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Time of India
3 hours ago
- Business
- Time of India
Man loses Rs 10L in online job scam
Mangaluru: Online fraudsters cheated a man out of Rs 10.4 lakh after offering a profit in an investment. Mangaluru CEN Police said that the complainant received a message saying ONLINE JOB with a link to a Telegram channel. On clicking the link and opening the Telegram account, the complainant found a channel named 'Daily Review.' When he messaged this Telegram account, the person on the other end claimed to work for a company called Anjali Digit. The individual sent a YouTube channel link to the complainant, instructing him to open, subscribe, and take a screenshot, which he then sent to the 'Daily Review' Telegram account. The complainant was told that he would receive Rs 41 per screenshot. Following these instructions, the complainant sent 10 screenshots per day. Later, he was informed that investing money in the DIGIT company would yield profits. Acting on this, the complainant initially invested Rs 1,000 via UPI and received a profit of Rs 300. Later, the accused sent a link and asked the complainant to register by entering his name and mobile number. Subsequently, the complainant was instructed to invest Rs 34,000. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like 5 Books Warren Buffett Wants You to Read In 2025 Blinkist: Warren Buffett's Reading List Undo He began transferring money in stages, eventually transferring a total of Rs 10.4 lakh to various bank accounts provided by the unknown individual using UPI, NEFT, and RTGS methods. After few days, the complainant received a small refund on his investment. When he requested to withdraw the remaining funds via the customer service Telegram channel, he was pressured to pay Rs 5.5 lakh in taxes. This raised suspicion, and upon investigation, the complainant realised he was scammed. Truck loader dies in accident In an accident reported on Moodbidri Road in Bantwal on Friday, a loading staff of a truck died after the vehicle overturned when the driver lost control. The deceased is Nirmal Hansda from Jharkhand. Bantwal traffic police registered a case. |
Yahoo
2 days ago
- Business
- Yahoo
Trump's War on the ‘Deep State' Will Hurt His Own Agenda
For nearly a decade, U.S. President Donald Trump and his supporters have raged against the 'deep state' and how it has allegedly been weaponized against him and his followers. If one believes the MAGA narrative, a coterie of unelected bureaucrats implacably opposed to Trump's agenda have disregarded their obligations to implement it. Instead, they have engaged in a variety of strategic leaks, excessive lawfare and malign resistance to thwart his America First policies. A month into Trump's first term, for instance, his chief strategist at the time, Steve Bannon, famously declared war on the 'administrative state.' The first Trump administration's attempts to accomplish this proved to be fitful at best. Just a few months into his second term, however, these redoubled efforts have had greater success at eroding the size and influence of the federal bureaucracy. These initiatives include staff layoffs overseen by the so-called Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE; the planned expansion of Schedule F employees who can be fired at will; and the trauma inflicted on those bureaucrats who have stayed on. In other words, the deep state is getting shallower. The idea that the federal bureaucracy needs reform is hardly unique to Trump and his MAGA supporters. More than a decade ago, my Fletcher School colleague Michael Glennon argued in his book, 'National Security and Double Government,' that the unelected bureaucracy was now exercising unprecedented influence over U.S. foreign policy, superseding the Madisonian institutions that the U.S. Constitution empowered. The bureaucratic politics literature within political science is replete with hypotheses about how institutional imperatives and organizational culture can affect policy implementation. Bureaucrats within the federal government often possess an informational advantage over political appointees, making it easier for them to resist undesired policies. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. Furthermore, these bureaucratic issues have bedeviled presidents since long before Trump. After Dwight Eisenhower was elected president, Harry Truman famously said, 'Poor Ike! When he was a general, he gave an order and it was carried out. Now he's going to sit in that big office and he'll give an order and not a damn thing is going to happen.' And at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the U.S. military continued U-2 overflights of the USSR despite heightened tensions, John F. Kennedy bemoaned, 'There is always some [expletive] who doesn't get the word.' The bureaucracy has similarly stymied Trump's foreign policy preferences on occasion. During his first term, Trump often found himself rolled by the Pentagon on questions of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. In 2020, his outgoing Syria envoy infamously bragged to the press about the 'shell games' he and others played in order to obfuscate how many troops the U.S. had in the country after Trump's decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria in 2019. Even in his current term, there is evidence that elements of the national security bureaucracy are still up to their old tricks. When Trump asked for metrics to measure progress in the short-lived U.S. bombing campaign against the Houthis, for instance, U.S. military commanders reportedly responded 'by providing data showing