LDP panel hears complaints about policy message for Upper House election
On Monday morning, an LDP panel set up last week to analyze the party's bitter election setback on July 20 interviewed unsuccessful candidates who ran for electoral districts. Some of them took part online.
Some reportedly pointed out that the party's policy message to voters, including its use of social media, was insufficient, compared with other parties.
Some said the LDP should have done more to highlight its achievements as the main ruling party.
Some were also quoted as saying the party needs to clarify its organizational responsibility for the election results in a way that will convince rank-and-file members.
The panel is scheduled to hear from unsuccessful candidates in the proportional representation segment in the afternoon.
The panel, headed by LDP Secretary-General Moriyama Hiroshi, is to draw up a report on why it suffered the defeat by the end of this month.
The LDP is also set to hold a session of the Joint Plenary Meeting of Party Members of Both Houses of the Diet on Friday to discuss the responsibility of the party leadership.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
5 hours ago
New Legislation Signals Japan's Shift to 'Active' Cyber Defense
In the spring of 2025 Japan entered a new era in digital security with the passage of new active cyber defense legislation. A look at what it means for the government to try to get ahead of threats before they arise, rather than sticking to its previous passive, reactive approach. Guerrilla Warfare in the Cyber Domain On May 16, the Diet passed legislation enabling Japanese authorities to adopt 'active' defense measures to preempt and prevent serious cyberattacks. The Active Cyber Defense Act will come into effect in 2026 and will structure Japan's cyber defense strategy around four pillars: Strengthened collaboration between the public and private sectors Monitoring of communications data for threat detection Counter-access to sources of cyber attacks and neutralization by authorities Strengthened cyber security institutions Japan's cyber security approach up until now has been 'passive' in that it relied on defense based on firewalls and antivirus measures confined to the networks of the parties targeted. This resembled 'siege warfare,' where the authorities had to wait until they were attacked before responding with countermeasures. Active defense, however, is more like 'guerrilla warfare.' The successful conduct of such combat involves identifying the patterns of enemy attacks and understanding their movements, ambushing them at chokepoints where they are vulnerable, and disrupting their supply lines. Active cyber defense exploits enemy vulnerabilities to disrupt attackers' operations and employs technical measures to increase the cost of their attacks, hopefully deterring them in the first place. Centralized Coordination by the Government Let's take a closer look at the pillars of the new approach and how they will be implemented in practice. To enhance public-private collaboration, operators of Japan's critical infrastructure will now be legally required to inform the government when they suffer a cyberattack or when they introduce new, important IT systems to operate this infrastructure. To this end, a 'Cyber Threat Information Sharing Council' will be established to strengthen cooperation on cyber incident response and regularize information and intelligence sharing between the government and the private sector. This new platform will also enable the government to better supervise critical infrastructure that could be targets of cyberattacks and promptly request operators to address zero-day vulnerabilities. By mandating private-sector reporting, the government will also gain a more comprehensive understanding of Japan's cyber security situation at any given time for improved strategic planning. In terms of 'monitoring communications data for threat detection,' the new law legally empowers the government to collect domestic communications-related data to identify and analyze cyber threats. The focus will be on so-called 'communication data' related to cyber incidents, such as IP addresses, character strings to execute commands, dates and times of transmissions, and communication logs that could be used to identify the type of malware used and the attack source. However, the government will not be able to collect and analyze the 'substantive content' of personal and private communications of citizens. To this end, an independent cyber communications supervisory board will be established to monitor government operations and ensure respect for the secrecy of communication guaranteed by Article 21 of Japan's Constitution. The third pillar enables the police and Japan's Self-Defense Forces to directly counter access and neutralize computers and infrastructure used for cyberattacks and remove malicious software. Legally, such actions will only be undertaken in a restricted range of situations when a rapid response is necessary to prevent or mitigate serious cyber