Latest news with #DealoftheCentury
Jordan Times
30-04-2025
- Business
- Jordan Times
Jordan's strategic choices in a shifting world order
In light of the rapid geopolitical transformations taking place on the international scene, and the accompanying sharp regional shifts in the balance of power, Jordan finds itself facing increasing and multidimensional American pressure. These pressures are linked to the Kingdom's political positions on core issues, most notably the Palestinian issue and its rejection of the concessions imposed by the "Deal of the Century." They are also linked to its rapprochement with some regional powers, such as China and Iran, and its efforts to establish new strategic balances. The pressures also include economic issues, which, in this context, raise crucial questions about Jordan's options for protecting its sovereignty and interests without compromising its stability. In this article, we present three main scenarios that Jordan can adopt in confronting American pressure, outlining the conditions for each scenario and its chances of success on the ground. Scenario one: Flexible Response (Smart Containment): This scenario entails adopting a delicate balancing policy based on accommodating American demands within limits that do not infringe upon Jordanian sovereignty or national principles, particularly on issues related to the Palestinian cause and the Hashemite custodianship of holy sites in Jerusalem. This strategy also involves gaining time and reshuffling internally and regionally. Conditions for realization: The presence of a political leadership with a long-term strategic vision. Effective diplomatic tools are available that allow Jordan to maneuver in its relations with Washington without escalation. Arab support (particularly from the Gulf) compensates for any economic pressures that may be imposed by Washington. Effective coordination with the European Union, Russia, and China is essential as international actors to counterbalance American influence. The chances of realization are relatively high, given Jordan's long historical experience in managing its relations with major powers in a manner that relies on wisdom, gradualism, and calm interaction, avoiding escalation. Jordan has traditionally adopted a long-term policy in dealing with pressure, which has given it international credibility and the ability to absorb crises. The United States also recognises the importance of Jordan as a moderate and stable ally in a turbulent region and does not wish to destabilise this balance or lose it to competing powers. Scenario Two: A shift toward nternational multilateralism (relatively disengaging from Washington): This scenario is based on diversifying political, economic and military partnerships outside the US sphere by strengthening cooperation with China, Russia, and the European Union, and engaging in regional projects that enhance Jordan's economic and security independence. Conditions for realisation: Building a strong network of relationships with alternative international powers capable of providing the necessary political and economic support; providing a firm political will to reshape Jordan's foreign policy orientations; overcoming obstacles related to US aid, on which the Jordanian economy depends; and possessing the security and economic capacity to deal with any sanctions or harassment that may be imposed by Washington. The chances of this scenario being realised range from medium to weak in the short term, given Jordan's dependence on US aid, which amounts to more than $1.4 billion annually. However, these opportunities may increase in the medium and long term if the Kingdom succeeds in strengthening its non-traditional partnerships and achieving relative self-sufficiency in some vital sectors, such as energy and water. Scenario three: Direct confrontation (explicit rejection of pressure): This scenario involves Jordan publicly rejecting American demands that it considers an infringement on its sovereignty or an infringement on its national interests, such as demands to sign unpopular security agreements or adopt political positions that conflict with its principles on the Palestinian issue. This rejection could take political, media, or even legal forms. Conditions for Realisation: Strong domestic mobilisation and popular support for the official position; the government's ability to bear potential economic consequences, especially the reduction or suspension of aid; the availability of ready alternatives to secure the country's vital needs; and a clear awareness of the limitations of American power to force behavioural change in internally stable countries. The chances of this scenario coming true are relatively slim at the present time, but it could be used as a temporary pressure card, especially if American pressure accumulates to a degree that threatens national principles. This scenario will likely be used in conjunction with the first scenario as a negotiating tool, rather than as a permanent strategic option. Despite the strength of American influence on Jordan, represented by economic aid and close security and military relations, the Kingdom possesses effective tools for political and diplomatic maneuvering that enable it to deal with these pressures in a manner that preserves its sovereignty and national interests. These tools include accumulated political experience, Jordan's balanced regional role, and a flexible network of regional and international relations. The first scenario, a "flexible response," is the most realistic and appropriate option for the current political situation, as it gives Jordan room to maneuver without direct confrontation with Washington, while preserving its national discourse and fundamental principles of foreign policy. At the same time, strengthening the trend toward the second scenario, related to diversifying international partnerships, is a strategic necessity to ensure gradual independence in the long term. The third scenario, related to direct confrontation, should remain a backup option, resorted to only if American pressure crosses red lines and essential national interests are threatened. Jordan's success in managing its relationship with the United States depends on a combination of strategic vision, internal cohesion, and regional and international openness, which enhances its sovereignty and protects its interests without losing its traditional allies or compromising its principles. Hasan Dajah is professor of strategic studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University