the number of munitions dropped.' Relying on quantitative metrics that are only loosely related to the stated policy goal is Bureaucratic Politics 101. As the Trump administration's efforts to winnow the bureaucracy have made inroads, one might expect to see a more docile bureaucracy that keeps its head down and tries to accomplish its assigned tasks. In actuality, however, the political science literature offers multiple cautionary tales against assuming that life is that simple. The most obvious and direct problem is that the ways in which the Trump administration has attacked the bureaucracy have weakened the state's capacity to perform any essential tasks. One can complain about unnecessary red tape all day long, but Americans like knowing that nuclear weapons will not accidentally explode, airplanes will land safely and extreme weather events will be detected and responded to. Despite its loud denials, however, the Trump administration's myriad staffing cuts at the National Nuclear Security Administration, Federal Aviation Administration and Federal Emergency Management Administration have put all of these essential government functions at risk. And despite the claims of the libertarians in the administration, like Elon Musk, the private sector will not necessarily be able to pick up the slack for the erosion of public goods. Indeed, the provision of public goods often facilitates the functioning of private markets. Unfortunately, that can work in reverse as well. The elimination of positions at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, for example, will make private insurance more difficult to issue. A related problem is tasking bureaucracies with multiple, conflicting goals. That is a surefire way to reduce government efficiency, and yet this is exactly what Musk's DOGE has done time and again during the first half of this year. For example, the Social Security Administration, or SSA, has a longstanding history of efficiency at fulfilling its primary task: accurately and speedily processing payments to retirees and other beneficiaries. Its skill at this task was so good that James Q. Wilson made it one of his exemplary cases in his classic text, 'Bureaucracy.' As has been well-chronicled, however, DOGE's efforts to install anti-fraud measures at SSA proved debilitating to the agency's core mission. The DOGE-led staff reductions have slowed the pace of claims processing. DOGE's changes are causing the SSA's website to crash on a near-daily basis. Wait times on the phone have increased dramatically. All the while, minimal amounts of fraud have been detected, mainly because the claims of Social Security fraud, waste and abuse were wildly inflated among Trump's MAGA base. Perhaps the most pernicious effect has been in the areas where the shallow state is trying to comply with the administration's priorities, as the bureaucracy is often picking the lowest-hanging fruit to reach those goals. This has been on prominent display in the efforts to adhere to Trump's executive orders prohibiting diversity, equity and inclusion, or DEI, initiatives as well as his crackdown on immigration. On the former, the bureaucracy's efforts to scrub anything DEI-related from official websites has led to absurd overreaches, such as wiping any references to the World War II-era aircraft that dropped the first nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, because its name—the Enola Gay—probably tripped a keyword filter. Trump's defenders have accused the bureaucracy of 'malicious compliance.' But the problem also stems from the lack of clarity in Trump's directives, which can lead to overzealousness from bureaucrats seeking to avoid opening themselves up to charges of dereliction of duty. Even in areas where the administration has not cut staff to the bone, the shallow state is implementing Trump's preferred policies in a shallow manner. Consider the efforts to crack down on illegal immigration and deport undocumented immigrants currently residing in the United States. Trump and his subordinates initially signaled that criminals and gang members would be the priority for these deportations. Over the past four months, however, the shallow state has implemented deportations in ways that expose myriad bureaucratic shortcuts, badly warping the process. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, agents have relied on caricatural metrics, like tattoos and hoodies, to identify gang members, with unsurprising results. The Cato Institute recently concluded that more than 20 percent of the Venezuelans deported to El Salvador in March had entered the U.S. legally and committed no criminal offense. ICE has also scooped up those who have scheduled meetings with immigration officials because, according to political scientist Auston Kocher, they are the easiest people for ICE to collect. Kocher's analysis of ICE data shows that detentions of immigrants with no criminal record have grown three times greater than those of convicted criminals. This has led to the internment of individuals who have endeavored to comply with all the rules. Trump might very well succeed in eviscerating his fantasized deep state. The result will not be a more efficient bureaucracy, however, but a shallow state that is unable to perform its vital functions—including carrying out the directives of the president of the United States. Daniel W. Drezner is distinguished professor of international politics at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. He is the author of Drezner's World. The post Trump's War on the 'Deep State' Will Hurt His Own Agenda appeared first on World Politics Review.
