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AllAfrica
a day ago
- Politics
- AllAfrica
Confucian peace myth: East Asia minus US risks disaster
Skip to content History shows the notion of a 'Confucian peace' in East Asia is a myth. Image: X Screengrab Recently, several arguments have emerged suggesting that Korea, Japan and China could peacefully coexist without the US's presence in Northeast Asia. Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs recently argued that China has never invaded Japan in its entire history – aside from two failed attempts – and characterized Japan's incursions into China as anomalies. Citing Harvard sociologist Ezra Vogel, he claimed the two Confucian civilizations enjoyed nearly 2,000 years of relative peace – a striking contrast, he noted, to the near-constant wars between Britain and France. Yonsei University professor Jeffrey Robertson added that, as 'US attention drifts away from East Asia, the unthinkable becomes thinkable' – a region where Europe, Russia, India, and China balance each other imperfectly, but none dominates. Political scientist John Mearsheimer also weighed in: 'If I were the national security adviser to Deng Xiaoping – or Xi Jinping – and they asked me what I thought about the US military presence in East Asia, I'd say, 'I want the Americans out. I don't want them in our backyard.'' This vision of a self-balancing Asia – shared by economists, sociologists, strategists and realists alike – assumes that history, culture and trust can fill the vacuum left by American power. But can it? Sachs's notion of a historical 'Confucian peace' collapses under scrutiny. In his speech, he conveniently omits Korea – arguably the most Confucian state in East Asia – which has frequently been at war with both China and Japan. Consider Goguryeo, one of Korea's ancient kingdoms. Confucianism had already been influential in the region for 400–500 years when Goguryeo emerged. Yet Goguryeo fought multiple wars against various Chinese dynasties: Han, Liaodong, Wei, Lelang, Yan, Sui and Tang. While modern Chinese narratives frame Goguryeo as a tributary, historical records – marked by repeated wars and political stalemates – depict it as a rival power that directly contributed to the collapse of multiple Chinese dynasties. As for Japan, the fact that typhoons thwarted China's attempts to conquer it doesn't mean those efforts lacked seriousness. On the contrary, China was determined. After its initial invasion in 1274 – involving 900 ships and 40,000 troops – ended in failure, it doubled down. In 1281, it returned with 4,400 ships and 140,000 troops – the largest seaborne invasion force in world history before D-Day. To claim that China 'never invaded' simply because these attempts failed is nonsense. These were not theoretical plans – they were full-scale invasions, launched with overwhelming force and clear intent. Typhoons may have stopped them, but they do not erase the historical fact of the invasions themselves. Robertson's claim that the US is 'drifting away' from East Asia is inaccurate. Washington isn't pulling back – it's doubling down. The goal is clear: contain China. This has been official US policy since Hillary Clinton's 2011 article, 'America's Pacific Century,' which outlined a strategic pivot to Asia as the cornerstone of US foreign policy. The US may be distracted by Ukraine and Gaza, but its top strategic priority remains unchanged – and is, in fact, becoming more focused. Washington has bolstered its Indo-Pacific posture through large-scale multinational exercises, such as the 40,000-strong Talisman Sabre in Australia, and expanded military deployments under AUKUS, rotations through Guam and greater access to bases in the Philippines through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Mearsheimer says China wants the US out of East Asia. That may seem true on the surface – but the reality is more complicated. After World War II, China initially viewed US security treaties with Japan, Korea and Taiwan as part of a broader strategy to contain its rise. In an October 1971 meeting with US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai accused Washington of using Taiwan and Korea as 'two wings of outward expansion by Japanese expansionist policies.' Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger in Beijing in 1971. Photo: Henry Kissinger Archives / Library of Congress In response, Kissinger offered a candid and far-reaching explanation of why the US maintained its military presence in Japan. 