Shafaq News
18-04-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Despite the President's appeal, Al-Sadr rejects election return
Despite the President's appeal, Al-Sadr rejects election return Shafaq News / The head of the Patriotic Shiite Movement (PSM), Muqtada al-Sadr, on Saturday firmly rejected reconsidering his decision to boycott the upcoming parliamentary elections. Al-Sadr's statement comes after President Abdul Latif Rashid issued a public letter urging the influential leader to reverse course and rejoin Iraq's political arena ahead of the November 11, 2025, elections. In his response, Al-Sadr clarified that his election boycott was never intended to delay or cancel the vote, but rather to stand against a system that consistently recycles what he called 'corrupt and shameless' figures. 'When I ordered the election boycott, it was not to postpone or abolish them,' Al-Sadr wrote. 'But it saddens me deeply that a great people might vote for the corrupt, the shameless, and the thieves of public funds—including those involved in the 'Deal of the Century,' which has yet to be resolved.' Despite his continued political withdrawal, Al-Sadr reaffirmed his commitment to Iraq's well-being, describing himself as a soldier who will remain on the front lines in defense of the nation. 'Even if I do not participate—and will never participate—with the corrupt or those who disregard the people's voice, I will always remain one of Iraq's soldiers,' he said. 'I will be the first to defend it with honor and dignity against calamities, so we may live free of corruption, dependency, and vile sectarianism.' Al-Sadr concluded by placing Iraq's fate 'in the hands of the Merciful God,' while reminding current leaders of their responsibilities, 'Iraq is in your care, its people and components are your responsibility. No one will aid you if you do not help yourselves.' Al-Sadr's political exit in June 2022 included the resignation of all 73 Sadrist lawmakers—a dramatic move that reshaped the balance of power in Parliament. Since then, Al-Sadr has distanced himself from formal political engagement while continuing to influence Iraq's public discourse through social, religious, and nationalist platforms.
Memri
25-03-2025
- Politics
- Memri
Hamas Official Salah Bardawil, Recently Killed In Gaza – Clips From The MEMRI TV Archives
On March 23, 2025, three senior Hamas officials in Gaza were killed in an Israeli airstrike. Among them was Hamas political bureau member Salah Bardawil, who had headed Hamas's planning and development office and had led strategic and military planning in the Gaza Strip.[1] Below are MEMRI clips of Bardawil from the MEMRI TV archives. Salah Bardawil Criticizes Arab Nations for "Footing the Bill" For Trump's Deal of the Century, Says: We Can Crush the Deal – May 28, 2019 In a May 28, 2919 speech, Hamas political bureau member Salah Bardawil said in a May 28, 2019 speech that that Palestine belongs to the Palestinians, and he criticized the Arab nations for "footing the bill" for the "rope and gallows" and the shackles that are being placed on the Palestinians and their dignity, their religion, and their moral values. He said that President Trump, Jared Kushner, and Jason Greenblatt cannot overpower the will and the blood of the Palestinians, and that the Palestinians are capable of the crushing the Deal of the Century. The speech aired on aired on Hamas's Al-Aqsa TV (Gaza). Salah Bardawil: "Our people have rights. This is our land. The day has come when the Arab nation is footing the bill for the shackles that are placed on the necks of our men and women, and on our dignity, our religion, and our moral values. [...] "The rope and the gallows are bought with Arab money. From the ocean to the Gulf, and from the Gulf to Hell, they are the ones preparing [our] funeral? And what has become of us? That vagabond Trump – let him squawk. Let [Jason] Greenblatt and Kushner make statements and hints. Can they overpower our will, our decisions, our blood? They cannot. So why is the Arab nation voluntarily giving them money? [...] "If we have to – our weapons are within our reach, and we are capable of crushing the 'deal' along with its 'century,' Allah willing." To view this clip on MEMRI TV, click here or below: Palestinian Author Mushir Al-Farra: MEMRI Monitors Everything; Salah Bardawil "Made A Big Mistake" When He Said In May That 53 Of The 68 "March Of Return" Martyrs Were From Hamas – December 23, 2018 During a December 23, 2018 interview on Gaza's Baladna TV, Palestinian author Mushir Al-Farra said that the Palestinians should be more cautious when representing their cause on media outlets so as not to undermine it. One example he gave of Palestinian leaders' statements that played into Israel's hands was what Hamas's Salah Bardawil had said in May 2018 about nearly all those killed in the May 2018 "March of Return" were Hamas members (see below). Mushir Al-Farra: "We should not speak on media outlets in a way that weakens us. For example, I raised an issue concerning the March of Return... Salah Bardawil, who is a personal friend of mine and one of the leaders of Hamas... He is a dear friend who is like a brother to me, but he made a big mistake when he said, following the Friday of the Nakba anniversary on May 15-16, that 53 of the 68 martyrs were from Hamas. He was quoted by Benjamin Netanyahu, by the Israeli ambassador to the U.N., and by various ambassadors, who said: 'Why do you call it a popular uprising? It is an uprising by Hamas.' [...] "Inadvertently, he caused great harm to our public relations, because we had to shift from our attacks on Israel, its snipers, its war crimes, and its killing of children who run in open fields, who do not pose any danger to the Israeli army... We had to start defending ourselves by saying: 'No, it's a popular uprising, not one orchestrated by Hamas." To view this clip on MEMRI TV, click here or below: Salah Bardawil: 50 Of The Martyrs Killed In Gaza Were From Hamas, 12 Regular People – May 16, 2018 Hamas political bureau member Salah Bardawil said that of the 62 people killed in clashes along the Gaza border on May 14, 2018, 50 of them were from Hamas, and emphasized that this was the official figure. He was speaking on May 16 on Baladna TV, which broadcasts from Gaza. Interviewer: "Many people are saying that the children... I'm telling you what people are saying. It's not that I believe this. People are saying that children are dying and that Hamas is reaping the fruits." Salah Bardawil: "In the last round, there were 62 martyrs." Interviewer: "Right." Salah Bardawil: "50 of the martyrs were from Hamas, and the other 12 were regular people. So how can anyone claim that Hamas is reaping the fruits, when it paid such a steep price? What did Hamas gain? 50 martyrs..." Interviewer: "This figure is..." Salah Bardawil: "I am giving you an official figure. 