Yahoo
2 days ago
- General
- Yahoo
With Bukele Emboldened, El Salvador's Authoritarian Slide Is Accelerating
Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele has never concealed his autocratic tendencies. He had already unabashedly referred to himself as the world's coolest dictator, but since enjoying the firm embrace of U.S. President Donald Trump, Bukele has grown emboldened. In recent weeks, he has intensified his crackdown on critics and accelerated his efforts to suppress dissent, turning the screws on human rights organizations, journalists and civil society at large. Bukele's acolytes have arrested one of the country's most prominent human rights activists, have enacted a 'foreign agents' law that resembles the ones used in dictatorships like Russia and Nicaragua to weaken civil society, and have made life even more threatening for independent journalists, prompting more of them to flee into exile. The millennial president, who became enormously popular by imposing draconian policing tactics that restored security to a country that had been plagued by brutal gang violence, quickly consolidated power after becoming president in 2019. He easily led his New Ideas party to full control of the legislature, secured an ironclad majority in the Supreme Court, and maneuvered to win a second term in office, even though the country's constitution clearly limits presidents to a single one. Before long, he had full control of the country, steadily dismantling democratic institutions. Through it all, Salvadorans seemed satisfied with the bargain. Security had greatly improved the quality of life in their impoverished country. Polls consistently showed his approval hovering around 80 percent. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. In the past few months, however, as El Salvador has come under greater global scrutiny stemming from Trump's deportation of migrants to prisons there, even Salvadorans are having second thoughts. A recent poll showed Bukele's approval rating sliding to 55 percent, fully 20 points lower than a year ago, with two-thirds of respondents saying they disapprove of his controversial use of Salvadoran prisons to house deportees in exchange for cash from the U.S. government. Bukele's notorious prisons stand at the center of the security policies that transformed the country and raised the alarm of human rights organizations and democratic activists. In 2022, he declared a state of emergency that remains in place to this day, allowing police to arrest and imprison individuals without any semblance of due process. The prison population has tripled, with human rights groups documenting hundreds of deaths inside and desperate families saying their relative have disappeared without a trace into the system. Thousands of innocent men have been swept up and warehoused in crowded cells without access to legal representation or communication with the outside world. Conditions in the terrorism confinement center, or CECOT—which now also houses migrants deported by the Trump administration—are labeled as torture by human rights experts. Now, after high praise from the U.S. president, a visit to Trump in the White House, and histrionic tours of the CECOT prison by administration officials like Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, Bukele is feeling no pressure from the world's most powerful country to tone down his tactics. As a result, he is becoming less patient with his critics at home. On Sunday night, May 18, police arrested Ruth Lopez, one of the best-known anti-corruption and human rights lawyers in Central America. Lopez heads Cristosal, an organization that has been looking into corruption in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. Cristosal was investigating multiple instances of potential corruption under Bukele, including the misuse of pandemic funds, the diversion of public funds to acquire Pegasus software for spying on journalists, as well as secretive negotiations between Bukele's government and Salvadoran gangs. Her organization lambasted Lopez's detention as part of a 'systematic strategy of criminalization against those who defend human rights' under Bukele. Human Rights Watch said the arrest, 'is not an isolated incident—it marks a dangerous escalation in President Bukele's effort to silence dissent.' The Bukele administration's attorney general's office accused her of collaborating 'in the theft of funds from state coffers,' linking her to the former president of the supreme electoral tribunal, Eugenio Chicas, who had been arrested earlier on charges of illicit enrichment. Chicas, who had also worked under the previous administration, denies the charges. The opposition claims his arrest is politically motivated. Chicas and Bukele have an acrimonious history. Back in 2017, when Chicas was a government minister, Bukele accused him of rape. Chicas sued for slander and won. Bukele was ordered by the court to pay Chicas $50,000. Earlier this month, two days after arresting the head of an NGO that was looking into malfeasance in Bukele's government, the legislature moved to silence just about any organization it deems threatening. By a 57 to 3 vote, the Bukele-controlled Congress passed