Mexican truck drivers study English to comply with new US language rules
CIUDAD JUAREZ, Mexico (Reuters) -Mexican truck drivers in the border city of Ciudad Juarez have begun studying English in efforts to comply with an executive order by President Donald Trump requiring commercial drivers in the U.S. to meet English-proficiency standards.
Some 50 drivers who haul goods back and forth between Ciudad Juarez and El Paso, just across the border in Texas, are attending four to eight hours of English classes a week organized by their employer, Fletes Sotelo, in order to meet the U.S. standards.
The company's owner, Manuel Sotelo, said the classes started some six weeks ago, and that the goal is for all the company's drivers to know basic English. Sotelo is also the president of the transport association of Ciudad Juarez.
Jose Murguia, one of the drivers, said he thought the classes were a great opportunity, especially given the recent executive order.
"It's important to know the language, at least in the ways that are necessary for our work, which is to transport goods into El Paso," he said.
While the English-proficiency standard for truckers was already longstanding U.S. law, Trump's executive order in April reversed 2016 guidance that inspectors not place commercial drivers out of service if their only violation was lack of English.
The order came on the heels of Trump's March executive order mandating English as the official language of the United States.
That executive order has been criticized as discriminatory since millions of Americans speak languages other than, or in addition to, English.
(Reporting by Jose Luis Gonzalez in Ciudad Juarez; Writing by Laura Gottesdiener; Editing by William Mallard)
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New Straits Times
3 hours ago
- New Straits Times
Malaysia should focus on critical economic sectors in tariff negotiations
IF there was ever any doubt that US President Donald Trump's tariffs were nothing but political, recent American actions have put it to rest. Early this month, Trump announced updated duties on imports from 25 nations through template letters that talked about everything but trade. Malaysia was not spared. Trump's letter to Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim raises Malaysia's tariff from 24 to 25 per cent. More worryingly, the revised rate now covers "any and all" of Malaysia's US$43 billion exports to the United States. This means critical exports like semiconductors are no longer tariff-exempt, at least unless a subsequent Truth Social post or amended executive order indicates otherwise. Previously, 45 per cent of Malaysia's exports to the US were explicitly excluded from Trump's "reciprocal" tariffs, primarily in the electrical and electronics (E&E) sector. Barring any deal, about 13 per cent of Malaysia's total exports will become more expensive overnight. US demand for Malaysian goods will come up against intense competition from markets subject to lower tariffs, such as the Philippines and Singapore. Until July 7, US-Malaysia trade talks seemed to be progressing well. Negotiations had entered their second round. Trump's team boasted of signing "90 deals in 90 days". So, what happened? It is premature to conclude that the negotiations failed outright. Even close US allies like Japan and South Korea were targeted despite months at the negotiating table. Trump is raising the stakes out of frustration with the inevitably slow pace of talks. Malaysia has until Aug 1 before the updated tariffs kick in. In the meantime, Putrajaya's priority should be to secure tariff exemptions or reductions in key sectors, including E&E. A critical consideration is that US tariffs are likely to stay for some time. The UK, despite its bilateral trade deficit, could not push tariffs below 10 per cent. Tariffs on Indonesia and Vietnam still hover around 20 per cent. Rather than chasing marginal across-the-board cuts, Malaysia should focus on sectors most exposed to the US, both in dollar terms and as a share of exports. Machinery and E&E products should top the list, as they make up 55 per cent of Malaysia's US-bound exports. This is more important than dismantling all our tariffs and non-tariff measures in the hope of a deal. Such an approach sets a dangerous geoeconomic precedent, leaving Malaysia vulnerable if the US reneges on any deal later. Instead, Malaysia should address legitimate concerns in a calculated way without surrendering policy space. One step is to strengthen legislation against "origin washing", or the transshipment of foreign goods to circumvent US tariffs. Another is to increase imports of high-profile American products, such as aircraft and soybean, to signal goodwill. Domestic regulations no longer serving credible public policy objectives, such as Malaysia's 2022 ban on compliant US poultry imports, should also be revisited. Malaysia must continue to diversify trade, positioning itself as a bridge between the Global South and North. Washington's policies should not distract from the existential task of strengthening economic complexity and equitable growth at home. There is no quick fix to the challenges that the tariffs have created but a strategic, nuanced response will serve Malaysia better. The writer is an analyst at Institute of Strategic & International Studies Malaysia
