Latest news with #AlAqsaFlood
Asharq Al-Awsat
9 hours ago
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Beirut, Damascus and the Challenge of a Normal Country
The Lebanese people complain about the advice from ambassadors and dictates from international financial organizations. They believe that the outside was paving their road and goals and setting the means for them. They are annoyed that their country is being treated like a minor, who the world has no faith in his ability to get himself out of the abyss. The abundance of doctors and treatments often deepens the patient's confusion. There can be no arguing that the Lebanese people, similar to other peoples, have the right to address their present and shape their future. However, recalling givens is not enough to retrieve this right. Hegemonies begin when countries start to break apart under the weight of divisions and interventions. The Lebanese divisions are old and so are the interventions. The most dangerous thing that can happen to a country is the loss of the ability to take a decision. This lack of this ability depletes what remains of the fortification that should be available to a sovereign and independent nation. The problem is compounded when the country is surrounded by wars and conflicts that are beyond its ability to join or distance itself from them. And so, the country becomes captive on the inside and before the outside world. The truth is that the Lebanese patient has suddenly found himself floundering in a cycle of wars that erupted after the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation. Then it found itself confronted with the difficult endings of these wars, which were contrary to the goals of the ones who launched the Aqsa Flood and 'support front'. The people of the region didn't need new experiences to become acquainted with Israel's hostility and savagery of its army. But what has happened has given the Israeli killing machine the opportunity to go to the extreme in its destruction and killing even going to so far as to commit genocide. Observers of Israel's behavior in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria and Lebanon sense that the balance of power has broken and is now tipped heavily to the Israeli side. There is no need to remind the reader of the blood being shed at the aid distribution points in Gaza; no need to explain the meaning of the Israeli army warning to residents of Beirut's southern suburbs to evacuate specific buildings before striking. The daily assassinations carried out by Israeli drones in Lebanon hold clear messages and so does the continued destruction of the remaining capabilities of the former Syrian army. The people of the region don't need someone to explain to them the significance of the collapse of the former Syrian regime. The end of the Assad regime changed features and roles in the region. The collapse broke the chain of the so-called 'Axis of Resistance' that started in Tehran and ended in Beirut, passing through Baghdad and Damascus. This is a massive change that confronted officials with very difficult choices. Ahmed al-Sharaa entered the Syrian presidential palace and was confronted with dangerous new facts. A country broken and without an army and state institutions. A country drowning in fear and poverty where millions live in refugee camps near the border. Sharaa had to choose and take decisions. The era of factions means endless wars, the fragmentation of Syria and more blood and death. Sharaa had to convince the Syrians and the world. There needed to be a moment for Syria to catch its breath, regroup and bring in aid. Sharaa surprised the Syrians, the region and world. His choice was Syria first and foremost. He has no desire to surrender to old formulas, unyielding beliefs and outdated treatments. He decided to understand the balance of power in the region and world and deal with it. The obsession of saving Syria and reclaiming it from militias and hegemonies took precedence. Sharaa sent a frank message that the new Syria wants to be a normal country. One where the state monopolizes control over decisions of war and peace and the possession of arms. This is not an easy task at all. The establishment of a normal state demands respecting local and international laws and ensuring equality between segments of society. It means abandoning the rhetoric of eliminating the other and changing features. The emergence of such Syrian determination encouraged countries eager to help Syria. Sharaa said the new Syria does not want to pose a threat to any of its neighbors. This desire to quit the military aspect of the conflict with Israel paved the way for handshakes and recognitions. Despite the difficulties, there is a sense that Sharaa's journey has kicked off with regional and international support. This took place at the same time as the Lebanese people were dreaming that their country could also kick off the journey of returning towards the normal state. This dream was reawakened with the election of Jospeh Aoun as president and appointment of Nawaf Salam as prime minister. The Lebanese people were hopeful in the president's swearing in speech and the government's policy statement. Months have since passed, and the Lebanese journey has not yet sailed. The conditions that led to Sharaa's arrival to power differ than those that led to Aoun and Salam's arrival. Lebanon's composition is very complicated and uniting the people is not easy. It is evident that Hezbollah's reading of what is taking place in the region is different than the readings of other Lebanese segments and those of Aoun and Salam. The world is demanding that Lebanon return to becoming a normal country that can be trusted, helped and supported. Aoun and Salam cannot do this mission alone. The responsibility equally also lies on Speaker Nabih Berri given his standing in the Shiite community and in the country. The return to the normal state cannot take place without Hezbollah reading how the war ended and what is taking place in Syria. Keeping Lebanon hanging in the Iranian and non-Iranian balances will leave it at risk of wasting the international support to help it. The world set a condition for the new Syria to agree to become a normal country, and it did. Lebanon's lack of serious collective decision to move towards such a goal will leave it vulnerable to many surprises.
