradigms and core strategic interests. It has reignited debate within Jordanian political circles regarding the country's relationship with the West Bank, including the limits of its potential, legitimate, and necessary role— and at what point disengagement becomes not just a strategic decision, but an existential gamble.
Within this debate, a prevailing school of thought in Jordan advocates for a "Jordan-first" approach, emphasizing domestic stability and steering clear of any direct or indirect involvement in the rapidly unfolding dynamics across the West Bank. This approach is driven by a growing conviction that the costs of regional entanglement—especially with Israel—have become prohibitively high, given the stark imbalance of power, waning Arab support, and the emergence of new regional alignments that do not necessarily favor Jordan's traditional stance on the Palestinian issue. Proponents of this position favor retreating into economic and social concerns, avoiding potentially volatile confrontations that could spiral out of control.
While this posture may appear rational and cautious, it raises deeper questions about whether such a policy is even viable—or wise—within Jordan's specific historical, geographic, and political context. Can Jordan truly "isolate" itself from the West Bank? Is it possible to redefine national interests independent of a land that is intertwined with the Kingdom through history, geography, demography, security, and identity?
In reality, the West Bank has never been merely an "external file" for Jordan. Even after the 1988 legal and administrative disengagement, the Palestinian issue has remained central to Jordan's national identity, and to both its domestic and foreign policy agendas. The West Bank—as a territory, a people, and a destiny—is embedded in Jordan's national security architecture. Its stability—or lack thereof—has a direct and tangible impact on Jordan's own internal stability. This strategic awareness is deeply embedded within the country's political and security institutions, particularly during moments of heightened tension, such as the Second Intifada, or during the recent Gaza war and subsequent escalation in the West Bank, where the rhetoric of a 'Jordanian option' re-emerged among certain extremist Israeli circles.
More dangerously, Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank would not neutralize threats; it may, in fact, invite them. The political and security vacuum emerging from the erosion of political solutions, expansion of Israeli settlements, and weakening of the Palestinian Authority only enhances the influence of extremist forces—many of which do not recognize Jordan's existence, let alone its sovereignty or borders. In such a context, even symbolic Jordanian withdrawal from the West Bank could be seen as a premature sacrifice of a foundational pillar of Jordan's strategic stability.
This is precisely where the urgency of redefining Jordan's regional role emerges—not as a passive bystander, but as an engaged and strategic actor possessing considerable influence over the Palestinian scene. Jordan, by virtue of its historical, geographic, and political connections, retains a unique ability to engage with Palestinian elites, the general public, and the social fabric—an influence unmatched by any other Arab state. To retreat from this role not only weakens Jordan's position vis-à-vis rising threats, but also erodes its strategic leverage.
Jordan's national security cannot be preserved through isolation. Instead, it must be safeguarded through a smart regional strategy—one that balances political independence with effective engagement, diplomatic de-escalation with strategic firmness, and leverages Jordan's assets of soft power and strategic credibility: political legitimacy, regional trust, deep-rooted ties with the Palestinian public, diplomatic flexibility, and the religious custodianship over Islamic and Christian holy sites.
Ultimately, the West Bank is not just a 'cause' for Jordan—it is an 'extension,' perhaps even a 'mirror,' of what could unfold in Amman should the situation there deteriorate. The real question, therefore, is not whether Jordan can isolate itself from the West Bank—but what the actual cost of such isolation might be. Can the state afford to gamble with its strategic security, political identity, and symbolic legitimacy in exchange for fragile, short-term stability that may not withstand the next tremor from the west?