Schengen visa digital revamp: From paperless application to benefits - details Indian travellers need to know
Marking a significant shift from the previous visa sticker system, the paperless digital visa will be secured by encrypted 2D digital barcode, Business Today reported.
From speeding up processing times and making the procedure more technologically advanced, the upcoming new feature will enhance security and is expected to be fully implemented across all EU member states by 2028.
This follows 2024 EU's pilot project implemented during Paris Olympics when 70,000 digital Schengen visas were issued. With plans to roll out a centralised online application system by 2026, the EU seeks to streamline the entire Schengen Visa process for applicants across the globe to reduce fraud associated with physical passport stickers.
By 2026, the European Union aims to fully digitalise the visa application system through a centralised online platform. Once launched, Indian travellers through this centralised online platform, will be able to upload required documents, pay application fees, track their visa status and receive digitally signed barcodes as visas replacing physical stickers.
It is important to note that first-time applicants will have to visit consulates or visa centres in person for biometric data collection. The biometric renewal process will take place every five years.
The Schengen visa offers access to a total of 29 countries, including Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
According to European Commission's current Schengen visa application process, the applicant must possess a valid passport, photo in compliance with ICAO standards, medical insurance, documents declaring the purpose of stay before applying. One must 'submit their application to the consulate at least 15 days before your intended journey and no earlier than 6 months beforehand,' it adds.
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