OceanGate CEO ‘completely ignored' flawed Titan sub before deadly Titanic trip
OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, who died on the deep-sea submersible alongside four others, ignored critical data leading up to the vessel's implosion in June 2023, according to a new report from the US coast guard.
The 335-page report, released today, revealed that OceanGate had 'critically flawed' safety practices and a toxic workplace culture — and that Rush's 'negligence' contributed to the deaths of those on board.
It also found that the Titan's disappearance — and eventual implosion — was 'preventable'.
'This marine casualty and the loss of five lives was preventable,' said Jason Neubauer, the Titan Marine Board of Investigation Chair, while calling for greater oversight.
'The two-year investigation has identified multiple contributing factors that led to this tragedy, providing valuable lessons learned to prevent a future occurrence.'
The Titan submersible imploded in June 2023 (OceanGate Expeditions/PA)
Rush, who acted as the Titan sub's pilot, was singled out as the driving force that led to the catastrophe.
The OceanGate boss 'exhibited negligence that contributed to the deaths of four individuals,' the report found.
It also 'identified evidence of a potential criminal offence'. Had Rush survived, the coast guard would have recommended the US justice department consider pursuing a separate criminal investigation.
How the company was run allowed Rush to 'completely ignore' critical data and other safety measures ahead of the doomed expedition to the Titanic's ruins.
'The lack of both third-party oversight and experienced OceanGate employees on staff during their 2023 Titan operations allowed OceanGate's chief executive officer to completely ignore vital inspections, data analyses, and preventative maintenance procedures, culminating in a catastrophic event," the report says.
The report detailed eight primary causal factors that led to the sub's implosion. They are:
OceanGate's design and testing processes didn't address 'the fundamental engineering principles' needed for operations in 'an inherently hazardous environment'.
OceanGate did not understand the expected cycle life of the sub's hull.
The company relied too heavily on a real-time monitoring system of the sub's condition, but failed to meaningfully examine the data the system provided.
OceanGate continued to use the Titan following incidents that 'compromised the integrity of the hull and other critical components'.
The Titan's carbon fibre construction led to issues that weakened its overall structural integrity.
The company failed to investigate the sub after 'mishaps that negatively impacted its hull and components during dives' before the implosion.
OceanGate's 'toxic workplace environment,' which utilised firings or senior staff members and the looming threat of being fired to keep employees from sharing safety concerns.
The company's failure to conduct 'preventative maintenance' on the sub's hull or protect it from elements during the off-season ahead of the doomed 2023 expedition.
However, it also confirmed the overarching cause was a 'loss of structural integrity,' which led to the 'instantaneous' death of all five people on board.
The Titan submersible imploded while Rush and his four passengers were on a dive to see the wreckage of the Titanic.
The other four passengers killed in the implosion included Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood (48); his son, Suleman Dawood (19); British businessman Hamish Harding (58); and French explorer and Titanic expert Paul-Henri Nargeolet (77).
The report also noted that OceanGate failed to investigate a whistleblower's complaint in 2018. Had there been an earlier investigation, the report suggests, OceanGate could have either met regulatory requirements or changed its plans for the Titanic expedition, the report found.