The Sun
5 hours ago
- The Sun
China EV brands Zeekr, Neta accused of inflating car sales
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Zeekr, a premium EV brand owned by Geely, used the same method to book early sales in late 2024 in the southern city of Xiamen through its main dealer there, state-owned Xiamen C&D Automobile, according to dealers, buyers and sales receipts seen by Reuters. Vehicles booked as sold before reaching a buyer are called 'zero-mileage used cars' in the Chinese auto industry. The practice has emerged out of cutthroat competition for sales in the world's largest auto market, which is reeling from a brutal, years-long price war caused by chronic overcapacity. The industry faces a moment of reckoning, with state media calling out the zero-mileage car practice, the cabinet pledging to regulate 'irrational' competition, and other central government bodies organising meetings with the industry's largest players to express concern about such methods. On Saturday a publication run by the China Association of Auto Manufacturers said the industry ministry was planning to clamp down on the practice by banning cars from being resold within six months of being registered as a sale. STATE MEDIA FOCUS Also on Saturday, state media reported that Zeekr had been selling cars with insurance already purchased to inflate sales, the first such naming and shaming of a specific automaker. In a front-page story, the China Securities Journal newspaper interviewed Zeekr car buyers in cities such as Guangzhou and Chongqing, who the newspaper said had found that their cars already had insurance policies before they were sold. They said they were refused refunds, even though they felt they were deceived. The newspaper questioned Zeekr's unusually high sales in the cities of Shenzhen and Xiamen in December. Its reported sales in Xiamen surged to 2,737 that month, more than 14 times its monthly average. Reuters could not determine how much of that volume might have been booked early. The China Securities Journal also raised questions over Neta's sales, saying it showed anomalies. Reuters is reporting for the first time details of how Neta inflated sales. Zeekr, Zhejiang Hozon New Energy Automobile, which owns Neta, and Xiamen C&D did not respond to requests for comment on Saturday. A spokesperson for Geely said, 'Geely firmly rejects the report put forward by the China Securities Journal.' The spokesperson declined to comment on Reuters findings or provide further details. Li Yanwei, an analyst with the China Automobile Dealers Association, said he believed the firms carried out such practices to embellish their financial reports and achieve their performance goals. 'This way of whitewashing performance is not advisable,' he wrote on Chinese social media platform Weibo on Saturday. Analysts and investors tracking China's auto industry gauge performance and estimate inventory levels with two sets of sales data. Wholesale numbers reported by automakers to the industry association show sales from automakers to dealers, while retail data compiled from insurance registration records show the sales to users. Some zero-mileage used cars are exported to be sold as second-hand cars overseas, but analysts and dealers say the domestic sales volume is significantly higher, with Chinese customers nationwide buying what they believe to be discounted new vehicles, only to find out later their car is not insured under their name. PRESSURE ON DEALERS Last month the state-owned People's Daily, the mouthpiece of China's ruling Communist Party, published an editorial condemning the sale of zero-mileage used cars domestically and listing a litany of harms the practice brings upon the industry and buyers. This month four dealer associations based in the wealthy Yangtze River Delta urged automakers to set them more reasonable sales targets and incentive policies, saying, without providing details, that dealers were being forced to falsify sales. Neta booked sales early by arranging insurance policies for cars before sending them to dealers, according to records shared with Reuters and a dealer for the brand. The records contain details for each car and the insurance policies purchased on them, with the names of the insurance agents. Dealers were able to refer to these when they found a buyer to transfer the policy to, according to copies seen by Reuters. The company booked early sales of 64,719 cars this way. 'In Neta's case, the company made it clear to dealers that the cars were insured ahead of time and therefore counted as sold,' said the dealer, who spoke on condition of anonymity, citing fears of retaliation from the company. 'We had to explain to buyers that the traffic insurance was complementary and remind them it would expire earlier and should be renewed on time,' he said. But three Neta buyers, who asked not to be named, told Reuters the dealerships had not told them the policies had begun well before the purchase date, only finding out when the policies expired. The dealer said Neta started doing this in late 2022 to obtain EV subsidies that were set to end that year. Neta's sales peaked in 2022 when it was ranked as the eighth-largest maker of new EVs in China with sales of 152,000 vehicles. Sales fell last year to 87,948 vehicles, including 23,399 exported, and it sold 1,215 cars in the first quarter of 2025, according to data from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers. The brand has been in financial trouble since late 2024, and its owner, Zhejiang Hozon New Energy Automobile, entered bankruptcy proceedings in China last month, according to state media. 