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The Diplomat
a day ago
- Business
- The Diplomat
‘Stable Instability': China-Japan Dilemmas in the Shadow of Sino-American Rivalry
Three enduring dilemmas define the complex relationship between Asia's two largest economies as they mark the 80th anniversary of World War II's end. Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru (left) meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Lima, Peru, Nov. 15, 2024. As Asia-Pacific nations grapple with an increasingly complex security environment, Japan and China find themselves locked in what can be described as 'stable instability' – a relationship characterized by sustained economic engagement alongside persistent political mistrust and security tensions. This paradoxical state has become the defining feature of bilateral relations between Asia's two largest economies, particularly as they commemorate the 80th anniversary of the conclusion of World War II in 2025. Despite strong economic ties, with bilateral trade reaching $292.6 billion in 2024, China-Japan relations remain strained by geopolitical disputes, wartime history, and territorial issues. This economic interdependence coexists uneasily with deep-seated public mistrust and strategic competition, creating a relationship that defies simple categorization as either cooperative or adversarial. Understanding this complex dynamic requires examining three structural dilemmas that have come to define contemporary China-Japan relations. These enduring challenges reveal why the relationship has settled into its current state of stable instability and what this means for regional security and prosperity. Interdependence vs Security: The First Dilemma The first dilemma centers on the tension between economic interdependence and security vulnerabilities. Japan and China have developed one of the world's most extensive economic relationships, with deeply integrated supply chains spanning automotive parts, semiconductor materials, and consumer electronics. China remains Japan's largest trading partner, a position that has persisted despite periodic political tensions and calls for economic decoupling. However, this economic intimacy has increasingly become a source of strategic anxiety rather than just mutual benefit. The concept of 'weaponized interdependence,' as described by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman in their seminal work on how global economic networks shape state coercion, perfectly captures this dilemma. Dependencies on critical materials, advanced technologies, and production networks that once represented pure economic efficiency now carry potential security risks and political leverage. Japan's concerns have been amplified by China's use of economic tools for political purposes, such as restrictions on Japanese seafood imports following the Fukushima wastewater release. China announced in June this year that it would resume imports of some Japanese seafood products that had been suspended due to the discharge of treated water from Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, but seafood from 10 prefectures, including Fukushima, remains subject to import bans. Such incidents underscore how economic relationships can quickly become instruments of political pressure. This dynamic has led Japan to pursue what it terms 'economic security' – a policy framework formally integrated into its 2022 National Security Strategy. The strategy defines Japan's economic security as ensuring 'Japan's national interests, such as peace, security, and economic prosperity, by carrying out economic measures,' reflecting a recognition that economic and security considerations can no longer be separated. The challenge lies in maintaining the benefits of economic cooperation while mitigating the vulnerabilities that come with interdependence. Neither complete decoupling nor naive trust represents a viable path forward, forcing both nations to navigate an uncomfortable middle ground where economic collaboration must coexist with strategic hedging. Alliance Strengthening vs Regional Leadership: The Second Dilemma Japan's second structural dilemma involves balancing its deepening alliance with the United States against its aspirations to play a constructive role in regional stability. This tension has been thrown into sharp relief by Japan's dramatic defense transformation, outlined in this same 2022 National Security Strategy and accompanying documents. The National Security Strategy pledges to increase defense spending from roughly 1 percent of GDP to 2 percent by fiscal year 2027 and calls for Japan's armed forces to acquire counterstrike missile capabilities. These changes represent the most significant shift in Japan's defense posture since World War II, effectively moving beyond the constraints of purely defensive capabilities. From China's perspective, these developments appear to confirm fears of Japan's participation in the U.S.-led containment strategy. The East China Sea remains a flashpoint due to territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyu in China, with China's growing military presence raising concerns in Tokyo. Recent incidents, including a Chinese JH-7 fighter-bomber flying within 30 meters of a Japanese intelligence aircraft in July 2025, illustrate how quickly tensions can escalate. Yet Japan simultaneously seeks to position itself as a responsible stakeholder in the regional order. Through initiatives like the China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) and its engagement with ASEAN, Japan attempts to demonstrate that its enhanced defense capabilities serve regional stability rather than destabilization. Recent diplomatic initiatives, including the meeting between Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during ASEAN-related foreign ministers' meetings