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Stockton Rush, CEO of theTitan submersible company OceanGate
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Irish Independent
16 hours ago
- Irish Independent
OceanGate boss ignored safety checks sub tragedy probe finds
Rush and four passengers were killed in June 2023 when Titan suffered a catastrophic implosion as it descended to the wreck of the Titanic, sparking a days-long search in the North Atlantic off Canada that grabbed international headlines. The Coast Guard convened its highest level of investigation in the aftermath, and the disaster has led to lawsuits and calls for tighter regulation of the developing private deep sea expedition industry. The Titan was operated by OceanGate, a private company based in Washington state. The Coast Guard found the company's safety procedures were 'critically flawed' and cited 'glaring disparities' between safety protocols and actual practices. Jason Neubauer, with the Marine Board of Investigation, said that the findings will help prevent future tragedies. 'There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside of the existing regulatory framework,' he said in a statement. OceanGate suspended operations in July 2023. A spokesperson for OceanGate, Christian Hammond, said the company has been wound down. Investigators repeatedly pointed to OceanGate's culture of downplaying, ignoring and even falsifying key safety information to improve its reputation and evade scrutiny from regulators. OceanGate ignored 'red flags' and had a 'toxic workplace culture'. 'By strategically creating and exploiting regulatory confusion and oversight challenges, OceanGate was ultimately able to operate Titan completely outside of the established deep-sea protocols,' the report found. Numerous OceanGate employees have come forward since the implosion to support those claims. The report says firings of senior staff members and the looming threat of being fired were used to dissuade employees and contractors from expressing safety concerns. The Marine Board concluded that Rush 'exhibited negligence' which contributed to the deaths of four people. ADVERTISEMENT Learn more The company reclassified submersible passengers as 'mission specialists' to bypass regulations on small passenger vessels and designate its subs as oceanic research vessels. Former mission specialists and OceanGate employees said their participation was 'purely for a ride in the submersible, not for scientific research', the report states. To obtain his credentials, Rush submitted a fraudulent sea service letter signed by OceanGate's chief operations officer to the Coast Guard's National Maritime Centre, the report said. In the letter, Rush claimed past service as a crew member on Titan and misrepresented the size of the vessel. An experienced submersible pilot described serious safety concerns within OceanGate's leadership over a decade before the disaster, when Rush insisted on solo piloting his 'rich friends' on a dive using a company vessel that was only licensed for scientific research. The trip in 2010 caused over $10,000 in damage after a critical battery component was removed without proper documentation, reinforcing the pilot's belief that safety was not a priority at the company, according to the report. Investigators found the submersible's design, certification, maintenance and inspection process were all inadequate. The vessel's carbon fibre hull design and construction introduced flaws that 'weakened the overall structural integrity' of its hull, the report stated. Mounting financial pressures in 2023 led to a decision by OceanGate to store the Titan submersible outdoors over the Canadian winter, where its hull was exposed to temperature fluctuations that compromised the integrity of the vessel, the report said. In addition to Rush, the implosion killed French explorer Paul-Henri Nargeolet, British adventurer Hamish Harding and two members of a prominent Pakistani family, Shahzada Dawood and his son Suleman Dawood. The family of Nargeolet, a veteran French undersea explorer known as 'Mr Titanic', filed a more than $50m (€43m) lawsuit last year that said the crew experienced 'terror and mental anguish' before the disaster. Titan's final dive came on June 18, 2023, a Sunday morning when the submersible would lose contact with its support vessel about two hours later. The Coast Guard-led team operated under the possibility there could be survivors for several days. Wreckage would subsequently be found on the ocean floor about 300 meters off the bow of the Titanic.
