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Yahoo
18-07-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Joby Aviation Doubles Air Taxi Factory Size As It Races To Launch Air Taxis
Stuck in traffic again, daydreaming about flying over the mess? Joby Aviation just doubled down on making that fantasy slightly more realistic. The company expanded its Marina, California, facility to 435,500 square feet, enabling production of 24 electric vertical takeoff and landing eVTOL aircraft annually. That's roughly one flying taxi rolling off the line every other week, assuming everything goes according to plan. This isn't just about bigger warehouses and more assembly lines. Joby's facility expansion represents the company's most aggressive push toward commercial air taxi service, with the Marina site handling everything from FAA certification processes to pilot training simulation. The expanded facility positions Joby to deliver on its 2025 U.S. launch timeline—a date that's been circled on calendars since the company first started making noise about urban air mobility, similar to Pivotal's progress in the personal air travel space. Toyota's deep pockets are making this scaling possible, with engineers from the automotive giant embedded throughout the expansion process. The Japanese manufacturer closed a $250 million investment tranche (part of a $500 million total commitment), bringing decades of manufacturing expertise to aircraft production. This partnership extends beyond California, with Joby operating facilities in Santa Cruz, San Carlos, and a recently renovated Dayton, Ohio, location that could eventually pump out 500 aircraft yearly. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. The regulatory pieces are falling into place faster than expected. Joby's six-aircraft test fleet has logged over 40,000 miles, with the FAA approving the company's proprietary ElevateOS software suite, critical for commercial deployment. The company recently demonstrated simultaneous flight operations with multiple aircraft, proving their systems can handle the complexity of urban air traffic management. While Joby leads the pack, competitors like Archer Aviation and Lilium are racing toward similar production milestones. Archer recently completed construction of its Georgia facility, targeting 15-24 aircraft in 2025, while Lilium has begun production of its first seven jets. The eVTOL market faces significant hurdles beyond manufacturing, from air traffic control integration to public acceptance of flying taxis overhead. Regulatory approval timelines remain uncertain, with the FAA taking a cautious approach to certifying aircraft that will carry passengers in urban environments. Traditional automakers spent decades perfecting assembly lines for cars that stay on the ground. Joby's betting that the same manufacturing discipline, applied to aircraft that need to be exponentially more reliable than your Honda Civic, can create a viable air taxi business. The expanded facility represents the moment when eVTOL companies stop talking about the future and start building it, as seen in Joby Aviation's first piloted electric air taxi transition. Ready to skip the freeway entirely? That depends on whether Joby's production timeline survives contact with reality—and whether your city's infrastructure can handle flying taxis landing in downtown areas. 擷取數據時發生錯誤 登入存取你的投資組合 擷取數據時發生錯誤 擷取數據時發生錯誤 擷取數據時發生錯誤 擷取數據時發生錯誤
Yahoo
08-07-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
China's Post-Xi Succession Problem Has Global Implications
In recent weeks, speculation became rife among overseas Chinese analysts and the tabloid media about the status of Chinese President Xi Jinping, prompted by a brief period of inactivity for Xi in May and early June. These rumors were further fed by continued purges of high-ranking military officials, including some promoted by Xi himself, and the announcement that Xi would not attend this week's BRICS Summit in Brazil. The speculation ranged from suggestions that there is internal resistance in Beijing to Xi's rule to reports that he is suffering from health problems and may step down from his three roles as China's paramount leader—Communist Party chief, president and head of the military—as early as August. These reports included misinterpretations and errors of fact, but that did not stop them from fueling further speculation and attempts at more analysis along similar lines. Given China's importance to the world economy and its ongoing competition with the United States for global power and legitimacy, the opaqueness of China's political system and its lack of an institutionalized process for political succession are problems with global implications. When Xi removed term limits for the state presidency in 2018 at the beginning of what would have been his second and last term, he discontinued a shaky but important attempt to limit China's paramount leader to two five-year terms. The term limits were intended to avoid the centralized and personalist rule that characterized the tenure of Mao Zedong, and instead encourage collectivist decision-making by the party leadership. They were more or less honored by Xi's two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, both of whom were selected by Deng to succeed him after he stepped down from his formal leadership role in 1989. