Latest news with #AdditionalProtocol
Rudaw Net
4 days ago
- Politics
- Rudaw Net
IAEA official to visit Iran for talks on new ‘cooperation framework'
Also in Iran Four killed in southeast Iran clashes Iranian artist Mahmoud Farshchian dies at 96 Unemployment soars in Iran's Ilam despite rich natural resources Iran returns prisoners to Evin after Israeli strike A+ A- ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - A senior official from the United Nations nuclear watchdog is set to visit Iran on Monday to discuss a new framework for cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Tehran, Iran's foreign minister confirmed on Sunday. The visit comes after weeks of tensions that saw Iran's parliament pass a law suspending cooperation with the agency. Tehran's state-run news agency (IRNA) quoted Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi as stating that a deputy to IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi 'will visit Tehran tomorrow [Monday].' Talks will focus on developing a 'new framework for cooperation,' Araghchi stated, while reiterating that there would be 'no open inspection program.' 'We have not yet reached an agreement on the new framework, and cooperation will not begin until such an agreement is reached,' the senior Iranian diplomat stressed, adding that any framework would be strictly based on the law passed by parliament in late June. The law mandates the suspension of 'all forms of cooperation with the IAEA that go beyond the country's core obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)." This includes halting implementation of the Additional Protocol, which had previously permitted intrusive, short-notice inspections by the agency. The legislation further conditions any future cooperation on guarantees for the 'security and safety of Iran's nuclear facilities and personnel,' as well as 'formal international recognition of Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear program.' It also explicitly prohibits IAEA inspectors from visiting nuclear sites, with non-compliance deemed a criminal offense for Iranian officials. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in late June defended the legislation, accusing the IAEA of having become 'a political instrument,' blaming it for the flare up of the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel, which also drew in the United States. On June 13, Israel launched a series of airstrikes on Iranian territory, targeting nuclear facilities and killing several high-ranking military commanders and nuclear scientists. Iran retaliated with missile and drone strikes against Israeli targets. Tensions escalated further when the United States conducted airstrikes on June 22 against Iran's Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz nuclear sites. In response, Iran fired ballistic missiles at the US-operated al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. A ceasefire, brokered by Washington on June 24, has since held. Notably, the Israeli strikes came just one day after the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution on June 12 declaring Iran in violation of its nuclear non-proliferation commitments. Tehran rejected the resolution as 'politically motivated,' accusing Israel of supplying 'forged' intelligence to the agency. Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) also condemned the resolution, claiming Grossi had abandoned the agency's principle of impartiality. Despite the intensifying rhetoric, Grossi in early July expressed cautious optimism about mending fences with Tehran, saying he was 'encouraged' by Iran's willingness to host an IAEA delegation. Stalled nuclear talks On broader nuclear negotiations, Araghchi confirmed Sunday that no new round of talks with the US has been scheduled. 'A new round of negotiations has not yet been scheduled, and nothing has been finalized,' he said. 'Indirect negotiations have also not been confirmed so far, and I am not confirming any country in this regard.' Mediated by Oman, indirect US-Iran nuclear talks resumed on April 12, with five rounds held - the latest on May 23. These discussions marked the most serious engagement since the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), under which Iran curbed its nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. The sixth round of talks, planned for June 15 in Muscat, was canceled following the outbreak of the Israel-Iran conflict two days earlier. Since the June 24 ceasefire, negotiations have stalled. Araghchi previously demanded 'financial compensation' from the US for its strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, a request dismissed by Washington as 'ridiculous.' Meanwhile, the US has continued imposing new sanctions, including fresh measures last Thursday targeting Iran's oil and shipping sectors. E3 pressures mount as 'snapback' looms Commenting on ongoing talks between Iran and the E3 - France, Germany, and the UK - Araghchi on Sunday stated that discussions remain 'ongoing,' but dismissed their ability to trigger the JCPOA's snapback mechanism. 'From our perspective, 'snapback' is not a relevant issue, and Europe cannot take such an action. Given the positions they have taken, in our view, the Europeans are essentially no longer considered participants in the JCPOA,' he stated. At the core of the dispute between Iran and the E3 is a high-stakes standoff driven by Iran's accelerating nuclear program and the E3's use of the looming snapback mechanism - a powerful diplomatic tool embedded in the JCPOA, which allows for the automatic re-imposition of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if it violates its nuclear commitments. Any of the remaining signatories of the 2015 deal - the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK), China, and Russia - can trigger this mechanism set to expire on October 18, 2025. The E3 recently voiced alarm over Iran's enrichment of uranium in what drastically shortens Iran's breakout time to a nuclear weapon.. The European countries have further set an ultimatum, warning they will trigger a "snapback" mechanism by the end of August 2025 if Iran doesn't show a "firm, tangible, and verifiable commitment" to a nuclear deal. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot has stated that the E3 "will not hesitate for a single second to reapply all the sanctions" if European security is threatened by Iran's nuclear activities. Whether diplomacy can be salvaged or a new phase of sanctions and confrontation awaits remains to be seen.