in Malaysia on July 10, suggest both sides recognize the need for dialogue even amid strategic competition. This balancing act reflects Japan's broader strategic challenge: how to fulfill alliance commitments while maintaining the flexibility to engage constructively with all regional stakeholders. The Trump administration's unpredictable approach to China adds another layer of complexity, as Japan seeks to influence how China-U.S. competition develops while emphasizing to Washington that Japan cannot completely sever ties with its largest neighbor and trading partner. Mutual Understanding vs Emotional Reactions: The Third Dilemma The third dilemma involves the growing disconnect between the imperative for mutual understanding and the emotional polarization amplified by digital media. Social media algorithms and online echo chambers have created information environments that often prioritize sensationalism over nuance, making thoughtful dialogue more difficult even as its importance grows. Public opinion data reveals the depth of this challenge. Japanese surveys consistently show that those who feel 'no affinity' toward China significantly outnumber those who think positively about the relationship. Today, 84.7 percent of Japanese respondents express that they 'do not feel close' to China – a dramatic reversal from the early post-normalization period, when favorable sentiment reached nearly 80 percent. This shift reflects not just policy disagreements but the accumulation of negative impressions reinforced by digital media consumption patterns. The problem extends beyond public opinion to the operational level of crisis management. While a China-Japan defense hotline was established in 2023, its effectiveness remains untested in severe crises. The rapid pace of military encounters in the East China Sea, where split-second decisions can escalate tensions, demands robust communication mechanisms backed by mutual trust, precisely what remains in short supply. Paradoxically, people-to-people exchanges have shown resilience. Tourism and educational exchanges have rebounded from pandemic lows, with China easing its stance on various issues, including the resumption of imports of Nishikigoi tropical fish and the reinstatement of visa-free entry. However, these positive developments at the societal level have not translated into improved political relations or reduced strategic mistrust. The challenge is compounded by the reality that both governments face domestic political pressures that reward tough rhetoric toward the other country. With Japan's House of Councillors election having taken place in July 2025, Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru continues to face constraints, given that the majority of the Japanese population is critical of China. Similar dynamics operate in China, where nationalist sentiment limits leaders' flexibility in making concessions. Embracing 'Stable Instability': The Art of Perpetual Management These three dilemmas illustrate why China-Japan relations have settled into their current pattern of stable instability. Rather than representing a temporary phase that will eventually resolve into clear cooperation or confrontation, this may be the enduring character of the relationship – one that requires constant management rather than definitive resolution. As reflected in their November 2024 meeting, Ishiba and Chinese President Xi Jinping confirmed that Japan and China continue to share a broad direction of comprehensively promoting a 'Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests' and building 'constructive and stable Japan-China relations.' The 80th anniversary of World War II's end provides a symbolic opportunity for both nations to demonstrate mature leadership, but the structural factors driving stable instability remain powerful. Success will likely depend on both countries' ability to compartmentalize different aspects of their relationship. Economic cooperation, climate change mitigation, pandemic preparedness, and cultural exchange can proceed even when security competition continues. Recent examples include the renewal of the bilateral currency swap deal worth 200 billion yuan (about $28.13 billion) and a Japanese business delegation visiting China for the first time since 2019. The path forward requires acknowledging that China-Japan relations exist in a multipolar context where neither country can afford to view the other purely through the lens of bilateral dynamics. Regional institutions, global challenges, and third-party relationships all shape the bilateral relationship in ways that create both constraints and opportunities. Rather than seeking to resolve the fundamental tensions that define the relationship, both countries might be better served by establishing mechanisms to manage these tensions constructively. This means strengthening crisis communication channels, maintaining economic dialogue even during periods of political dispute, and creating space for civil society exchanges that can withstand periodic government tensions. The concept of stable instability, uncomfortable as it may be, offers a more realistic framework for understanding China-Japan relations than expectations of either strategic partnership or inevitable conflict. In an era of growing global complexity, managing such relationships may be among the most essential diplomatic skills both nations can develop. As Japan and China navigate the remainder of 2025, their ability to demonstrate that major powers can maintain stable relationships despite fundamental differences will have implications far beyond Northeast Asia. In a world increasingly characterized by multiple centers of power and persistent areas of competition, the China-Japan model of stable instability may prove more relevant than traditional notions of either alliance or rivalry.
