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UPI
24 minutes ago
- Politics
- UPI
The real threat on Korean Peninsula: Chinese, North Korean political warfare
North Korea's Kim Jong-Un (L) and China's Xi Jinping are both engaging in political warfare with South Korea. File Photo by KNCA/EPA July 30 (UPI) -- Amid escalating tensions between conservatives and liberals in South Korea, and as the world fixates on North Korea's menacing nuclear arsenal, a more insidious threat is shaping the fate of the Korean Peninsula: sophisticated and largely covert political warfare orchestrated by the regimes in Beijing and Pyongyang. While missile launches and rhetoric grab international headlines, China's strategy of "unrestricted warfare" and the Kim family's brand of "political warfare with Juche characteristics" are quietly undermining the Republic of Korea from within, eroding its democracy and threatening the pillars of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Unrestricted warfare and "three warfares" in the Korean context China's concept of "unrestricted warfare" -- popularized by the People's Liberation Army and operationalized through the Chinese Communist Party's United Front Work Department -- goes far beyond traditional battlefield engagement. It includes a coordinated, all-domain campaign of "three warfares," psychological operations, legal, or lawfare, maneuvers and media/public opinion warfare. The goal of these tactics is clear: to weaken adversaries without firing a shot, minimize attribution and gain strategic dominance by sowing confusion, division and dependency in targeted societies. In South Korea, the United Front Work Department plays a pivotal role in coordinating influence operations. The department actively seeks to suppress dissent against the Chinese Communist Party, monitor diaspora communities and foster loyalty among ethnic Chinese within South Korea. Organizations such as the All-Korean Nationals of Chinese Descent Council mirror similar work department-aligned groups worldwide, cultivating pro-Beijing sentiment and integrating the community under CCP-friendly leadership. Intelligence gathering, elite capture, economic coercion and technology transfer are just a few of the tactics employed to shape South Korean policy and public opinion in ways that align with Beijing's interests. Political warfare with Juche characteristics: North Korea's hand North Korea, under the Kim family regime, has long waged political warfare, guided by its own Juche ideology, as a core weapon against the South. Pro-North Korean elements within South Korea, spanning political figures, civic organizations and clandestine networks pursue active subversion. Their efforts, sometimes lead to legal intervention, fuel political controversies and polarization, further complicating South Korea's internal dynamics. These activities are not theoretical concerns; they are ongoing, with direct implications for key political events such as the snap presidential election held last June. Covert assistance from Pyongyang's United Front Department and the Reconnaissance General Bureau supports agents of influence in the South, aiming to delegitimize Seoul's democratic institutions and fracture the U.S.-ROK security partnership. The subtle power of covert action One of the defining qualities of Chinese and North Korean influence operations is mastery of covert action. Their tradecraft is designed around deniability: admit nothing, deny everything, and make counteraccusations to undermine any allegations of illicit activities. The lack of overt evidence is not proof of innocence, but rather a hallmark of skillful subversion and effective tradecraft. When credible exposés or documentaries reveal such operations, well-coordinated attacks arise, not organically, but as orchestrated disinformation campaigns intended to discredit the truth and intimidate dissenters. The almost instantaneous, highly synchronized responses to critical media coverage of Chinese or North Korean influence operations in South Korea reveal the depth of planning and forethought -- not spontaneous public backlash, but a calculated attempt to manipulate perceptions and stifle legitimate concerns. Strategic objectives undermining democracy and the alliance The objectives of China and North Korea are inextricably linked. Beijing views a weak or politically fractured South Korea as a strategic advantage, undermining U.S. influence in the region and shifting the balance of power in favor of Chinese interests. Simultaneously, Pyongyang seeks to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington, undermine the legitimacy of South Korea's democracy and eventually end the U.S. nuclear umbrella, as well as the American military presence on the peninsula. Both regimes benefit from mutual reinforcement: Chinese support for North Korean provocations and Pyongyang's subversive leverage serves the broader aim of turning the Korean Peninsula into a fault line in U.S.-China strategic competition. This shared interest sustains a persistent campaign to destabilize the South, not just through conventional threats, but by eroding the very fabric of Korean society and politics from within. South Korea: battleground of strategic competition The Korean Peninsula is no longer just a flashpoint for North Korean military threats or domestic political struggles; it is ground zero in the broader clash between U.S.-led democratic alliances and authoritarian great power ambitions. Rather than simply preparing for open aggression, South Korea must recognize and counter the unseen campaigns waged daily by its northern neighbor and the world's most powerful authoritarian state. Ignoring or dismissing these operations as "fake news" or conspiracy theory only serves the interests of Beijing and Pyongyang. Their sophisticated political warfare is a direct assault on South Korea's independence, democratic institutions and its alliance with the United States. Recognizing and exposing these malign activities, however subtle, covert or denied, is the first step to ensuring South Korea's sovereignty, security and continued prosperity. South Korea must therefore invest in robust counterintelligence, civic education and information resilience to protect its democratic system. Only by acknowledging the true nature of the threat, one that operates invisibly but with strategic intent, can the Korean Peninsula avoid being reshaped according to the designs of those who seek its division and subjugation. David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.