Time of India
23-06-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Explained: What are the limits to the UN nuclear watchdog's oversight in Iran?
The U.N. nuclear watchdog, which polices the global nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty , has not been able to carry out inspections in Iran since Israel launched military strikes on its nuclear facilities on June 13. Below is an outline of the International Atomic Energy Agency's inspection powers. DOES THE IAEA HAVE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION? No. The IAEA's oversight is limited to the 191 states that are signatories to the NPT, and other countries it has separate arrangements with. Iran is a party to the NPT and thus subject to IAEA oversight including inspections meant to ensure that no nuclear material such as uranium is "diverted" for use in atomic bombs. Israel is not a party to the NPT and is the only country in the Middle East widely believed to have nuclear weapons. Israel does not confirm or deny having them. It has a limited safeguards agreement with the IAEA that provides for the agency to oversee some materials and facilities - a fraction of what Israel has and not any of what is widely believed to be its nuclear weapons programme. Iran, by contrast, has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA under which it must account for all its proliferation-sensitive nuclear material, including every gram of enriched uranium. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Why Seniors Are Snapping Up This TV Box, We Explain! Techno Mag Learn More Undo CAN THE IAEA GO ANYWHERE, ANYTIME IN IRAN? No. It is largely restricted to inspecting Iran's declared nuclear installations as provided for by its 1974 CSA - sites such as the three uranium enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow that were operating until Israel bombed them on June 13. It had regular access to those facilities until they were attacked. Since then, they have been "closed" and inspectors have not been allowed in, the IAEA has said, adding that it hopes its inspectors will return as soon as possible. Live Events HAS THE IAEA HAD GREATER POWERS BEFORE? Yes. A 2015 deal between Iran and major powers placed strict limits on Tehran's nuclear activities but also extended the IAEA's oversight to parts of Iran's nuclear programme not covered by the CSA, such as its production and stock of centrifuges, the machines that enrich uranium. It was the most comprehensive IAEA oversight of any country. Much of that additional oversight came from Iran agreeing, as part of the 2015 pact, to apply the Additional Protocol, an add-on to countries' CSAs that the IAEA developed to strengthen its hand in preventing nuclear proliferation. Iran has signed but never ratified the Additional Protocol. One of the most important extra tools the Additional Protocol gives the IAEA is the power to carry out snap inspections - short-notice access to locations including ones that Iran has not declared to be nuclear-related. WHY DOES IT NO LONGER HAVE SUCH SWEEPING POWERS? In 2018, during his first term, President Donald Trump pulled the U.S. out of the 2015 nuclear deal, reimposing U.S. sanctions on Iran that had been lifted as part of the agreement. In retaliation, as of the following year, Iran began pushing past the deal's limits on its nuclear activities but also scaled back the extra IAEA oversight introduced by the deal. In February 2021 Iran said it would no longer carry out its extra commitments under the 2015 deal, including implementation of the Additional Protocol. It struck a deal with the IAEA to keep monitoring equipment like surveillance cameras added under the deal rolling, but ordered them all removed in June 2022. WHAT WAS LOST WITH THE EXTRA OVERSIGHT? Reducing the IAEA's oversight not only took away the important tool of snap inspections. It also left blind spots in the areas to which extra oversight had been applied. The IAEA now says it has lost so-called "continuity of knowledge" for so many years that it will never be able to fully piece together what happened in areas including the production and inventory of centrifuges and certain key centrifuge parts, as well as Iran's stock of "yellowcake" - uranium that has not been enriched. The fact many centrifuges are unaccounted for means it cannot be ruled out that they will be used to enrich uranium in secret at an undeclared facility. Such a facility would be easy to hide in a relatively small building such as a warehouse. The IAEA says it cannot guarantee Iran's nuclear activity is entirely for peaceful purposes but it also has no credible indications of a coordinated nuclear weapons programme. WHAT IF IRAN PULLS OUT OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY? Iran has threatened to pull out of the NPT, while at the same time saying it would not develop nuclear weapons if it did. Tehran has complained that the treaty and non-proliferation regime failed to protect it from attack by a country with a nuclear arsenals, the United States, and another widely believed to have one, Israel. The NPT allows for withdrawal by a party at three months' notice "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country". The only country to announce its withdrawal from the NPT is North Korea in 2003, which expelled IAEA inspectors before testing nuclear weapons.