Straits Times
16-07-2025
- Business
- Straits Times
China hands 3-1/2-year prison sentence to Astellas' Japanese employee, Nikkei says
Find out what's new on ST website and app. TOKYO - A Beijing court on Wednesday sentenced a Japanese employee of Astellas Pharma to 3-1/2 years in prison, the Nikkei newspaper reported, citing the Japanese ambassador to China. The man had been detained since March 2023 on suspicion of spying and had been indicted about a year ago. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said on Wednesday that the country's judicial authorities handle cases in accordance with the law, when asked a question about a Beijing court sentencing an employee of a Japanese pharmaceutical company to prison for espionage. The question did not name the company. China has always supported China-Japan economic and trade cooperation, and provides a good environment for the lawful operations of Japanese enterprises and personnel in China, Lin told a regular press briefing. REUTERS
Nikkei Asia
01-07-2025
- Business
- Nikkei Asia
Chinese regulator approves ANA takeover of Nippon Cargo
ANA Holdings originally announced the plan to buy Nippon Cargo Airlines in 2023 but postponed the deal eight times, citing regulatory delays. (Photo by Makoto Okada) BEIJING (Reuters) -- China's market regulator said on Tuesday it has approved ANA Holdings' acquisition of Nippon Cargo Airlines (NCA) with conditions, including a set of binding commitments to preserve fair competition in the China-Japan air cargo market. The Chinese regulator's approval has cleared the way for ANA, Japan's largest airline, to buy NCA to bolster international cargo operations, after multiple delays. In a statement, the State Administration for Market Regulation said ANA, NCA and their merged entity must continue to honor existing agreements for cargo ground handling at the Tokyo area's Narita Airport and the Osaka area's Kansai Airport. The decision was made to ensure the smooth operation of bilateral trade and safeguard the stability of regional industrial and supply chains, the regulator said. With the green light from the Chinese authority, ANA is set to acquire NCA from current parent Nippon Yusen, Japan's largest shipping line, on Aug. 1, it said. ANA announced the plan to acquire NCA in 2023 but has postponed the execution eight times, most recently June 25, citing delays in regulatory processes. Japan Fair Trade Commission, the country's market watchdog, had approved the takeover plan in January.
The Diplomat
27-06-2025
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Japan's WWII Anniversary Strategy and China's Memory Politics
The historical issues in East Asia have long been a blindspot for the United States. Time to start paying attention. As Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru prepares for the 80th anniversary of Japan's surrender in World War II this August, the United States must, for the first time, fully recognize and respond to the geopolitical implications underpinning these commemorative cycles. While Washington tends to dismiss these disputes as political theater secondary to power politics, Beijing continues its decades-long campaign of systematically collecting, digitizing, and analyzing Japanese wartime records and military writings. This historical infrastructure provides insights into Tokyo's postwar defense establishment, reinforces China's broader nationalistic narrative, and expands Beijing's regional interests – yet Washington fails to recognize the full extent to which China weaponizes historical narratives in order to isolate Japan and weaken U.S. alliances and partnerships across Asia. As Tokyo's role in the Indo-Pacific evolves, Washington's assumption that Japan – constitutionally restricted from maintaining military forces and shaped by decades of antimilitarist constraints and pacifist public sentiment – is fundamentally divorced from its pre-1945 strategic tradition creates dangerous vulnerabilities for alliance management and regional strategy. These vulnerabilities demand a new strategy and vigorous diplomatic effort. Misreading History in the China-Japan Rivalry These strategic vulnerabilities have deep roots. During the 1990s, bilateral security trends between Japan and China received relatively little attention. The general absence of major bilateral disputes or direct military confrontation during this period – combined with the fact that the Japan-U.S. alliance itself has often obscured Japan's own security posture, sometimes deliberately, by serving as both a buffer and interpretive lens for regional dynamics – can partially explain this lack of analytical focus. Yet underlying Sino-Japanese pressure persisted in what Japanese analysts would later describe as a state of sustained 'low altitude flight' (teikū hikō) based on confrontation and distrust. While the late 20th century neglect was perhaps understandable, this analytical blind spot's endurance cannot be justified. This period of sustained tensions was punctuated by insufficient U.S. responses to Japan's history problems. During the 2005 textbook controversy, when China erupted in massive anti-Japanese protests over textbook revisions minimizing Japanese wartime atrocities, official U.S. attempts at intervention failed to effectively intermediate. Recurring disputes over Japanese leaders' visits to Yasukuni Shrine – which controversially honors convicted war criminals alongside Japan's war dead – exemplified the United States' diplomatic limitations. Washington, for