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Chilli processing plant to come up in Abohar by Sept: Punjab agri minister

Chilli processing plant to come up in Abohar by Sept: Punjab agri minister

Hindustan Times09-06-2025
The Punjab government will commission a ₹9.50 crore chilli processing plant in Abohar by September, state agriculture minister Gurmeet Singh Khudian said.
Being established by the Punjab Agri Export Corporation Ltd (PAGREXCO) over one acre of land, the plant will have an installed capacity of five tonnes per hour, the minister said. The area under chilli cultivation in the state has been increasing annually, with farmers being encouraged to grow high-yielding varieties suitable for processing, he said.
As of 2024, Punjab's chilli cultivation spanned 10,614 hectares, the highest recorded area in recent years, yielding 21,416 metric tonnes, the minister said.
Ferozepur district leads in chilli production, followed by Patiala, Malerkotla, Sangrur, Jalandhar, Tarn Taran, Amritsar, SBS Nagar and Hoshiarpur.
Ferozepur's average yield of approximately 19 metric tonnes (MT) per hectare showcases the region's efficient farming practices, Khuddian said.
PAGREXCO directly procures chillies from farmers and aggregators, leveraging a well-established marketing network, he added. The corporation is a major exporter of red chilli paste from Punjab, including to the Middle East and African countries.
Chilli cultivation has emerged as a vital component of Punjab's agricultural diversification, providing farmers with a lucrative alternative to traditional crops such as wheat and paddy, the minister said.
The state's favourable agro-climatic conditions have strategically positioned Punjab as a key player in chilli production and processing, capitalising on new opportunities in the agricultural sector, he added.
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