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. Abrogation of the two-term limit allowed Xi to further centralize power around himself and rule indefinitely. The fact that he accomplished this feat after only five years in office may indicate that many Communist Party leaders had grown dissatisfied with the two-term rule. Xi himself argued that it created weak leaders and lame-duck status in the second term. Centralization has allowed Xi to rule over an anti-corruption campaign of monumental proportions; to discipline and silence private sector entrepreneurs who spoke out against the Party, such as Jack Ma and Ren Zhiqiang; and to enforce draconian policies, such as China's 'Zero COVID' strategy, which locked people in their homes for weeks on end during the pandemic. China's bureaucracy, private sector and civil society have all been tamed into a docility thought nearly impossible at the beginning of his term as party chairman in 2012. But the rumors and speculation that currently dog Xi's rule will only continue to get worse as he ages. Centralization without institutionalized succession does not bode well for China's policymaking over the next decade. When Xi's third term ends in 2028, he will be 75. Each time something unusual happens with regard to Xi's public appearances, there will be speculation about his health and his grasp on power, as well as about how the next paramount leader will be chosen in a system that disavows the use of elections to make such selections. Autocracies are sometimes portrayed as more stable than democracies because leadership turnover is usually less frequent, meaning there is less uncertainty about who will be in power and the policies they will pursue. But unlike the uncertainty that pervades democracies, from the timing of elections and electoral outcomes to policy continuity across governments, political succession in autocracies in general, and in China in particular, is entirely uncertain. We don't know when it will occur; we don't know how it will occur; and because Xi has refused to groom a chosen successor, we don't know who his replacement will be or even whether one currently exists. This uncertainty over the process grows more important as Xi ages. It is ironic that a leader who has presided over the strengthening of the Chinese Communist Party by reducing corruption and formulating rules to enhance coordination of party organizations has not provided any mechanisms to transfer power. This may be due in large part to Xi's own rise to power, which was the first CCP leadership transition that did not include input from Deng, who continued to preside informally over China's post-Mao reforms until his death in 1997. Xi's ascendence was also marred by Bo Xilai's attempt to challenge him for the top leadership position in 2012. Bo, known to be an ambitious politician, ruled over the inland city of Chongqing and gained popularity as a populist leader who cracked down on crime and embraced China's communist past. His arrest and trial just before Xi was elevated to the top position in the CCP was the country's largest political scandal since the violent crackdown in 1989 against pro-democracy students in Tiananmen Square. Given the conflict that marred his ascent, Xi may fear that any attempt to choose a successor or plan a transition would lead to open conflict among China's elite. But the lack of transparency at the top of China's political system has its own costs. It's increasingly difficult to make sense of recent changes and happenings among China's elite. The unprecedented purge of China's top military officials since the beginning of Xi's third term may indicate that his attempt to clean up corruption has failed despite more than a decade of hard work. However, the recent purges have targeted Xi's own hand-selected men. What does this indicate about his ability to choose leaders wisely? Ultimately the recent concerns about Xi's health or a palace coup were put to rest when he resurfaced at a Politburo meeting in June, where new rules were announced to regulate the top coordinating commissions of the CCP. These commissions have been strengthened under Xi, and many have taken on roles previously performed by government agencies. Since 2018, Xi has assumed the chairmanship of many of them, indicating his centralization of power but also perhaps his lack of faith in others to lead. That said, further institutionalization of these bodies may be part of a process of delegation, even—as some experts speculated—a move to transition power to the next generation. Without greater clarity from the top, however, it's impossible to tell if Xi is planning to groom the next generation of leadership or further centralize power with rules that govern everyone but himself. Mary Gallagher is the Marilyn Keough Dean of the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame. The post China's Post-Xi Succession Problem Has Global Implications appeared first on World Politics Review.