'JUST DO IT' The Neta dealer said many of the zero-mileage used cars he received from the company remained in his warehouse, unsold. The company 'only had one message: Just do it, everyone else is doing it'. Zeekr, which is being privatised by Geely Auto, booked sales with the help of Xiamen C&D, which runs dealerships for Zeekr and other brands. Xiamen C&D insured and registered the vehicles under the names of two subsidiaries in December, allowing Zeekr to count the sales before year-end, according to four dealers and two buyers, as well as a receipt shared with Reuters. Zeekr dealers sold some of the cars in subsequent months to buyers in other cities such as Beijing and Chongqing, the sources said. 'The Zeekr salesman said the car would be 3,000 yuan ($420) less than a car I would get from the store and I would also get a charging coupon worth 10,000 yuan,' said a buyer in another southern city. He declined to be named, citing concerns of retaliation from the automaker. The China Securities Journal reported that most of the owners it spoke to said their cars were insured by Xiamen C&D and its affiliates. China Automobile Dealers Association data showed that 2,508 of the 2,737 sales Zeekr booked in Xiamen in December were sold to companies, while 257 went to individual buyers. But data published by Xiamen's vehicle administration bureau showed just 271 cars registered in December for license plates, which genuine buyers generally obtain once they receive their cars. - Reuters
The Star
6 hours ago
- The Star
‘Trump got China wrong': Two US-China experts on Washington's missteps
Welcome to Open Dialogue, a new series from the Post where we bring together leading voices to discuss the stories and subjects occupying international headlines. In this edition, two leading China watchers discuss the consequential relationship between the world's two largest economies and how ties might develop under the second Donald Trump administration amid growing trade frictions. Professor Li Cheng, a leading political scientist who has studied China for decades, is the founding director of the University of Hong Kong's Centre on Contemporary China and the World. He previously spent 17 years at the Washington-based Brookings Institution, which included heading up the think tank's John L. Thornton China Centre. Andrew Browne is an award-winning journalist who has covered China for The Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, Reuters and the South China Morning Post. More recently, he was a partner at advisory firm The Brunswick Group, where he advised some of the world's largest companies on geopolitical strategy from his New York base. The past few months have been a roller-coaster ride for US-China relations, beginning with President Donald Trump's 'Liberation Day' tariffs, followed by the tit-for-tat trade war and then trade negotiations. What are your assessments of the health of bilateral ties and how do you see things unfolding? Li: China certainly feels that the pressure is not just on China. Of course, China is a major trading partner of the US, but the US is not China's No 1 or No 2 trading partner and trade with the US is only 16 per cent of China's entire foreign trade – we should put that into perspective. In my view, the trade issue certainly puts tremendous pressure on China, but there are other issues that are probably far more important from the Chinese leadership's perspective. Of course, US-China relations are not in good shape, to state the obvious. But this did not start five months ago. The Biden administration's relationship with China did not go well and in Trump's first term – especially the last couple of years – it was also in terrible shape. In my view, this relationship and status have less to do with the top leaders – whether American or Chinese – and more to do with structural factors in terms of global geopolitical landscape changes and also the growing fear in the US, rightly or wrongly, of China. The US feels that since World War II there has been no competitor so strong in terms of not only economic and technological areas but also military and even probably financial areas, although some of these concerns may be exaggerated. That's what the US calls the Thucydides Trap and what the Chinese call the rivalry between the No 1 and No 2 powers. So that is what has shaped the relationship. But on the other hand, looking back, I think China probably sees Trump as less problematic compared with former president Joe Biden because Biden's 'two camps' framework of democracy versus autocracy certainly put China into a corner. But under Trump, America alienates its own allies, whether in Europe or elsewhere. So it depends on how you look at it and who you ask. Of course, China is still very much concerned because Trump is surrounded by hawkish people, but on the other hand, he has said that he wants to visit China. Let's see if it happens. His visit certainly would improve the relationship in a dramatic way, though it may or may not be