the 'foreign agents' law. The pretext for the law was a protest by peasant families in front of Bukele's residence. The president claimed they had been 'manipulated … by globalist NGOs.' Under the law, any organization that receives funding, including donations, goods or services from abroad must register as a 'foreign agent,' which triggers steep taxes, crippling government interference and potentially a stain on its reputation. The law's definition of foreign support is absurdly broad, and defines as foreign supporters 'people determined by the Foreign Agents Registry to fall under this category.' Groups that register are sharply limited in their activities and those which fail to register and are later found to qualify face destructive penalties. Most crucially, the law gives the government the ability to monitor and shut down organizations receiving foreign support. The government says the law aims to promote transparency, but Human Rights Watch says it's real aim is to 'stifle dissent.' Foreign agent laws have become a preferred tool of autocracy. When Georgia, the former Soviet republic, introduced similar legislation, the action triggered months of massive street protests by democracy advocates, who correctly feared the new law would severely handicap their democracy. There is no question that Bukele has done enormous good in El Salvador, pulling the country out of its morass of violence. But instead of using those security gains to steer El Salvador into a prosperous democratic future, he is aggressively using his successes to turn the country into a dictatorship under his rule. El Salvador didn't have to choose between security and democracy. But now, made even stronger by support from the Trump administration, Bukele seems more determined than ever to burnish his autocratic credentials. Frida Ghitis is WPR's senior columnist and a contributor to CNN and The Washington Post. Her WPR column appears every Thursday. You can follow her on Twitter and Threads at @fridaghitis. The post With Bukele Emboldened, El Salvador's Authoritarian Slide Is Accelerating appeared first on World Politics Review.
Yahoo
4 days ago
- Business
- Yahoo
Martinelli's Escape Is Testing Panama's Government—and Its Democracy
In early May, former Panamanian President Ricardo Martinelli quietly boarded a flight from Panama City to Bogota. The move ended Martinelli's 15-month stay at the Nicaraguan Embassy in Panama, where he had taken refuge to avoid serving a 10-year prison sentence for money laundering. His departure, which was sanctioned by a discreet safe-conduct granted by Panama's Foreign Ministry and transformed into territorial asylum upon his arrival in Colombia, marks more than the exit of a fugitive politician. It underscores the fragility of democratic institutions in Panama and the tactical resilience of its political elite. The entire episode, with its opaque legal maneuvers and strategic calculations, reveals a convergence of judicial evasion, partisan brinkmanship and international complicity. It forces a reckoning with how Panama's institutions function under pressure—and for whom. Martinelli's predicament stems from his conviction in 2023 in the 'New Business' case, a high-profile corruption scandal involving public funds funneled into the purchase of a media conglomerate. Martinelli initially counted on a return to the presidency and the immunity it would provide as a way out of his legal troubles, and in June 2023 he announced his candidacy for the country's presidential election, scheduled for May 2024. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. But in February 2024, after a court ordered his pre-trial detention while his appeal was decided, Martinelli sought asylum at the Nicaraguan Embassy. When his final appeal failed later that same month, resulting in him being barred from running for office, Martinelli pivoted to a new strategy, remaining in the embassy while working toward leaving Panama for political asylum abroad. Initially, the administration of President Jose Raul Mulino granted Martinelli safe-conduct to travel to Nicaragua in March 2025, but that plan collapsed amid reports of an unresolved Interpol red notice for Martinelli's arrest and Nicaragua's sudden withdrawal of landing clearance. A second safe-conduct was quietly issued in May, and only after Martinelli's arrival in Colombia was the operation made public, raising public debate about transparency and elite influence. Martinelli's maneuver was far from a retreat—it was a recalibration. Even from his refuge in the Nicaraguan Embassy, where his movements and associations were restricted under the rules of diplomatic asylum, he continued to exert political influence through social media and orchestrated visits, directing his Realizing Goals, or RM, party and pushing legislation tailored to secure his legal reprieve. Chief among these efforts was a controversial amnesty bill that would nullify his conviction along with those of other political allies. The bill has stalled in the National Assembly, but its mere proposal exposes the depths of Panama's institutional vulnerabilities and the lengths to which Martinelli's faction is willing to go to secure his political future. Complicating