Slogans urge Tibetans to assimilate under Chinese rule
Similar slogans can be seen on gates and other signage along the expressway that winds through green farmland beneath towering peaks.
While such political messaging is not uncommon in China, overt displays that many observers might view as propaganda -- particularly those highlighting the government's awareness of minority groups -- are rarely seen in major metropolises like Beijing.
Nyingchi is home to 35 ethnic groups, most of which are indigenous to Tibet. Other groups include the majority Han Chinese, Monpa and Lhoba people.
Slogans promoting ethnic integration are displayed throughout the region, and the Chinese government is promoting a project to relocate Tibetan ethnic minorities living in mountainous regions to urban areas.
In late June, a group of journalists and others were given a chaperoned tour by officials in Tibet, where media access is strictly controlled. They got a glimpse of life under Chinese government rule.
Other slogans read, "The central government supports Tibet, and the whole country lends its support to Tibet," and "Let's learn the (Chinese) common language for ethnic exchange."
Tibet has a long history of resistance and opposition to Chinese rule, including riots, in response to oppression and restrictions on Tibetan religion and culture.
The 1959 Tibetan uprising, sparked by fears of the Dalai Lama's arrest, resulted in a severe crackdown and his exile. More recently, protests and a period of unrest in 2008 have demonstrated that tensions persist and that resistance to Chinese policies remains strong.
Satoshi Tomisaka, a professor of Chinese affairs at Takushoku University in Tokyo, participated in the media tour. He said the slogans are "effective in using language in a way that naturally makes people think it is good to be part of China."
Along with the dominant Han Chinese group, which makes up more than 90 percent of China's population, there are 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities in the country.
Despite this, critics say the Chinese government has an active policy of assimilating ethnic minorities by force.
Last year, Human Rights Watch published a report stating that the Chinese government was forcibly relocating Tibetan villagers and herders from the autonomous region under the guise of "improving people's livelihoods."
Accompanied by officials on the media tour, the group of journalists was taken to visit the home of a person of the Monpa ethnic minority. The residents of his village were relocated from their mountainous home region about two decades ago under the government-sponsored program.
The man repeatedly expressed his gratitude for the move, saying, "No one refused to relocate. Life has become more convenient, and our income has increased."
A large portrait of Chinese President Xi Jinping hung in his living room. "I bought it of my own accord," the man explained. "He is like a parent to us."
According to local government officials who accompanied the group, it was "a very ordinary family home."
However, the walls of the home told a different story. They were adorned with commemorative photos of the family accompanied by Communist Party officials, demonstrating the family's close affiliation with the party.
Construction of high-rise tenements and other buildings is progressing in Nyingchi.
A woman who moved there eight years ago from Guangdong Province, a coastal area in southeastern China, runs a souvenir shop. She emphasized the friendly relationship between ethnic groups, saying, "There are many Han Chinese children at my children's school. The Han Chinese and Tibetans are one family."
However, a Tibetan woman who owns a restaurant in the suburbs discreetly told reporters, "All the shops along the main thoroughfare are Han Chinese-operated."
Despite the urban development, she said, "My shop isn't getting any more customers."
As the group of journalists left Nyingchi along the expressway, another slogan that reads more like a directive popped into view: "Let's show our gratitude to General Secretary (Xi)," it says.
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