LBCI
27-05-2025
- Business
- LBCI
Soaring war costs: Israel's mass reserve call-up deepens hostage crisis, sparks economic concerns
Report by Amal Shehadeh, English adaptation by Yasmine Jaroudi Israel's approval of the enlistment of 450,000 reservists for a three-month deployment to achieve its objectives in the Al-Aqsa Flood war has heightened tensions, particularly among families of Israeli hostages held by Hamas. The move has prompted many of them to bypass the Israeli government and directly engage with U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Adam Boehler, both of whom have reiterated that progress in negotiations is still possible in the coming days. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu initially suggested a deal to secure the release of hostages would be completed within two days, only to walk back later in his statement, blaming Hamas for rejecting the proposal presented by Witkoff. However, sources familiar with the negotiations have indicated that the main obstacle remains Hamas' demand for guarantees to end the war—something Israel has yet to commit to. As the stalemate continues, the fate of 59 hostages, including 20 confirmed to be alive in Gaza, remains uncertain. Their families and numerous activists have intensified calls for an immediate halt to the war, citing both humanitarian concerns and the enormous financial burden of the ongoing military campaign. According to reports, the cost of the "Gideon Chariots" operation has reached approximately $5 billion. The new mass reserve mobilization is expected to add over $9 billion in expenses, raising alarm about the war's impact on Israel's already strained economy. Critics have accused the Netanyahu government of using massive defense spending as a political tool to maintain its hold on power. Further straining resources, Israel has decided to reopen a detention facility in the country's north—originally used to hold Lebanese detainees during the last war—in preparation for processing potentially hundreds of new Palestinian prisoners expected to be captured during the expanded military operation.
Asharq Al-Awsat
13-05-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Is Peace Really Impossible?
Circles sympathetic to the 'Al-Aqsa Flood' have pushed through a remarkable shift over the months since the operation was launched: in the place of combative triumphalist assurances of 'liberation' and 'victory,' there emerged an apologetic, servile tone: 'peace with Israel is impossible.' Common to both, however, is a repudiation of peace and of the notion that peace could ever be possible. We should be under no illusions, achieving regional peace has indeed become extraordinarily difficult. One foundational difficulty, so to speak, is the Israeli hysteria around security - partly triggered by the Holocaust memory and partly by the sense that Israelis are an isolated minority in a vast Arab and Islamic world. This disposition encourages only the worst of political choices: Israel suffers from an 'absolute security' complex that has grown out of this pathological obsession with security - and its 'absoluteness' makes the only acceptable peace a peace without any risk, and everything should be guaranteed from the outset. In other words, this notion amounts to a bulwark to peace, as any reconciliation between two hostile parties necessarily carries risks. Moreover, this disposition fosters fanaticism that could perhaps be accompanied by the conviction that perpetually weakening the other to keep its evil at bay is 'necessary.' The historical slogan of 'liberating Palestine' has long heightened the hysteria around security in Israel. If it had seen the light of day, this slogan would have been enough, in itself, to achieve a monstrous genocide. The slogan found a new lease on life with the 'flood,' chants of 'from the river to the sea,' and the 'unity of fronts' theory, which was fodder for the flames of Israel's security hysteria and its