Straits Times
23-06-2025
- Politics
- Straits Times
Explainer-What are the limits to the UN nuclear watchdog's oversight in Iran?
FILE PHOTO: The IAEA flag flutters outside their headquarters after the first day of the agency's quarterly Board of Governors meeting at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, June 9, 2025. REUTERS/Lisa Leutner/ File Photo Explainer-What are the limits to the UN nuclear watchdog's oversight in Iran? VIENNA - The U.N. nuclear watchdog, which polices the global nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has not been able to carry out inspections in Iran since Israel launched military strikes on its nuclear facilities on June 13. Below is an outline of the International Atomic Energy Agency's inspection powers. DOES THE IAEA HAVE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION? No. The IAEA's oversight is limited to the 191 states that are signatories to the NPT, and other countries it has separate arrangements with. Iran is a party to the NPT and thus subject to IAEA oversight including inspections meant to ensure that no nuclear material such as uranium is "diverted" for use in atomic bombs. Israel is not a party to the NPT and is the only country in the Middle East widely believed to have nuclear weapons. Israel does not confirm or deny having them. It has a limited safeguards agreement with the IAEA that provides for the agency to oversee some materials and facilities - a fraction of what Israel has and not any of what is widely believed to be its nuclear weapons programme. Iran, by contrast, has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA under which it must account for all its proliferation-sensitive nuclear material, including every gram of enriched uranium. CAN THE IAEA GO ANYWHERE, ANYTIME IN IRAN? No. It is largely restricted to inspecting Iran's declared nuclear installations as provided for by its 1974 CSA - sites such as the three uranium enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow that were operating until Israel bombed them on June 13. It had regular access to those facilities until they were attacked. Since then, they have been "closed" and inspectors have not been allowed in, the IAEA has said, adding that it hopes its inspectors will return as soon as possible. HAS THE IAEA HAD GREATER POWERS BEFORE? Yes. A 2015 deal between Iran and major powers placed strict limits on Tehran's nuclear activities but also extended the IAEA's oversight to parts of Iran's nuclear programme not covered by the CSA, such as its production and stock of centrifuges, the machines that enrich uranium. It was the most comprehensive IAEA oversight of any country. Much of that additional oversight came from Iran agreeing, as part of the 2015 pact, to apply the Additional Protocol, an add-on to countries' CSAs that the IAEA developed to strengthen its hand in preventing nuclear proliferation. Iran has signed but never ratified the Additional Protocol. One of the most important extra tools the Additional Protocol gives the IAEA is the power to carry out snap inspections - short-notice access to locations including ones that Iran has not declared to be nuclear-related. WHY DOES IT NO LONGER HAVE SUCH SWEEPING POWERS? In 2018, during his first term, President Donald Trump pulled the U.S. out of the 2015 nuclear deal, reimposing U.S. sanctions on Iran that had been lifted as part of the agreement. In retaliation, as of the following year, Iran began pushing past the deal's limits on its nuclear activities but also scaled back the extra IAEA oversight introduced by the deal. In February 2021 Iran said it would no longer carry out its extra commitments under the 2015 deal, including implementation of the Additional Protocol. It struck a deal with the IAEA to keep monitoring equipment like surveillance cameras added under the deal rolling, but ordered them all removed in June 2022. WHAT WAS LOST WITH THE EXTRA OVERSIGHT? Reducing the IAEA's oversight not only took away the important tool of snap inspections. It also left blind spots in the areas to which extra oversight had been applied. The IAEA now says it has lost so-called "continuity of knowledge" for so many years that it will never be able to fully piece together what happened in areas including the production and inventory of centrifuges and certain key centrifuge parts, as well as Iran's stock of "yellowcake" - uranium that has not been enriched. The fact many centrifuges are unaccounted for means it cannot be ruled out that they will be used to enrich uranium in secret at an undeclared facility. Such a facility would be easy to