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Bangladesh struggles with unrest fallout after last year's govt ouster
Bangladesh was on the cusp of charting a new beginning last year after its former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was removed from power in a student-led uprising, ending her 15-year rule and forcing her to flee to India.
As the head of a new interim government, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus promised to hold a credible election to return to democracy, initiate electoral and constitutional reforms and restore peace on the streets after hundreds were killed in weeks of violence that began on July 15, 2024.
A year later, the Yunus-led administration has struggled to contain the fallout of the uprising. Bangladesh finds itself mired in a growing political uncertainty, religious polarisation and a challenging law-and-order situation.
Here's what to know about Bangladesh a year after the protests that toppled Hasina.
Chaotic political landscape
Uncertainty about the future of democracy looms large in Bangladesh.
The student protesters who toppled Hasina formed a new political party, promising to break the overwhelming influence of two major dynastic political parties the Bangladesh Nationalists Party, or BNP, and Hasina's Awami League.
But the party's opponents have accused it of being close to the Yunus-led administration and creating chaos for political mileage by using state institutions.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh's political landscape has further fragmented after the country's largest Islamist party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, returned to politics more than a decade after it was suppressed by Hasina's government.
Aligned with the student-led party, it's trying to fill the vacuum left by the Awami League, which was banned in May. Its leader, Hasina, is facing trial for crimes against humanity. The strength of Jamaat-e-Islami, which opposed Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan in 1971, is unknown.
Both BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami party are now at loggerheads over establishing supremacy within the administration and judiciary, and even university campuses.
They are also differing over the timing of a new parliamentary election. Yunus has announced that the polls would be held in April next year, but poor law and order situation and a lack of clear-cut political consensus over it have created confusion. The chief of Bangladesh's military also wanted an election in December this year a stance Yunus didn't like.
Post-revolution honeymoons often don't last long, and Bangladesh is no exception, says Michael Kugelman, a Washington-based South Asia analyst and senior fellow of Asia Pacific Foundation. The interim government faced massive expectations to restore democracy and prosperity. But this is especially difficult to do as an unelected government without a public mandate."
Yunus wants reforms before election
Yunus has delayed an election because he wants reforms from changes to the constitution and elections to the judiciary and police. Discussions with political parties, except Hasina's Awami League, are ongoing.
Some of the reforms include putting a limit on how many times a person can become the prime minister, introduction of a two-tier parliament, and appointment of a chief justice.
There appears to be little consensus over some basic reforms. While both the BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami parties have agreed to some of them with conditions, other proposals for basic constitutional reforms have become a sticking point.
The Jamaat-e-Islami also wants to give the interim government more time to complete reforms before heading into polls, while BNP has been calling for an early election. The student-led party mostly follows the pattern of the Jamaat-e-Islami party.
Kugelman says the issue of reforms was meant to unite the country, but has instead become a flashpoint.
There's a divide between those that want to see through reforms and give them more time, and those that feel it's time to wrap things up and focus on elections, he says.
Human rights and the rise of Islamists
Human rights in Bangladesh have remained a serious concern under Yunus.
Minority groups, especially Hindus, have blamed his administration for failing to protect them adequately. The Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council says minority Hindus and others have been targeted in hundreds of attacks over the last year. Hasina's party has also blamed the interim government for arresting tens of thousands of its supporters.
The Yunus-led administration denies these allegations.
Meenakshi Ganguly, deputy Asia director for Human Rights Watch, says while the interim government has stopped enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions that had occurred under the Hasina government, there has been little progress on lasting security sector reforms or to deliver on the pledge to create robust, independent institutions.
Meanwhile, Islamist factions some of whom have proposed changes to women's rights and demanded introduction of Sharia law are vying for power. Many of them are planning to build alliances with bigger parties like the BNP or the Jamaat-e-Islami.
Such factions have historically struggled to gain significant electoral support despite Bangladesh being a Muslim majority, and their rise is expected to further fragment the country's political landscape.
Diplomatic pivot and balancing with global powers
During Hasina's 15-year rule, Bangladesh was India's closest partner in South Asia. After her ouster, the Yunus-led administration has moved closer to China.
Yunus' first state visit was to China in March, a trip that saw him secure investments, loans and grants.
Globally, Yunus seems to have strong backing from the West and the United Nations, and it appears Bangladesh will continue its foreign policy, which has long tried to find a balance between multiple foreign powers.
But Kugelman says the country's biggest challenge may be the Trump factor.
In January, the Trump administration suspended USAID funds to Bangladesh, which had sought significant levels of US support during a critical rebuild period post Hasina's ouster.
Dhaka must now reframe its relations with an unconventional US administration that will largely view Bangladesh through a commercial lens, Kugelman says.
(Only the headline and picture of this report may have been reworked by the Business Standard staff; the rest of the content is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.)
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The interim government has presided over a relentless wave of violence—murders, mob lynchings, rapes, and attacks on minorities—that has left Bangladesh's social fabric in tatters. The brutal killing of Lal Chand Sohag in Dhaka and the gang rape in Cumilla are not anomalies but glaring evidence of a nation spiralling into lawlessness. Yunus, with breathtaking arrogance, claims crime statistics show 'stabilisation', a lie so blatant it mocks the fear gripping ordinary citizens. The move to demolish the ancestral home of Harikishore Ray Chowdhury, Satyajit Ray's forebear, in Mymensingh—once the Mymensingh Shishu Academy—is a deliberate act of cultural vandalism. India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) requested for its preservation, offering to fund its transformation into a museum celebrating the shared Bengali heritage of both the nations. 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