Is the US About to Establish a Military Base in Thailand?
That gloomy reality is materializing, with Thailand's tariff rate remaining unaltered at 36 percent despite the Pheu Thai government having spent 97 million baht ($2.99 million) on lobbyists, and the state-owned energy conglomerate PTT Group having inked a 20-year agreement with Glenfarne Alaska LNG to import 2 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas annually. Murmurs about security-related concessions are growing louder. But, contrary to my anticipation of arms deals, the buzz centers around the establishment of a U.S. base within the Phang Nga Naval Base on Thailand's southwestern coast.
That the buzz refuses to fade regardless of repeated denials from Thai officials reflects two contradictory trends, which are sharpened by today's U.S.-China showdown. On the question of the U.S. basing rights in Thailand, American persistence competes with unyielding Thai resistance. Thailand's stance is not only shaped by its pursuit of strategic equilibrium, but also by its first-hand experience.
The heyday of the Thailand-U.S. alliance during the Vietnam War saw a massive American military stationing across seven key bases on Thai soil. The number of U.S. troops in Thailand was 46,300 in 1969, and 27,000 in 1975, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office. While the gradual troop reduction was America's doing, the catalyst for the Thai government to formally request that U.S. combat forces pack up and leave was domestic discontent.
The problems around hosting the garrisoned presence of another nation are succinctly captured by the late Thanat Khoman, Thailand's esteemed diplomat and one of ASEAN's founding fathers. These include the erosion of sovereignty, direct or indirect interference in domestic politics, and the disruption of social stability, from psychological unease to the economic shocks triggered by sudden inflows and pullouts of foreign funds. Because these problems are structural in nature, even the closest, friendliest ally with shared objectives can still leave a negative footprint.
One might assert further that the closer the alliance, the easier it is to overlook the problems for the host country, particularly the psychological imprint. A case in point is the U.S. deployment of the chemical herbicide Agent Orange to destroy jungle cover and crops in Vietnam. Its long-lasting health implications for the Vietnamese population and American veterans are well-recognized, rightfully so. Presumed exposure among U.S. veterans stationed in Thailand are also acknowledged. The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs specifically acknowledges compensation consideration for veterans serving 'on or near the perimeters' of U.S. bases in Thailand between 1961 and 1975, which suggests that Thai civilians living around those bases should not be ignored in the broader discourse. Yet, to date, there appears to be no real policy or research focused on the possible exposure of Thai civilians.
Since the relatively smooth U.S. withdrawal in 1976, Thailand has not hosted a permanent American or other foreign military presence. All U.S. military activities in Thailand – while still substantial, with greater depth and wider scope than Thailand's military engagement with other nations – are now joint or rotational on a case-by-case basis. Uncle Sam has not been discouraged, though, and the prospect of American basing at Thailand's U-Tapao air base is a recurring discussion. An offshore military base in Thai waters is another area of U.S. interest. The request to establish one reportedly dates back to 1997.
The reason for the U.S. interest is simple: Thailand's ideal geographical location. A gateway to mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand is a springboard for U.S. power projection into continental Asia, which is currently lacking. Given that U.S. ground-based cruise and ballistic missiles have a reported range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, shots fired at maximum capacity from central or eastern Thailand could threaten all of China's southern provinces (Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong) and the western Xinjiang Region. Furthermore, America's maritime dominance would be underpinned by Thailand's close proximity to both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
The rumored U.S. push to secure an institutionalized foothold on Thailand's southwestern coast is most straightforwardly understood in the context of the intensifying competition in the Indian Ocean. The regional littoral power India, and distant powers China and Russia, are all ramping up their naval presence – the latter two in apparent accordance with the classic Mahanian thinking on sea power. Although America has a forward naval presence on Diego Garcia, it is quite a distance away. American access to Singapore, meanwhile, is limited and takes place on a rotational basis under an agreement that runs through 2035. Through Thailand's Phang Nga Naval Base, then, the U.S. would have a firmer hold near the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal.
If ever greenlit, a formalized U.S. access to Phang Nga would likely follow the Singapore model. When it comes to Phang Nga, however, Thailand's apprehension goes beyond geopolitical balance and deep-seated sensitivities. Phang Nga is effectively a sister province of Phuket, bound by geographical proximity and a shared economic trajectory, from tin mining in the past to today's tourism. Phang Nga's internationally known resort zone, Khao Lak, is just a 30-minute drive away from the naval base in question. It must also be highlighted that Phang Nga, Phuket, and another neighboring province, Krabi, are undergoing a wellness-focused transformation under the national development agenda. An established foreign military presence in the area is at odds with that development priority.
To cite Thanat Khoman once again, 'the criteria for allowing foreign forces to remain should rest on the national interests of the host country, or at least on the concord between the former and those of the foreign party.' The answer to the first criterion is clear, but the second one is murky considering that Thailand remains a formal U.S. ally.
Perhaps unnoticed by many, there exists no mutual defense treaty between Bangkok and Washington. Instead, the Thai-U.S. defense alliance draws symbolic significance from the 1954 Manila Pact, which created the now-defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. The alliance is reinforced by subsequent bilateral documents: the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communiqué, the Joint Vision Statements of 2012 and 2020, and the 2022 United States-Thailand Communiqué on Strategic Alliance and Partnership. None of these has binding provisions for basing rights.
Ultimately, there is neither legal compulsion nor interest – and thus no political will – on Thailand's part to host an institutionalized U.S. military presence. More viable and desirable ways to boost the Thailand-U.S. alliance would be to expand military education and training, to co-develop or support indigenous defense capabilities, and to focus on strengthening a number of existing joint exercises, whether in bilateral or multilateral formats.
The fact that there is no good outcome for Thailand on the trade front makes it even more unlikely that the ruling government would concede basing rights as part of its negotiations with the U.S. While a 36 percent tariff stands to devastate Thai exports and growth rate, Thailand offering zero tariffs on U.S. imports risks opening the floodgates to overwhelming inflows of American goods. This, combined with the already high influx of Chinese goods, will kill Thai-made products. The trickier business is determining the position of the Trump administration, which, on the one hand, has been relentless in bending others to its will. On the other hand, however, setting up a new base in Thailand seems to go against the administration's cost-saving agenda, especially as Trump himself has shown little interest in Southeast Asia. All things considered, an American base in Thailand remains a distant prospect.
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