hide in a relatively small building such as a warehouse. The IAEA says it cannot guarantee Iran's nuclear activity is entirely for peaceful purposes but it also has no credible indications of a coordinated nuclear weapons programme. WHAT IF IRAN PULLS OUT OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY? Iran has threatened to pull out of the NPT, while at the same time saying it would not develop nuclear weapons if it did. Tehran has complained that the treaty and non-proliferation regime failed to protect it from attack by a country with a nuclear arsenals, the United States, and another widely believed to have one, Israel. The NPT allows for withdrawal by a party at three months' notice "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country". The only country to announce its withdrawal from the NPT is North Korea in 2003, which expelled IAEA inspectors before testing nuclear weapons. REUTERS Join ST's Telegram channel and get the latest breaking news delivered to you.
Straits Times
23-06-2025
- Politics
- Straits Times
Explainer-The limits to the UN nuclear watchdog's oversight in Iran
FILE PHOTO: The IAEA flag flutters outside their headquarters after the first day of the agency's quarterly Board of Governors meeting at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, June 9, 2025. REUTERS/Lisa Leutner/ File Photo VIENNA - The U.N. nuclear watchdog, which polices the global nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has not been able to carry out inspections in Iran since Israel launched military strikes on its nuclear facilities on June 13. Below is an outline of the International Atomic Energy Agency's inspection powers. DOES THE IAEA HAVE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION? No. The IAEA's oversight is limited to the 191 states that are signatories to the NPT, and other countries it has separate arrangements with. Iran is a party to the NPT and thus subject to IAEA oversight including inspections meant to ensure that no nuclear material such as uranium is "diverted" for use in atomic bombs. Israel is not a party to the NPT and is the only country in the Middle East widely believed to have nuclear weapons. Israel does not confirm or deny having them. It has a limited safeguards agreement with the IAEA that provides for the agency to oversee some materials and facilities - a fraction of what Israel has and not any of what is widely believed to be its nuclear weapons programme. Iran, by contrast, has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA under which it must account for all its proliferation-sensitive nuclear material, including every gram of enriched uranium. CAN THE IAEA GO ANYWHERE, ANYTIME IN IRAN? No. It is largely restricted to inspecting Iran's declared nuclear installations as provided for by its 1974 CSA - sites such as the three uranium enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow that were operating until Israel bombed them on June 13. It had regular access to those facilities until they were attacked. Since then, they have been "closed" and inspectors have not been allowed in, the IAEA has said, adding that it hopes its inspectors will return as soon as possible. HAS THE IAEA HAD GREATER POWERS BEFORE? Yes. A 2015 deal between Iran and major powers placed strict limits on Tehran's nuclear activities but also extended the IAEA's oversight to parts of Iran's nuclear programme not covered by the CSA, such as its production and stock of centrifuges, the machines that enrich uranium. It was the most comprehensive IAEA oversight of any country. Much of that additional oversight came from Iran agreeing, as part of the 2015 pact, to apply the Additional Protocol, an add-on to countries' CSAs that the IAEA developed to strengthen its hand in preventing nuclear proliferation. Iran has signed but never ratified the Additional Protocol. One of the most important extra tools the Additional Protocol gives the IAEA is the power to carry out snap inspections - short-notice access to locations including ones that Iran has not declared to be nuclear-related. WHY DOES IT NO LONGER HAVE SUCH SWEEPING POWERS? In 2018, during his first term, President Donald Trump pulled the U.S. out of the 2015 nuclear deal, reimposing U.S. sanctions on Iran that had been lifted as part of the agreement. In retaliation, as of the following year, Iran began pushing past the deal's limits on its nuclear activities but also scaled back the extra IAEA oversight introduced by the deal. In February 2021 Iran said it would no longer carry out its extra commitments under the 2015 deal, including implementation