Nomura Q1 profit jumps 52% as markets, investment bank units ride out volatility
Japan's top investment bank and brokerage firm booked a profit of 104.6 billion yen ($705.71 million) in the April-June period, compared to a profit of 68.9 billion yen in the same period a year prior.
The results come on the back of Nomura's highest ever annual profit in the year to March 2025, advancing its leading position in the Japanese market as well as its multi-year effort to become a global financial player.
Nomura's global markets division recorded 7 per cent growth in revenue as volatility triggered by the proposed tariffs announced by U.S. President Donald Trump in April boosted demand for macro and spread products.
While global M&A dealmaking was held up by tariff-related uncertainty over the quarter, Nomura benefitted from major domestic deals, including the privatisations of listed subsidiaries by NTT and Toyota Motor.
Nomura has had some success in raising its global profile, ranking 11th in worldwide M&A advisory fees in the first six months of 2025, LSEG data showed.
Nomura has expanded its wealth and asset management businesses as a means of generating stable income that is less subject to market volatility after years of choppy returns.
It is now Japan's leading wealth management firm, capitalising on Japanese households' move from savings to investment, and the division made nearly 40 per cent of its pretax profits over the quarter.
Alongside, assets under management in Nomura's asset management division reached a record high of 94.3 trillion yen.
Nomura also generated pre-tax net income of 56 billion yen from the sale of a Tokyo property by one of its subsidiaries during the quarter.
In April, Nomura announced the acquisition of Macquarie Group's asset management business, adding approximately $180 billion in client assets. The Japanese company has had a troubled history in its attempts to expand overseas, including the acquisition of assets from the collapsed Lehman Brothers in 2008 which it later wrote down.
($1 = 148.2200 yen)
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
CNA
a minute ago
- CNA
Japan June retail sales rise 2.0% year/year
TOKYO :Japanese retail sales rose 2.0 per cent in June from a year earlier, against the median market forecast for a 1.8 per cent rise, government data showed on view full tables, go to the website of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry at:
CNA
2 hours ago
- CNA
Commentary: Why students from China are picking Malaysia over traditional destinations
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN: Since at least 2019, China has become Malaysia's top source of international students, overtaking traditional sources such as Bangladesh, Indonesia and Pakistan. In 2023, a total of 44,043 Chinese students constituted 38.4 per cent of all international students enrolled in Malaysia's public and private higher education institutions. In 2024, Chinese student enrolment in Malaysian higher education institutions showed a five-fold increase from 2019. Broadly, there are three contributing factors to this recent increase in Chinese student mobility to Malaysia: Shifts in immigration stances in traditional study destination countries; geopolitical tensions and worsening bilateral relations between China and some traditional study destination countries; and country-specific conditions in Malaysia and China. Importantly, these factors do not operate in siloes; it is their concurrent existence that facilitates the current trend. RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONS First, the shift towards more restrictive immigration stances in the 'big four' study destinations (Australia, Canada, the UK and the US) is making them less attractive to Chinese students. This shift is evident in new initiatives such as capping international student numbers, increasing visa costs, imposing stricter student dependent rules, and limiting access to post-study work visas. This situation is exacerbated by funding cuts in these countries' higher education sectors, which reduce their attractiveness to international students through fewer scholarships, and a less vibrant research and study environment. The rise of Sinophobia in some of these destination countries, especially during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, has also led to safety and security concerns on the part of prospective Chinese students and their families. Second, the current geopolitical climate, with rising China-US tensions and worsening bilateral relations between China and some