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The Star
10 hours ago
- Politics
- The Star
Editorial: Seoul's mixed messages on Pyongyang will only sow confusion
South Korean and North Korean guard posts are seen on either side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Paju between the two counntries. — AFP THE notion of a country's main enemy – or ' jujeok ' in Korean – is not just symbolic rhetoric. It is the fulcrum around which national defence policy, military readiness and diplomatic posture revolve. Yet the Lee Jae Myung administration's incoming ministers are offering strikingly divergent views on North Korea's status. In a region where miscalculation can lead to catastrophe, the lack of clarity is not a luxury South Korea can afford. During confirmation hearings this week, the country's Unification Minister nominee Chung Dong-young described North Korea not as an enemy but as a 'threat.' Labour Minister nominee Kim Young-hoon echoed that assessment, distancing himself from the 'main enemy' label. By contrast, Defence Minister nominee Ahn Gyu-back offered a resolute view, stating that the North Korean regime and military are indeed South Korea's principal adversary. This inconsistency is not merely semantic. The designation of North Korea as South Korea's main enemy first appeared in the 1995 Defence White Paper under President Kim Young-sam, following the North's threats to turn Seoul into a 'sea of fire.' While subsequent governments shifted between hard-line and conciliatory stances, most notably under Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration reinstated the enemy designation in 2022. Now, Seoul risks retreating from this stance just as Pyongyang has explicitly emphasised its own hostility. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last year formally declared the South a 'primary foe,' rejecting unification and dismantling the inter-Korean reconciliation framework. Since then, the North has accelerated weapons development, severed communication channels and deepened military ties with Russia. To overlook these developments or downplay their implications is to misread the strategic environment. Chung's statements suggest the new administration may be preparing a significant policy pivot. He proposed suspending joint military drills with the United States as a confidence-building measure, citing the 2018 model. He also raised the idea of renaming the Unification Ministry to the Ministry of the Korean Peninsula, a move he claims would signal flexibility. Yet such proposals, absent careful coordination or broad consensus, could project confusion rather than pragmatism. Strategic ambiguity has long characterised inter-Korean policy, but frequent shifts weaken credibility. South Korea's defence posture cannot oscillate with each political transition. Doing so emboldens adversaries and complicates coordination with allies, particularly Washington. North Korea has repeatedly exploited policy vacillations, alternating between provocation and dialogue to gain time for weapons advancement. Calls to revive the 2018 military accord – annulled by the North and later suspended by Seoul – underscore this risk. South Korea honoured the agreement despite repeated violations by the North, including missile launches, GPS jamming and trash balloon campaigns. Restoring such an accord without preconditions could repeat a pattern of unreciprocated concessions. What is missing from the current debate is a sober reflection on the record of past engagement. Chung attributes the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in 2010 and Yeonpyeongdo shelling to the Lee Myung-bak administration's hawkish posture, yet similar provocations occurred under liberal governments. North Korea has pursued escalation to secure leverage regardless of the South's tone. This is not to dismiss the value of diplomacy. Efforts to reduce tensions must continue, but only with a clear-eyed understanding of the other side's intentions. Engagement should be mutual, measured and anchored in deterrence. One-sided overtures, whether symbolic or substantive, can be as risky as belligerence. If the Lee government intends to revise its stance toward Pyongyang, it must do so with unity, transparency and strategic rationale. Fragmented messaging – especially on foundational concepts like the main enemy – undermines trust both at home and among allies. In a geopolitical landscape marked by intensifying tensions, Seoul cannot afford ambiguity in its security doctrine. — The Korea Herald/Asia News Network
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Korea Herald
3 days ago
- Politics
- Korea Herald
[Editorial] Mixed messages
Seoul's fractured view on Pyongyang could sow strategic confusion amid rising tensions The notion of a country's main enemy — or 'jujeok' in Korean — is not just symbolic rhetoric. It is the fulcrum around which national defense policy, military readiness and diplomatic posture revolve. Yet the Lee Jae Myung administration's incoming ministers are offering strikingly divergent views on North Korea's status. In a region where miscalculation can lead to catastrophe, the lack of clarity is not a luxury South Korea can afford. During confirmation hearings this week, Unification Minister nominee Chung Dong-young described North Korea not as an enemy but as a 'threat.' Labor Minister nominee Kim Young-hoon echoed that assessment, distancing himself from the 'main enemy' label. By contrast, Defense Minister nominee Ahn Gyu-back offered a resolute view, stating that the North Korean regime and military are indeed South Korea's principal adversary. This inconsistency is not merely semantic. The designation of North Korea as South Korea's main enemy first appeared in the 1995 Defense White Paper under President Kim Young-sam, following the North's threats to turn Seoul into a 'sea of fire.' While subsequent governments shifted between hard-line and conciliatory stances, most notably under Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration reinstated the enemy designation in 2022. Now, Seoul risks retreating from this stance just as Pyongyang has explicitly emphasized its own hostility. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last year formally declared the South a 'primary foe,' rejecting unification and dismantling the inter-Korean reconciliation framework. Since then, the North has accelerated weapons development, severed communication channels and deepened military ties with Russia. To overlook these developments or downplay their implications is to misread the strategic environment. Chung's statements suggest the new administration may be preparing a significant policy pivot. He proposed suspending joint military drills with the United States as a confidence-building measure, citing the 2018 model. He also raised the idea of renaming the Ministry of Unification to the Ministry of the Korean Peninsula, a move he claims would signal flexibility. Yet such proposals, absent careful coordination or broad consensus, could project confusion rather than pragmatism. Strategic ambiguity has long characterized inter-Korean policy, but frequent shifts weaken credibility. South Korea's defense posture cannot oscillate with each political transition. Doing so emboldens adversaries and complicates coordination with allies, particularly Washington. North Korea has repeatedly exploited policy vacillations, alternating between provocation and dialogue to gain time for weapons advancement. Calls to revive the 2018 military accord — annulled by the North and later suspended by Seoul — underscore this risk. South Korea honored the agreement despite repeated violations by the North, including missile launches, GPS jamming and trash balloon campaigns. Restoring such an accord without preconditions could repeat a pattern of unreciprocated concessions. What is missing from the current debate is a sober reflection on the record of past engagement. Chung attributes the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in 2010 and Yeonpyeongdo shelling to the Lee Myung-bak administration's hawkish posture, yet similar provocations occurred under liberal governments. North Korea has pursued escalation to secure leverage regardless of the South's tone. This is not to dismiss the value of diplomacy. Efforts to reduce tensions must continue, but only with a clear-eyed understanding of the other side's intentions. Engagement should be mutual, measured and anchored in deterrence. One-sided overtures, whether symbolic or substantive, can be as risky as belligerence. If the Lee government intends to revise its stance toward Pyongyang, it must do so with unity, transparency and strategic rationale. Fragmented messaging — especially on foundational concepts like the main enemy — undermines trust both at home and among allies. In a geopolitical landscape marked by intensifying tensions, Seoul cannot afford ambiguity in its security doctrine.