incidents. Japan's cyber authorities will be able to remotely track watermarked electronic files stolen by attackers and neutralize relay servers used by attackers. It will also be legally permissible for government agencies to counter access and take down computers used by attackers. For example, Japanese authorities could launch a distributed denial of service attack against an imminent threat—flooding a server with a massive number of requests to overload and essentially prevent the server from functioning. The above pillars represent an overall strengthening of Japan's cyber defense institutions and allow Japanese authorities to proactively gather and centrally coordinate threat information related to advanced cyberattacks, including those perpetrated by state actors. This in turn will enable improved information exchange with allied and like-minded countries. When other countries make requests of Japan, such as to neutralize attacks by a state-sponsored actor or highly organized criminal organization, Japan will be better positioned to facilitate effective international cooperation. Human Resources a Major Challenge The biggest obstacle to implementing this active cyber defense approach is human resources. There is a shortage of cyber security experts, but current training for Japanese professionals is inadequate, especially as it applies to national security matters. Japan's cyber security experts require greater knowledge of diplomacy, military affairs and intelligence to facilitate an 'active' approach. A recent significant step forward in this vein was the introduction of national security clearances in May 2025. This clearance system allows government officials and private sector employees who have been vetted by higher-level authorities to access classified government information that could threaten Japan's national security if leaked. However, this is only the first step—it is essential to develop other institutional frameworks for training personnel. While it is difficult to precisely identify the extent of the shortage of cyber security personnel, a useful reference is a 2016 survey conducted by ISC2 (the International Information System Security Certification Consortium), a nonprofit organization that certifies professional cyber security qualifications. This survey predicted that Japan would face a shortage of approximately 170,000 cyber security personnel by 2024. Similarly, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry in 2020 also estimated that there was a shortage of approximately 190,000 people. Even the shortage of personnel needed for national security-related cyber security is estimated to be in the tens of thousands. As the new ACD legislation made its way through the Diet in May 2025, METI announced that it would double the number of registered information security specialists who possess advanced information security capabilities by 2030, raising their number to 50,000. This human resource issue also has international dimensions. One government plan involves the sharing of information on threats and undisclosed zero-day vulnerabilities obtained from foreign governments with the private sector based on the observation of certain confidentiality restrictions. Therefore, Japan's critical infrastructure operators and companies operating in the cyber domain must also secure personnel capable of dealing with the national and international security implications of the new legislative and strategic regime. The new legislation is only a starting point. Threats in cyberspace are evolving daily and transcend national borders. In the future, national security-focused cyber actors need to be prepared to continuously prevail in a 24/7 battle against cyber adversaries, including against state-based actors. This is the concept of 'persistent engagement' promoted by the United States in its active defense strategy. Persistent engagement is characterized by maintaining continuous contact with adversaries while detecting cyberattacks in advance and blocking them in the adversary's domain. Since the focus of defense is on disrupting the adversary's operations, the defense side requires advanced technical capabilities and enhanced judgment and analytical capabilities. Furthermore, comprehensive national security capabilities in the cyber domain will not only include being able to operate within cyberspace. To enhance Japan's capabilities in this arena, the government must also be able to engage in information collection, intelligence analysis, diplomacy, and economic pressure beyond cyberspace. In particular, when attacks are perpetrated or enabled by state-sponsored actors, Japan must be willing to take decisive measures in collaboration with the international community. The introduction of active cyber defense represents a significant evolution in Japan's cyber security strategy. It also marks the beginning of endless cyber warfare. (Originally published in Japanese. Banner photo © Pixta.)
Japan Times
5 hours ago
- Japan Times
Were the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings necessary?