sustainable. There's a lot of irony and uncertainty, so people have been very much confused about the whole situation. Andy, Professor Li mentioned that US-China relations don't appear to be in good shape and that Trump could be less problematic than Biden for China. Do you agree? Browne: Well, I think so – to the extent that Trump is non-ideological and almost entirely transactional. And he's quite capable of executing U-turns and flip-flops, is open to persuasion, and is subject to multiple forces working on him, not least the last person who has his ear. So I think that, from a Chinese perspective, they probably feel that in Trump they've got somebody that they can work with. To echo Dr Cheng Li, the fundamental problem with this relationship is that it is almost completely devoid of trust. At a high level, they're strategic competitors, and each thinks the absolute worst of the other. On the US side, there's a great fear that China is accelerating its technological development, catching up and surpassing the United States, and dominating many of the powerful technologies that will shape the global economy. This presents nightmare scenarios for the United States and zero-sum competition. On the other hand, these two economies are joined at the hip. They are entirely dependent on each other in a host of different ways. And both of these economies have just stared into the abyss and realised that. This isn't, by the way, a tariff war any more. This is now a supply chain war – much more difficult, much more threatening, far more consequential. China essentially threatened to close down the US automotive and defence industries – and it could do so by denying the United States access to certain rare earths. There are 17 rare earths sitting at the bottom of the periodic table. China has almost 100 per cent control over many of these. On the US side, it has threatened to disrupt China's entire petrochemical sector by denying it ethane, threatened to derail its entire civilian airline programme by putting export controls on jet engine parts, and so on. The two sides looked at that and recoiled. In some ways, you could say that it was a positive development. Donald Trump needs an agreement, probably more than Xi Jinping needs an agreement. You mentioned that Trump is non-ideological and open to persuasion. He has also branded himself as a deal maker. Does this leave more room for US-China relations to improve? Browne: We saw this playing out in his first term with the much-ballyhooed phase one trade deal. This was supposed to be the culminating achievement of months, if not years, of trade negotiations between China and the US. As a matter of fact, it wasn't a trade agreement at all. It was a very thin purchase agreement and in the end, it turned into a bust partly because of Covid-19. Nonetheless, Trump was quite capable of packaging this up as an enormous achievement. I have no doubt now that as these two sets of negotiators go into talks, these are going to be incredibly difficult, tough, give-and-take talks – if they try to achieve something that is really ambitious, such as completely changing the terms of their trade arrangement or changing the internal structures of each other's economies. This is going to be impossible, and they'll probably end up with something that looks rather similar to what they ended up with in the first term, which is China agreeing probably to something around fentanyl, and attached to that is some kind of purchase agreement. That would be the base case. If they want to get more ambitious, they can start talking about things like whether Trump could potentially open up the United States to Chinese investment around tech transfer, IP transfer, licensing and so on. But let's see. I think, though, with Trump, he needs an agreement, probably more than President Xi Jinping needs an agreement. The World Bank halved projections for US GDP growth this year – more than any other country in the world. Real threat and real danger of inflation, falling growth, rising inflation. This is your stagflation nightmare. Trump does not want that going into the midterms in 2026. Li: I agree with Andy, but I want to explain a Chinese perspective. Yes, Trump is ideological, but China would probably follow up that statement by saying he is very political. In his first term, after Covid-19 spiralled out of control, he completely changed his policy towards China. Former Chinese vice-premier Liu He's visit to the US was just two months before Trump's 180-degree U-turn, and so the Chinese will remember that. This is related to what Andy said – accurately – about the lack of trust, about Trump and his unpredictable nature. Of course, there are some things that he is very predictable about, but his political nature is very important from the Chinese perspective. The way Trump treated American allies in Europe, no Chinese leader wants to go to the White House at the moment. I think Andy made a very important point, that the trade war will certainly hurt both countries but at different levels. It will probably hurt the US more for various reasons. When Trump imposed tariffs on China, Beijing did not budge, matching them instead. How does this inform us about China's approach towards Trump's second presidency? And how does it differ from the Chinese approach in his first