Yahoo
12-06-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
The Trump-Musk Feud Revealed Two Massive National Security Concerns
The spectacular falling out last week between U.S. President Donald Trump and Elon Musk, the billionaire who became one of his closest aides, put the spotlight on two dangerous developments affecting U.S. national security. The breakup provided Schadenfreude to the two men's critics and delivered entertainment value to social media audiences across the world. But it also revealed crucial vulnerabilities deriving from the ways in which important elements of U.S. military and intelligence operations, among others, have been personalized in both men's hands. While this is particularly alarming for the U.S., its repercussions extend beyond U.S. borders, to U.S. allies and others. When the world's most powerful man and the world's wealthiest entrepreneur started lobbing verbal missiles at each other from the social media platforms they each own, the crossfire included threats with serious geopolitical consequences. It may have looked like a high-profile schoolyard scuffle, but the two people involved are so powerful that the clash was far more consequential. It all started when Musk blasted Trump's massive budget bill currently making its way through Congress. If approved, the legislation would add trillions of dollars to the national debt. That was anathema to Musk, whose ostensible role in the Trump administration was to strengthen the government's finances. He initially vowed to slash $2 trillion in spending, later lowering his sights to $1 trillion. Ultimately the so-called Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, cut less than $200 million, and by some estimates it produced more costs than savings. Still, Musk lambasted the budget bill, and when Trump criticized him for that, it unleashed the furies, with Musk going as far as suggesting Trump should be impeached. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. Among the many threats the erstwhile allies traded was a warning Trump posted on his Truth Social platform that '[t]he easiest way to save money … is to terminate Elon's Governmental Subsidies and Contracts,' to which Musk responded on his X platform that his SpaceX company 'will begin decommissioning its Dragon spacecraft immediately.' The U.S. depends on the Dragon to send astronauts and supplies to the International Space Station, making it no small threat. Focusing on just these two posts, we can see the danger. First, there's the deeply alarming fact that Trump openly threatened to use the power of the presidency to exact personal revenge. We've seen this many times already since he returned to the presidency less than five months ago, but it's an undemocratic, corrupt practice that may be routine in dictatorships but should be unacceptable in solid democracies. Over the weekend, Trump once again threatened to use the power of his office against Musk, warning of 'very serious consequences' if Musk opted to fund Democratic candidates in next year's midterm congressional elections. In other words, he would use his office for political retribution, another affront against democracy. In addition to canceling contracts, as he suggested on Thursday when the war of words started, Trump could also unleash regulators on Musk's firms. As president, Trump's duty is to make decisions in the national interest. If the contracts made sense before the falling out, they should still make sense after it. But the contracts were actually deeply troubling before, and the dispute and threats highlight just how dangerously dependent the U.S., as well as other countries, have become on companies controlled by a single individual, and a volatile one with a troubling ideology at that. Musk retracted his threats to decommission Dragon, but the mere mention of the possibility alarmed NASA and shocked the space travel community. As mentioned, without Dragon, the U.S. has no way to send its astronauts and supplies to the ISS for now, as an alternative built by Boeing proved unreliable. But the threat to shut down Dragon is minimal compared to other off switches on Musk's console. The Pentagon and the entire U.S. security apparatus have become perilously dependent on Musk's companies. In addition to its contracts for the ISS, SpaceX carries out the overwhelming majority of all satellite launches around the globe, including those of military and intelligence satellites. Then there's the SpaceX subsidiary Starlink and its military version Starshield, both of which have become indispensable communications platforms, and not only for the United States. In 2022, when Russia launched its all-out invasion of Ukraine, Musk provided Starlink equipment to Kyiv, allowing Ukrainian troops to access the internet and communicate with each other and their commanders. A large part of the cost of that arrangement is borne by the Pentagon. The dangers of relying on Musk's company for such a fundamental function in the midst of an active war was already becoming evident when Musk started echoing Russian talking points. Then, a recently published biography of Musk claimed that when the Ukrainians asked for Starlink support in 2022 as part of an operation in Russian-occupied Crimea, Musk refused, saying that attacking the illegally annexed territory was 'going too far.' The revelation raised red flags at the Pentagon, where officials started speaking about the risk represented by Musk's ability to simply deny access to his products in the midst of a conflict. And yet, despite urgent calls by military officials for competitors to provide alternatives, few viable options have emerged. The Boeing space vehicle for taking astronauts to the ISS was a disappointment, and Eutelsat, a Franco-British competitor of Starlink, has launched only 600 satellites compared to Musk's 7,000, which represents the majority of the satellites orbiting Earth. What's more, Eutelsat's user equipment is more cumbersome. This March, while he was still working closely with Trump, Musk posted that 'Ukraine will inevitably lose' the war and noted ominously that Kyiv's 'entire front line would collapse' if he turned Starlink off. That's a not-so-veiled warning about Musk's power to cause havoc not only for Ukraine but for all of Starlink's users, of which the U.S. government is the biggest. The U.S. has a reported $22 billion in federal contracts with SpaceX. Musk already controls the launching of spy satellites as well as much of the communications systems the U.S. uses and would use should it go to war. If Trump launches construction of his promised missile shield, the Golden Dome, Musk would be a major player. This risky dependence on Musk is not the reason Trump has threatened to abuse his presidency against his former friend. That is all about revenge. But the U.S. should do everything in its power to ensure it can carry out its policies and objectives without being at the mercy of any single individual or company, even if that was not something Trump was concerned about before he had a reason to punish Musk. The acrimonious breakup, while entertaining, has also delivered two important warnings. It showed that Trump's use of his office for personal vendettas has become a regular, openly deployed practice in this presidency. And it has provided an urgent reminder that the U.S. and other countries have become dangerously dependent on the unpredictable and untrustworthy Musk. Frida Ghitis is WPR's senior columnist and a contributor to CNN and The Washington Post. Her WPR column appears every Thursday. You can follow her on Twitter and Threads at @fridaghitis. The post The Trump-Musk Feud Revealed Two Massive National Security Concerns appeared first on World Politics Review.