matters is the increasingly tense relationship between Martinelli and Mulino, who was initially Martinelli's vice presidential running mate in last year's election but became his handpicked successor when Martinelli was barred from the race. While Martinelli's support was instrumental in Mulino's electoral victory, fissures have emerged since then. Martinelli loyalists have accused Mulino of betrayal, and the legislative alliance between RM and Mulino's broader coalition is fraying. Amid the tensions, the amnesty debate has become a litmus test. Backing it signals loyalty to Martinelli. Opposing it signals a commitment to legal accountability and institutional integrity, but comes at a political cost. Disavowing the bill distances Mulino from Martinelli's legacy, allowing him to assert his independence, but it also risks alienating RM's legislative bloc and inviting retaliation from Martinelli's still-powerful network. Beyond its domestic repercussions, the circumstances surrounding Martinelli's departure have taken a toll on Panama's global standing. Observers across the region view the episode as emblematic of elite impunity. While legal under the 1954 Caracas Convention, Martinelli's transition from diplomatic to territorial asylum reads to many as a procedural workaround to avoid accountability. Territorial asylum means protection granted by a country when the individual is physically on its soil, allowing greater freedom than diplomatic asylum inside an embassy. In Colombia, Martinelli gained rights such as freedom of association, and his designation as a 'politically persecuted' individual blocks extradition efforts for now. Unsurprisingly, Colombia's role in his flight has raised eyebrows. By accepting a convicted ex-president on grounds of political persecution—a claim widely disputed by legal analysts—President Gustavo Petro's government broke with precedent and triggered criticism at home and abroad. Colombian journalist Daniel Coronell summed up the sentiment succinctly, declaring that '[t]he only winner is Martinelli.' The optics since Martinelli's arrival in Colombia have only worsened the backlash. Having previously claimed serious health issues, Martinelli appeared smiling in Bogota and even posed with Panama's ambassador, who was later reprimanded by the Mulino administration. The performative nature of Martinelli's public appearances not only contradicted his asylum narrative but also undermined the seriousness of his legal case. Rather than a fugitive in hiding, Martinelli projected the image of a seasoned operator playing the system. Martinelli's ambitions remain unchanged: a return to the presidency, but in 2029 rather than 2024. Achieving that goal hinges on either overturning his conviction or rendering it irrelevant through legislation like the amnesty bill. His continued control over RM—the second-largest party in the National Assembly—gives him considerable influence within the legislature, and by all indications he has every intention of using it. Despite his legal troubles, Martinelli remains very popular in Panama. Before he was forced to withdraw from the race, he was favored to win the 2024 presidential election. While sheltered in the Nicaraguan Embassy, he used social media prolifically and strategically, sharing political commentary alongside casual, relatable content like videos of barbecues and selfies with his dog. That kept him visible and engaged with supporters, fueling his influence even in exile. All of this sets the stage for a high-stakes political struggle in the years ahead. Should the amnesty effort succeed, Panama risks institutional backsliding and a further erosion of public trust. If it fails, Martinelli could leverage his exile as a rallying cry, positioning himself as a persecuted leader poised for a comeback. Either way, Mulino must continue to manage complex relationships among Panama's political elites, including with his predecessor. Martinelli's escape to Colombia marks not the end of his political story, but the beginning of a new chapter—one where exile is used as part of a calculated political strategy. Whether he will continue to shape Panama's political landscape through 2029 remains uncertain, largely dependent on the fragile dynamics within the National Assembly and the country's resilience in this test of its democratic institutions. The broader regional implications are, of course, sobering. The use of political asylum to protect convicted elites could further weaken judicial independence across Latin America, where corruption and impunity already test the resilience of democratic systems. Cristina Guevara is a Latin America policy analyst and writer. She previously served as a policy and legislative adviser in Panama's National Assembly. In addition to World Politics Review, she has written for Foreign Policy, The Miami Herald, Rolling Stone, Americas Quarterly and The Dallas Morning News, among other outlets. A Chevening scholar, she is currently pursuing her second master's degree focused on inequality and governance in Latin America at University College London. The post Martinelli's Escape Is Testing Panama's Government—and Its Democracy appeared first on World Politics Review.