term? Li: The negotiations in Geneva that resulted in a return to 30 per cent, with some months of waiver, reflected the degree of tariffs that China can accept. It has been consistent. If US tariffs go beyond 60 per cent, China may still want to cut a deal, but China might also want to get something in return, like market access and removing some Chinese companies from the Entity List. And all the economic and geopolitical issues will be related, including TikTok and many others. This is the way to explain the Chinese behaviour. This tells you that Donald Trump got China wrong. But I want to add one more thing. Donald Trump is not really well prepared for this tariff war with China. The way he talked about Xi Jinping and thought that [Xi] would call him – people in China know that Xi Jinping would not call Trump under these circumstances. He also talked about how China would have an uprising – like a revolution – if the trade deal was not made. It's certainly not the case. When the foreign pressure is so strong, usually Chinese people will unite and support the leadership rather than the other way round. This tells you that Donald Trump got China wrong. I also want to echo what Andy said about inflation. A more important impact is related to the broader cooperation in certain sectors that Andy mentioned. This will hit the US very badly. But fundamentally, the most important one is already happening, in terms of global reaction and its impact on the US stock market and bond market. That also explains how US$5 trillion of market value disappeared. This probably got Trump very much concerned about what China will do, as its actions will probably hit the US very badly – although China will be hesitant to use that kind of revenge. From the Chinese leadership's perspective, political pressure is more critical, but the fact that Donald Trump's tariff war is against the entire world puts China in a relatively good position. The dialogues in Geneva and London certainly made China less worried about the situation. Browne: I would just echo one point that Professor Li made. I think that the US severely underestimated China and the degree to which it was prepared this time for a trade war with the Trump administration. So you have a figure like Peter Navarro who – at least judging from his writings, his books – has a sort of comic book understanding of China and the Chinese economy as a place filled with Dickensian workshops and slave labour, when he talks about Chinese sofas that are really acid baths, and so on. But even a sophisticated figure like Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, before the first set of tariff talks, said: 'Look, the Chinese would be crazy to escalate. We have all the cards.' He said they're playing with a pair of twos. Well, it turns out that the Chinese had a couple of aces up their sleeves and very, very powerful cards – which they played. They really should talk to real experts in the United States regarding China. Which is why, I think now, when we go back to the negotiations, they are not going to be negotiations such as those the United States is going to have with other countries, which aren't really negotiations. They are more about 'you present us with your best offer, we will evaluate it, tell you whether it's acceptable, and if it's not we're going to put the tariffs back up again'. Now there's an understanding that they're going into real negotiations with China, and both sides have leverage. Building on that, what are some lessons that Trump should learn or would have learned from this recent tariff war with Beijing? And how tricky will negotiations be, given this context? Li: First of all, there is a lack of expertise on China in Washington, be it economic, social issues, technological issues, you name it. It's an important phenomenon, and on top of that is also Trump's ignorance about the Chinese mindset. And also, among his cabinet members, six of them were anchor people from Fox News. The prevailing perception in Washington nowadays is that those hawkish US policymakers are not brainwashed by China. This is a very bad assessment. They really should talk to real experts in the United States regarding China. But if you look at the current cabinet, look at the deputy level, there are very few or no experts on China. I think they probably should really find some people who understand the Chinese economy and politics, who can negotiate with Chinese financial or economic technocrats. Andy has said rightly that they have absolutely underestimated China's capacity. Yes, China has some economic problems, but remember just a few months ago there was talk about China's economy being past its peak, that China was not investible, and also that Chinese technology would never catch up with the United States for political, cultural and other reasons. All these are being challenged now. And so I think that certainly there are lots of mistakes being made on the part of the US that are very hard to fix. You do need to have a capable team to follow up. This is not just about one person or several cabinet members. But the US is not in the mood to seriously study the outside world. Donald Trump is a great example. He only listens to Peter Navarro and a few others. So I think this will be very devastating from a US perspective. This is only