Japan Shifts Space Policy from Science to Security

Japan Forward

11-07-2025

As space becomes a contested, congested, and competitive domain, Japan is rapidly transforming its approach to space development. A recent lecture by Mitsuru Nodomi, former Director of the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSIC) and retired Ground Self-Defense Force official, highlighted the urgency of integrating space into Japan's broader national security strategy.
From GPS dependency to satellite warfare, his insights reveal why Japan can no longer afford to treat space as a purely scientific endeavor.
Japan's early space development efforts were largely civilian and academic, led by the Ministry of Education and focused on scientific research. This orientation was further codified by Japan's adherence to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1969 Diet resolution restricting space use to "non-military purposes."
However, this stance began to shift in 1998 after North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory. Within months, the Japanese government made an unprecedented Cabinet decision to launch its own information-gathering satellites. "That decision, made in just four months, marked a fundamental turning point," Nodomi explained. "Under normal circumstances, such a process would have taken years."
Nodomi, who helped oversee Japan's information-gathering satellite programs, noted that this shift laid the groundwork for the current national space policy. The 2008 Basic Space Act formalized the integration of space into national defense, replacing "non-military" principles with a commitment to "non-aggressive" use. Mitsuru Nodomi
Space is now integral to modern life, from GPS navigation and internet timing to financial markets and air traffic control. A loss of satellite function, Nodomi explained, could bring daily life to a halt.
"A GPS outage wouldn't just affect your phone," he warned. "It would disrupt financial systems, power grids, and even air traffic. It's an invisible infrastructure we depend on every day."
This dependency makes satellite infrastructure a tempting target. China, Russia, and others have already demonstrated anti-satellite capabilities. Japan, Nodomi emphasized, must be prepared to protect its own systems while remaining vigilant against adversarial threats.
Nodomi identified three emerging trends: competition, congestion, and contestation. Space is no longer the exclusive domain of superpowers. Over 80 nations now possess satellites, and private companies like SpaceX have revolutionized launch frequency and cost. Japan's participation in the global space economy will depend on its ability to reduce launch costs and scale up production.
"We're in a world where the number of actors in space has exploded," Nodomi said. "That means more debris, more potential collisions, and more risks, including military ones."
The rise of commercial constellations such as Starlink introduces both opportunities and vulnerabilities. These networks offer high redundancy and low latency, but their proliferation has drastically increased the risk of orbital collisions and debris. China's 2007 anti-satellite missile test and Russia's 2021 satellite destruction created thousands of hazardous fragments.
Nodomi also highlighted the growing use of small satellites for real-time imaging, surveillance, and communication. While cheaper and more agile, they require resilient architectures to ensure functionality amid potential attacks.
The war in Ukraine has shown how space assets can alter battlefield dynamics. Ukraine, lacking its own satellite infrastructure, has leveraged commercial satellites for intelligence and communications.
"Ukraine has no military satellites of its own," Nodomi noted. "But thanks to commercial constellations, it's been able to fight a 21st-century war. That's a game changer." The counteroffensive of the Ukraine forces near Bakhmut in May 2023 (©Serhii Nuzhnenko, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/the Collectionofwar.ukraine.ua)
Meanwhile, Russia's hesitancy to destroy United States commercial satellites used by Ukraine underscores the geopolitical risks of targeting space assets.
Nodomi emphasized that modern combat depends on real-time intelligence, positioning data, and resilient communication links. All of these are satellite-dependent. In future conflicts, attacks on satellites or ground-based control centers, through missiles, cyberattacks, or jamming, are highly plausible.
Japan has already taken steps to adapt. The CSIC is expanding its satellite constellation, aiming for 10 satellites by FY2031. The Japanese version of GPS, the MICHIBIKI system, is being expanded from 4 to 10 satellites. The Ministry of Defense is also expanding the Space Operations Group, originally established in 2022, with plans to significantly enhance its capabilities and mission scope by 2026.
In 2022, Japan's National Security Strategy explicitly named "space security" for the first time. A year later, the government released a dedicated Space Security Initiative identifying anti-satellite weapons and space debris as key threats. The strategy also emphasized international cooperation, particularly with the US.
"We've come a long way from the days of leaving space policy to science ministries," Nodomi said. "Now, it's about national survival."
Despite these developments, Japan still faces major hurdles. Its domestic space industry lags behind competitors in launch frequency, satellite manufacturing, and solutions-based services. Rocket costs remain high, and the failure to scale small satellite launch platforms like Epsilon remains a concern.
Nodomi noted that for Japan to become a true space power, it must foster a virtuous cycle between security and industry. "National security needs should drive technological innovation," he said. "That innovation, in turn, can fuel commercial growth, but only if we get the legal and policy environment right."
Author: Daniel Manning