Yahoo
23-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Trump Is Dealing With a Very Different North Korea Than Before
Just over year ago, the multinational body established to provide credible, independent analysis and reporting on the implementation of United Nations Security Council sanctions on North Korea was disbanded. Known officially as the UNSC 1718 Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts, the body's mandate expired in April 2024, after Russia vetoed its renewal the previous month. Since then, the international community's ability to monitor and constrain one of the world's most dangerous nuclear threats has been severely limited. At a moment when the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump is reportedly evaluating opportunities to restart dialogue with North Korea, the panel's demise is a stark reminder of how much the strategic environment has shifted since Trump's diplomatic engagements with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during his first administration. Back then, international pressure on Pyongyang was arguably at its peak and provided crucial leverage for Trump's leader-level diplomacy. Today's world looks much different. The Security Council is paralyzed by geopolitical gridlock. Russia has joined China in actively shielding Pyongyang from international condemnation and sanctions pressure. And North Korea has grown more financially and militarily capable at a time when U.S. alliances are strained. As the Trump administration revisits its North Korea policy, it must reckon with a strategic environment that looks far different than it did in 2018 and 2019, when Trump met Kim in two high-profile summits. Failure to do so could leave the U.S. with even fewer tools to manage an increasingly dangerous North Korean threat. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. For more than a decade, the U.N. Security Council played a crucial role in responding to Pyongyang's provocations. After North Korea's first-ever nuclear detonation on Oct. 9, 2006, the Security Council swiftly condemned the test and imposed the first set of multilateral sanctions on the country. Between 2006 and 2017, the council adopted nine sanctions resolutions—as well as one that designated additional individuals and entities to existing sanctions regimes—in response to Pyongyang's escalating ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests. That series of resolutions reflected a rare moment of consensus among the permanent members, including China and Russia. Notably, three of those resolutions were adopted in 2017 at the height of the escalating standoff between Pyongyang and Washington, in which Trump famously promised to unleash 'fire and fury' on North Korea should it threaten the U.S. homeland. These resolutions restricted North Korea's export earnings, capped refined petroleum imports and limited the regime's ability to send its citizens abroad to profit from their overseas labor. Even China—historically Pyongyang's economic lifeline and chief diplomatic shield—took steps to enforce U.N. sanctions more rigorously than ever before. This rare convergence of international pressure, reinforced by a unified Security Council, helped create the conditions that pushed Kim to meet Trump at the negotiating table in 2018. Those talks ultimately failed to achieve any breakthroughs. And in the intervening years, the unity among the veto-wielding powers has long since collapsed, leaving the council paralyzed by geopolitical divisions that have only deepened since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Security Council has failed to adopt any meaningful resolutions on North Korea since 2017, including after multiple ICBM launches by Pyongyang in 2022 that in previous years would have triggered new multilateral sanctions regimes. The last U.S.-led attempt to hold North Korea accountable for its ICBM tests failed in May 2022 due to vetoes by China and Russia. Moscow's veto blocking the renewal of the Panel of Experts' mandate in March 2024 has only worsened the gridlock. The Security Council's inability to even rhetorically condemn North Korea for violating its resolutions has consequences that extend beyond the body's credibility. It undermines the foundation and legitimacy of the multilateral pressure that helped create the U.S. diplomatic opening with North Korea in 2018. Quite simply, that leverage no longer exists today. The gridlock plaguing the Security Council is more than a reflection of fractured consensus. It is actively sustained by Moscow's deepening military and political alignment with Pyongyang. Indeed, Russia's refusal to renew the Panel of Experts' mandate was a blatant attempt to silence its investigations of Moscow's procurement of North Korean weapons in violation of Security Council resolutions. This evolving relationship has far-reaching implications. It affects not only regional security and sanctions enforcement, but also the conditions required for meaningful diplomatic engagement with North Korea. For years, China was seen as the primary enabler of North Korea's evasion of international pressure, providing economic support and shielding Pyongyang from the full weight of sanctions enforcement. Beijing's longstanding priority for the peninsula—no war, no instability, no nukes, in that order—meant it was reluctant to pursue measures that risked destabilizing Pyongyang. Even at the lowest point in their bilateral relationship, China remained North Korea's economic lifeline, accounting for 95 percent of its total trade. The conventional wisdom was that pressuring North Korea to return to the negotiation table required first securing Chinese cooperation. But Russia's invasion of Ukraine has significantly altered that picture. Facing deepening isolation from the West, Moscow has turned to Pyongyang for military support, publicly flouting Security Council resolutions and sanctions that