The order to attack Japanese cities with atomic bombs was issued on July 25, 1945, by acting U.S. Army Chief of Staff Thomas Handy to Gen. Carl Spaatz, commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces, to "deliver (the) first special bomb as soon as weather will permit after about Aug. 3, 1945. ... The target list: 'Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki.' " Further attacks on the above targets were authorized to proceed as soon as additional atomic bombs were delivered. The order explicitly confirmed that Chief of Staff George Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson had approved it. U.S. President Harry Truman, of course, provided the ultimate authorization for dropping the bombs. Before the above order to attack was given, the U.S. Air Force had started practicing to use the atomic bombs from around mid-July through early August in Japan, dropping 49 mock bombs with conventional explosives, each weighing 6.5 tons, the same as the one used on Nagasaki, on 18 prefectures. The training was to learn the necessary trajectory for the real thing. The first uranium bomb (Little Boy) had been shipped earlier and arrived in Tinian on July 26. The plutonium implosion device (Fat Man) arrived in Tinian shortly thereafter. A third bomb of the Fat Man type would arrive in Tinian later in August. With two bombs in Tinian, both would be used. The Potsdam Declaration demanding Japan's surrender or face destruction was issued on July 26, 1945, around the same time as the order to deploy the atomic bombs. The declaration promised the Japanese that they could design their new government as long as it was peaceful and more democratic. There was debate on the U.S. side to suggest the imperial system could continue, as some knew this would be critical to a successful occupation, but the declaration was silent on this point. Diplomatic discussions were launched through Switzerland, a neutral and nonbelligerent power acting as an intermediary, to seek clarification on whether the imperial system could continue in the Asian nation's postwar government. In Japan's request for clarification on the issue, its communications did not specifically mention Emperor Hirohito, who, according to Imperial Household historical records, had resigned himself to abdicating to assume accountability. Soviet leader Josef Stalin chose to delay those discussions because he wanted the USSR to enter the war so it could grab territory. Yet, the U.S. did know from intercepted messages between Tokyo and Moscow that the Japanese were seeking a way to end the war starting in June 1945. And after the Potsdam Declaration was issued, the intercepted messages confirmed that Japan sought a clarification of the continuation of the imperial system in the new democratic system. The U.S. chose to interpret that request for clarification as a rejection of the Potsdam Declaration. At the Potsdam Conference, the Soviets had committed to attack Japan by Aug. 15. However, with confirmation that the July 16 bomb test in New Mexico had been a complete success, the Allies no longer needed the USSR's help to end the war without an invasion, nor did they want Stalin involved in the postwar aftermath. The U.S. and U.K. chose not to inform him about the bomb, but through his spy networks, he already knew all about the Manhattan Project. After the Hiroshima bombing at 8:15 a.m. on Aug. 6, the Soviet attack was brought forward. It commenced just after midnight on Aug. 9 Moscow time. Fat Man was dropped on the unlucky city of Nagasaki at 11:02 a.m. on Aug. 9 (Japan time). The bombing took place later than planned because the city of Kokura was the primary target that day, but cloud cover and smoke obscured the city, so after a delay, the Americans chose the secondary target. Was it necessary to drop the bombs on civilian population centers to demonstrate the power of the weapons? Months before the attacks, a special committee debated how to deploy the new weapons. An early proposal to stage a demonstration, possibly on an offshore island near Tokyo Bay, was rejected as officials believed only the shock of an actual strike would compel Japan to surrender. The committee ultimately settled on a "dual target" plan to strike a military facility located near a manufacturing hub with its workers. However, shortly after, a different committee set aside the "dual target" plan and proposed the cities of Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Kyoto as targets. Secretary of War Harry Stimson vetoed Kyoto so Nagasaki took its place. These cities were chosen mainly because, unlike other major Japanese cities, they had not yet been heavily bombed, which would help in assessing the damage and effectiveness of the attack. The question then is why the first atomic bomb was dropped just a week or so after the Potsdam Declaration. The evidence strongly suggests the attacks were timed to occur before the USSR could enter the war against Japan. With the "iron curtain" already descended on Eastern Europe, the U.S. and Great Britain wanted to check Stalin's influence in postwar Asia. Was it necessary to drop it in the