traditional study destinations, has contributed to declining Chinese student mobility to these countries. In the US, it has been observed that universities have become extensions of political power. Indeed, Proclamation 10043 (Proclamation on the Suspension of Entry as Non-immigrants of Certain Students and Researchers from the People's Republic of China), signed by US President Donald Trump in May 2020, suspended and limited the entry of Chinese students associated with China's military and high-tech agenda. In 2023, the US rejected a record high of 36 per cent of Chinese student visa applications. Chinese student enrolment in US higher education institutions dropped 25 per cent from 372,532 in 2019/20 to 277,398 in 2023/24. US allies such as Australia and Canada also have imposed restrictions on visa applications from Chinese students, especially those intending to undertake studies in 'sensitive' fields in advanced science and technology. While Chinese students and researchers were previously viewed as welcome talents, they are now increasingly perceived as potential threats to these countries' military and intellectual security. Overall, the above factors have made Australia, Canada, the UK and the US less attractive, even hostile, environments for Chinese students, especially those planning post-study employment and settlement in these countries. THE DRAW OF MALAYSIA By contrast, Malaysia is increasingly seen as an appealing study destination for Chinese students owing to a combination of sociocultural and pragmatic reasons, alongside closer Malaysia-China bilateral relations. The presence of Malaysian Chinese communities (third or fourth generation overseas Chinese) means that Malaysia offers a soft landing for Chinese students who may be living overseas for the first time. Some Chinese students may have family connections in Malaysia, which constitute additional assurance to their parents. Chinese students can take advantage of a shared language (Mandarin and the use of simplified Chinese characters) and dialects, food, and sociocultural practices. Malaysia thus offers an international yet familiar environment – a comfortable home away from home. Malaysian higher education institutions' favourable positions in global university rankings are also a major draw. Another attractive factor is the relatively more affordable tuition and cost of living in Malaysia. In addition, the geographical proximity and the availability of affordable flights between Malaysia and Chinese students' home cities enable frequent home visits. Malaysia may also have acquired greater visibility as a study destination for Chinese students because of the improved political and economic relations between Malaysia and China in recent years. Notably, the establishment of Xiamen University Malaysia (XMUM) in Sepang in 2015, the first international campus of a prestigious Chinese public university, signals a commitment to China-Malaysia bilateral collaborations in education. Every year, XMUM admits about 500 Chinese students directly through China's gaokao (National College Entrance Exams). Malaysia's state-led student recruitment engagements with prospective Chinese students and education agents in China have also contributed to the country's visibility in the Chinese market. AN AFFORDABLE AND COMFORTABLE ALTERNATIVE With rising graduate unemployment in China, more Chinese students are seeking overseas postgraduate degrees to enhance their competitiveness in the domestic and international labour markets. By studying in Malaysia, Chinese students gain access to an affordable, English-medium education with credentials that are recognised in China and elsewhere. Malaysia thus offers an alternative pathway for Chinese students who are seeking a more cost-effective, proximate, comfortable and secure overseas study experience, bypassing the West. Malaysia's current Chinese student mobility trend may be part of a longer-term trend of intra-regional Chinese student mobility (for example, to Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand) and global student mobility pivoting towards Asia and Southeast Asia. The extension of Malaysia's post-study Graduate Pass to Chinese nationals (currently until Dec 31, 2026) will certainly add to the country's attraction to Chinese students. Given this trend, Malaysia's higher education institutions must be prepared for the influx of Chinese students and their study abroad needs such as English language support, social integration and career guidance by investing in additional manpower, resources and infrastructure.