50 of the martyrs in the recent battle were from Hamas. Before that, at least 50% of the martyrs were from Hamas. So what did Hamas gain from this?" To view this clip on MEMRI TV, click here or below: Hamas: Facebook Besieges the Palestinians Just Like the Occupation Does; Salah Bardawil: "The Occupation Is Making Great Efforts, In Coordination With Facebook, Twitter And Other Platforms, To Delete Accounts Of People Who Oppose The Zionist Occupation" – January 11, 2017 A January 11, 2017 report on Hamas's Al-Aqsa TV stated that Facebook, Twitter, and other platforms are coordinating with Israel to delete accounts of Hamas supporters. It said that "Facebook besieges the Palestinians just like the occupation besieges them' and that Facebook's campaigns "are like the periodical detention campaigns by the occupation." Hamas MP Salah Bardawil called for exposing the "secret and public contracts" of the occupation in its "onslaught against free will and freedom of expression." Host: "Many believed that social media would become pioneering platforms for the supporters of freedom – freedom of speech and the freedom to bring change. The reality, however, has been entirely different. Facebook besieges the Palestinians, just like the occupation besieges them. From time to time, supporters of Palestine are surprised to find that Facebook has deleted many pages and accounts without prior warning. It conducts periodical campaigns, which resemble the periodical detention campaigns by the occupation, as part of its so-called 'weeding out' policy. In the most recent campaign conducted last Friday, Facebook deleted some 200 accounts of Palestinian journalists and activists, especially those who support the resistance. This behavior coincided with the anniversary of the martyrdom of the first 'engineer' [Yahya Ayyash], when the hashtag 'Be Like Ayyash' went viral." [...] Hamas MP Salah Bardawil: "The occupation is making great efforts, in coordination with Facebook, Twitter and other platforms, to delete accounts of people who oppose the Zionist occupation. This stems from the occupation being a thief and a robber, which is terrified of being exposed for what it is. [...] "This is not the first time. It happened a few months ago, when many accounts were shut down, and some remain closed. But new accounts have been opened instead. Each time, the occupation monitors the new media, which defeats it by exposing the truth about it. [...] "We do not fear this reckless conduct. However, we – and anyone who can – must expose the occupation, and expose those who make contracts with it. These companies purport to be platforms of freedom, where anyone can express his opinion. We must expose these platforms and their managers. We must expose their secret and public contracts, which are used by the occupation in its onslaught against free will and the freedom of expression. [...] "We must work day and night to shut down the many Zionist websites that incite to terrorism and racism. We must close down Zionist pages that incite to racism, and we must expose the truth about what the occupation is doing in the occupied land, and we must expose the overt and covert agreements with the occupation. This is the job of the experts in the field, and I believe that it should be further developed." To view this clip on MEMRI TV, click here or below: Salah Bardawil: Jews Kill Palestinian Children in Order to Knead Their Blood into Passover Bread – November 25, 2015 In a November 26, 2015 interview on the Hamas Al-Aqsa TV channel, Hamas official in Gaza Salah Al-Bardawil said that the Jews had "ancient biblical beliefs, which instructed them to kill children and collect their blood, in order to knead it into the bread that is eaten on Passover." "This is the killing of a Palestinian child in order to collect his blood and to knead it into the bread they eat," he said. Following are excerpts: Salah Al-Bardawil: Why does the Zionist enemy, with all its might, execute Palestinian children – especially Palestinian girls? I can tell you that there are six reasons for this – not just one reason, but six. The first reason for the targeting of Palestinian children has to do with faith. The Zionist entity subscribes to false biblical doctrines – especially today, when we are experiencing so-called extremism. But this is a typical Jewish situation, which is in harmony with the biblical-Zionist history and faith. This is manifest in the Quran, which quoted the Jews as saying: 'kill the sons of the belivers' [Quran 40:25]. Thus, they subscribe to a principle of faith, which they must implement, and kill the sons of the believers. "Why not kill the believers? Why kill their sons? The killing of the sons of the believers – or, to be clearer, the killing of the Palestinian children – stem from children being weaker and thus easier to kill than adults. This is a cowardly enemy, which fears retaliation, and therefore it targets the weaker, still accomplishing the goal of reducing the number of Palestinians. […] "In addition, they have beliefs which they have tried to conceal from the world. I am referring to the ancient biblical beliefs, which instructed [the Jews] to kill children and collect their blood, in order to knead it into the bread that is eaten on Passover. This is the killing of a Palestinian child in order to collect his blood, and knead it into the bread they eat. Today, they are trying to say that these things never happened, and that it was a joke or a lie, but these are the facts of history. Anyone