example, could muster only tepid diplomatic 'disappointment' when Prime Minister Abe Shinzo proceeded with his own controversial visit despite high level appeals from the Obama administration in 2013. In the 'comfort women' dispute, Japan's controversial approach to its own wartime responsibility for sexual slavery in Korea remains largely unresolved. U.S. pressure for a quick diplomatic resolution – the 2015 Japan-South Korea agreement – alienated survivors and triggered diplomatic backlash that undermined the accord's implementation. These and other recurring tensions and missteps, persisting despite U.S. intervention and Japanese concessions, reveal a deeper challenge: the inability of U.S. policymakers to fully recognize the drivers of such regional strain. Washington's mismanagement culminated in its response to Abe's August 2015 statement marking Japan's 70th surrender anniversary. While Abe had publicly pledged during his April 2015 U.S. visit to uphold the 1993 Kono Statement officially apologizing to comfort women, his August assertion that future generations shouldn't be 'predestined to apologize' signaled a shift in Japan's approach. U.S. officials responded positively to Abe's statement, despite predictable regional fallout with Japan's neighbors. This diplomatic misstep undermined trilateral security coordination precisely when North Korean threats and Chinese incursions demanded it. As Ishiba prepares to navigate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, he now inherits this decades-long challenge. Ishiba's Anniversary Strategy As early as January 2025, Ishiba recognized the 80th anniversary as a predominant challenge of his early tenure, despite fumbling and recently recovering approval ratings. He has proposed an expert panel to examine the war's origins. This approach allows him to sidestep a formal Cabinet statement and instead minimize personal association with the issue by issuing a message to the public based on the findings of this panel. Ishiba's April 2025 visit to the Philippines War Memorial revealed the uneasiness in his approach. His observation that 'they haven't forgotten' Japan's wartime actions acknowledges regional wounds that persist eight decades later. Yet his government's proposed war panel appears to analyze primarily procedural questions and policy failures – what Komeito party leader Saito Tetsuo described as examining 'why Japan plunged into a war where many died and why it couldn't be stopped' – not moral responsibility. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian, in contrast, demanded that Japan 'deeply reflect on its historical guilt' while citing Ishiba's November 2024 pledge to 'look to the future, facing history squarely.' Beijing commands this gap between acknowledging history and accepting guilt – and it will maintain this territory regardless of Tokyo's approach. What Japan has traditionally treated as diplomacy, China wields as strategy. Yet Ishiba's strategy seems to further break a pattern set by his predecessors. Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi's 1995 statement at the 50th anniversary established a template of expressing 'deep remorse' and 'heartfelt apology' for Japan's wartime aggression – language that Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro maintained at the 60th anniversary in 2005. Ten years later, Abe's 2015 approach marked a sea change in this cycle, emphasizing instead Japan's evolving international role while attempting to curtail the cycle of apology. Ishiba's focus, in contrast, appears to be on process and examining wartime decision-making rather than addressing moral culpability, which positions him farther from Murayama's acceptance of guilt and closer to the strategic autonomy that has emerged from Japan's expanding security leadership in the Indo-Pacific under Abe's vision. Yet, importantly, behind Ishiba's mask of analytical neutrality lies a drift in Japan's grand strategy: nationalist narratives muted by procedural distance, quietly assuming Japanese leadership as U.S. power recedes – a shift that helps explain Beijing's efforts at controlling international narratives. Beijing's Memory Politics While Japan crafts new narratives of regional leadership, China has spent decades building the historical arsenal to counter them – translating, studying, and cataloging Japanese war materials that serve Beijing's strategic objectives regardless of Tokyo's diplomatic approach. For Beijing, mastering historical narratives stands equal to technological and economic dominance in securing China's rise to great power status – a strategy evidenced by the Chinese Ministry of State Security's 2021 analysis 'National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers.' This document shows that China studies Japan's path from wartime collapse to postwar growth to map its own rise and navigate around avoidable pitfalls while undermining Tokyo's current position. Beijing does this not to settle scores, but to amplify its own advantages – a game Tokyo is only recently learning to play. Beijing's systematic preservation of wartime records is worth understanding because it both exemplifies China's priorities and serves its strategic intelligence needs – monitoring what officials like Senior Colonel Wu Qian, director general of the Information Office of the Ministry of National Defense, describe as the lingering 'specter of militarism' in Japan's modern defense posture. China leverages this strategy to both elevate its own great