Latest news with #Afghan-Pakistani
News18
12 hours ago
- Politics
- News18
Explained: What Is Pakistan-Based Al Qaeda's Brigade 313 And Why Is It Back In Focus?
Last Updated: Brigade 313: The group functions not as a single organisation but as a coalition of jihadists, including defectors from the Pakistani military and intelligence services. A recent question posed to former Pakistani envoy Sherry Rehman by a Sky News journalist reignited interest in Brigade 313, a shadowy terror unit operating under the umbrella of Al Qaeda. Sherry Rehman acknowledged the group's violent past as she referred to a 'digital dossier" saying, 'I don't know who told you this, but I can produce any number of pages saying all this." 'Most of the analysts you're quoting are aligned with India's narrative. They only tell India's story," she further said, rejecting claims about Brigade 313's Al Qaeda links. What Is Brigade 313? Brigade 313 is the operational arm of Lashkar al-Zil (Arabic for 'Shadow Army"), Al Qaeda's paramilitary wing. It functions not as a single organisation but as a coalition of jihadists, including defectors from the Pakistani military and intelligence services. While most active along the Afghan-Pakistani border, Brigade 313 has also outsourced attacks to proxy outfits such as The Resistance Front (TRF) and People's Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF). TRF was behind the April 2022 Pahalgam terror attack. Why Is It Called Brigade 313? The group's name refers to the 313 soldiers who, according to Islamic tradition, fought alongside Prophet Muhammad in the Battle of Badr. Brigade 313 draws its cadre from various banned militant outfits, including the Taliban, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jundallah. The group was founded by Ilyas Kashmiri, a former Pakistani Special Services Group (SSG) commando turned jihadist. He was also a senior leader of HUJI and a key commander in Al Qaeda's military hierarchy. Ilyas Kashmiri was implicated in multiple terror plots across Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and even the United States, including the 2009 New York subway plot involving Najibullah Zazi and a plan to attack the Danish Jyllands-Posten newspaper. He was designated a global terrorist by the US and the United Nations before being reported killed in a US drone strike in 2011. After his death, leadership reportedly passed to a commander known as Shah Sahib. What Attacks Has Brigade 313 Been Linked To? Brigade 313 has executed or supported numerous high-profile attacks including: 2003: Attempted assassination of Pakistan's then-president Pervez Musharraf. 2008: Killing of Maj Gen Faisal Alvi, an SSG officer who threatened to expose links between the Taliban and Pakistan's military elite. 2009: Attack on Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, killing 17. 2009: Suicide bombing in Afghanistan's Khost province targeting US assets. 2011: Attack on Pakistani Naval Base in Karachi, killing 14 in retaliation for the death of Osama bin Laden. Is Brigade 313 Linked To Pakistan's Military And Intelligence Services? While Pakistan has officially distanced itself from the group, analysts say Brigade 313 continues to function discreetly while maintaining ideological loyalty to Al Qaeda. Location : Pakistan First Published:
Asia Times
12-02-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
Russia better than China for making Afghan-Pakistan peace
Russian Ambassador to Pakistan Albert Khorev told TASS over the weekend that his country supports Pakistan and Afghanistan's respective counter-terrorism efforts. He then added that it encourages both of them to resolve their border tensions through bilateral or multilateral means. This suggests a desire to mediate between them. China has already tried to do so but has struggled to achieve anything, yet Russia has a better chance of success. Russia's grand geo-economic plan in this part of Eurasia is to pioneer parallel connectivity and energy corridors to India via Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. To that end, Russia must cultivate equally excellent relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan, help resolve their border tensions, and then do the same with Pakistan and India's. The first step has already been achieved upon strategically partnering with the Taliban last summer and then clinching a strategic resource pact with Pakistan in December. The second step will be much more difficult to fulfill but therein lies the purpose behind Ambassador Khorev's latest remarks regarding Russia's support for Pakistan and Afghanistan's respective counter-terrorism efforts. On the one hand, he acknowledged his host country's problems with Afghan-emanating terrorist threats, but on the other, he shied away from blaming the Taliban for them like Islamabad does and instead offered to provide them with vague 'necessary assistance'. The goal appears to be to empower each to in their own way, the first through political support for stopping all terrorist infiltration from Afghanistan and the second by possibly equipping them with small arms and potentially training their special forces to fight ISIS-K. Left unsaid is any reference to Pakistan's claims that the Taliban backs the TTP ('Pakistani Taliban') and other terrorist groups, however, though commenting on this either way would ruin Russia's careful balancing act. To be sure, China has already applied the same approach towards this issue, but it lacks the geo-economic vision that Russia does wherein the improvement of Afghan-Pakistani ties is integral to the success of its broader regional policy. Pakistan and Afghanistan don't need to trade across one another's territory in order to do business with China since the first employs the Belt & Road Initiative's China-Pakistan Economic Corridor flagship to that end while the second has rail access to it via Central Asia. Therefore, although China does indeed want its neighboring partners to work more closely together, this isn't required to advance its geo-economic interests. The situation is altogether different with Russia, whose grand geo-economic plan necessitates Afghanistan and Pakistan patching up their problems in order to pioneer parallel connectivity and energy corridors that could one day ideally reach India. Those two, therefore, naturally understand that Russia has much greater stakes in mediation than China does. Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan would receive additional economic benefits from China upon resolving their tensions, but Pakistan could finally receive more direct overland connectivity with Russia and perhaps even energy from it with time too if that happens, both via Afghanistan. Likewise, Afghanistan could profit from its middleman role in these corridors, especially if they ever extend to India. No such benefits stand to be reaped from China if Beijing were to successfully mediate between them. Accordingly, it's incumbent on Russia to utilize creative means for moving this diplomatic process along to the best of its ability, which could include sharing detailed plans of its proposed connectivity and energy investments in both in Afghanistan and Pakistan should they agree to resolve their disputes. These could include specific projects, the estimated amount that'll be invested, lending terms if required, the possibility for joint ownership of some sort, and the local labor that might be employed. It might still not be enough for a breakthrough, but it would still be more than what China has offered to do if they make peace, which is nothing. Moreover, such a detailed proposal could later be returned to if the political and/or military situation changes and they decide to patch up their problems, in which case they'd have a mutual interest in reviving Russia's plans. It's too early to predict what'll happen either way, just that Russia is expected to push for peace, and its efforts will be more meaningful than China's. This article was first published on Andrew Korybko's Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber here.