reading about their history will find this there." To view this clip on MEMRI TV, click here or below: Hamas Senior Officials, Including Salah Bardawil, At Movement's 27th Anniversary Celebrations: We Will Not Recognize Zionist Entity Or Be Satisfied With A Palestinian State Within 1967 Borders; We Thank Iran For Supplying Us With Weapons, Missiles – December 16, 2014 Salah Bardawil: We Adhere To Jihad And Resistance Until Liberation In his December 12, 2014 speech at a rally in the central Gaza Strip, senior Hamas official Salah Bardawil said: "We renew our promise and our oath of loyalty to the blood of [our] martyrs the illustrious leaders, [promising] to continue the path of jihad and resistance until [the attainment of] victory and liberation." He noted that "Hamas, along with other Palestinian dignitaries from among the [Palestinian] people, preserved the national capabilities from destruction and succeeded in withstanding all those who schemed to eliminate the Palestinian people's just cause..." In an exclusive December 14, 2014 statement to the Hamas mouthpiece Al-Risalah on the occasion of the movement's 27th anniversary, Bardawil said that Hamas still has considerable surprises up its sleeve, which it will unveil at the suitable time, following the surprises it already unveiled in the latest Israeli war against Gaza, which was won by the resistance. He added that Hamas would not run out of surprises as long as it adheres to the path of resistance and of defending the Palestinians' rights, and as long as it refuses to shackle the weapons of the resistance to some negotiations with the Israeli side. He said further: "Every day, the Al-Qassam Brigades... unveil a new surprise, which reflects the movement's method of struggle against the occupation and its army." (To read the full report, click here.) Banners announcing the anniversary celebrations: On left: the Dome of the Rock, a Hamas fighter carrying a kidnapped Israeli soldier, and Hamas missiles, with the caption "Persistence in Truth and Resistance'; on right: call to join the "100,000- man demonstration in the northern Gaza Strip" (images:
Mada
03-03-2025
- Politics
- Mada
Gaza: ‘A fireball being tossed around by everyone'
On the eve of his father in law's reelection to the highest office in the United States and as Gaza and Lebanon were being bombed relentlessly by Israel, Jared Kushner took to X to express excitement at the fortuitous situation he saw in a Middle East that had resisted his efforts to change it when he was an architect of the Abraham Accords and the Deal of the Century nearly five years ago. 'The Middle East is too often a solid where little changes. Today, it is a liquid and the ability to reshape is unlimited. Do not squander this moment,' Kushner cajoled officials in power in late September. While brief, Kushner's comment was an ideological seed that writers close to the new administration of US President Donald Trump have sowed since he came into office. Writing in Foreign Affairs in early February, Elliott Abrams, Trump's special representative for Iran and Venezuela during his first term, argued that the US can take advantage of the current situation if it is 'willing to abandon Washington's habitual goal in the Middle East — 'stability' — and presses instead for dramatic changes that will benefit the security of the United States and its allies.' 'Stability,' Abrams argued, has meant nothing more than 'the preservation of the situation in which Gaza was entirely under Hamas control, Hezbollah dominated Lebanon and Iran's nuclear program advanced.' What has followed in the wake of the rollout of this ideological groundwork is a shock and awe campaign by the US administration that has dispensed with any politeness that once colored American foreign policy. In repeated statements since the end of January, Trump has advocated for the forced displacement of Palestinians from the war-torn Gaza Strip and jettisoned long-held US pro forma language about the necessity of a Palestinian state, saying instead that the United States should 'own' the coastal enclave. In the process, he has threatened to suspend the aid that is paid out as part of totemic peace agreements between Jordan and Egypt with Israel as leverage if they don't cooperate in 'taking' in Palestinians. Arab nations, he has added, could finance the resettlement of Gazans to 'a good, fresh, beautiful piece of land' that would provide better living conditions. The US president's brash comments have caused turmoil among Arab countries. Egypt and Jordan have each issued a flurry of statements rejecting forced displacement and upholding their commitment to the 'Palestinian cause.' Saudi Arabia has dismissed the move and reaffirmed that it will not discuss normalization with Israel without the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. But beyond the public comments on either side, shifting geopolitical realities wrought by and preceding the war on Gaza and a desire by Arab states to secure a foothold with the new United States administration have prompted all parties to soberly grapple with the increasingly 'liquid' reality of the region. While Trump's stated plan is as grotesque as it is farfetched, 11 Egyptian officials, a European diplomat in touch with regional capitals and a researcher at a state-run research center who have spoken to Mada Masr in recent weeks acknowledge that change has long been afoot. And while the current plan is unrealistic, an alternative that may come to pass in its place will see a rewriting of the main pillars of regional politics. *** 'I don't think people should be going back to Gaza,' Trump said on February 4. 