Latest news with #CTBT
Newsweek
25-04-2025
- Science
- Newsweek
Earthquakes Could Be Hiding Secret Nuclear Tests, Say Seismologists
Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources. Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content. Earthquakes could be being used as cover for secret nuclear tests, a newly-published review article by leading seismologists has cautioned. The findings come as part of a review article by Joshua Carmichael and colleagues at Los Alamos National Laboratory, published in the latest edition of the Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America. According to the analysis, advanced signal detector technology capable of identifying a 1.7-ton buried explosion with a 97 percent success rate only has a 37 percent success rate when seismic signals from that explosion are hidden within the seismic waveforms of an earthquake happening within 100 seconds and around 250 kilometers away from the explosion. Carmichael's review concluded that the overlapping waveforms of explosion and earthquake "obfuscate the ability of even the most sensitive digital signal detectors we have to identify that explosion." These findings contradict a previous 2012 report on "masking," which suggested earthquake signals could not cover up explosion signals. Warning signs about radioactive materials erected at White Sands Missile Range following the detonation of the world's first atomic bomb in Socorro, New Mexico, Warning signs about radioactive materials erected at White Sands Missile Range following the detonation of the world's first atomic bomb in Socorro, New Mexico, SWInsider/Getty The idea of explosions being masked by natural seismic signals will be a source of concern to scientists tasked with monitoring nuclear testing around the world. Under the terms of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), all nuclear explosions are prohibited whether for military or peaceful purposes. In the review, Carmichael warned that his findings suggest that "background seismicity in regions where there's any sort of seismicity at all is going to measurably and substantially reduce the probability that we can detect signals from an underground explosion at a test site." Carmichael noted that in countries like North Korea, where six nuclear tests have been conducted in the past 20 years, an increase in regional seismic instruments indicates "there's been a lot more low-magnitude seismicity in the vicinity of test sites than we initially realized." North Korea's nuclear program was recently described as being "completely off the charts," with South Korea already being prepared for a potential attack. The review also highlighted how the natural signals from earthquake swarms and other repeating seismic events could also be hidden within overlapping waveforms. In these instances, the masking effect could potentially lead to a drop from 92 percent to 16 percent in detection rates Carmichael said: "This may mean that we probably underestimate a lot of the low magnitude seismicity that is sourced during a swarm or an aftershock sequence." "In other words, we could be largely undercounting the number of earthquakes that occur in these swarms or in certain aftershock sequences." The theory of explosion masking has proven to be difficult to prove in practice. This is largely down to a lack of explosions to examine as well as limited data containing both natural seismic signals and explosions. Rather than simulate explosion data to reach their findings, Carmichael and his colleagues utilized data on explosions and natural seismicity at the Nevada National Security Site. Scaling down the amplitude of the explosion data, they then mixed this waveform with earthquake signals to try and determine if the two could be differentiated by detectors. It's important to note that a coinciding earthquake alone would not be enough to cover up an explosion even of this kind. Multiple factors go into effective nuclear test monitoring, such as looking for the presence of certain radionuclides in the atmosphere. Newsweek has contacted Nuclear Security Technologies, a company at the forefront of detecting and verifying potential nuclear tests worldwide through seismic data, for comment. Do you have a tip on a science story that Newsweek should be covering? Do you have a question about seismology? Let us know via science@ Reference Carmichael, J. D., Delbridge, B. G., & Alfaro‐Diaz, R. (2025). The Reduced Detection Rate of Signals That Are Hidden by Earthquakes: Case Studies with Spotlight Detectors That Operate at Seismic Arrays. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America.