power status while creating a self-reinforcing internal narrative focused on historical justice and national resurgence. Institutionalizing China's Historical Infrastructure Marshal Xu Xiangqian's 1979 speech at the Central Military Commission symposium established an institutional mandate that defined China's historical intelligence apparatus. One of his core directives required Chinese military cadres to study foreign histories of World War II to prepare for modern warfare, explicitly linking historical analysis with strategic advantage. This high-level mandate stimulated a major research effort by Chinese military education institutions and civilian universities to translate and analyze works of Japanese strategic and military thought. From approximately 1980 to 2010, Chinese academies published over 700 translations of foreign military texts on World War II, while institutions including the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Academy of Military Science, and the National Defense University began offering graduate degrees in military history. This translation infrastructure grants Chinese military decisionmakers what Ma Jun of the Chinese National Defense University called a 'rich knowledge of historical studies, and a strong ability to draw insights.' Meanwhile, such foundational Japanese military thought and historical documents are largely unknown and inaccessible to Japan's English-speaking allies. Further, China operationalizes its memory politics through memorial institutions, legal documentation, and strategic research, then deploys this historical knowledge through not just military training but confrontational diplomacy and coordinated public narratives. The Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall exemplifies Beijing's public approach, gradually transforming since its establishment in 1985 from memorialization into a celebration of 'national rejuvenation' under Xi Jinping. Beijing has long weaponized the facility's presence, including recently introducing new documentary evidence of Japanese atrocities, and maintains its international visibility and access to transform historical preservation into political leverage. Beijing applies the same strategic historiography to the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. Treatment of these proceedings remained largely neglected until China began entrenching its own historical interpretation of the trials. In 2011, Shanghai Jiao Tong University established a Center for the Tokyo Trial Studies, readily surpassing any similar institution in Japan or elsewhere internationally. The center collects, translates, and publishes Tribunal documents from the 1940s, making them widely available online. Most notably, during heightened tensions over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial disputes in 2016, the center launched one of the world's most comprehensive, multilingual online depositories of trial records and evidence to date. As just these few significant examples aptly demonstrate, Beijing has spent decades learning to read and weaponize Japan's strategic identity and history while Washington barely grasps how its ally thinks, much less where it's heading. Conclusion The knowledge asymmetry between the United States and China – compounded by Washington's failure to recognize Japan's own evolving grand strategy – creates three immediate vulnerabilities for U.S. strategy in Asia. First, it erodes effective alliance management when Japanese security decisions and postures are interpreted differently by U.S. and Chinese officials, creating the potential for dangerous misalignment during crises. Second, it risks undermining Japan's leadership ambitions while ceding narrative advantage to Beijing in multilateral fora where historical context shapes regional receptiveness to competing security frameworks. Third, it leaves Washington both ill-equipped to counter Chinese political offensives that strategically weaponize historical Sino-Japanese grievances and inclined to prioritize short-term alliance goals over addressing deeper historical tensions, U.S. retrenchment, or broader strategic evolutions in the region. Beijing's historical memory politics will test these vulnerabilities as Ishiba navigates the upcoming 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. While China's decades of strategic preparation provide significant advantages, Washington can still address these asymmetries through targeted policy adjustments. Most fundamentally, the United States must demonstrate sustained commitment to alliance management with Japan through both concrete actions and public statements that reassure Tokyo of Washington's staying power. Only then must the United States and Japan develop integrated intelligence capabilities to counter Beijing, creating bilateral initiatives that challenge China's monopoly on interpreting Japanese strategic thought for regional audiences while building U.S. expertise. Washington, alongside Tokyo, must anticipate and prepare for Beijing's historical offensives, developing proactive anniversary strategies and multilateral coordination mechanisms that prevent China from exploiting commemorative cycles to drive wedges between the United States and Japan. U.S. retreat increasingly drives Japan toward autonomy, if not outright isolation. Without reform, Beijing will exploit this upcoming anniversary to accelerate that drift while Washington will remain blind to what drives apart one of its most important Asian alliances.