'I heard that Gaza has been very unlucky for them. They live like hell. They live like they're living in hell. Gaza is not a place for people to be living, and the only reason they want to go back, and I believe this strongly, is because they have no alternative.' By the time Trump was uttering these words standing beside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for a joint press conference, he had already called for Palestinians to be displaced to Egypt and Jordan five times, slightly changing the details each time. What started as temporary displacement had become by February 4 a push for permanent resettlement. While flying in the face of Palestinians' steadfast commitment to remain on their land, the shifting nature of Trump's comments were seen by analysts and statesmen alike as a call for Arab states to fill the void and propose an 'alternative.' Writing in the pro-Israel think tank The Washington Institute, former US diplomat Dennis Ross presented the displacement plan as moving 'the goalposts on Gaza negotiations, very much in line with Trump's established playbook of upping the ante, creating a pressurized situation and putting the onus on others to offer workable solutions. In his view, 'workable solutions' do not require full-scale policy changes — for example, when Colombia, Mexico and Canada responded to his recent pressure with modest adjustments to resource investments and cooperative language, the president eased off.' It is an assessment that an Egyptian official directly involved in the management of Cairo's position on Gaza agreed with. 'Displacement is an old, renewed topic whose purpose is to raise the ceiling of demands related to eliminating Hamas, disarming the resistance and managing Gaza with a moderate authority,' the official tells Mada Masr. What Trump is doing is 'inherently provocative for all parties, whether for the resistance and Hamas, which will refuse, or for regional parties that want to play a prominent role in this issue, especially the Emirates.' Both understanding the nature of Trump's boardroom dealing and trying to curb public opinion over the implication that Egypt would be made to accept forcibly displaced Palestinians, Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Atty announced on February 2 that Egypt had a plan to rebuild Gaza that would not require Palestinians to leave their land. The details of the Egyptian proposal have been slow to make their way to the public. According to four Egyptian officials, a source at state-affiliated research institutions and a European diplomat, the plan has several key axes. The first would see Hamas and Islamic Jihad excluded from political, administrative and military affairs in Gaza. Hamas would announce that it is 'temporarily stepping down to give Gaza and its people a new opportunity.' The resistance factions would also pledge not to use their weapons and place them under the supervision of a joint-Arab monitoring committee. In place of the current Hamas-led governance, the proposal makes provision for a communal committee of prominent Palestinian families and former elements of the Palestinian Authority from Gaza to run the strip's affairs. The committee's remit would include receiving and distributing aid, tracking and registering the official death toll, arranging medically permitted travel outside Gaza, holding discussions with Egyptian and European authorities on the management of the Rafah crossing and coordinating with private security teams that are carrying out inspections of Palestinians moving from the strip's south to its north. As for reconstruction, Egyptian and Turkish companies would take the lead in leading construction work financed by Gulf states. Palestinians would be moved away from areas close to Gaza's borders with Israel and placed in 'secure zones' in the strip while construction takes place. While this plan is still in the works, it has already faced significant hurdles from many sides on its technical details. At the level of coordination within Palestine and Israel, Israel has struck out against a plan that would offer anything less than the complete disarmament of Hamas. When Egypt and Qatar proposed that Hamas's missiles be placed under the supervision of a joint Egyptian-Qatari monitoring committee during a 10 to 20-year ceasefire, Israel and the US rejected the initiative, according to one of the four Egyptian officials briefed on the proposal. Equally, when it comes to the administration of Gaza, Israel has indicated that it is not willing to accept anything less than the removal of all Hamas leaders from the strip. Hamas, on the other hand, absolutely refuses to take any steps that represent the end of its political presence and the right to resistance for the Palestinian factions. From his side, PA President Mahmoud Abbas has categorically refused the creation of an entity to administer civil affairs in Gaza that is not affiliated with the Palestinian Authority. While Hamas and other Palestinian factions in Gaza have agreed not to join the committee, they have rejected Israel's demand to review information obtained by the administrative committee. Hamas and the other factions also want a clear timeline to hold general elections for Gaza and the West Bank. Egypt has also tried to engage Arab states on its plan, having first called for an extraordinary Arab League meeting on February 27 to present the plan. However, due to gaps between states for a unified Arab position, Egypt had to reschedule the meeting for March 4. According to the same Egyptian official, Egypt moved to delay the meeting to try to build a wider consensus, as the UAE, Morocco and Bahrain are not fully opposed to the Trump plan and because all states within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — except for Qatar and Kuwait — want reassurances on how Hamas will act to avoid investing money into the strip only to see it destroyed again by Israel. The UAE, in particular, had already given public voice to some of its assent to Trump's plan. UAE Ambassador to the US Yousef al-Otaiba was asked about an alternative to the displacement plan at the World Governments Summit in Dubai on February 13. Despite the fact that Egypt had already come out to announce its plan and was working to build confidence around it, Otaiba said, 'I don't see an alternative to what's being proposed [by Trump]. I really don't. So if someone has one, we're happy to discuss it. We're happy to explore it, but it hasn't surfaced yet.' In the wake of the Arab League meeting's postponement, Saudi Arabia announced it would hold an emergency summit on February 20, which the Egyptian official says was intended to allow the Egyptian proposal to be passable to all parties. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi arrived in Riyadh on February 19 for preliminary talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and was followed the next day by heads of state from Jordan and the GCC. Describing the meeting as an 'informal brotherly gathering,' the official Saudi state news agency, SPA, reported that the 'meeting included consultations on various regional and international issues, with a focus on joint efforts to support the Palestinian cause and address developments in the Gaza Strip. The leaders welcomed the emergency Arab summit scheduled for Cairo on March 4, 2025.' However, according to another Egyptian official with inroads in DC, brotherly spirit wasn't enough to overcome some of the differences. Following the meeting in Riyadh, the Emirates communicated to the Trump administration that the Egyptian proposal is more or less a plan whereby Cairo is just trying to get major financial gains through the reconstruction process, but the political basis for the proposal is 'very weak,' the source says. The plan, the Emiratis said, does not guarantee the full uprooting of Hamas and other Palestinian factions in Gaza, nor does it offer a comprehensive vision to reform the PA and allow it to gain traction in Gaza. *** While Egypt attempts to work toward a viable alternative to Trump's plan, it is also trying to navigate the parallel implications that changes in Gaza would have for its wider regional role and historic relations with the US. Asked by reporters on February 10 whether he would consider withholding aid from Jordan and Egypt if they don't agree to take in Palestinians from Gaza, Trump made a veiled threat to withhold aid that the US provides Jordan and Egypt as part of their respective normalization agreements with Israel. 'Yeah, maybe, sure, why not? If they don't, I would conceivably withhold aid, yes,' the US president said. What was particularly disturbing to different parties, a high-level Egyptian official says, is that Trump was taking backdoor conversations out in the public. According to the official, as the normalization talks with Saudi Arabia have proceeded behind closed doors in the last year, US and Israeli officials have made it clear that the Gulf will be receiving political, security and economic privileges 'that may reduce those that Egypt enjoyed under Camp David.' US and Israeli officials told their counterparts in Cairo that the 'UAE has offered its services and assistance in a number of sensitive and important regional files for the United States and Israel in the Middle East, North Africa and [the rest of] Africa, including security, political and economic projects,' the official says. Since the late 1970s, Washington has sent Cairo up to US$1.3 billion each year as a legacy of the 1979 peace agreement in which Egypt became the first Arab country to establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel. The decision to normalize had brought Egypt money, yes, but by putting aside opposition to the creation of a Jewish state — which had been the unified position of the Arab League in the 1948 war with Israel and animated subsequent aggressions and diplomatic moves — former President Anwar al-Sadat had effectively converted the threat of Egypt's military into a new regional, political power based on alignment with the US. The equation of the relations created in 1979, according to an Egyptian researcher of American foreign policy toward the Middle East, had it that 'Egypt as the biggest military in the Middle East threatens Israel's security and thus a treaty between the two is the main cornerstone of peace in the Middle East. Based on this equation, Egypt is a regional partner to the US, not only in keeping the peace with Israel, but also in creating peace in the region.' But throughout the decades since signing the treaty, Egypt's strategic choice was that any relationship with Israel has to go through the US. At the same time, Egyptian official discourse maintained that Israel is the enemy, in order to make sure that the US will stay committed to supporting Egypt to maintain peace, as Nael Shama writes in his 2013 book Egyptian Foreign Policy From Mubarak to Morsi. This is why, at times, the relationship between Egypt and Israel 'was not always satisfactory to policy-makers in Washington. Indeed, the American administration and members of Congress regularly expressed their irritation at Egypt's 'cold' attitude towards Israel,' Shama writes. From that point on, as Shama writes, 'any disagreement between Cairo and Washington from the late 1970s to Mubarak's fall in 2011 was no longer on strategies, but instead was on tactics. The direction, in other words, was set and both parties happened to just differ sometimes on the pace or details.' While the fading of the Palestinian question and the recentering of US policy on Iran and China in the new millennium began to change the equation and diminished Egypt's influence, according to the researcher, he points to closer relations between Egypt and Israel as a driver for transformation. 'Egypt committed a strategic mistake in its close rapprochement with Israel after 2013,' the researcher says. 'There was no strategic reason to achieve this rapprochement and the damage occurred when some Egyptian officials told their American counterparts that Egyptian-American relations are trilateral relations, impacted by Egyptian-Israeli relations,' the researcher says, citing conversations with diplomats at the time. The rapprochement with Israel showed that Egypt's role 'downsized from a peace process mediator to a Gaza Strip security guarantor, as was clear in all wars since 2014,' the researcher says. But even Egypt's role as a security guarantor has come under scrutiny over the course of the war on Gaza. Israel has repeatedly expressed distrust that Egypt was adequately screening incoming aid shipments for potential weapons and that it had done enough to prevent smuggling through tunnels that traverse the Egypt-Gaza border. According to the last source and another two Egyptian officials informed on the matter, this has resulted in a steadfast position by Israel to minimize Egypt's role in security arrangements for any post-war scenario. That is in part why, two of the three officials and another official say, US and Israeli officials discussed with their Egyptian counterparts over the course of the last year a range of possible amendments to the security annex of Camp David, which divides Sinai and the border with Gaza into four zones (A, B, C and D), limits the