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Mint
an hour ago
- Politics
- Mint
India went 300 kms inside Pakistan, and penetrated with ‘pinpoint accuracy' says CDS Anil Chauhan
Indian Armed Forces Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Anil Chauhan said that India went 300kms inside Pakistan during Operation Sindoor and penetrated with 'pinpoint accuracy.' Adding to new details about Operation Sindoor, CDS Chauhan further added that the coveted operation has drawn a 'new red line' of intolerance against terror. CDS Anil Chauhan made the comments during an interview with Bloomberg TV on Saturday, while attending the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. 'We were able to penetrate air defence as long as 300 km with pinpoint accuracy and targets, airfields and infrastructure, deep inside Pakistan," said General Anil Chauhan. In this image posted by @HQ_IDS_India via X on May 31, 2025, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan during a meeting with Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Samuel J Paparo, on the sidelines of the 22nd Shangri La Dialogue, in Singapore From Pakistan's Muzaffarabad to Bahawalpur, India struck key terror hubs long believed to harbour Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad operatives on May 7 – the DGMOs had said during earlier briefings on Operation Sindoor. Chauhan also downplayed Pakistan's claims about the effectiveness of weaponry deployed from China and other countries, saying they 'didn't work." He added that Operation Sindoor had drawn a 'new red line' of intolerance against terror. Multiple reports had already been doing the rounds about Indian fighter jets downed during the conflict with Pakistan. Without going into specifications, CDS Chauhan said India swiftly rectified its 'tactical mistakes.' CDS Chauhan added that India learnt from the incident and resumed high-precision strikes deep in Pakistani territory. 'The good part is that we are able to understand the tactical mistake which we made, remedy it, rectify it, and then implement it again after two days and flew all our jets again, targeting at long range,' Chauhan said. Apart from elaborating on the mistakes made, and the lessons learnt by India, CDS Anil Chauhan flagged Pakistan's claims that it shot down six Indian warplanes as 'absolutely incorrect." Without getting into further details about Indian fighter planes being downed, Chauhan added: 'What is important is that, not the jet being down, but why they were being down. 'Why they were down, what mistakes were made — that are important,' Chauhan said when asked about the fighter jets.'Numbers are not important,' he added. India launched Operation Sindoor on May 7, targeting at least nine terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. This was a retaliation to the Pahalgam terror attack, which claimed the lives of 26 people. The cross-border strikes sparked four days of heavy clashes between India and Pakistan, which eventually came to a halt following a mutual understanding to cease military actions on May 10.
Hindustan Times
2 hours ago
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Projecting the right message
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan's comments on tactical mistakes that led to the loss of an undisclosed number of fighter jets during Operation Sindoor — India's strikes on terror and military installations in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) following the terror strikes at Pahalgam — are significant. That's because of the communication strategy, or the lack of one, that is evident in the comments. It is not clear why the first explicit admission of fighter jet losses had to come in an interview given overseas to two foreign news agencies. From the first briefing, the messaging from India has been that all the pilots were safe, which suggested that reports of jet losses were not untrue. That jets would be lost is understandable in a conflict of this nature — one where the Indian Air Force (IAF) took on the challenge of taking out targets deep inside Pakistan. It was assumed that once the heat and the dust of the battle was over, IAF would share details of how many jets were lost, and how. Instead, in response to a question that he and his handlers must have known would be coming, the CDS spoke not just of jet losses, but also tactical mistakes that were corrected in subsequent strikes. Again, it is not clear why this admission had to be made now, and to foreign news agencies. Everyone, including international experts who have pored over detailed satellite imagery, admit that India was the clear winner in the battle, and inflicted significant damage on key Pakistani military installations. That is the only message that needs amplification. New Delhi has also sought to take the high moral ground after — sending outreach teams to various corners of the world to share its position on how Pakistan-sponsored terrorism necessitated Operation Sindoor, and how it is difficult for India to discuss anything else with that country, including water sharing, as long as it continues to foster, encourage, support and sponsor terror groups targeting India. To admit to tactical mistakes — even if only to make the point that they were corrected and India went on to inflict more damage on Pakistani military installations — at this stage seems to be not just a case of bad timing, but also poor communication. 'History', says a quote attributed to several people, most notably Winston Churchill, 'is written by the victors'. But in this day and age, they are not going to be able to do that without getting their communication strategy right. Get 360° coverage—from daily headlines to 100 year archives.