AllAfrica
07-06-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
Li Qiang's realist pitch seeks to reset Sino-Japan ties
In a moment of diplomatic clarity that quickly gained traction across Chinese and international media, Chinese Premier Li Qiang recently remarked: 'China and Japan are neighbors who cannot be moved. Since we cannot move, we should be good neighbors.' This deceptively simple statement carries a deep sense of geopolitical realism. It reflects Beijing's awareness that proximity is not merely a geographical fact—it is a strategic condition that requires sober diplomacy, especially amid rising regional volatility and heated rivalry with the US. Few bilateral relationships in the Indo-Pacific are as fraught and intertwined as those between China and Japan. Rooted in centuries of interaction, marred by the horrors of 20th-century warfare and shaped by decades of economic symbiosis, the China-Japan relationship has historically and recently swung between wary competition and cautious cooperation. In invoking the idea of immutable geography, Premier Li also hinted at a basic truth: China wants stability with Japan, not out of sentimentality but strategic necessity. 'Cannot be moved' is a blunt admission of reality. From Shanghai to Fukuoka, the distance is less than 800 kilometers. Between them lies the East China Sea—an arena of resource disputes, overlapping air defense zones, and naval brinkmanship, but also a vital artery of commerce and energy transit. Despite maritime tensions, this shared body of water anchors both countries in an unavoidable relationship. Li's appeal to geography recalls the thinking of the late Japanese diplomat Yukio Okamoto, who argued that China and Japan are condemned by fate and physics to coexist—so they must learn to do so constructively. The remark also stands in contrast to nationalist or triumphalist rhetoric that often defines Cross-Strait and East Asian discourse. It acknowledges limits. Neither Beijing nor Tokyo can wish the other away. But geographical realism cannot alone extinguish historical angst. Chinese public opinion continues to be shaped by the memory of Japan's wartime occupation. The Nanjing Massacre, Unit 731, and other atrocities are not distant footnotes in Chinese historiography—they are actively remembered and politically relevant. Occasional visits by Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine or attempts to revise textbooks often rekindle nationalist anger. Conversely, Japan perceives a more assertive China with increasing alarm. Under former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and now Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Tokyo has accelerated defense reforms, increased military spending, and deepened security cooperation with the United States, Australia and the Philippines. Its participation in the Quad and increased patrolling of disputed waters signal that Japan is preparing for an era of intensified strategic competition. China interprets these developments as part of a US-led containment architecture. However, even as bilateral tensions simmer, China seeks to compartmentalize relations—keeping economic and diplomatic dialogues open even as strategic distrust lingers. It is impossible to discuss Sino-Japanese relations without referencing their vast economic interdependence. Despite all political turbulence, China remains Japan's largest trading partner. Japanese corporations remain deeply embedded in China's automotive, electronics, and high-end manufacturing sectors. Complex supply chains now stretch from Osaka to Chengdu to Southeast Asia. In this context, Premier Li's words also function as a reminder to safeguard economic engagement at a time when US-led decoupling pressures are mounting. The US is encouraging Japan to join the 'Chip 4' alliance to curtail Chinese advances in semiconductors. For Beijing, ensuring Tokyo does not fully align with Washington's techno-nationalist agenda is of paramount importance. Thus, Li's tone suggests both a pragmatic acknowledgment of tensions and an appeal to maintain economic pragmatism. Li's remarks should also be understood in a broader regional context. Both China and Japan are deeply invested in ASEAN—economically and diplomatically. While China promotes its Belt and Road Initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Japan continues to focus on high-quality infrastructure, vocational education and developmental aid. This competition is not inherently zero-sum. In fact, ASEAN can benefit from it—so long as it does not become a theater of strategic polarization. As chair of ASEAN in 2025, Malaysia has an opportunity to play the role of stabilizer. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's emphasis on multipolarity, civilizational dialogue and strategic equidistance aligns well with Li's tone. Track 1.5 diplomacy—semi-official dialogues involving academics, former officials, and policy thinkers—hosted in neutral venues such as Kuala Lumpur or Jakarta, could help China and Japan manage tensions. Such efforts would be particularly valuable on non-traditional security issues such as maritime environmental protection, climate governance and crisis communication protocols in the East China Sea. Ultimately, the future of the China-Japan relationship rests on whether the two sides can convert geographical inevitability into a foundation for stable coexistence. That requires strategic empathy, political maturity and a willingness to restrain nationalist impulses. Li's statement, stripped of bravado and couched in sober realism, offers a certain opening. It signals a potential shift away from US-led zero-sum thinking, at least in bilateral terms. For Japan, the challenge will be to balance its alliance with the United States under Donald Trump while maintaining open communication with Beijing. For China, the task is to build trust—not just through words but through consistent maritime behavior, diplomatic discipline and economic transparency. In the final analysis, the lesson is clear: China and Japan cannot ignore or outflank each other. They can either manage their rivalry or risk being overtaken by it. Geography offers no exit—but it does offer a starting point for dialogue. As Asia braces for an uncertain decade, the world will be watching whether two of its greatest powers can indeed become 'good neighbors.'