'China,' he said, 'has a universal outlook; Japan's has had a tribal outlook.' More than cultural commentary, this was a strategic warning. He argued that 'the Japanese are capable of sudden and explosive changes. They went from feudalism to emperor worship in two to three years, and from emperor worship to democracy in three months.' Such volatility, in Kissinger's view, made a self-armed Japan a latent threat – not because of intent, but because of potential. 'A Japan that defends itself with its own resources will be an objective danger to the region. The US alliance actually restrains it.' He acknowledged the cynical alternative: 'We could cut Japan loose and let it stand on its own. That would trigger tension with China and let us play the middleman.' But he dismissed that option as dangerously shortsighted: 'Either you or we would end up the victim.' Kissinger warned against romanticizing US withdrawal. 'We didn't fight World War II to stop Japan's domination of Asia only to enable it 25 years later. If Japan truly wants us out, we'll leave – but I don't think you should rejoice when that day happens, because some day you may regret it,' he said. The shift in Chinese thinking was so significant that Zhou began to question whether the US could truly restrain what he called the 'wild horse' of Japan. Chairman Mao even encouraged Kissinger to maintain good relations with Japan. 'When you pass through Japan, you should perhaps talk a bit more with them.' On Kissinger's most recent visit, Mao remarked, 'You only talked with them for one day, and that isn't very good for their face.' The conversation took place in 1971, seven years after China had become a nuclear power and while Japan remained non-nuclear. Yet Beijing was still deeply uneasy about what a remilitarized Japan might do without US oversight. That fear lingers to this day – not just in China, but across all the nations that clashed with Japan in the first half of the 20th century. Historian Kenneth Pyle distills Kissinger's view in contemporary terms: The real issue is trust. 'Part of the answer' regarding the continued US presence in Japan, says Pyle, 'lies in a fundamental, often unspoken question in the minds of US policymakers: Can Japan be trusted to participate responsibly in international security affairs?' He continues, 'This Japanese question is at the core of American thinking about its alliance with Japan and beclouds the issue of how Japan should contribute to the maintenance of the international order. Mindful of Japanese nationalism and militarism, world leaders are intensely ambivalent as to whether Japan should enlarge its security role.' 'Prompted by a fear of revived Japanese nationalism, US leaders are extremely circumspect toward Japan. This feeling recurs throughout Asia, in the Soviet Union, and in Europe – indeed, in Japan itself.' 'This concern must be resolved, for it is fundamental to the continued relationship between the United States and Japan and to the potential role of Japan in the changing pattern of international relations in East Asia.' Perhaps the most surprising endorsement of US presence in East Asia comes from an extremely unlikely source – North Korea's Kim Jong Un. In 2022, Mike Pompeo, who had been US secretary of state during Donald Trump's first presidential term, revealed: 'As we developed our relationship more fully, what became very clear is he [Kim Jong Un] views the United States of America on the Korean Peninsula as a bulwark against his real threat, which came from Xi Jinping.' Kim Jong Un rules over what was once the heartland of Goguryeo – and he knows who the real enemy is. He has reportedly told his aides in the past: 'Japan is the 100-year enemy, but China is the 1,000-year enemy.' The real question isn't whether China becomes a hegemon in Asia. It's what comes next. That's what most commentators overlook – yet it carries the gravest consequences. Once a regional power secures dominance, it no longer has to watch its flank – it becomes 'free to roam.' When China eventually pushes into the Western Hemisphere, it will challenge the Monroe Doctrine – Washington's historical red line – for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The resulting showdown could rival, or even surpass, that Cold War standoff. In comparison, current and potential proxy wars in Ukraine, the Middle East, Taiwan and Korea would look like child's play. Calls for an 'Asia without America' might sound like peace. But remove the US and the ghosts of history come rushing in – from Goguryeo's defiance to kamikaze invasions, from Japanese militarism to Cold War paranoia. In Northeast Asia, peace without the US isn't just unlikely – it's historically unprecedented, strategically reckless and potentially catastrophic. Hanjin Lew is a political commentator specializing in East Asian affairs.