type and quantity of Egyptian and Israeli security deployment in each zone and created the Multinational Force Observers, who monitor the treaty and negotiate disputes and exceptions to its enforcement. When negotiators met in Rome last July, according to the sources, members of the multinational force that observes the 1979 peace treaty, whose headquarters are in the Italian capital, and senior officials discussed securing the border between Egypt and Gaza, the possibility of doubling the size of the multinational force in the northern part of the border, and increasing the number of international civilian observers to ensure the commitment of all parties and monitor the implementation of the security agreement in a neutral manner. When Egypt rejected Israel's proposal on maintaining the presence of the Israeli military in the Philadelphi Corridor or deploying the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) to manage the border, the United States proposed that the UAE be the mediator between Egypt and Israel in dealing with the management of the border with Gaza. The three Egyptian officials aware of the meeting expressed that there was a prevailing suspicion toward the proposal on Cairo's part, even as it tries to balance its relations with the UAE, which it understands plays a vital role in the region that Egypt cannot refute. The issue was not resolved during the July meeting though and no agreement has been reached until now. This is why, beyond Trump's comments, the issue of Camp David has entered public discussion in recent weeks, as Israeli officials and members of the US Congress have cast doubt on Egypt's compliance with the accords. In mid February, Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter told leaders of Jewish organizations in the US that Sisi has breached the US-brokered peace agreement between Cairo and Tel Aviv. Leiter said that Sisi was profiting from 'the desperation of Palestinians who seek to flee Gaza' and 'duplicitously operating to benefit Hamas.' 'We have bases being built that can only be used for offensive operations, for offensive weapons — that's a clear violation,' Leiter said. 'For a long time, it's been shunted aside, and this continues. This is going to be an issue that we're going to put on the table very soon and very emphatically.' Equally, some members of the US Congress have claimed that Egypt has been in violation of the peace treaty terms, according to another Egyptian official, who says that the embassy in DC is pushing against this rhetoric. The Israeli press also noted that imagery from 'Egypt's Sinai Peninsula in recent weeks shows a massive build-up of troops and tanks.' One of the sources who spoke about the minimization of Egypt's security role says the new reinforcements to Sinai are not for the purpose of war, but rather an internal message to emphasize the military's readiness to defend and confront any violations that may occur in light of Israel's persistence in its aggression against Gaza. Israel's distrust taken together with Egypt's attenuating regional clout has set off what another one of the sources in the same group says is a 'regional competition' to usurp Egypt's role, many of which are centered on the numerous and competing post-war governance plans that have emerged in the last year. The first Egyptian official tells Mada Masr that in November 2023, some Arab states proposed to the US that it take security responsibility for managing Gaza. Washington responded by conditioning its involvement on the formation of a joint force composed of Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Morocco and Indonesia to secure the strip. However, Arab states' concerns about putting boots on the ground have so far prevented serious discussion of the US proposal at the Arab and Islamic levels, especially since, last summer, the Biden administration revised its vision for Gaza, making it resemble the post-2003 Iraq model, the official says. Under this plan, which was leaked to the American press last year, a senior US military officer would command the joint force, while US diplomats and senior officials would oversee local affairs, effectively having the United States take the lead in Gaza. The proposal has yet to gain approval, except for the UAE, which agreed to participate in the joint force, according to the official. The official adds that one of the proposals presented involved giving control over Gaza's security to NATO. However, this idea faced reservations, just like the joint force did, due to US conditions regarding the force's operational framework. Washington insisted that the force's command headquarters be based in Sinai, specifically in the city of Arish, to utilize its airport and maritime port for the international force's operations in the strip, the official and an informed source close to the official quarters in North Sinai say. Egypt, however, rejected this on the grounds that it would open up Sinai to military and administrative issues for Gaza, instead offering the United States an alternative: to station the force at Gorah Airport, the current base of the MFO. According to the first Egyptian official, these arrangements remain under extensive discussion between the US, Egypt, Israel and Arab states, and have yet to be decided on. One of the sources who spoke about the minimization of Egypt's security role, however, says 'only if Palestinians themselves assume control over Gaza, could the peace treaty remain intact.' *** The clock is ticking to find a solution, both due to Arab states' awareness that the Netanyahu government is highly volatile, but also because of internal divides within Arab countries, says the same official. 'The UAE promised the US and Israel to convince more Arab countries of the feasibility of normalization with Israel and to try to present itself as an indispensable regional interlocutor,' the official adds. The Emiratis' aspirations will be the biggest motivation for normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, the source says, due to the quiet competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi and their growing divergence on many regional matters — from bilateral disputes regarding shared borders, to Yemen, Africa and the Middle East. This may eventually push Saudi Arabia toward normalization to maintain its regional leadership. This, in turn, could increase pressure on Egypt, which has maintained strong ties with both countries since 2013 and will need to carefully balance its relationships in the coming period. Both another high-ranking Egyptian official and a European diplomat coordinating directly with the Saudis think that the Arab states on one side and the US and Israel on the other will have to compromise on their demands. 