India Seeks to Stabilize Newly Thawed Relations With China
Jaishankar's visit to Beijing was the first to the Chinese capital since India and China clashed violently along their disputed border at Galwan in Ladakh on June 15, 2020. The meetings on the sidelines of the SCO summit provided the two sides with an opportunity to take stock of recent efforts to improve bilateral relations that had frayed significantly over the past five years.
Both sides had mobilized a large number of troops along the Line of Actual Control, the de facto border, and built up military and other infrastructure. Several rounds of talks took place between top military commanders of the two countries and these resulted in troops pulling back from five of seven friction points in Ladakh. However, agreement was elusive disengagement at two friction points, and tensions continued to simmer.
Then in October last year, India and China reached an agreement on patrolling arrangements and disengagement of troops from the last two friction points, paving the way for a meeting between Xi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of a BRICS summit at Kazan in Russia.
Since the Xi-Modi meeting at Kazan, relations have moved in a 'positive direction,' according to Jaishankar. In the months since, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Defense Minister Rajnath Singh have travelled to China, as has Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri.
In Beijing, Jaishankar observed that ties are improving and underlined the responsibility of both sides to 'maintain that momentum.'
The normalization of bilateral relations was due to the resolution of frictions and the ability of both sides to maintain peace and tranquility along their border, he said. This was key to developing mutual strategic trust and bilateral relations. 'It is now incumbent on us to address other aspects related to the border, including de-escalation,' Jaishankar said, drawing attention to the tens of thousands of troops still amassed on the border, though disengaged from the eyeball-to-eyeball situation that they were locked in previously.
Jaishankar thanked China for reopening a pilgrimage route to Kailash Mansarovar, a site that Hindus revere, in China after a gap of five years. Building people-to-people relations could promote mutually beneficial cooperation, he said.
Equally essential was the avoidance of restrictive trade measures, Jaishankar said. Recently, Indian media reports pointed to China imposing restrictions on the export of critical minerals used in the manufacture of a wide range of products, including personal electronics and military hardware, to India. China, which dominates the critical minerals production and export supply chain, announced that the curbs on exports of these metals in April were in retaliation for U.S. President Donald Trump's imposition of tariffs on China. India is heavily dependent on China for imports that support its electronic, engineering and pharmaceutical industries. In 2024-25, India's trade deficit with China was almost $100 billion. There are concerns in New Delhi that this deficit will increase.
The Chinese readouts on the two meetings Jaishankar had in Beijing steered clear of any controversy. The statement on Jaishankar's meeting with Chinese Vice President Han Zheng's meeting with Jaishankar said that as 'major developing countries and important members of the Global South, China and India should be partners that help each other succeed.' It added that the two sides must 'advance practical cooperation, respect each other's concerns,' and promote China-India relations.
The Chinese statement following the Wang-Jaishankar meeting described India and China as 'two major Eastern civilizations and major emerging economies living adjacent to each other.' Given this, 'the essence of China-India relations lies in how to live in harmony and help each other succeed,' it said.
Given the tone and tenor of statements from both sides, it would be natural to think that India and China ties are poised to move in an upward trajectory.
But a closer look reveals the many problems complicating an already complex relationship.
Since 1962, when India and China fought a border war, ties have been riddled by suspicion, especially over their unsettled border. Additionally, China's close relations with India's arch-rival Pakistan have been a source of concern for Delhi. China and Pakistan describe each other as 'all-weather strategic cooperative partners' with an ''ironclad'' friendship between them. This friendship extends to the military and nuclear domain – which India has repeatedly flagged.
While this has been known for decades, the support China extended to Pakistan during the recent May 7-10 India-Pakistan military clashes has drawn India's ire, especially since such support came amid Indian efforts to improve ties with Beijing. Pakistan used Chinese-origin fighter jets, Chinese PL-15 missiles, and drones, highlighting deep levels of cooperation. It reaffirmed what Indian military strategists have been raising for decades – the challenges India faces in having to fight a two-front war along its hostile borders. Deputy Chief of the Indian Army, Lt Gen Rahul R. Singh, said earlier this month that India had to deal with three adversaries during Operation Sindoor – Pakistan being the 'front face' and China and Türkiye providing vital support to it. Given Pakistan's use of Chinese-made weapons, China was able to test its hardware in a live conflict scenario, he said, describing the situation as a 'live lab' available to China. Besides this, China has also backed Pakistan at international fora where India has tried to spotlight Islamabad's support to anti-India terrorist groups.
India believes that China's unstinted support to Pakistan and its reluctance to resolve its border problem with New Delhi by clearly delineating its frontier are aimed at keeping India pinned down in South Asia, stymying India's ambitions to emerge as a global power or a key pole in a multipolar world.
Adding to New Delhi's suspicions about Chinese intentions is Beijing's efforts to create a new South Asian grouping to replace the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which comprises India, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka as its members. SAARC has not met since 2014; Afghanistan, India, Bhutan and Bangladesh pulled out of the summit that Pakistan was to host in 2016, citing Islamabad's support for terrorism. In the context of trilateral cooperation between China, Pakistan and Afghanistan on the one hand, and China, Pakistan and Bangladesh on the other, the prospects of a new China-led South Asian regional grouping have brightened. This is of concern to India.
Last but not the least, is the question of the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. The presence of the Dalai Lama and tens of thousands of refugees in India and the fact that the Tibetan government-in-exile is headquartered in India has riled Beijing for decades. Earlier this month, the 90-year-old Tibetan leader said the institution of the Dalai Lama would continue after his death, with the Gaden Phodrang Trust picking his reincarnation. The announcement incensed China, which said that the 15th Dalai Lama would need its recognition as well. Also angering Beijing was Indian minister Kiren Rijiju's remark that only the current Dalai Lama and conventions established by him could decide on identifying his successor. Officially, the Indian foreign ministry said the Indian government had no position on religious matters. But in deeming the Dalai Lama's reincarnation a 'religious matter' that it had no comment about, New Delhi seemed to suggest it would not intervene when the Gaden Phodrang Trust identifies the reincarnation. That could mean that India would stay silent on Beijing's choice of the 15th Dalai Lama too. Beijing is keen on India endorsing its choice of the Dalai Lama.
Following Rijiju's remark, China called on India to act cautiously on Tibet-related issues. Chinese embassy spokesperson Yu Jing posted on X that members of the strategic and academic communities, including former officials, had made 'improper remarks' regarding the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. 'In reality, (the) Xizang-related (Tibet-related) issue is a thorn in China-India relations,' Yu said in the post, shortly after the Indian foreign ministry announced Jaishankar's China visit.
Things may be looking up on the India-China front, but the road ahead to normalization is riddled with potholes. Testing times lie ahead for India as it tries to balance these challenges while seeking a working relationship with China in a turbulent and unpredictable world.
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