sense of being an isolated minority, especially since the forces advocating for the 'unity of fronts' reject the idea that Israel has a legitimate right to exist. On top of that, there is no comparison between Israel and the Palestinians' incentives to make peace. Israel would be the one to 'cede' occupied territory, which explains its stalling and evasion. As for the Palestinians, who, on the one hand, have the moral high ground, but find themselves in a position of weakness on the other, they are called upon to do everything possible to pull Israel into the political process. It seems, however, that resistance to peace and sabotaging peace initiatives and plans have repeatedly stifled those efforts in their infancy. As a result, it became impossible to arrive at a stage in which we could wage a political battle that puts the Jewish state and its desire for peace before a real test. Those who lived through the 1960s and 1970s will know that chants like 'No to a peaceful solution, no!' and 'No peace, no surrender!' roared through protests across the Levant more than any others, and equating 'reconciliation' with 'liquidation' was commonplace. Even Nasser himself was not spared accusations of betrayal after he seemed to be leaning toward reaching a settlement after 1967. Despite some leftist and liberal intellectuals' attempts to distinguish between 'Jews' and 'Zionists,' conflation remained dominant. For decades now, Israel has been veering further and further right amid demographic shifts that weakened local advocacy for peace. Still, the biggest blow to the 'peace movement' was dealt by the terrorist attacks launched by Hamas and its sister organizations in the 1990s as part of their war on the Oslo Accords, finishing the job started by the settlers and religious fanatics who assassinated Rabin. Despite the many instances of collusion from opposite sides, a peace deal was signed with Egypt in 1979 and another with Jordan in 1994. This peace, despite everything, has remained stable since. Once we add a few intermittent episodes, it becomes clear that peace is not impossible, and that the parties to the conflict are not inherently rigid actors eternally closed to any peace. One moment that reinforces this claim was the shift from Madrid (1991) when the Israelis refused to negotiate with the Palestinians as Palestinians, to Oslo (1993) when they reached a settlement with the PLO; another is Israel's decision to opt for unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000... A current obstacle to peace - one that is not mentioned often - is that the manner of the defeats suffered by the forces fighting Israel depresses demand for peace. Since peace is, as a rule, underpinned by a relatively even playing field, Israel's overwhelming dominance strengthens its impulse to demand surrender. For instance, the defeat Arabs suffered following 'Al-Aqsa Flood' has propelled the Israelis to the gates of Damascus. Decades earlier, Israel managed to inflict a thumping defeat on the three countries that had waged the 1967 war in just six days, and as a result, a 'war of attrition' was needed to initiate negotiations under Nasser, followed by the expulsion of the Soviet experts from Egypt under Sadat. But all Egypt's efforts and concessions proved insufficient to bring Israel to the negotiating table. And that is precisely the virtue of the 1973 October War: seen from a Sadatist angle, it was a war to invigorate politics and end all wars. It ended in a defeat that politics could absorb, not a defeat that removes the need for politics altogether, at least from the victor's point of view. Today, it is difficult to discuss peace as Israel keeps the genocide going without regard for any sort of peace. But what else can we do? So long as this state of affairs does not change, striving to make progress on the path to peace is our only choice - a path that does not include wars like those of 1967 or 'Al-Aqsa Flood,' neither today nor tomorrow.