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Business Standard
5 hours ago
- Business
- Business Standard
China's five-year plan enters final year: How much has it delivered?
China is entering the final stretch of its 14th Five-Year Plan, the country's blueprint for economic and social development. With just months to go before the plan wraps up in 2025, the Chinese Communist Party is preparing to chart the course for the next five years. On Wednesday, state media announced that the Party will hold a key meeting in October in Beijing to set priorities for the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030). The upcoming Fourth Plenary Session will bring together more than 370 senior officials. As global growth slows and tensions with the United States persist, China is using this moment to assess where it stands—and where it's headed next. What are five-year plans, and why do they matter? In China, Five-Year Plans are more than just paperwork. Since 1953, these policy roadmaps have guided nearly every corner of the country's development — from steel production to school reform, internet regulation to green energy. The plans are drafted by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), reviewed by the Communist Party leadership, and approved by the National People's Congress. Though China now operates a market economy, the plans remain central to its long-term strategy. China's current five-year plan 2021-25 The current 14th Plan, adopted in 2021, came with a long list of goals. It aimed to grow the economy steadily, boost homegrown innovation, cut carbon emissions, and improve people's lives, while also keeping the country secure and stable in a rapidly changing world. What China set out to do by 2025 According to the official plan document, the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) focused on eight big areas: Grow smarter, not just faster – Shift from high-speed to high-quality development. Rely more on domestic innovation – Invest in science and technology to reduce foreign tech dependence. Boost local demand – Rely less on exports, more on consumer spending at home. Go green – Cut emissions and lead in clean energy. Keep reform going – Modernise the economy while still opening up to the world. Make life better for people – Improve jobs, health care, education, and social security. Balance the rural-urban divide – Reduce gaps between cities and the countryside. Strengthen security – Safeguard China's economic and national interests. China's scorecard: What's been achieved Now in its fifth and final year, how close has China come to meeting those goals? According to a recent NDRC briefing and official data released by state media Xinhua, progress has been strong across most areas. A separate report by the US Chamber of Commerce, released in May 2025, also presented its own evaluation of China's economic strides. Here is what the reports say: Economic growth China's economy expanded by an average of 5.5 per cent from 2021 to 2024. Evaluation: In line with the goal of stable and high-quality growth, especially considering pandemic-era disruptions and global economic headwinds. US Chamber perspective: The US Chamber of Commerce acknowledged China's industrial advances, but cautioned that overcapacity and inefficiencies have weighed on productivity, contributing to a slower and less balanced growth model. Technological self-reliance Research and Development spending rose by nearly 50 per cent, totalling over 1.2 trillion yuan. Breakthroughs were reported in chips, AI models, and robotics. Evaluation: Clear progress toward the goal of reducing dependency on foreign technology, though external sanctions continue to pose constraints. US Chamber perspective: The Chamber's assessment agreed that China made strides in emerging sectors like robotics and AI, but emphasised ongoing vulnerabilities in semiconductors, advanced machinery, and biopharmaceuticals — sectors where foreign dependence remains high. Domestic demand and economic restructuring Consumption contributed 56.2 per cent to GDP growth, an increase of 8.6 percentage points from the previous plan period. Evaluation: Achieved intended rebalancing from investment-driven to consumption-led growth. US Chamber perspective: The report added that despite these structural shifts, China's industrial policies continue to favour producers over consumers, limiting the potential for stronger domestic demand and creating persistent imbalances. Green transition Energy consumption per GDP unit fell by 11.6 per cent. Installed renewable energy reached 2.09 billion kW. New energy vehicles surged to 31.4 million. Evaluation: Exceeded targets. China remains a global leader in renewable capacity and electric vehicle deployment. US Chamber perspective: The Chamber recognised China's technological edge in clean energy, but noted that massive state-driven capacity—particularly in solar panels and EVs—has begun to distort global markets and escalate trade tensions. Reform and opening-up Despite geopolitical tensions, foreign trade and investment levels remained stable. The number of private enterprises surpassed 58 million. Evaluation: Mixed success—private sector growth