Yahoo
12-06-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Synthetic Stones Are Sinking Botswana's Diamond-Based Economy
Diamonds are losing their sparkle, at least for the stones dug out of the ground. The rapid development of lab-grown synthetic diamonds increasingly looks like it will deliver a death blow to diamond mining, with major repercussions for countries that built their economies on the sector. The basic problem is that lab-grown diamonds are now virtually indistinguishable from natural stones. They have the same chemical properties and appearance as natural diamonds, and to tell the difference requires specialist equipment and expertise. What's more, labs can now make a diamond in a few weeks, whereas the timescale to create natural diamonds is more like billions of years. Labs also have the advantage of being much cheaper. In 2020, lab-grown diamonds were about 25 percent more expensive than natural diamonds. Now they are about 80 percent cheaper. This trend is dragging down the price of natural diamonds, which are now almost 40 percent lower than their all-time high in 2022. As mining diamonds is usually complicated and expensive, the diminished payoff is making the economic calculus unsustainable. For the countries that depend on diamonds for their economic wellbeing, that has now become a major problem. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. There has been much speculation over the years about when the growth of synthetic diamonds would begin hurting diamond mines. It looks like the real impact has now begun. Botswana is currently the world's biggest diamond producer by value and relies on diamonds for almost 80 percent of its export revenues. Yet in May, the government announced that 1,000 workers would be laid off at the country's largest diamond mine, which is jointly managed by a state-owned company. This was followed by an announcement that production would be halted at some mines for three months. The layoffs represent a substantial proportion of the total mining workforce in the country. Despite their longstanding economic importance, diamonds are not a big driver of employment, with less than 10,000 people working in Botswana's mining sector. It is a risky move from a government that was propelled to power in 2024 by voters angry over rising unemployment, bringing an end to six decades of rule by the Botswana Democratic Party. It is perhaps unavoidable, though, as in June the government cut its forecast for annual economic growth from 3.3 percent to almost zero. Other countries in the region will be hit hard too. Diamonds are by far Lesotho's largest export, and they are Namibia's and Angola's second-biggest. This represents a dramatic and unfortunate economic reversal for these countries, which as recently as 2022 enjoyed a boost after diamonds from Russia, then the world's largest producer by volume, were hit by sanctions and shunned by Western buyers. In one sense, this is a kind of final reckoning that the diamond industry has been postponing for the past 150 years. Diamonds are valuable not only because of their translucent beauty and durability. They are also valuable because they are scarce. But their scarcity is not entirely a natural phenomenon. In the 1870s, the first in what turned out to be a series of big diamond discoveries in Southern Africa threatened to flood the market with precious stones and drive down prices. The feared price collapse did not happen, though, because of the sharp insight of a company that became synonymous with diamonds: De Beers. Founded in 1888, De Beers realized that it could make more money by selling fewer diamonds, so long as it could control the global supply. By limiting production, it could keep prices high, something it was highly successful at doing. This created a peculiar economic structure in the diamond industry. Usually, high prices for a commodity encourages greater production. The opposite occurred with diamond mining, where production remained limited despite high prices. The scarcity of diamonds was artificially induced. This strategy had been more or less perfected by the time huge diamond deposits were discovered in Botswana in the 1960s. It was not only De Beers that benefited from these discoveries, however. Careful management of this bounty of precious stones transformed Botswana from one of the world's poorest countries into a relatively wealthy one. A landlocked, mostly desert nation so neglected by Britain, its colonial ruler, that even the territory's capital was located outside its borders, Botswana defied the odds and became something of an economic miracle. All of this was built on diamonds. De Beers, however, is not what it once was. Although the company lost its monopoly on diamonds in the early 2000s, its fortunes were buoyed by rising demand from China. By the 2010s, in fact, it was selling more diamonds than ever. However, diamond sales in China have declined steeply in the past two years. The slump has battered De Beers, and its parent company, Anglo American, is now offloading it after a century of ownership. Ahead of the sale, Anglo American has twice written down the De Beers' value, by $1.6 billion in 2024 and $2.9 billion this year. The world's biggest diamond company is worth less than half of what it was two years ago. This is a major problem for Botswana. After years of tough negotiations, the government signed a new deal with De Beers covering the diamonds mined by their longstanding joint venture Debswana. Even a few years ago, the deal would have been viewed as something of a coup. For decades, Botswana