The Diplomat
2 days ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Bureaucratized Confucianism: How Tradition Became a Tool of Control in China
What does it mean when a regime speaks the language of ancient virtue but enforces it through curriculum mandates and ideological scorecards? The opening essay of Simulated Sagehood, a five-part series, traces how Confucianism has been reconstructed, not as a living tradition, but as a calibrated instrument of bureaucratic control. Through textbook reform, propaganda choreography, and institutional incentives, Xi's China fuses ethical language with Leninist mechanics. The result is not revival but simulation: a Confucianism of surfaces, stripped of its moral interior. The return of Confucian language under Chinese leader Xi Jinping isn't a spontaneous cultural revival. It's a carefully orchestrated campaign — engineered from the top of the Chinese party-state — to wrap centralized political control in the language of ancient virtue. What's unfolding is a quiet reversal: values once rooted in moral constraint, like filial piety, virtue, and ethical cultivation, are being refitted to serve a system built on obedience and authority. This isn't Confucianism reborn. It's a state-authored script, stitching together the vocabulary of tradition to legitimize modern power. The turning point came in 2013 with a little-known but foundational document: the Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere — more commonly known as Document No. 9. Here, the Chinese Communist Party elevated 'cultural security' to the same strategic level as political or cyber defense, identifying 'Western constitutional democracy,' 'universal values,' and 'historical nihilism' as existential threats. The proposed solution wasn't dialogue or reform, but insulation: Confucian culture would be deployed as a kind of ideological firewall, meant to inoculate China against liberal ideas. This approach was codified in the 2017 Opinions on Implementing the Inheritance and Development Project of Excellent Traditional Chinese Culture — a mouthful of a title, but one with clear intent. It brought Confucian texts under the wing of national security. The classics were no longer seen as sources of independent moral insight, but as symbolic tools linking the Communist Party to an unbroken Han civilizational arc. The machinery driving this transformation spans a vast web of state organs: the propaganda system, the education bureaucracy, and the united front system — a structure designed to manage intellectuals, religious groups, and diaspora networks. Each branch reshapes Confucian motifs to suit its own mission. After the Central Propaganda Department issued its 2015 Action Plan for promoting 'core socialist values,' local governments were told to inject concepts like li (ritual), xiao (filial piety), and zhong (loyalty) into school posters, radio scripts, and CCP publications. But these concepts are no longer invitations to ethical reflection. Xiao is reframed as deference to political authority. Zhong — which once carried the tension between loyalty and principled dissent — is reduced to personal allegiance to Xi as the party's 'core.' These values aren't interpreted; they're rebranded as slogans. The shift is institutionalized most clearly through the Ministry of Education. In 2017, under State Council directive No. 61, the government established the National Textbook Committee, chaired by a vice premier and staffed by Marxist theorists and propaganda cadres. Its job? To vet all school textbooks for ideological conformity. Accuracy — whether philological or philosophical — takes a backseat. By 2019, new standardized textbooks in literature, civics, and history began inserting handpicked excerpts from the Analects, the Classic of Filial Piety, and the Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean). These insertions weren't meant to provoke classical interpretation. One widely noted example pairs Mencius' famous line, 'When the ruler is upright, the people will follow,' with a photo of Xi visiting a poor village. The message is clear: Xi doesn't just rule — he continues a civilizational mandate. This symbolic fusion reached a new level in 2021 with the launch of the Three-Subject Unified Textbooks (三科统编教材). For the first time, Xi Jinping Thought became mandatory reading in all public primary and secondary schools — including in ethnic minority regions. Sayings like 'The noble man cultivates himself to govern family and state' (君子修其身以齐家治国) now appear alongside directives to 'love and follow the party's core, General Secretary Xi.' Confucian virtues are no longer positioned as part of an ethical journey. They are cast as historical truths — completed, fulfilled, and embodied in CCP rule. What remains of Confucian discourse is the scaffolding. The meaning has been hollowed and refilled with political certainty. Since 2020, this 'Confucianism with CCP characteristics' has become part of institutional performance. The state now applies ideological-political quality assessments (思想政治素质考核) to teachers, cadres, and schools. The Eight-Ministry Opinion of 2020 explicitly links results from these evaluations to funding decisions, promotions, and curriculum approvals. By 2023, the National Cadre Education and Training Plan designated the study and application of Xi Jinping Thought as the key test for political fitness. Provincial party academies now use numerical dashboards to track how often officials invoke 'excellent traditional culture' in speeches, papers, and events. In this environment, Confucian vocabulary doesn't function as ethical language. It becomes metadata — an ideological KPI, measurable and monetized. The tradition survives not as thought, but as performance.