India Gazette
4 hours ago
- Politics
- India Gazette
Let's convene Parliament and talk, even Pak did it: Congress' Mallikarjun Kharge
Bengaluru (Karnataka) [India], June 1 (ANI): Stating that Pakistan has convened its Parliament and held discussions, Congress President and Rajya Sabha MP Mallikarjun Kharge called on the BJP-led central government on Sunday to convene a Parliament session to discuss Operation Sindoor. Speaking to media persons, Kharge said that the entire nation stands with our armed forces, adding that there should be unity in national matters and a focus on defeating our opponents. Taking a veiled dig at Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Congress President asked the former to refrain from self-praise on Operation Sindoor. He further asserted that no one will speak against the country. 'We must know when to speak what. There should be unity in national matters and a focus on defeating our opponents. All leaders across the country should remain silent regarding matters of national security. It's better to understand what has happened before speaking about it. There should be no election campaign before the delegation reports are out. PM Modi should refrain from giving election speeches. There is no need for self-praise. The entire nation stands with our armed forces. PM Modi had earlier said that he had given full authority to the army, so why is he speaking again now? The Prime Minister should not make self-glorifying speeches. We have said, let's convene Parliament and talk. Even Pakistan has convened its Parliament and is holding discussions. None of us will speak against the nation,' the Rajya Sabha MP said. Congress has been demanding a special session of Parliament to discuss the Pahalgam terror attack and Operation Sindoor. India carried out Operation Sindoor and launched precision strikes on terror infrastructure in Pakistan and PoJK in response to the Pahalgam terror attack, which claimed 26 lives, including one Nepali national. A day earlier, Congress chief Mallikarjun Kharge demanded a special session of Parliament concerning Operation Sindoor, alleging that the government had 'misled the nation' and instead of clarifying US President Donald Trump's assertions, Prime Minister Narendra Modi 'is on an election blitz, taking personal credit for the valour of the Armed Forces'. In a post on X, Kharge referred to remarks made by the Chief of Defence Staff during an interview and demanded a comprehensive review of the country's defence preparedness by an independent expert committee. 'In the wake of the remarks made by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in Singapore in an interview, there are some very important questions which need to be asked. These can only be asked if a Special Session of the Parliament is immediately convened. The Modi Govt has misled the nation. The fog of war is now clearing,' Kharge said. 'Our IAF pilots were risking their lives fighting the enemy. We have suffered some losses, but our pilots were safe. As per CDS's interview, 'we made, remedied it, rectified it, and then implemented it again after two days and flew all our jets again, targeting at long range.' We salute their resolute courage and bravery. However, a comprehensive strategic review is the need of the hour. The Congress party demands a Comprehensive Review of our Defence Preparedness by an independent expert committee, on the lines of the Kargil Review Committee,' he added. (ANI)
The Print
4 hours ago
- Politics
- The Print
India paid for ignoring warnings in 1965 war. It can't afford to repeat those mistakes today
'There were no concentration of troops on the Pakistani side and no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes,' then-XV corps commander Lieutenant-General Kishan Pal told Unified Headquarters in Srinagar on 24 May 1999. The 'situation was local and would be defeated locally.' Even though commanders across the Kargil sector were reporting that troops were being fired on across the Line of Control, from Mashkoh and Dras to Batalik and the gates of the Siachen glacier, their Generals lined up behind the Minister. 'Forty-eight hours,' Defence Minister George Fernandes confidently proclaimed to the nation: 'The intruders will be evicted in 48 hours.' The previous night, on 14 May 1999, Captain Saurabh Kalia and five soldiers—Arjun Ram, Bhanwar Lal Bagaria, Bhika Ram, Moola Ram, and Naresh Singh—had disappeared on their way up the Kaksar River to Bajrang Post on the Line of Control. Their bodies were returned weeks later, bearing evidence of their torture: cigarette burns, fractures, and amputated genitalia. Last week, Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan made the courageous decision to tell a nation in denial that India had lost combat jets on the first night of the 100-hour war with Pakistan: 'Why they were down, what mistakes were made—that are [sic.] important,' he explained. Those errors, General