has sought to sell diamonds independently of De Beers to gain a greater share of the revenue. As recently as 2010, Botswana could only sell 10 percent of the stones they mined. Under this new deal, Botswana's share of diamonds will rise to 50 percent by the late 2030s. The deal also allows Botswana to sell diamonds to selected buyers on long-term contracts for the first time, something that was previously the preserve of De Beers. There is a painful irony that this long sought-after goal has been achieved precisely at the moment when diamonds are collapsing in value. Sales are due to begin in September. The question is: Who will want to buy the diamonds by then? More than anything, lab-grown diamonds cut away at diamonds' image of exclusivity. A natural stone was once the ultimate ostentatious status symbol. It is not quite the same now that a synthetic replica is available for a fraction of the price, and no one can tell the difference between the two. Optimists for the industry point to the romance and glamor of large natural stones, like the enormous 2,492-carat diamond discovered at Karowe Mine in Botswana in 2024. But in the near future, this won't be hard to replicate in a lab. The dilemmas of the wealthy whose exclusive symbols can now be copied by anyone pale in comparison to the dilemma faced by countries like Botswana, which must now build post-diamond economies, at a time when global trade disruption has made investors skittish and development aid has dried up. What Botswana and other Southern African heavyweights will do after diamonds is a question with no easy answer. And they don't have a billion years to come up with one. Duncan Money is a historian and researcher who works on the mining industry, with a focus on copper, as well as on Southern Africa more broadly. He has a doctoral degree in history from Oxford and has worked in various countries in Africa, Europe and North America. The post Synthetic Stones Are Sinking Botswana's Diamond-Based Economy appeared first on World Politics Review.
Yahoo
11-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Trump Is Pushing U.S. Civil-Military Relations to the Brink
On Saturday night, U.S. President Donald Trump federalized 2,000 soldiers from the California National Guard and deployed them to Los Angeles, with orders to 'temporarily protect' federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement personnel, as well as other government personnel and federal property in the city. The move followed minor clashes between ICE as well as other federal security agencies involved in Trump's mass deportation program and local community members in Los Angeles over the weekend. National Guard troops are state-based members of the U.S. military that are under the command of state governors unless federalized. They are normally used to assist in responding to natural disasters as well as to restore and maintain order when local law enforcement is overwhelmed. Even so, they are most often federalized at the request of the governor due to the additional support and money that federal control can bring. The last time they were federalized without the governor's consent, as is the case today, was in the 1960s to ensure compliance by southern states with federal civil rights protections for Black Americans. Despite warnings from California Gov. Gavin Newsom that federalizing the guard was in this case unnecessary and would further inflame the situation—a warning that proved prescient—Trump doubled down on it, mobilizing an additional 2,000 National Guard soldiers as well as 700 active-duty Marines based in the state yesterday. Observers of civil-military relations as well as legal experts have long worried that Trump may try to deploy the military domestically against Americans. Trump's actions since the weekend have confirmed those fears, while raising new ones about the potential for abuses of power. They not only undermine the rule of law and raise a red flag for U.S. democracy but also threaten the relationship between American society and the military. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. The move first and foremost stretches the limits of presidential authority. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 explicitly prohibits the president from deploying the military domestically to perform law enforcement functions, with a few exceptions. The law has ignominious origins—it was proposed and passed by southern Democrats who wanted to end the Army's role in civil rights enforcement during the Reconstruction period following the Civil War. But it has nevertheless formed the bedrock of Americans' understanding of the role of the military and is particularly important today. While in the early days of the republic it was necessary to call upon the Army to enforce law and order because of a lack of policing capacity, today's state and local law enforcement are some of the most capable and well-resourced in U.S. history. The main exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is the Insurrection Act, which is actually a series of laws passed in the 18th and 19th centuries that outline the—arguably broad—conditions under which the president can legally deploy federal forces to perform domestic policing operations. The details and logistics of chains of command under such circumstances get complicated, but the general sentiment is relatively straightforward: Law enforcement inside the U.S. is intended to be a matter for state and local authorities, not the federal government. States have their own laws, ordinances and standards of practice that