3 days ago
Japan's Three Scenic Views
Cultural Snapshots Guideto Japan The Three Scenic Views have been recognized as Japan's greatest beauty spots since the seventeenth century. Beauty Spots The Three Scenic Views, which consist of Miyajima, Amanohashidate, and Matsushima Bay, are traditionally considered to be Japan's most beautiful locations. They were originally selected by the seventeenth-century Confucian scholar Hayashi Gahō. The island of Miyajima in Hiroshima Prefecture is famous as the location of Itsukushima Shrine with its famed torii gate that, half-submerged at high tide, makes the main building of the shrine appear to float on the water. It is also known for its autumn colors. (© Pixta) Amanohashidate in the north of Kyoto Prefecture is a narrow sandbar covered in pine trees. Its name can be interpreted as 'Bridge to Heaven'; some legends describe it as a toppled ladder once used by the gods themselves to ascend into the clouds. (© Pixta) Miyagi Prefecture's Matsushima Bay is celebrated for the spectacular views of its hundreds of islands. Their features change dramatically depending on where visitors are standing, with there being four famous traditional viewpoints. (© Pixta) Along with the Three Scenic Views, Japan has a number of other famous threes, including three great gardens and three major night views. (Originally written in English. Banner photo © Pixta.)
Korea Herald
16-07-2025
- Science
- Korea Herald
A Journey into Confucian Wisdom at Nishan
QUFU, China, July 16, 2025 /PRNewswire/ -- A report from Qilu Evening News•Qilu Yidian On April 19th, 11 international students from Jining University visited Nishan Sacred Land in Qufu, Shandong Province, the birthplace of Confucius. This cultural theme park is designed for experiencing Confucian culture and serves as a base for international cultural exchange. During their visit, the students explored the fusion of traditional culture and modern civilization, witnessing how ancient wisdom harmonizes with cutting-edge technology. Through interactive exhibits and philosophical explorations, they discovered the significance of Confucian ideals in today's world.
Korea Herald
15-07-2025
- Health
- Korea Herald
Baby's first haircut can go a little extreme in S. Korea
A baby's first hair naturally falls out over time, but some parents in South Korea choose to shave it early. Why? The practice stems from a long-held belief, though less common today, that shaving encourages hair to grow back thicker and fuller. As in many cultures, lush, full hair is highly valued in Korea, often regarded as a symbol of health and youth. The shaved hair is often kept as a memento, stored in decorative keepsake boxes or framed for display. Some even have it crafted into a brush, following a tradition once practiced by ancestors, as a symbolic gesture of hope for the child's future. During the Joseon era (1392–1910), many Confucian scholars shaved their children's first batch of hair and turned it into a brush known as taemopil, which was believed to bring academic success. Unlike the coarse and oily hair of adults, a newborn's first hair is exceptionally soft and fine, making it ideal for crafting delicate calligraphy brushes. Making a brush from a baby's first hair is a tradition not unique to Korea; it is also practiced in countries like China and Japan. Shaving in hopes of achieving fuller hair, however, has no scientific basis. According to local medical experts, while newly grown hair may appear fuller compared to before, this is merely an optical illusion. When hair is shaved, the blunt tips of the regrowing strands can make the hair look thicker and coarser. In reality, shaving does not alter hair's structure, density or growth rate. The experts also caution that a baby's scalp is highly sensitive, and shaving might cause unnecessary irritation. Although not as extreme as shaving, a baby's first haircut is often remembered as a small yet meaningful rite of passage, a tender milestone that parents cherish among the many 'firsts.' Is it time for your baby's first haircut? What will you do with those tiny strands?