CNA
2 hours ago
- CNA
Commentary: Why China is finally starting to acknowledge its overcapacity problem
LONDON: For years, Beijing dismissed Western concerns about Chinese overcapacity as protectionist rhetoric. When the United States and European Union complained about cheap Chinese exports flooding global markets, China's response was predictable: These were simply competitive advantages in a free market economy. That narrative has now fundamentally shifted. In a remarkable policy U-turn, China has not only started acknowledging the overcapacity problem but is treating it as a national priority that requires urgent intervention. While there have been signs of this narrative change for a while, the clearest signal of this messaging transformation came through recently on China's own policy channels. In July, the Communist Party's leading journal Qiushi warned that "disorderly competition has destroyed entire industry ecology". This wasn't diplomatic language about market dynamics – it was an admission that destructive competition had reached crisis proportions. Around the same time, President Xi Jinping chaired a meeting of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, calling for "low-price competition to be regulated" and outdated production capacity to be "phased out in an orderly manner." Weeks later, the State Council explicitly linked "irrational competition" to weak domestic economic circulation, naming high-profile sectors like new energy vehicles as targets for immediate oversight. This represents a dramatic departure from China's previous stance. Where Beijing once celebrated its manufacturing prowess and export competitiveness, it now openly discusses the need to curb "involution" – or neijuan, the Chinese term for excessive and destructive internal competition that has become central to policy discourse. WHY THE CHANGE? The shift reflects a sobering recognition that China's industrial overcapacity has moved beyond an export problem to become a domestic economic threat. The cost of some raw materials has reached historic lows due to supply chain deflation, yet factory prices are being cut even further as manufacturers engage in suicidal price wars. The result is unsustainable profit margins that are forcing many manufacturers to suspend operations entirely. This deflationary spiral now threatens what Chinese leadership calls the "whole-chain manufacturing model" – the integrated production networks that Mr Xi recently reaffirmed as a national priority. When factories cannot operate profitably, the entire industrial ecosystem becomes vulnerable. The messaging change also reflects Beijing's broader strategic recalibration. As China faces mounting external pressure and talks increasingly about economic self-reliance, maintaining a healthy domestic industrial base has become a matter of national security rather than just economic efficiency. FRAMING THE PROBLEM AS PRICE WARS Importantly, China is not using the language of "overcapacity" that has dominated international criticism. Instead, Beijing frames the problem as "price wars" and "disorderly competition". This distinction matters because it allows Chinese policymakers to address the underlying issue while avoiding the admission that their industrial policy created systemic overproduction. By focusing on pricing behaviour, China can position itself as promoting fair competition rather than acknowledging fundamental structural imbalances. This semantic shift enables policy action without losing face internationally or undermining confidence in China's economic model. However, the practical effect may be similar. Whether addressed as overcapacity or predatory pricing, the solution requires reducing output, consolidating industry players, and restoring sustainable profit margins across key sectors. THE PATH TO ACTION Chinese ministries are already coordinating their response. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, market regulators, and the National Development and Reform Commission have held symposiums with new energy vehicle companies, warning that pricing practices must be "monitored and standardised". Platform companies have been told to respect anti-unfair competition laws, and regulators are moving to contain large-scale subsidy wars. Just last week, China released draft revisions to its pricing law, aimed at containing improper pricing behaviours. But meaningful action faces significant obstacles. Local governments have strong incentives to protect regional champions, often offering subsidies to maintain employment and economic output. Provincial leaders compete to attract investment in priority sectors like artificial intelligence, electric vehicles and semiconductors – creating the very fragmentation that fuels destructive competition. As Mr Xi recently acknowledged at a Central Urban Work Conference: "When it comes to launching new projects, it's always the same things ... Should every province in the country be developing industries in these areas?" BETTER LATE THAN NEVER? But those seeking immediate results may be disappointed. China's approach appears to favour gradual consolidation and regulatory discipline over dramatic market interventions. This methodical approach reflects the political complexity of dismantling entrenched local interests. For global markets, China's acknowledgment of its overcapacity problem should be welcomed, albeit cautiously. If Beijing can successfully curb destructive price competition, it could lead to more stable global commodity prices and reduced trade tensions. Sectors like solar panels, steel and electric vehicles might see healthier profit margins as Chinese producers focus on sustainable competition. The shift also signals China's evolution toward a more mature economic model – one that prioritises long-term industrial health over short-term market share gains. Whether this transformation succeeds will depend on Beijing's ability to overcome local resistance and implement the structural reforms necessary to address decades of misaligned incentives. China's messaging U-turn on overcapacity may have come late, but it represents a crucial first step toward addressing one of the global economy's most persistent distortions. The real test now is whether shifting rhetoric will translate into meaningful action.