Sunday World
a day ago
- Sunday World
OceanGate CEO ‘completely ignored' flawed Titan sub before deadly Titanic trip
The 335-page report, released today, revealed that OceanGate had 'critically flawed' safety practices and a toxic workplace culture OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, who died on the deep-sea submersible alongside four others, ignored critical data leading up to the vessel's implosion in June 2023, according to a new report from the US coast guard. The 335-page report, released today, revealed that OceanGate had 'critically flawed' safety practices and a toxic workplace culture — and that Rush's 'negligence' contributed to the deaths of those on board. It also found that the Titan's disappearance — and eventual implosion — was 'preventable'. 'This marine casualty and the loss of five lives was preventable,' said Jason Neubauer, the Titan Marine Board of Investigation Chair, while calling for greater oversight. 'The two-year investigation has identified multiple contributing factors that led to this tragedy, providing valuable lessons learned to prevent a future occurrence.' The Titan submersible imploded in June 2023 (OceanGate Expeditions/PA) Rush, who acted as the Titan sub's pilot, was singled out as the driving force that led to the catastrophe. The OceanGate boss 'exhibited negligence that contributed to the deaths of four individuals,' the report found. It also 'identified evidence of a potential criminal offence'. Had Rush survived, the coast guard would have recommended the US justice department consider pursuing a separate criminal investigation. How the company was run allowed Rush to 'completely ignore' critical data and other safety measures ahead of the doomed expedition to the Titanic's ruins. 'The lack of both third-party oversight and experienced OceanGate employees on staff during their 2023 Titan operations allowed OceanGate's chief executive officer to completely ignore vital inspections, data analyses, and preventative maintenance procedures, culminating in a catastrophic event," the report says. The report detailed eight primary causal factors that led to the sub's implosion. They are: OceanGate's design and testing processes didn't address 'the fundamental engineering principles' needed for operations in 'an inherently hazardous environment'. OceanGate did not understand the expected cycle life of the sub's hull. The company relied too heavily on a real-time monitoring system of the sub's condition, but failed to meaningfully examine the data the system provided. OceanGate continued to use the Titan following incidents that 'compromised the integrity of the hull and other critical components'. The Titan's carbon fibre construction led to issues that weakened its overall structural integrity. The company failed to investigate the sub after 'mishaps that negatively impacted its hull and components during dives' before the implosion. OceanGate's 'toxic workplace environment,' which utilised firings or senior staff members and the looming threat of being fired to keep employees from sharing safety concerns. The company's failure to conduct 'preventative maintenance' on the sub's hull or protect it from elements during the off-season ahead of the doomed 2023 expedition. However, it also confirmed the overarching cause was a 'loss of structural integrity,' which led to the 'instantaneous' death of all five people on board. The Titan submersible imploded while Rush and his four passengers were on a dive to see the wreckage of the Titanic. The other four passengers killed in the implosion included Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood (48); his son, Suleman Dawood (19); British businessman Hamish Harding (58); and French explorer and Titanic expert Paul-Henri Nargeolet (77). The report also noted that OceanGate failed to investigate a whistleblower's complaint in 2018. Had there been an earlier investigation, the report suggests, OceanGate could have either met regulatory requirements or changed its plans for the Titanic expedition, the report found. More to follow Stockton Rush, CEO of theTitan submersible company OceanGate News in 90 Seconds - Tuesday, August 5th
Irish Times
a day ago
- Irish Times
US Coast Guard says Titan submersible's ‘inadequate' design a primary factor in implosion
A US Coast Guard investigative board concluded on Tuesday that the 'inadequate design' of the Titan submersible was a primary contributing factor in its implosion in 2023 that left five people dead. The Titan was on a tourist expedition to the wreckage of the Titanic - a British passenger liner that sank in 1912, killing at least 1,500 on board - when it lost contact with its support vessel during descent. Its remains were found four days later, littering the seabed about 1,600ft (488 meters) from the bow of the Titanic wreck. The implosion was preventable, the chair of the US Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation, Jason Neubauer, said as a 300-page report was released following a two-year investigation. 'There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside of the existing regulatory framework,' he said in a statement. READ MORE A media spokesperson at OceanGate, the US-based company that managed the tourist submersible and suspended all operations after the incident, was not immediately available for comment. The board determined that the primary contributing factors were OceanGate's 'inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection process for the Titan'. It also cited 'a toxic workplace culture at OceanGate', an inadequate regulatory framework for submersibles and other novel vessels, and an ineffective whistleblower process. The report added 'for several years preceding the incident, OceanGate leveraged intimidation tactics, allowances for scientific operations, and the company's favorable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny.' The board found that OceanGate failed to investigate and address known hull anomalies following its 2022 Titanic expedition. It said data from Titan's real-time monitoring system should have been analysed and acted on during that expedition. It also criticised OceanGate for failing to properly store the Titan before the 2023 Titanic expedition. - Reuters