it had once backed. As early as March 2023, the United States warned that Russia was seeking munitions from North Korea to sustain its war in Ukraine. These warnings intensified following Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu's participation in North Korea's military parade and Kim's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Russia. By January 2024, the United States confirmed that Russia had used North Korean short-range ballistic missiles to strike Ukrainian targets. The 1718 Panel of Experts, which traveled to Ukraine in April after Russia's veto of its mandate renewal but before the cessation of its activities, similarly reported to the Security Council that missile debris recovered in Kharkiv matched a North Korean design. The partnership between Moscow and Pyongyang has only deepened since then, with the signing of a mutual defense pact and North Korea's deployment of troops to support Russia's operations in Ukraine. Russia's growing military partnership with Pyongyang gives Moscow strong incentives to shield the regime diplomatically, while its economic and humanitarian support—fuel shipments, labor access and food aid—has allowed North Korea to diversify away from its traditional reliance on Beijing. China may be uneasy with Russia's rising influence over North Korea, but it is unlikely to take steps to curb this development for fear of pushing North Korea further into Russia's orbit and of exposing friction in its own 'no limits' partnership with Moscow. The result is a strategic environment in which both Russia and China help insulate North Korea from sanctions and global scrutiny, further complicating efforts to rebuild the kind of international pressure that helped bring Kim to the negotiating table during Trump's first term. To make matters worse, North Korea today is not just more insulated. It is also more capable and less incentivized to engage in meaningful diplomatic negotiations. In recent years, Pyongyang has significantly expanded its cyber operations, leveraging a network of state-sponsored hacking groups to conduct high-volume cryptocurrency thefts that directly fund its weapons programs. In 2024, North Korean hackers not only stole a record $1.3 billion in cryptocurrency, but also carried out large-scale operations more frequently than in previous years—marking a sharp increase in both the scale and pace of their operations. The FBI recently accused North Korean-linked hackers of stealing roughly $1.5 billion worth of cryptocurrency in one of the largest cryptoheists publicly known. These operations have allowed Pyongyang to circumvent financial sanctions, diversify revenue streams and continue funding the development of increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles and nuclear delivery systems. Indeed, North Korea's ambitious weapons development program has continued apace despite international condemnation. In recent years, Kim has developed and tested a wide range of systems to further strengthen North Korea's weapons capabilities in defiance of multilateral sanctions. In 2022 alone, Pyongyang conducted more than 70 missile tests—at one point launching 23 missiles in a single day—marking one of the most active years on record. These advances have taken place in a geopolitical environment that is far less conducive to coordinated action than in years past. The global agenda is overwhelmed: Russia's war in Ukraine grinds on; the Middle East remains mired in conflict; and growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait demand U.S. and allied attention. Amid this landscape of concurrent crises, North Korea often remains a secondary priority, eclipsed unless or until it engages in spectacular provocation. At the same time, many of the partners that Washington relied on previously to pressure Pyongyang are either politically distracted or at risk of drifting away. South Korea, a central pillar of the U.S. coalition on North Korea, is embroiled in domestic political turmoil. Across Europe and Asia, some allies are increasingly frustrated by the Trump administration's renewed push for tariffs and a transactional approach to alliances, making coordinated diplomatic action harder to organize—and harder to sustain. The conditions that enabled diplomacy with Pyongyang in 2018 included a rare alignment among major powers, credible sanctions enforcement and sustained international pressure. Today, those conditions no longer exist. North Korea is now not only protected by two powerful patrons, but also more capable both financially and militarily. As the Trump administration considers its next steps on its policy toward North Korea, it must recognize the different strategic contexts since the last time Trump was in office. This is particularly true if the administration is considering rekindling diplomatic negotiations with Pyongyang. Although meaningful engagement is always worth pursuing, failed diplomacy, especially at the leader level, carries significant opportunity costs. When such talks collapse, there are few fallback options, as was demonstrated the last time Trump engaged directly with Kim. Before proceeding, the Trump administration would therefore benefit from a clear-eyed assessment of the leverage and tools it has today. It must also rebuild coordination with allies, whose trust and cooperation will be essential to any sustainable diplomatic outcome. This moment may look familiar in many ways. It is not. Assuming otherwise risks wasting what little leverage over Pyongyang remains. Theresa Lou served as senior policy adviser to the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 2023 to 2025, where she led on Indo-Pacific policy and strategic competition. Prior to that, she was the Democratic staff director for the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. The post Trump Is Dealing With a Very Different North Korea Than Before appeared first on World Politics Review.
