Bilateral Bonhomie During PM Modi's Visit to the Maldives
After several months of flailing around in turbulent waters, the India-Maldives relationship is cruising again. Deft navigation on the part of the two governments has contributed to steadying the bilateral relationship.
During Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the Maldives on July 25-26, the two governments signed several important agreements covering debt repayment, fisheries, health, tourism, and digital payments. In addition to extending a new credit line of $565 million for development projects in the Maldives, India agreed to reduce its loan repayment burden from nearly $51 million annually to about $29 million — a 40 percent reduction. The visit also saw the start of talks on a free trade agreement.
Modi and Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu jointly inaugurated infrastructure projects; pledged cooperation on climate, disaster risk, and renewable energy; and reaffirmed commitment to a stronger economic and maritime partnership. Modi also handed over 3,300 social housing units and medical equipment.
The depth and diversity of India-Maldivian cooperation were on full display during Modi's visit, signaling the return of a measure of calm in the bilateral engagement.
India-Maldives ties have generally been warm. The two countries have engaged in robust economic and defense cooperation for decades. India has played a major role in building the Maldives' human and infrastructural capacity, and has been the first responder in times of political crisis, natural disasters, and health emergencies.
However, relations soured off and on over the past decade. President Abdulla Yameen's authoritarian rule (2013-2018) and tilt toward China did not go down well in New Delhi. Ties frayed. After he was voted out of office, Yameen spearheaded an 'India Out' campaign to target the India-friendly Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) government.
Building on the momentum of Yameen's campaign, Muizzu made the eviction of Indian security personnel from the archipelago his main election plank. It helped propel him to the presidency in November 2023.
As it turned out, Muizzu's call for the withdrawal of Indian military personnel was not just election rhetoric. He persisted with the demand for several months after his swearing-in, raising the issue in meetings with Modi and other Indian leaders and officials, and subsequently even issued a deadline for the pullout of Indian military personnel.
Unlike previous Maldivian presidents who made India the destination of their first official visit, Muizzu headed to Turkiye and China. He signed 20 agreements with China in January 2024 and allowed a Chinese research ship, Xiang Yang Hong 3, to dock in the Maldives. Not surprisingly, it drew New Delhi's ire.
Meanwhile, a war of words broke out on social media. When three deputy ministers in the Muizzu government described Modi in their posts as a 'clown, 'a terrorist,' and a 'puppet of Israel,' Modi's supporters hit back by calling on Indian tourists to boycott the Maldives. The online spat quickly escalated into a diplomatic row.
Muizzu repeatedly provoked India in the early months of his presidency. In January 2024, on his return from Beijing, the Maldivian president said in a veiled reference to India that the Indian Ocean 'does not belong to a specific country.'
'We may be small but this doesn't give them [India] the license to bully us,' he said.
Eighteen months after those anti-India jibes, Muizzu broke protocol to welcome Modi at the airport. His government rolled out the red carpet for the Indian leader and welcomed him with a 21-gun salute. Huge cutouts of Modi greeted him in Malé.
Muizzu was effusive in his praise of Modi, describing him as a 'wonderful person who is very fond of building relationships between India's neighbors,' he said. He waxed eloquent on the 'very good relationship' between India and the Maldives 'that goes back centuries.' As for India's role in the Maldives, Muizzu said that 'India has helped develop Maldives in the past. And, nobody will doubt how India will be a very crucial partner in going forward.'
Muizzu was not just humming a different tune but a different song. From shrill demands for 'India Out,' he has shifted to endorsing a close partnership with India. How did he get here?
There are several reasons underlying this shift. First is the dire state of the Maldivian economy; the archipelago is struggling with a substantial budget deficit and dwindling foreign reserves. With China's support proving to be rather underwhelming – talks on loan restructuring initiated during Muizzu's Beijing visit in January 2024 have seen little progress so far – India's support has emerged critical.
Second is the shift in India's approach to dealing with a smaller neighbor. Unlike in Bangladesh, where the ouster of a pro-India leader (Sheikh Hasina) in a mass uprising has seen India turn rather unfriendly to Bangladesh, in the case of the Maldives, India adopted an 'accommodative' approach. As Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, associate fellow at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation, wrote recently, New Delhi 'understood domestic compulsions of Muizzu's demands [for India to pull out its military personnel stationed in the archipelago] and replaced its 76 troops with technicians in May 2024.'
Despite Muizzu's repeated provocations, India continued to engage with the Maldives, choosing restraint rather than reprimand and rhetoric in dealing with this strategically located neighbor.
The bilateral bonhomie on display at Malé during Modi's visit did not happen overnight. Since at least May last year, India and the Maldives have been engaging with each other not just at the highest levels but in a sustained manner.
Muizzu's objections to India's presence, even military presence, lasted a few months into his presidency. But when he visited Delhi in October 2024, he put out the welcome mat for Indian military presence in the archipelago.
Under the Vision Statement that India and the Maldives adopted during the Delhi visit, Muizzu agreed to allow India to open a consulate in Addu, the Maldives' southernmost atoll; seek Indian support on 'hydrographic matters;' and complete the military harbor at Uthuru Thila Falhu with India's assistance. The Muizzu government also agreed to India providing radar systems and 'support Maldives with provisioning of defense platforms and assets.'
It was during Muizzu's visit to Delhi that bilateral relations were reset. At Malé, the relationship was steadied.
Sections of the Indian media have interpreted the recent bonhomie as a sign of 'China Out, India In' in the Maldives. This is an excessively optimistic reading of the visit.
China's shadow over the Maldives looms. It would be unrealistic on India's part to expect Malé not to do business with Beijing. China's presence in the Maldives is already substantial and given its interests in the Indian Ocean, Beijing will use its financial muscle to further expand its influence in the archipelago. To counter China, India will need to make better offers to Malé.
The possibility of Maldivian politicians and parties initiating new 'India Out' campaigns cannot be ruled out. India will need to keep the Maldivian people on its side.
India and the Maldives share strong social and cultural ties that go back centuries. India has been the preferred destination of Maldivians seeking better education and health facilities. It needs to build on its soft power in the Maldives. Importantly, it must ensure that its aid to Malé is not just about security and defense but directed to people-focused projects as well.
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