morning hours when civilian populations would be most concentrated in the city center? With the change in U.S. bombing strategy in January 1945 from high-altitude precision targeting to low-altitude attacks on civilian centers with incendiary bombs, the distinction between military, industrial and civilian targets was cast aside. The objective became to destroy large sections of a city at once. Starting with the firebombing of Tokyo on March 9-10, 1945, which took the lives of over 100,000 civilians, the use of napalm and white phosphorus incendiary bombs dropped by hundreds of bombers on major civilian centers continued over the following months, causing several hundred thousand more civilian deaths and leaving millions homeless. The issue of civilian casualties during this period was not a priority. Daytime raids allowed bombing crews to see their targets clearly and document the damage caused. Given the nature of the orders issued on July 25 and the fact that two bombs were expected to arrive in Tinian before Aug. 3, it's clear the plan was to drop both bombs to compare their effectiveness before Japan could mount a realistic response. The debate over the necessity of using such destructive weapons continues to this day. U.S. history books have long stated the bombings were needed to avoid an invasion of Japan that could cost up to 1 million American casualties. The fierce defense of Okinawa is cited as an example of what would take place in an invasion of Kyushu, which was expected to be the first U.S. target. The problem with that reasoning is that the invasion of Japan under Operation Olympic was planned to start in November, some three months after the atomic bombings. The U.S. knew with certainty that Japan was trying to end the war and believed surrender could likely be secured by accepting the recommendation of some American experts to signal support for a constitutional monarchy. The obvious alternative to using nuclear weapons was to wait for the USSR's planned attack on Japan, expected around mid-August. But Washington and its allies wanted to avoid Soviet involvement, so the U.S. saw using atomic bombs as the better option. There is some historical evidence that suggests the bombs were also intended to pressure Stalin to halt further advances into Europe and elsewhere. But that plan failed miserably — both bombs were dropped, the USSR entered the war and demanded full involvement in postwar plans for the Asian nation as a reward for its brief six-day fight before Japan announced its surrender. Every Aug. 6 and 9, Hiroshima and Nagasaki update and announce the number of deaths caused by the atomic bombings. Radioactive fallout continued to cause cancers for decades after the attacks. As of Aug. 6, 2025, Hiroshima has recorded 349,246 names; Nagasaki will also add more names to last year's total of 198,785. Edo Naito is a commentator on Japanese politics, law and history. He is a retired international business attorney and has held board of director and executive positions at several U.S. and Japanese multinational companies.
Japan Times
8 hours ago
- Japan Times
The Japan-Australia frigate sale is a big deal. Here's why.
This week, the Australian government announced that Japan has won the hard-fought competition to provide the Royal Australian Navy's next surface warfare vessel and that it will purchase up to 11 Mogami-class frigates. The amount of money in the deal is a whopping 10 billion Australian dollars (¥950 billion) to be committed over about 20 years. While the price tag and length of the deal are substantial, they are only partly why this agreement is so significant. For Japan, it signals a key step in the evolution of its defense industry. For Australia, it offers a viable near-term solution to modernizing its navy while also supporting its own domestic shipbuilding industries. Equally important is what it means for the deepening relationship between the two countries based on the long-term commitment they are embarking upon together. Japan and Australia have dubbed their relationship the 'Special Strategic Partnership,' but it has taken time and effort from both sides to evolve it to this point, particularly in the realm of security. In the mid-1990s, the two governments started to routinize defense-related engagements. This accelerated after cooperation in the early 2000s in Iraq where Australian forces were directly responsible for protecting Japanese engineering units, as well as through burgeoning trilateral cooperation with the United States. The two governments recognized their mutual interests both in the region and abroad and signed their first joint declaration on security cooperation in 2007. By the mid-2010s, the Japan-Australian security relationship seemed to be on an irreversible path of alignment. Which is why it came as such a shock to the Japanese when the precursor to this frigate deal fell through. A decade ago, the Australian military was in the market for a new diesel-powered submarine to replace its aging Collins-class vessels. The deal came down to two options: the Japanese Soryu-class or the French Suffren-class. The Australian