'Israel will be forced to make concessions when it becomes a burden on its Western allies,' whose interests may be harmed if Israel sparks a new regional escalation by trying to reshape the region in its favor, the Egyptian official says. 'What matters to Trump is completing the Abraham Accords project and normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which is why he is keen to hear the Kingdom's stance on displacement and whether it will bear the cost of rebuilding Gaza.' And on the other side, the Western diplomat thinks that parts of the Trump plan will ultimately have to be incorporated into the Egyptian proposal. 'Inevitably, some people will be leaving Gaza,' the diplomat says. The European diplomat and multiple Egyptian sources in the corridors of political power in Egypt acknowledge that regional countries could use a workaround that would entail 'voluntary family reunification' operations for residents of the strip who have relatives outside Gaza. In the end, Palestinians who wish to travel outside of Gaza have the right and should be given the opportunity to do so, according to the sources, especially if there are countries that wish to host them and grant them citizenship or long-term residencies, provided that the Gulf provides financial support to some countries that are prepared to participate in the hosting and provided that this does not lead to the complete evacuation of Gaza. For some, all this 'negotiation' is a good thing. 'The silver lining of Trump's proposal is that Gaza's dire conditions and postwar fate are now a front-page, front-burner issue,' Ross wrote for The Washington Institute. There is flame involved, according to the official close to Egypt's management of Gaza, but he opts for a more incandescent image: Gaza as a 'fireball being tossed around by everyone.' Who will get burned remains to be seen.
Ammon
24-02-2025
- Politics
- Ammon
From the 2019 'Deal of the Century' Failure to the 2025 Displacement Project's Defeat
Jordan is steadfast with its leadership and people. Over the past decades, Jordan has faced fateful challenges targeting its national security and social stability, but it has remained steadfast thanks to the cohesion of its leadership and people. Since the failure of the 'Deal of the Century' in 2019 to the failure of attempts to impose the displacement project in 2025, the Kingdom has proven that it is a solid entity that protects its rights and defends its interests with all firmness. Jordan faced what was called the 'Deal of the Century', a political and economic plan that would have changed the features of the Palestinian issue at the expense of the historical rights of Palestinians and Jordanians. From the very first moment, the Jordanian position was clear and firm in rejecting any settlement that would diminish the rights of the Palestinians to establish their independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital, or affect Jordan's sovereignty and its historical role in the Hashemite guardianship of Islamic and Christian holy sites. His Majesty King Abdullah led active diplomacy in international forums, warning of the danger of the project and its negative effects on the stability of the region, and emphasising three fixed noes: no to displacement, no to settlement, no to an alternative homeland. The Jordanian state also mobilised a supportive Arab and international position, which contributed to aborting the plan and preventing its implementation. The Jordanian position, based on international legitimacy and the will of the people, was a rock on which the deal was shattered, as Jordan consolidated its historical position rejecting any solutions that come at the expense of the rights of the Palestinian people and their national identity, and maintained its central role in defending the Palestinian cause and its holy sites. The challenges did not stop at the 'Deal of the Century', but rather pressures continued in various forms, the most dangerous of which were attempts to impose new displacement projects from the Palestinian territories, threatening Jordan demographically and politically. Over the past years, warnings have escalated of plans aimed at emptying Palestinian areas and pushing their residents towards Jordan, in an effort to change the facts on the ground and impose new facts that serve certain agendas. From 1948 to 2025, the Jordanian leadership worked to thwart these plans, through diplomatic moves, coordination with allies and raising its voice in international forums. Jordan was not just an objecting party, but was an active player in defending the rights of the Palestinians and preventing any attempts to impose unfair solutions at its expense. What enables Jordan to overcome these challenges is its internal unity and the cohesion of its people with its leadership. Jordanians, with all their components, have proven that they are of one heart when it comes to the fate of their homeland. Whether it was in the face of the 'Deal of the Century' or displacement plans, the voice of the Jordanian street was supportive of the state's position, rejecting any solutions that come at the expense of the homeland or the Palestinian cause. At every critical juncture, Jordan stood steadfast, not only with the support of its leadership, but also with the will of its conscious people who believe in the justice of their cause. Jordanians realize that their national security is linked to the Palestinian cause, and that any attempt to tamper with it means a threat to their stability. The failure of the 'Deal of the Century' in 2019 and the failure of the displacement project in 2025 were not just passing stations, but rather confirmation that Jordan does not accept imposed solutions and does not allow itself to be part of plans that do not serve its interests. It is a fixed, ongoing position, rooted in the conscience of all Jordanians.