one of the many problems I want to mention. Browne: I would also say that the Chinese side has made some mistakes too, and the first was to believe that their problem is primarily with the United States. It's not. Everybody is worried about China's export machine and the degree to which Xi Jinping has attempted to rescue his economy – suffering from high debt and suffering from a multi-year real estate meltdown – by doubling down on manufacturing. And this is not sustainable. Actually, as the United States puts up high tariffs against China, other countries are even more alarmed that goods that were headed towards the US are going to be diverted towards them. Europe is extremely worried about that. Southeast Asian countries are worried about that. There is a real problem. Scott Bessent got it about right, that the Chinese economy is severely unbalanced, and they need to fundamentally address that issue. They are far too big to export their way out of economic difficulties. China needs to spend down its savings. It needs to reallocate national wealth from the state sector to the household sector. On the other hand, the United States needs to do the opposite. It needs to save more, which would mean higher taxes potentially. It needs to spend less, which means curbing entitlement spending and so on. Politically, in both countries, that type of resolution to the trade issue, which is really the only resolution, is unacceptable. And so both sides are mistaken in believing that they can resolve their issues through trade and through tariffs. Li: I understand Andy's view. I also wrote extensively on the importance of empathy and inclusive growth in China's outreach to the world, be it the Global South or North America or Europe. I've been concerned about the Made in China 2025 policy. But the thing is that Beijing is working on domestic consumption for China's economic growth. It's not so easy. And also, if we compare China with the United States, the US is so rich in terms of natural resources and in terms of land. But the US is not doing well. Economic disparity is out of control. China's policy, looking back, was wise on common prosperity, poverty elimination and the redistribution of wealth. Despite all the challenges and the overall GDP slowdown, China's GDP per capita still grew, which means that the middle class is still growing. I think that all countries should look at their own problems. It's very difficult to tell the Chinese to slow down, to not do foreign trade or other things. China will probably very strongly reject this due to Chinese entrepreneurship. My view is, yes, both parties in the US-China relationship should fix some of their own problems. But the nature and seriousness of their problems are quite different. The US has a distribution problem, economic disparity, and also it continues borrowing and spending. It's far worse than China's difficulties or China's so-called industrial policy. Nowadays when we talk about industrial policy, it's not mainly about China but the United States. That's the reason the trade war actually may not serve the US well. Its manufacturing sector is in terrible shape. The US should really take advantage of its services sector, but the whole campaign is to bring manufacturing back. Unless artificial intelligence can play an important role in this area, it will not work. In their call in June, Xi invited Trump to visit China. How useful would a summit be in easing tensions? Is the relationship so fragile it can only have a small truce after a small truce? What is needed to stabilise ties now? Browne: I think small truce followed by small truce is probably what we should expect, and it may be the best that we can expect given that, as I was describing earlier, there's this high-level problem of a lack of trust. They regard themselves as strategic competitors, and all of that leaches into the trade relationship and everything else – into people-to-people exchanges, scientific exchanges, education, technology, you name it. A fragile truce is where we are and where we're likely to remain. I think it's critical that these two leaders meet to prevent things from spinning out of control, and to keep things on track. Clearly, these two are the decision makers. Every decision reaches their desk. Trump has concentrated more power in his hands than perhaps any other US president in modern times. Xi Jinping is often described as the new Mao Zedong. It's vitally important that they meet and there is a good chance that they will later this year at an Apec summit. The question is, what sort of expectations should we have for the outcome of a meeting between Xi and Trump? I think that in Trump's mind, he believes that man-to-man, we can sit together and negotiate anything. We can do a deal, make a grand bargain. I think he may be exaggerating the utility of a summit in that respect, that when he sits down with Xi Jinping, he is sitting down with a through-and-through nationalist who represents China's interests. When you sit down with Trump, you're sitting down with the US president. You're sitting down with the head of the Maga movement. You're sitting down with a figure who has personal interests. He's a media figure. He wants media moments. He has business interests. That was very much top of mind for leaders in the Gulf when he visited