Asharq Al-Awsat
07-05-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
The Journey of a Broken Transition from Nasser to His Sons and Grandsons
The audio recording of Gamal Abdel Nasser continues to make noise. Some of this noise comes from the ideas that have been discovered, as this time, they diverged sharply from prevailing narratives; some of it stems from the fact that we were discovering things about Nasser, whose positions many test their own - be they opposed or aligned with his. More than anything else, the recording is significant because it touches on an ongoing controversy that was blown up by the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation and its repercussions, particularly with regard to the binaries of war and peace, extremism and moderation, and maximalism and realism. Naturally, much of this attention has been tinged with praise or derision, as well as agreement, reproach, skepticism, and repudiation, or attempts to defend his imperiled reputation or reactions that fall into the category of "I told you so." We also have intrigue and vitriol that, at times, rise to the scandalous heights that social media fawns over. One basis for making judgments on the recording is to measure the Nasserist position against the positions (both explicit and implicit) of Nasser's sons and grandsons, and, in turn, to measure the sons and grandsons' positions against the explicit and implicit Nasserist position. A stench comes out of this mutual exercise that resembles voyeurism, as we find lots of lying, as well as lots of duplicity in the name of Palestine and toward Palestinians; it also makes clear that neither side can extend the legitimacy both lack to the other. Indeed, it is as though the shattering of radical politics has deprived it of sustainability, with the grandfather seemingly sterile, with no offsprings, and the grandson a bastard who had come from nowhere. The "sons," here, are those of Nasser's contemporaries who imitated him and, in his later years, began clawing at his leadership with the aim of becoming his heirs: Hafez al-Assad, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi, Jaafar Nimeiri... All of them seized power between 1968 and 1970 through coups and conspiracies, just as the "father" had done in 1952. As for the grandsons, they are the ones who, without having necessarily branched out of Arab nationalism, devoted themselves to upholding the banner of the struggle, as well as to an antagonistic portrayal of the world and the self. The top spot, here, is occupied by Islamist forces and militias like Hamas and Hezbollah, for whom "Al-Aqsa Flood" was a doorway to great history. The erosion (or rather obliteration) of the national and pan-Arab basis of this conflict's transnationalism might be the most consequential outcome of the process. Under the sons, the exploitation of Palestine and the Palestinians in the service of "pan-Arab" authoritarian projects, and the incitement and provocation of civil wars to this same end, became transparent and exposed. When their time came, the grandsons sought to compensate for this by soliciting international foundations for the conflict - foundations that resist being tied to a particular country or the particular affairs of a specific country. Thus, Iran (a non-Arab state, evidently) came to play a central role in the conflict - one that was paralleled by student-led protest movements in the United States. Regardless of the wishes or intentions of either of the two parties, Khomeini's Iran was the ultimate and most powerful embodiment of "confronting imperialism" and "decolonization." It might be fair, especially after the recent revelations, to say that in the final years of his life, Nasser abandoned a conception of politics grounded in transnational "solidarity" for another - a conception of politics that he had, at an earlier time, buried with his own hands. The slogan of "Undoing the effects of aggression," Nasser's focus on Sinai and nothing else, and his assertion that "We have nothing to do with the Palestinian cause," all underscore his prioritization of one particular country and state. The defeat of 1967 was not the only reason for this shift; his policy of prioritizing "solidarity" had caused two setbacks before the Naksa (the Arabic word for setback, which is also used to refer to the Six Day War of 1967). The 1958 union between Egypt and Syria, which was said to have been intended to "save Syria from the Turkish and Hashemite threats," ultimately led to Syria's secession from the "United Arab Republic" in 1961. In turn, Egypt's intervention in the Yemen war, "in support of the republic and to save Yemen the imamate and reactionary forces," had only one outcome: weakening Egypt in the face of Israel in 1967. The other distinction between Nasser's final years and his "children" and "grandchildren" generations, is that he acknowledged the defeat, resigned after the war, and learned something about war and the balance of power: "Are we going to wage a war against the entire world?!" he asks Ghaddafi with indignant sarcasm That Egypt could then count on the support of the Soviet Union, the world's second military power at the time, mattered little. We know that their sons never behaved that way. Saddam Hussein, for example, would go from one "mother of all battles" to another, while Hafez al-Assad, to avoid finding himself at a dead end, would flee from one regional crisis to another. It is with the descendants, however, that the aversion to acknowledging defeat appears to reach astronomical proportions. Indeed, "Axis of Resistance" forces continue to declare victory over the rubble that surrounds their broken peoples. This is not alien to politics that dismiss their countries and peoples, striving to divide them, as Hamas has done with its coup and the Houthis did in Yemen, which has been turned into two Yemens. Moreover, their unequal relationships with Iran come to shape objectives and strategies. None of that can be said about Nasser's Egyptianism, even if he did not always advocate it compellingly.