of the Additional Protocol. It struck a deal with the IAEA to keep monitoring equipment like surveillance cameras added under the deal rolling, but ordered them all removed in June 2022. WHAT WAS LOST WITH THE EXTRA OVERSIGHT? Reducing the IAEA's oversight not only took away the important tool of snap inspections. It also left blind spots in the areas to which extra oversight had been applied. The IAEA now says it has lost so-called "continuity of knowledge" for so many years that it will never be able to fully piece together what happened in areas including the production and inventory of centrifuges and certain key centrifuge parts, as well as Iran's stock of "yellowcake" - uranium that has not been enriched. The fact many centrifuges are unaccounted for means it cannot be ruled out that they will be used to enrich uranium in secret at an undeclared facility. Such a facility would be easy to hide in a relatively small building such as a warehouse. The IAEA says it cannot guarantee Iran's nuclear activity is entirely for peaceful purposes but it also has no credible indications of a coordinated nuclear weapons programme. WHAT IF IRAN PULLS OUT OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY? Iran has threatened to pull out of the NPT, while at the same time saying it would not develop nuclear weapons if it did. Tehran has complained that the treaty and non-proliferation regime failed to protect it from attack by a country with a nuclear arsenals, the United States, and another widely believed to have one, Israel. The NPT allows for withdrawal by a party at three months' notice "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country". The only country to announce its withdrawal from the NPT is North Korea in 2003, which expelled IAEA inspectors before testing nuclear weapons. REUTERS Join ST's Telegram channel and get the latest breaking news delivered to you.
New Indian Express
15-06-2025
- Politics
- New Indian Express
Seismic miscalculation? Why Israel's strikes could end up pushing Tehran closer to the n-bomb
It needs to be called out for what it is. After decades of shadow conflict—covert strikes, cyber sabotage, proxy battles, and a near conflict last year—Israel and Iran are now at war. Israel has launched Operation Rising Lion, striking Iran's nuclear enrichment facilities, its leading nuclear scientists, top leadership of Iran's military, especially the Revolutionary Guards, military headquarters and weapons storage, ballistic missile facilities, and air defences. This marks a profound shift in the region's strategic landscape. This is a war Israel has long wanted to fight—a direct campaign to roll back a nuclear threat it sees as existential for the survival of the Jewish state of 1 crore. The trigger, perhaps, is the latest IAEA report published in May 2025. It confirmed that Iran has amassed more than 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60% U-235, plus thousands more enriched to lower levels. This stockpile is enough for up to nine nuclear weapons. The agency also reported that Iran has disabled key monitoring systems, refused access, and ceased implementing the Additional Protocol, making full verification impossible. The significantly increased production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium by Iran, the only non-nuclear-weapon State to produce such nuclear material, is of serious concern. This is the clearest nuclear breakout profile the world has seen in decades—and Israel decided it could wait no longer. Israel's strikes went beyond nuclear weapons facilities. They have killed senior IRGC commanders and nuclear engineers and targeted oil and gas infrastructure. Destruction of the program in its entirety is likely beyond reach. Iran's nuclear sites are dispersed, fortified, and in some cases buried deep underground. So Israel is doing what it can–targeting centrifuges and research centres, and eliminating the human capital behind Iran's progress. It's a strategy of degradation, disruption, and demoralisation. What sets this round of conflict apart is Israel's open psychological and political messaging. After the first wave of strikes, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu directly addressed the Iranian people, saying, 'The time has come for the Iranian people to unite around its flag and its historic legacy, by standing up for your freedom from the evil and oppressive regime.' This is a call for uprising. While Israel officially denies that regime change is its objective, Netanyahu's words—combined with military actions targeting Iran's top command—make the message clear.