in May. When you sit down with Xi, he is disciplined. He is focused. He represents his country and he's not going to make spur-of-the-moment decisions. He's going to stick to his plan, and he's executing on that plan very, very effectively. So if Trump feels that he's going to go in and Xi – because he has some kind of personal rapport or affinity with Trump – is going to do a deal, I think he's mistaken. Li: I just want to say one thing based on what Andy said. The way Xi handled the situation showed that he's not primarily a Mao-like figure. It was a combination of Mao and Deng Xiaoping. But most importantly, it's Xi who has supervised the country's rapid development and through a historical geopolitical landscape change. So that's quite unique in many ways. It's probably too simplistic to say 'just like Mao', when with Mao the country was very much isolated, and with Xi Jinping supervising, the country is on a very different path. Finally! Andy and I have found some differences in our views! Browne: Look, you're obviously right. I was referring to Xi Jinping as a Chinese nationalist and, in that sense, that is the Mao legacy that he embraces. He certainly doesn't embrace the legacy of Mao's chaos. In fact, quite the opposite. But he does inherit quite a lot of the authority of Mao through his father. He is red aristocracy. But I agree there are fundamental differences between Xi and Mao. Professor Li, given Chinese thinking and considering Trump's more mercurial and unpredictable character, is a summit between the two leaders more distant than we might expect? Li: First of all, there are at least six or seven issues that are far worse than a tariff war from the Chinese perspective. Even though 60 per cent tariffs will certainly bankrupt some companies, the country probably can muddle through. But there are other issues – for example, a complete decoupling. If there was a complete decoupling, it would hit China very severely. That's No 1. No 2, a freezing of Chinese assets or Chinese official's assets. This would also be a terrible thing from the Chinese perspective. Donald Trump can do everything and anything in his view. This kind of attitude is really disturbing. Asking China to pay for the losses from Covid-19 – some of Donald Trump's team members, including some congressmen, have argued for that. Of course, China is not going to do that, so that would mean a very serious clash. Also – as Andy said on completely stopping cultural and educational exchanges – no longer giving out visas for Communist Party members and their immediate family. How many? 300 million! How do they know these people are Communist Party members? So, they are basically saying that no Chinese should enter the US and they are putting a stop to educational exchanges. Even more important is the political or military pressure on the Taiwan issue and in the South China Sea. These are all very crucial issues from the Chinese perspective. Now, there's hope that Donald Trump's visit to China will at least prevent some of these crashing issues, otherwise his hawkish team will dominate. But the Chinese are also keenly aware that there is a lack of trust. How do we know that Donald Trump will not change the next day? And how to prevent Trump's positive policies and approaches to China from being hijacked by his anti-China team members? An important factor in international relations is that we cannot control unexpected events. Events can drastically change. But they could also make China and the US work together – because Donald Trump is still interested in getting the Nobel Peace Prize. Look at his parade, look at the AI-generated images of him. What can he not do? He can do everything and anything in his view. This kind of attitude is really disturbing. He wants to end the war in Ukraine... He probably still wants to visit North Korea and hug Kim Jong-un and stop nuclear proliferation in the region. In all these areas, he needs China's help. For China, these are not vital or the most critical issues. Andy, circling back to your earlier point about how the two countries think the worst of each other, how would you explain Washington's growing anxiety over China? And what is Trump's biggest fear when dealing with Beijing? Browne: Trump is fixated on trade and the trade deficit, and he is nothing if not consistent on this. With China, he is determined to narrow this trade deficit. He's also determined to create jobs. He rightly perceives that the import surges which followed China's entry into the World Trade Organization helped to hollow out the US industrial base. He sees that America's lack of industrialisation is now a security threat – that during the pandemic, the US couldn't get hold of supplies of emergency medical equipment and protective gear and syringes, and so on. So all of this is top of mind. Layered on top of this, of course, are fears that China is outcompeting the United States in areas of high technology. That was a concern of the Biden administration as well. And so that's where I think the fear that Professor Cheng Li talked about comes from. It's really the technological competition. Li: The thing is that, in reality, technology also requires cooperation. I do believe that both countries are equally competitive in many areas. Maybe in AI, the US has an advantage, though this is