military members are unfamiliar with and unprepared to enforce. The use of as blunt an instrument as active-duty military, or National Guard troops under the command of the president, is therefore supposed to be a last resort. Historically, invoking the Insurrection Act is extremely rare—it has only been done 30 times in all of U.S. history, and as a result it comes with political costs. It is noteworthy that Trump has not yet officially invoked the Insurrection Act. Instead, the administration is relying on a section of the U.S. Title 10 Code, Section 12406, that allows the president to deploy forces to protect federal assets. Not only is the justification for using this code alone—rather than in combination with the Insurrection Act, as has historically been the case—completely unprecedented, it is legally dubious. What's more, even if the administration had invoked the Insurrection Act, the Executive Order it is using to federalize the California National Guard is not geographically limited to California. Rather, it purports to authorize the use of the military wherever protests may occur, making it a preemptive authorization to do so anywhere in the United States. This itself sets a dangerous precedent, as previous uses of the Insurrection Act have all been geographically defined. Even then-President Abraham Lincoln's invocation of the act during the Civil War was limited to the southern states in rebellion. These two features—the reinterpretation of U.S. law to justify the independent deployment of military forces and the lack of limits on where they may be employed—create the potential for a massive abuse of power. If allowed to stand, they effectively pave the way for the administration to use military force against American citizens anywhere on U.S. soil. This is not the first time that the Trump administration has sought to use emergency powers to justify extremely broad interpretations of federal authority in legally dubious ways, or the first time that it has involved the military to facilitate legally dubious actions. Notably, however, it is the first time it is attempting to use the military's coercive power, as opposed to its logistics capabilities, in the service of its domestic political goals. In addition to the clear challenges the administration's actions pose to rule of law in the U.S., they further violate important civil-military norms and jeopardize the military's relationship with the broader U.S. society in important ways. The deployment to Los Angeles involves the military in a highly controversial and already politicized immigration operation; puts service members in a situation for which they receive little to no training; and puts military leaders in the middle of a political fight between the president and a state governor. The effect, especially if it is reproduced elsewhere, will be to further politicize the military and undermine public confidence in it as an institution, which research suggests could have downstream effects on recruitment, retention, morale and the overall professionalism of the force. Indeed, while the public has historically tolerated the deployment of National Guard forces during times of civil unrest as they work to restore law and order, local residents don't remain supportive if military forces are seen as contributing to the chaos rather than quelling it. And if the Trump administration does choose to use its Executive Order to deploy military forces to cities beyond Los Angeles, it lays the groundwork for abuses of power that will polarize public opinion about the military and very possibly galvanize opinion against it. Already some political actors have begun to push back in positive and constructive ways. Newsom has already brought a lawsuit against the Trump administration, which will likely clarify the president's authorities under section 12406 and publicize the ways in which the Executive Order as issued could lead to profound abuses of power. Growing demonstrations in Los Angeles and solidarity protests that have already sprung up elsewhere will shape public opinion about the use of the military in domestic situations and—to the extent that they remain peaceful—probably drive opposition to the administration's moves. And retired military leaders, along with experts on civil-military relations, have begun to speak out about the misuse of military resources for domestic law enforcement operations. Yet Congress must also get involved. As others have pointed out, these operations cost money, and congressional leaders should exert control and oversight over how federal dollars are spent on them. Service members must also be informed about the nuances of operating within the U.S., and military leaders have an obligation to provide strict and clear rules of engagement in order to mitigate harm and prevent escalation. The Trump administration has once again pushed civil-military relations to the brink, this time by using military power to undermine state officials' authority and further politicize already controversial operations. If its actions are not appropriately contested and reversed, the consequences could be profound and have lasting impacts on the military's relationship with the American people. Carrie A. Lee is a senior fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States and visiting scholar with the University of Pennsylvania's Perry World House. From 2021 to 2025, she served as chair of the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. The post Trump Is Pushing U.S. Civil-Military Relations to the Brink appeared first on World Politics Review.