&w=3840&q=100)
First Post
21-04-2025
- Politics
- First Post
China's fissile-free hydrogen bomb: Silent detonation that could rewire global security
A hydrogen bomb—thermonuclear by design—that doesn't require uranium or plutonium; such a weapon of mass destruction could bypass existing nuclear non-proliferation treaties and is a game-changer for rogue states, terrorist organisations, and strategic parity in the Indo-Pacific read more The bomb has gone quiet. But the echoes will be deafening. Representational image: REUTERS In early 2025, deep within the bowels of Lop Nur in Xinjiang, China executed a test that may well change the world—not with the roar of a mushroom cloud, but with the chilling silence of ambiguity. Reports emerging from high-resolution satellite imagery and seismic sensors point to a detonation—small, precise, and curiously clean. No radiation, no fissile residue, no clear violation. Yet intelligence insiders and Western analysts whisper of a new terror: a fissile-material-free hydrogen bomb, or more accurately, a non-fission-triggered thermonuclear device. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Let's pause and let that sink in. A hydrogen bomb—thermonuclear by design—that doesn't require uranium or plutonium. A weapon of mass destruction that could bypass existing nuclear non-proliferation treaties. A game-changer for rogue states, terrorist organisations, and strategic parity in the Indo-Pacific. What is a Fissile-Free Hydrogen Bomb? Traditionally, all hydrogen bombs (H-bombs) use a two-stage process: Primary fission trigger: A core of fissile material (like uranium-235 or plutonium-239) explodes, creating the temperature and pressure required to initiate fusion. Secondary fusion stage: Under this extreme heat, isotopes of hydrogen (deuterium and tritium) fuse, releasing an exponentially larger amount of energy. Now imagine skipping the first part altogether. China's claimed breakthrough replaces the fission trigger with alternative ignition systems—possibly inertial confinement using high-energy lasers or magnetic compression akin to Z-pinch plasma devices. These methods focus energy on a tiny pellet of hydrogen isotopes until fusion occurs—essentially a laser-ignited fusion bomb. No fissile core. No critical mass. No tell-tale nuclear signature. Why This Is Terrifying Legal Loophole: Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a nuclear weapon is defined largely by the use of fissile material. This new device sidesteps that definition. Technically, it could be seen as non-nuclear under international law—despite its thermonuclear effects. Easier to Build, Easier to Hide: Fissile material is the bottleneck in any nuclear weapon program. It's scarce, trackable, and requires large infrastructure (reactors or enrichment plants). Fusion fuels like deuterium and tritium are harder to control, especially in civilian research or fusion energy programs. Proliferation Risk: If China can develop and test such a device, so can Russia, North Korea, Iran, or even Pakistan—with Chinese assistance or theft. It opens a backdoor to thermonuclear capability for any state with a fusion research lab and sufficient ambition. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Undetectable Testing: Unlike traditional nuclear explosions, laser-triggered fusion bombs emit little to no radioactive fallout. The Partial Test Ban Treaty or CTBT becomes toothless. Sub-critical tests can be cloaked as scientific fusion experiments. Rogue Use and Asymmetric Warfare: A bomb with a fusion-level yield, compact enough to fit in a suitcase, devoid of a radioactive signature, and potentially deniable—this is a terrorist's dream and a general's nightmare. How This Changes the Strategic Equation Let's be clear. If such a weapon is confirmed, we are no longer in the world of MAD—Mutual Assured Destruction. We're entering MAPD—Mutual Assured Political Denial. These bombs could be: Delivered covertly. Used in gray zone warfare . Blamed on third parties. Disguised as industrial accidents. In a hypothetical Indo-Pacific scenario, imagine a fusion bomb exploding in a port like Singapore or Mumbai. No radioactive traces. No missile trajectory. No conclusive attribution. And yet, thousands are dead. The enemy walks away whistling. The Domino Effect: Who Follows? Pakistan: With deep nuclear ties to China, an already fragile civilian control over its nuclear assets, and an ISI willing to play dirty, this could give Pakistan strategic parity with India without risking international sanctions. A fusion bomb in Balakot changes the calculus. North Korea: Already boasting a failed economy but successful nuclear ambitions, Pyongyang may find this cheaper and more scalable. They've invested heavily in laser technology and fusion research under the guise of civilian energy programmes. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Iran: Tehran, stuck under sanctions and closely watched for uranium enrichment, could pivot to laser-based fusion under its civil research umbrella. The West would have no legal basis to challenge it—until it's too late. Russia: With advanced fusion research (e.g., at Dubna) and an increasingly belligerent strategic posture, Moscow could resurrect the clean bomb doctrine. A fusion weapon without fallout would be seen as a tactical battlefield option—less politically toxic, more militarily effective. What About India? India, a responsible nuclear power, faces a uniquely precarious position. Unlike China, it does not enjoy strategic ambiguity. Unlike Pakistan, it cannot rely on deniability. And unlike the US, it cannot enforce the rules. India must now reassess its no first use (NFU) doctrine. A fusion bomb detonation in Kashmir—deniable and untraceable—would place immense pressure on India's retaliatory posture. The doctrine of credible minimum deterrence must now account for credible attribution capabilities. Moreover, India's fusion research (notably at the Institute for Plasma Research, Gandhinagar) must pivot from energy to strategic defence applications. Laser-triggered inertial confinement fusion may no longer be just a scientific curiosity. It could become a sovereign necessity. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD International Law Is Not Ready Existing frameworks like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards are built around fissionable material. They monitor uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, and nuclear reactors. But a fissile-free bomb? No enrichment required. No reactors involved. No need to declare stockpiles of uranium or plutonium. Fusion fuel, such as deuterium, can be extracted from seawater. Tritium, though trickier, can be bred from lithium using neutron sources—which could come from accelerators or sub-critical reactors. In other words, the raw materials are civilian-accessible, and the manufacturing footprint is deniable. We now need a Fusion Non-Proliferation Treaty (FNPT) or an International Thermonuclear Safeguards Regime—one that: Monitors laser fusion research. Tracks tritium production. Creates red lines for inertial confinement fusion above specific energy thresholds. Adds fusion bombs to the definition of nuclear weapons in all treaties. The Role of the United Nations If ever there was a time to reform the UN Security Council and its instruments, it is now. A special Fusion Weapons Verification Body (FWVB) under the IAEA could be modelled after the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons). The CTBT must be amended to account for non-radiological thermonuclear detonations. And perhaps, for the first time, global powers must consider classifying thermonuclear weapons by energy yield, not by fissile content. What India Must Do India cannot afford to lag behind on three fronts: 1. Fusion Research for Deterrence: Ramp up defence applications of laser and plasma confinement. Encourage public-private research with DRDO and premier institutes like IISc and IITs. We need our own 'clean bomb' programme—not to use it, but to deter its use. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD 2. Legal Leadership: Leverage India's growing global stature to champion a Fusion Weapons Convention. Use platforms like G20, BRICS, and the Quad to push for global clarity. India, with its moral weight and strategic balance, is uniquely positioned to lead this debate. 3. Strategic Infrastructure Resilience: Prepare for a world of deniable detonations. Harden ports, airports, and economic corridors. Develop AI-based anomaly detection systems. And start preparing for post-blast attribution protocols, including satellite forensics and AI pattern recognition. Final Thoughts: A Weapon Born of Science, Destined for Ambiguity History is replete with turning points masquerading as footnotes. Just as Einstein's letter to Roosevelt ushered in the atomic age, this quiet Chinese test may inaugurate a new era—where legal loopholes meet thermonuclear horror, and science races ahead of diplomacy. The world is not ready. International law is outdated. Strategic doctrine is static. And the fuse may already be lit. The bomb has gone quiet. But the echoes will be deafening. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The author is a columnist, Group Captain (retd) and a former fighter pilot of the IAF. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
Russia Today
30-01-2025
- Science
- Russia Today
US to test aging plutonium in its nuclear arsenal
The US is preparing for another 'subcritical' nuclear experiment this spring, to test whether the decades-old plutonium at the core of its nuclear weapons has degraded, the National Public Radio (NPR) network reported on Wednesday. Such tests are not full-scale nuclear tests, meaning they do not use enough fissile material to produce a self-sustaining reaction. Washington insists such experiments are not prohibited under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which forbids nuclear test explosions in all environments. Both the US and Russia signed the 1996 accord but stopped short of ratifying it. Neither nation has conducted live nuclear tests since the early 1990s. Code-named 'Nob Hill,' the plutonium-testing procedure will be performed at the US PULSE facility in Nevada. The test will take place as part of a project called Cygnus, which is considered one of the US government's most secretive science projects, NPR claimed. 'The explosion will be tiny, an unimaginably small fraction of a nuclear weapon's true power, and the US government says there will not be a runaway nuclear reaction, even a little one,' Tim Beller, who is directing the planned test, told a group of journalists believed to have been allowed to tour a secretive nuclear weapons laboratory by the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Since plutonium forms the core of America's nuclear arsenal – much of it produced decades ago – these tests aim to address aging concerns, while also contributing to the modernization of existing weapons, the report noted. As the plutonium ages, it decays radioactively, releasing helium atoms. Those atoms can form bubbles and damage the plutonium metal's structure, which could have a significant impact on the material response, Ivan Otero, a nuclear weapons scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, told the outlet. READ MORE: Russia could resume nuclear tests – deputy FM Discussions about nuclear testing come amid a global resurgence of nuclear weapons, NPR said, quoting Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, who warned, 'The risk is significant.' The US, Russia's main nuclear rival, conducted its last full-scale nuclear test in 1992 and has since relied on computer simulations and subcritical tests. The last known test of this type took place in May, with Moscow saying it was 'looking closely at what is happening' at American test sites and that 'signals' coming from Washington suggest the possible further development of American nuclear weapons. In November 2023, Russia downgraded its participation in the CTBT to signatory status, stating the move was intended to restore parity with the US. Moscow emphasized that this did not indicate plans to resume underground nuclear testing. READ MORE: Putin supports idea of reducing nuclear stockpiles – Trump Last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Moscow should be ready to resume nuclear testing if the US does. However, he has repeatedly stressed that for Moscow the use of nuclear weapons is a 'last resort.' This month, US President Donald Trump stated that he hopes to hold talks with Russia and China on reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles. Moscow is ready to resume disarmament negotiations with the US as soon as possible, the Kremlin has said.