only relative and subject to change. That has certainly caused a lot of anxiety. Probably, Donald Trump wants more cooperation in these areas but his hawkish team will not let that happen. One thing I wanted to alert you to was some recent surveys of American public opinion – that despite still being quite negative, there are some changes. I think we will see more changes, looking at Trump's current way of dealing with China. Some other countries may also adjust their policy, despite having some concerns with China. That will put tremendous pressure on the US and on Donald Trump. Andy is probably more aware of the general atmosphere than I am, since I left the US two years ago, but while I think it's quite negative about China, we should not jump to the conclusion that Americans want to fight a war with China. These are different issues. If the US is in a really chaotic situation, it's not necessarily good news for China. Nothing is predetermined in this area. I think the Chinese should be fully aware that, in my view, the US will probably review its policy towards China after 10 years. My favourite quote is from Winston Churchill – that America will do the right thing only after it has tried everything else. Unfortunately, the US is in a very difficult period at the moment. Look at the military parade last month. It was astonishing to see this for a person who lived in the United States for over 30 years. I hope it's temporary but it will last for a while. But, as Andy said earlier, we need to emphasise inclusive growth and not see things in an absolutely zero-sum way. Because again, if the US is in a really chaotic situation, it's not necessarily good news for China. The same things can be said about China – if China is in trouble or chaos... it could also be a disaster for the world. So I think all these things require a mindset change, a perspective change. It will take some time. I think there will be some tough times ahead. Browne: I would just pick up on one point there, which I think is an important one – I don't think that when it comes to China, Trump is as fixated as Biden or the Biden administration was on national security. Witness the presence of TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew at the inauguration, witness Trump's strenuous efforts to try to save TikTok, in spite of a Congressional Act that insists TikTok is sold to a US business. Look at what happened on AI and the AI diffusion rule. The Trump administration just blew away the whole framework put in place in the final few days of the Biden administration. It was designed to sort of rank countries in tiers based on their geopolitical alignment with the United States, and based on that the US would dole out semiconductors. That has now been completely scrapped. On his trip to the Gulf, Trump pretty much pledged to give Gulf countries what they wanted to turn the region into an AI superpower. And the reason for that whole AI diffusion framework was to prevent leakage of advanced semiconductors to China. So if you look at that precedent, it suggests that there is actually a deal that can be made. As I said earlier, I think that deal may well have something to do with opening up the US wider to Chinese investment. There's a recognition, I hope, in the US that China has technologies that the US doesn't have and really needs, and may not be in a position to develop for years, if ever. Batteries are a great, classic example, and I think that given the right understanding, it is possible that you could see a deal where a CATL is allowed to invest in the EV sector in the United States. Or that a TikTok or a Shein or a Temu could figure out a way of entering and remaining in the US markets by resolving issues around data and ownership and AI algorithms, and so on and so forth. So I think that there could be technical solutions that could improve the overall US-China trade and investment relationship. Li: What Andy said is very important. But also there are some even more obvious things – probably less controversial – like the agriculture sector, the energy sector, oil and natural gas. The US wants to sell, China wants to buy. With China's help, American infrastructure could improve profoundly. I think Donald Trump may not be so ideological and he may push for that, and that would be great news for China. So I think that both leaders should think outside the box about how to, through economic cooperation, gradually enhance some confidence in each other. It's a high calling but it's still possible. Donald Trump, in that regard, may be the right person because, to him, everything is transactional; he is not ideological. Trump has never insulted the Chinese leader. Some people probably will have different views, but I think overall he has shown that he has strong interests in cooperating with China. There's some distrust, there are some structural tensions. Nevertheless, you do need to find some ways to avoid free-falls in this most important bilateral relationship in the world, which could be devastating. I think the bottom line is to avoid military conflict. If we talk about the two major powers, or the two leading powers, or two AI powers caught up in war, this is beyond anyone's imagination. This is the thing to absolutely avoid. - SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
