Analysis: The wars Trump promised to end are escalating. Why?

CNN

29-07-2025

Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden.
As a candidate, Donald Trump promised to end the Ukraine war on his first day in office and swiftly bring the Gaza war to a close as well. Now more than six months into his presidency, peace on both fronts appears further away than ever.
In Gaza, talks for a ceasefire and hostage deal that had shown promise only a few weeks ago broke down, and the humanitarian situation is catastrophic. In Ukraine, repeated diplomatic approaches were answered by Russia with its largest air attacks to date.
What happened? And what can be done now?
There is no more difficult diplomatic task than ending a war, and Trump is not the first president to learn this lesson the hard way:
Dwight D. Eisenhower, as a candidate in 1952, promised to rapidly end the Korean war, pledging 'I will go to Korea' to break what was then a deadly stalemate. Once elected, he did go to Korea, but it took him seven months and threats to significantly escalate the war before negotiating an armistice to freeze the lines. The war has never formally ended.
Richard Nixon, as a candidate in 1968, pledged an 'honorable end' to the Vietnam war and was said to have a secret plan to bring it about. In fact, most of Nixon's first term saw an escalation of the war. The Paris Peace Accords mapping out a wind-down of direct US military involvement were signed after his reelection four years later.
Barack Obama as a candidate pledged to end the war in Iraq but he largely continued the policy that he inherited from the outgoing George W. Bush administration, which had already set in place the path for ending US combat operations in the country.
Trump, as a candidate in 2016, promised a 'secret plan' to rapidly defeat ISIS, but then as president kept the same personnel and for the most part prosecuted the plan he inherited from Obama, defeating ISIS's so-called caliphate in year three of his first term.
I was a part of those last two transitions, spanning Bush-to-Obama and Obama-to-Trump, witnessing first-hand how campaign promises often clash with the hard reality of global affairs. In the recent transition from Joe Biden-to-Trump, I helped secure the agreement for a ceasefire in Gaza and the release of Israeli hostages before Trump's inauguration.
This agreement led to six weeks of peace with hostages coming out and massive quantities of aid (at least 600 trucks per day) flowing into Gaza before tragically falling apart.
From history and first-hand experience, I appreciate how difficult this is, particularly when – as in Gaza and Ukraine – the United States is not a direct participant in a conflict. But six months into the president's term, it's fair to ask what has not worked and what might be done now to produce better results over the coming weeks and months.
What is so unfortunate about the current situation is that Trump inherited policies (and in one case an agreement) that were far more likely to lead to the results he promised as a candidate than the policies he adopted over the early months of his presidency.
In any negotiation, it's important to first understand and define what's known as a ZOPA, or 'Zone of Possible Agreement.' Is it even possible for two parties to reach a deal?
For example, if you are prepared to sell your car for no less than $5,000, and a buyer is prepared to pay no more than $6,000, the ZOPA is the range between the two, and a broker can easily close a mutually agreeable deal.
When approaching a negotiation in international affairs, the issues are far more complex, but the framework for any diplomatic strategy is similar. The negotiator must consider all potential areas of leverage and compromise to map out a possible ZOPA.
Applying this framework to both Gaza and Ukraine demonstrates why the two situations are so intractable from the standpoint of a diplomatic outcome.
In Gaza, the terrorist group Hamas has had one core demand from the moment it invaded Israel and slaughtered over 1,000 people and stole nearly 250 people as hostages. That demand is to stay in power as the ruling authority in Gaza under cover of an internationally recognized and permanent ceasefire and reconstruction plan. Hamas to this day has not accepted even a discussion of handing security responsibility to another entity – such as a coalition of Arab forces, or other Palestinian forces – even as it's militarily battered.
Israel flatly rejects that demand. It is committed to an outcome whereby Hamas at the end of the war is no longer willing or able to control Gaza. The United States has endorsed that outcome, as have many other countries. The prime minister of the UK, Keir Starmer, just yesterday while seated next to Trump, said the UK would not allow Hamas to remain in power in Gaza but he did not offer any ideas as to how to achieve that outcome, let alone what the UK or other partners of the United States might do to bring it about.
Given that there is no ZOPA whatsoever when it comes to Israel and Hamas, the United States, together with Egypt and Qatar, formulated a negotiation to secure the release of hostages in exchange for temporary ceasefires that might then be extended. This began in November 2023, with a deal to release all the women and children then held by Hamas in exchange for a rolling ceasefire. Over 100 hostages were freed before Hamas broke the deal by refusing to release the younger women hostages.
In May of last year, President Biden set forth a three-part framework for the release of hostages and a roadmap for ending the war altogether. This deal ensured the release of remaining women, older men and sick and wounded hostages in exchange for a ceasefire, Israel's military withdrawal from populated areas in Gaza, release of Palestinian prisoners and a massive sustained surge in humanitarian aid that the ceasefire would enable.
The second phase would see a full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza subject to both sides agreeing on 'conditions' for the post-war phase. That phase would need to include a new governance structure without Hamas in a meaningful role. So long as mediated talks were ongoing towards that outcome in good faith, the ceasefire would continue.