and trade continued, but foreign investment sentiment remains uneven due to policy unpredictability. US Chamber perspective: The report mentioned that foreign firms continue to face market access restrictions, discriminatory procurement rules, and forced localisation, challenging China's narrative of openness and reform. Employment and welfare Over 12 million new urban jobs are created annually. Social insurance coverage remains above 90 per cent. Evaluation: On track. Employment and social welfare targets were largely met despite economic pressure. US Chamber perspective: The report observed that most policy benefits favoured state-backed industrial firms over household welfare, limiting broader livelihood gains and contributing to rising inequality. Urban–rural integration Urbanisation, average life expectancy, and food/energy production exceeded projections. Evaluation: Progress exceeds expectations. Income disparities persist but are narrowing, according to NDRC metrics. US Chamber perspective: While not a primary focus, the US Chamber of Commerce report noted that industrial policies have led to uneven regional outcomes, with wasteful duplication in some provinces and underinvestment in others. National security and stability Enhanced food and energy security, maintained social stability during the pandemic and economic restructuring. Evaluation: Strong performance in stability and self-sufficiency areas. China continues to build capacity for crisis response and strategic autonomy. US Chamber perspective: The Chamber added that the push for self-sufficiency is rooted in national security concerns, but warned it risks exacerbating global fragmentation, retaliation, and supply chain decoupling. China's 15th five-year-plan (2026-30) Officials say the gains made during the 14th FYP lay a strong foundation for the upcoming 15th Plan. With geopolitical tensions rising and global economic uncertainties deepening, the next plan is expected to prioritise technological independence, demographic policy, and large-scale industrial AI integration. 'We are entering a phase of industrial transformation, and the foundation laid over the past four years will support sustainable growth in the next cycle,' said Hu Qimu, deputy secretary-general of the Forum 50 for Digital-Real Economies Integration, speaking to the Global Times.
Yahoo
7 hours ago
- Politics
- Yahoo
The three major flaws in China's military
China's military is not a real army - it's the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party. Ideology is paramount and corruption is endemic. Plus, the People's Liberation Army hasn't fought a war since 1979. Xi Jinping calls it 'the peace disease'. In episode two of this three-part series, Venetia Rainey looks at the PLA's weaknesses and how Chinese president Xi is trying to fix them, from endless purges of top generals to a specially built training centre in Mongolia and live-fire drills around Taiwan. This series on China's military dives into the strengths and weaknesses of China's military and its remarkable transformation over the last few decades from obsolete to world-class. How significant is China's military buildup? What does Xi Jinping's ongoing purge mean for the People's Liberation Army? And how likely is an invasion of Taiwan in the next few years? You can also listen to episode one about how China's military went from obsolete to world-class. As the US pivots to the Indo-Pacific and the threat of a truly global war looms, understanding the evolving role of China's military on the world stage has never been more important. Listen to Battle Lines using the audio player in this article or on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or your favourite podcast app. Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. Try The Telegraph free for 1 month with unlimited access to our award-winning website, exclusive app, money-saving offers and more. Solve the daily Crossword
The Diplomat
10 hours ago
- Business
- The Diplomat
The Challenge to China's ‘Unified Big Market' Drive
The country's vast consumer base is the key to riding out Trump's tariffs. But China's internal market is riven by its own trade barriers. In April, U.S. President Trump announced his so-called 'Liberation Day,' slapping tariffs on nearly every country in the world. However, after Beijing retaliated, Trump made China his primary target. China has been widely viewed as 'well-prepared' for Trump's full-scale tariff war. It did not come as a surprise; Chinese economic officials and scholars had been discussing the possibility of renewed China-U.S. trade tensions since Trump's election victory in November 2024. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, one of his top economic priorities has been to enhance the Chinese Communist Party's capacity to control and lead the economy while strengthening China's resilience to external shocks. The trade war during Trump's first term, along with the COVID-19 pandemic, further accelerated China's pivot away from reliance on international trade. Xi's strategy of economic self-strengthening – through technological nationalization and the promotion of 'dual circulation' – has made China less vulnerable to foreign economic coercion. The dual circulation strategy, introduced by Xi in 2020, prioritizes domestic economic activity over international trade. The goal is to increase the resilience of China's supply chains by reducing dependence on foreign technology. Xi's confidence rests on his belief in the strength of China's domestic market. He identifies China's vast consumer base – comprising over 400 million middle-class citizens – as the foundation of the national economy. As a result, strengthening the domestic market has become a top priority on Xi's agenda. During the most recent National People's Congress in March, Chinese leaders emphasized boosting domestic demand as the key to future growth, introducing new policies aimed at stimulating consumer spending and improving the domestic business environment. One example was the launch of a national subsidy program for major household purchases. Under this program, individuals buying cars, home appliances, and electronics can apply for price reductions. The goal is to encourage consumer spending and, in turn, stimulate economic growth through increased domestic consumption. The Chinese government is also advancing a major structural reform: dismantling internal market barriers. In the Government Work Report released in March, building a 'unified national market' was identified as a key policy objective. By breaking down regional trade barriers, policymakers aim to reduce logistics and other operational costs, thereby improving corporate profit margins and lowering consumer prices to boost domestic sales. Additionally, a unified market is expected to foster fair competition among businesses, enhancing the efficiency of resource allocation. More broadly, Xi envisions a system in which all factors of production – land, labor, capital, skills, and information – can circulate freely across the country. This nationwide integration, he argues, will maximize the use of resources and generate greater economic value. The root of China's 'dukedom economics' – a term coined by Chinese economists in the 1980s to describe the fragmented domestic market – can be traced to the growing power of local governments following the economic reforms. As part of the fiscal decentralization efforts in the 1980s, local governments gained control over their own budgets. In addition, they acquired authority over regional state-owned enterprises, effectively making them both regulators and entrepreneurs. The reforms also altered the incentives of local leaders: fostering local economic development became their top priority, as economic growth emerged as the most important criterion for cadre promotion. This shift gave rise to a tournament-style competition among localities, with each striving for rapid economic gains. As a result, local governments pursued aggressive investment strategies aimed at generating visible outcomes within short timeframes, often emphasizing self-sufficiency and local protectionism to achieve their growth targets. They are also incentivized to maximize the profits of local enterprises, which serve as their primary tax base. To protect these interests, many local governments established trade barriers to prevent local resources from flowing out and to block external goods from entering their jurisdictions. In recent years, the Chinese government has launched several major initiatives to dismantle internal trade barriers, including strengthened enforcement of anti-monopoly measures and regulations on unfair competition. These efforts specifically target local protectionist policies that discriminate against non-local firms. In June 2024, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) issued a policy document on fair market competition regulation, outlining the agency's responsibilities and enforcement powers. The document authorizes the SAMR and its local branches to investigate local laws and regulations that obstruct the development of a unified national market – particularly those involving discriminatory practices in subsidies, market access, and market entry and exit. Notably, the policy grants local Market Regulation Bureaus sweeping authority to scrutinize the policymaking processes of other local agencies and to strike down any regulations deemed inconsistent with the goal of building a unified national market. While China's recent reforms have significantly elevated the status of the Market Regulation Bureau – giving it more power within local governments – important exemptions remain in its authority. Specifically, policies that aim to 'protect national interests,' 'promote technological and innovation capabilities,' and 'provide public goods such as energy conservation, environmental protection, and disaster relief' are exempt from investigation. These broad exemptions leave the door open for local governments to continue offering subsidies to China's strategic industries, particularly the high-tech sector, including electric vehicles. In effect, local authorities can shield their own tech companies from both domestic and international competition, making market consolidation in China's tech sector more difficult. Regarding the national interest clause, an immediate question