government opted for the French deal, in part because of guarantees on the amount that local Australian shipbuilding industries would be incorporated into the procurement process. The Japanese government felt slighted by the decision for two reasons: first, it believed the Soryu was the superior submarine; and second, it saw the deal as emblematic of deepening security ties. For the Australians, the submarine deal with France ended up collapsing anyway. Amid delays and cost increases, the government decided in 2021 that it would abandon diesel submarines altogether and move to acquire nuclear-powered vessels under the new AUKUS pact. The result is that Australia still has no new submarines almost 10 years after eschewing the Japanese option. Thus, one of the things that this deal does is erase the memory of the Soryu-class submarine deal gone wrong. With this frigate deal, Japan and Australia get a mulligan — that is, they have another opportunity at a big, multiyear procurement agreement with a guarantee for new vessels to be delivered in the near term. However, even this recent outcome was not guaranteed for the two defense partners. Like the last submarine competition, it came down to Japan and a European competitor — this time, it was the Germans. The German Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems A-200 Frigate held an early advantage based on the fact that Australia already had previous experience with procurement of its Anzac-class vessels from a Thyssen group subsidiary. But with an aim of guaranteeing near-term delivery, the Japanese Mogami-class prevailed. There are still additional steps that must be taken. Australia's Department of Defence must now engage Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the Japanese government in negotiating and entering binding commercial contracts. Their aim is to complete this process next year, with the delivery of the first Mogami-class frigate to Australia by 2029. For the Japanese government, this will make for the largest defense export to date. It is a huge milestone that entices Japanese companies to invest more heavily into their defense-related industries. Up to this point, export controls and the Japanese government's inability to facilitate the conclusion of deals have hampered progress in achieving these kinds of deals even when Japan has had top-of-the-line products. While the Soryu-class submarine offers one salient example, another is the ShinMaywa US-2 rescue seaplane — a one-of-a-kind search and rescue craft that still has not been exported overseas despite foreign interest. The fact that the Japanese government has finally netted something of this magnitude may be the kind of signal to Japan's big conglomerates that this sector can promise a worthwhile return on investment. For Australia, this deal is significant because it accelerates the procurement of its next-generation frigates. The administration of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is touting that this new design will enable the delivery of the new frigate five years ahead of the previous government's designs. The successful integration of this new vessel will help modernize the Australian Navy as it continues its important efforts to preserve the rules-based international order in the maritime domain. Further, the deal allows for investment in local Australian manufacturers. While the final contours of the deal will be worked out next year, a key parameter for this recent agreement-in-principle is that the shipbuilding will eventually transition from Japan to Australian soil in cooperation with domestic shipbuilders. Thus, this is not just a deal that satisfies government interests but creates important and enduring links to private sector interests as well. As the Australian government announced, this deal will underpin a 20-year program of record, and that is not even including the longer-term sustainment initiatives. Considering that vessels operate for decades, this agreement signals long-term investment from both countries. As for interoperability between defense forces, the deal promises both information-sharing and like systems. Licensed assembly in Australia means that there will be a necessary transfer of information on defense technology and operational designs. Further, interoperability becomes easier when the systems being used are alike. And, if all goes well, there is potential for similar procurement options in the future. It also offers additional synergy with the U.S. ally. As the Japanese touted to the Australian government, the Mogami-class frigate is designed to operate principally with Japanese and American technologies (e.g., weapons targeting systems, radars, datalink systems, etc.), meaning that Australia can leverage its existing relationships with U.S. defense companies for long-term sustainment and potential future upgrades. Understanding all this, it is easier to recognize why this frigate agreement is such a big deal. With it, the growing Japan-Australia Special Strategic Partnership just added another foundational pillar. [bio]Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow.[bio]