This phased arrangement was endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council and helped place the spotlight on Hamas to release hostages and stop the war.
Ukraine similarly lacks a ZOPA between warring parties. Russia's intent from the start has been to subjugate the entirety of Ukraine, to annex significant portions of its territory, and to 'de-militarize' the country. Ukraine flatly rejects this, seeks to eject Russian troops, and aims to join NATO or secure western military security guarantees in another form.
Without a ZOPA to be found, the United States since the war began and in coordination with its NATO allies had sought to increase Ukraine's bargaining power through military support and economic assistance, as well as economic pressure against Russia, while seeking at most to broker smaller deals such as prisoner exchanges or localized truces before seeking a longer-term ceasefire, let alone settlement of the conflict.
Trump's approach has been inconsistent at best. In February, he berated Zelensky as the obstacle to peace whereas the next month his administration deemed Russian reciprocity as the key to peace. This month, Trump's defense chiefs announced a pause on military assistance to support Ukraine before Trump himself days later reversed that decision and announced significant military support to Ukraine through NATO allies.
The result has been constant diplomatic motion by the president and his emissaries but no forward movement against the backdrop of ongoing Russian escalations.
In Gaza, the Biden ceasefire was secured through painstaking negotiations with pressure applied to both Israel and Hamas to make necessary compromises. At the same time, the Biden administration consistently focused on the humanitarian situation, rejected calls by Israeli ministers to blockade or besiege Gaza, and publicly condemned calls by hard-right Israeli leaders calling for the depopulation of Gaza altogether.
Every day throughout the crisis, even while negotiating the ceasefires, my first call every morning was with our senior humanitarian coordinator for Gaza, USAID experts and our team in Israel to ensure aid continued to flow and to address blockages or bottlenecks wherever possible.
Trump from the start took the opposite approach. He abolished the humanitarian aid coordinator position. He abolished USAID, which was responsible for overseeing US-provided aid in Gaza. He said nothing as Israel imposed an unprecedented 77-day blockade on aid deliveries. He called for mass displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, and Itamar Ben Gvir, an extremist Israeli minister that calls for the same, was welcomed into the United States and feted by guests at Trump's Mara Lago resort.
Only in the last 48 hours and in the face of an international uproar have Israel and the US adjusted their approach to once again support and enable UN deliveries of aid.
The result has been tragic, with Gaza witnessing the worst humanitarian catastrophe of the war and diplomacy now deadlocked as Hamas basks in the international condemnation of Israel even as it holds hostages in tunnels and hardens its demands in ceasefire talks.
In Ukraine, the Trump administration over its first six months sought to entice Russian President Vladimir Putin with promises of sanctions relief while refusing to replenish the pipeline of assistance that had helped Ukraine defend itself and protect its people from Russian attacks. Putin answered Trump's entreaties with escalations and doubled down on his own maximalist demands at the negotiating table, believing that he now held all the cards.
The result was an eroding position for Ukraine and increasing confidence in Moscow, the recipe for an even longer war that Putin believed he might now win.
Fortunately, Trump two weeks ago dramatically shifted course and promised military assistance to Ukraine through NATO as well as brandishing sanctions against Russia and tariffs on countries (mainly India and China) that purchase Russian energy products unless Putin accepts a ceasefire by September 2. Trump yesterday reaffirmed this new policy and pledged that his September 2 deadline on Putin may now come even sooner.
To ensure the next six months produce better results, it's important for the White House to follow through on the recent adjustments in approach.
For Gaza, this means truly prioritizing the humanitarian crisis. Where pressure is required on Israel, it must be applied deliberately and consistently. Where pressure is required on the UN and other distributors, it must be applied there as well. Yes, Hamas uses suffering of civilians to advance its cause, and Hamas benefits indirectly and in some cases directly from the flow of assistance, but the assistance must flow regardless. The administration could buttress this approach by restoring the senior humanitarian adviser position, to ensure the concerted and daily focus on this problem as will be required.
Along with urgently addressing the humanitarian crisis, the US should not give up on the ceasefire talks because without them there is no serious hope of freeing the hostages or ending the war anytime soon. If Israel must make final compromises on an issue or two, then at this stage it must do so, and the White House should demand it. If the issue as usual is Hamas, then the mediators should make this clear publicly and place the onus and the ongoing suffering on the backs of Hamas' leaders where it belongs.
As for Ukraine, the path is more straightforward: follow through on the new policy that Trump just yesterday reinforced. That means getting ready to sanction purchasers of Russian energy products, while working with our NATO allies to surge military materiel into Ukraine. This will not lead to an immediate breakthrough, but by buttressing Ukrainian defenses and demonstrating that pending sanctions are serious and on the way, Washington can reset the table for a future diplomatic push in lockstep with its European allies, something that Putin only a few months ago thought he could avoid.