arises: Who holds the authority to define 'national interest'? Local governments – especially those at the municipal level – play a crucial role in the distribution of subsidies. While national and provincial governments formally own industrial policy subsidies, they typically do not engage in the detailed review and allocation process. For national subsidies, the central government allocates funds to provinces based on economic performance and other indicators. Provinces then distribute these subsidies to cities using similar criteria. It is the municipal governments that actually review companies' applications and decide on the final allocation of subsidies to individual firms. In addition to subsidies from higher levels, many cities also operate their own local industrial policy programs. There have been some attempts to centralize the distribution of subsidies. For example, last year Hunan province revised its industrial policy so that companies would submit subsidy applications directly to the provincial government, rather than through municipal governments. The goal was for the provincial government to review applications and allocate subsidies in a way that better reflected provincial economic priorities. However, the provincial government quickly found itself overwhelmed by the volume of applications, exceeding its processing capacity. Moreover, unlike municipal governments, which could conduct on-site visits to verify company information, the provincial government lacked the human and financial resources to carry out such reviews. As a result, the effort failed, and the Hunan government was forced to delegate the review and distribution authority back to the municipal level. By controlling the distribution of subsidies, municipal governments effectively gain the power to define 'national interests,' which often results in equating national interests with local interests. Consequently, city governments continue to use subsidies to protect local companies from outside competition. For example, Article 46 of the 'National Unified Big Market Construction Guideline' (全国统一大市场建设指引) states that local government cannot use local registration, subsidiary, and investment requirements to exclude companies from receiving local subsidies. But the local commerce bureaus, who are responsible for subsidies distribution, view this article as complete nonsense. 'Our job is to protect our [local] companies and promote our economic growth,' a Commerce Bureau cadre said, commenting on this requirement. 'If you don't contribute to our local economy, why do we give you our money?' 'We will try our best to carry out the rest of the document, but there is no way for us to implement this article,' he concluded. The SAMR is responsible for enforcing the unified national market, so the local Market Regulation Bureau is expected to monitor compliance. According to the cadre, the Commerce Bureau would likely receive a warning from the local Market Regulation Bureau. However, the Commerce Bureau would respond by invoking 'national interest' to justify its policy. In the end, the local Market Regulation Bureau is still part of the local government – its budget comes from the city – so it understands that it cannot act in direct opposition to local interests. The warning is therefore more symbolic than substantive; it serves primarily to demonstrate to the higher-level Market Regulation Agency that it is fulfilling its duties, rather than to enforce any meaningful policy change. The challenge to Xi's 'unified big market' vision will certainly hamper China's ability to weather the China-U.S. trade war. Without a massive boost to the domestic market as a buffer, China cannot implement a shifting export policy without experiencing short-term pain. However, the implications go far beyond the current trade war: Despite over a decade of power centralization under Xi, Beijing still faces pushback from its localities in implementing its vision.
Telegraph
12 hours ago
- Politics
- Telegraph
The three major flaws in China's military
China's military is not a real army - it's the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party. Ideology is paramount and corruption is endemic. Plus, the People's Liberation Army hasn't fought a war since 1979. Xi Jinping calls it 'the peace disease'. In episode two of this three-part series, Venetia Rainey looks at the PLA's weaknesses and how Chinese president Xi is trying to fix them, from endless purges of top generals to a specially built training centre in Mongolia and live-fire drills around Taiwan. Over three episodes, this special series dives into the strengths and weaknesses of China's military and its remarkable transformation over the last few decades from obsolete to world-class. How significant is China's military buildup? What does Xi Jinping's ongoing purge mean for the People's Liberation Army? And how likely is an invasion of Taiwan in the next few years? Episode one looked at how China's military went from obsolete to world-class. As the US pivots to the Indo-Pacific and the threat of a truly global war looms, understanding the evolving role of China's military on the world stage has never been more important.