Chauhan went on, were examined during a 48-hour pause in Indian Air Force offensive operations before it resumed long-range strikes. Even if there has been needless coyness in matters of details, the importance of this truth-telling cannot be overstated. The summer of war Last week, six decades ago, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, the largest political party in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, called on citizens to join the army of Razakars, who were preparing a guerrilla campaign to seize Kashmir from India. The government of the so-called Azad Kashmir ordered all men aged between 16 and 45 years to undergo military training. Local clerics called for jihad, new camps were set up to train volunteers, and units of Pakistan's Frontier Corps began to be moved into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir from the border with Afghanistan. Amazingly, no one in India seemed to hear the words being broadcast on loudspeakers across the ceasefire line, now known as the Line of Control. From the end of July, nine columns of irregulars and troops—each made up of several hundred men—made their way into the heart of Kashmir almost unnoticed. Later, Indian intelligence officers would learn that the guerrillas had been ordered to join the annual congregation to mark the death of the saint Sheikh Syed Abdul Qadir Jilani at Khanyar, Srinagar, scheduled for 8 August. Then, they were to march with protestors who were to gather to protest the arrest of Kashmir's former Prime Minister, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. They were to take over the airfield and radio station and proclaim a revolutionary council. This would be the signal for regular Pakistani forces to cross the ceasefire line to help the Kashmiris. There has never been an explanation, India's official war history notes, 'of how such a large number of men had managed to slip across the Indian borders, supposed to be so vigilantly guarded.' 'Even on 2 August 1965,' it notes, 'when a high-level conference was held at Srinagar to review the security arrangements on the Cease Fire Line, there was no inkling of the impending guerrilla invasion within 72 hours.' Earlier that summer, though, the Indian Army had begun to experience an unusual degree of fire from across the ceasefire line. Then, on 16 May, an Indian outpost near Kargil came under direct attack. The Army then discovered that Pakistani forces had occupied positions on Peak 13620—so named for its altitude, in feet—as well as the adjoining Kala Pahar area. For the first time since the 1947-1948 war, the Indian Army responded with offensive operations, seizing Peak 13620 and a series of positions along the ridge over Kargil. The positions were, however, returned to Pakistan on 30 June after an assurance from the United Nations Secretary-General, General U Thant, about the safety of the Kargil-Srinagar highway. The Indian Army's outposts in Tithwal, Uri, Mendhar, Poonch, and Naushera, though, continued to come under attack through coming weeks—likely compelling soldiers to reduce patrolling along the passes across the ceasefire line. Also read: To deal with a 2.5-front war, India must tackle the half-front inside The chaos of war For commanders of the Pakistan Army, India's blindness must have seemed like a gift from God. Then-Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leading hawk in Field Marshal Ayub Khan's regime, had drawn up the plans in consultation with Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad and the commander of Pakistan Army forces in PoK, Major General Akhtar Husain Malik. The memoirs of the Pakistan Army's then-army chief, General Mohammad Musa, assert he was sceptical of the idea, concerned that it might lead to all-out war. To Musa's surprise, his divisional commander continued execution of an idea he had shot down: 'The policy-makers thwarted professional assessment and advice on a matter having grave military implications because of their miscalculation of the politico-strategic situation and the over-ambitiousness of a few individuals.' Lieutenant-General Gul Hasan Khan has suggested that these political tensions undermined the operation from the outset. 'The Chief [General Musa] and the Chief of General Staff, General Sher Bahadur, had, from its inception, viewed Gibraltar as a bastard child, born of the liaison between the Foreign Minister [Bhutto] and General Malik,' Gul Hasan wrote in his memoirs. Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force from 1957 to 1965, has recorded that he was asked to assign a Kashmiri-speaking officer to run a radio station, which was purported to be operating from Srinagar but was actually located at the Race Course Grounds in Rawalpindi. The Air Marshal was promised a 24-hour heads-up before operations began, but the chaotic organisation of the attack meant he only learned of it after the event. Late on the afternoon of 5 August, Gulmarg-based shepherd Mohammad Din turned up at the local police station to report that he had run into large numbers of armed Pakistanis. Troops were dispatched to surround the infiltrating column. There were further fire contacts in Teetwal, Kupwara, and Mendhar that night. The Salahuddin column, the largest of the groups, succeeded in pushing its way into four Srinagar suburbs and exchanging fire with Indian soldiers dispatched from the Badami Bagh cantonment. The assault, though, soon began to stall because of its lack of local support and the absence of well-structured logistical backup. Major Farooq Ahmed would later recall hiding among flea-infested animal herds as he fled ahead of Indian troops. The starving personnel of the Kargil column mutinied twice, while thousands simply returned home across the ceasefire line. Following its initial failure, the Indian Army began to push back—famously capturing key infiltration routes, like the Haji Pir Pass and, once again, Peak 13620. Also read: India doesn't need a war with Pakistan. We must act like Krishna, not Bhasmasura Failures of command The unravelling of the attempt to seize Kashmir led Pakistan's leadership to dither. At the end of August, military historian Shuja Nawaz has written, Field Marshal Ayub sent a missive to Bhutto, asking him to 'take such action that will defreeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring her to the conference table without provoking a general war.' General Gul Hasan now begged for permission to launch Grand Slam, an offensive aimed at Akhnur and then Chhamb, which would eventually cut off the highway to Srinagar. Even though the Indian Army had repeatedly war-gamed such an attack since at least 1956, Lieutenant-General Harbaksh Singh recorded in his memoirs that the Pakistani offensive caught it completely off-guard. 'The preparations made by Pakistan for this thrust could not be concealed,' the official war history notes, 'and the United Nations observers had warned India of the impending attack. The warnings were probably not taken seriously.' To make things worse, the Indian Air Force—which had never been warned or consulted on the prospect of a war in Kashmir—ended up hitting the Army's armour and gun positions. Flailing Indian commanders, though, were saved by General Musa's inexplicable decision to relieve General Akhtar Malik of his command mid-battle. Following the fall of Chhamb, the onward push to Jourian spluttered and lost momentum. This gave India time to launch its counter-offensive across the border in Punjab. The XI Corps secured initial successes in its push toward Lahore, securing significant victories at the battles of Asal Uttar and Barki. There was a stalemate, however, in other key sectors, like Dera Baba Nanak and Fazilka, while a Pakistani counter-offensive succeeded in capturing Khem Karan. For its part, the I Corps push toward Sialkot soon degenerated into what the official history describes as 'a slogging match.' Large-scale preemptive strikes on Indian airbases on 6 September by the Pakistan Air Force succeeded in destroying several aircraft on the ground in Pathankot and Kalaikunda. These losses forced the Indian Air Force to commit a large part of its resources to combat air patrols to protect its bases, thus degrading its ability to support the Army's push toward Lahore. Two days before India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire, Ayub and Bhutto made a secret visit to Beijing to seek support from then-Premier Chou En-lai. The message from Chou was less than reassuring: 'You must keep fighting even if you have to withdraw to the hills.' A tired and worried Ayub took counsel from Musa and Nur Khan and decided not to prolong the fighting. The failures of 1965 helped India triumph in the Bangladesh war just seven years later—but the absence of an institutional culture of relentless and open questioning meant some mistakes were soon to resurface. In 1988, India proved unable to prevent large-scale infiltration across the Line of Control, opening the way to the long jihad in Kashmir. Failures of Generalship claimed a bitter toll on Indian soldiers' lives in Kargil, just as it had in 1965. And weaknesses in Indian air power exposed in 2019 were hushed up, leading to the reverses General Chauhan has now underlined. Lessons can be learned through close examination of one's own errors or be taught by the successes of enemies. Praveen Swami is contributing editor at ThePrint. His X handle is @praveenswami. Views are personal.
Time of India
5 hours ago
- Politics
- Time of India
Congress seeks urgent Parliament session over defence chief's disclosure on Operation Sindoor
Live Events (You can now subscribe to our (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel The Congress on Sunday demanded the immediate convening of a special session of Parliament to discuss the military and foreign policy strategy in the wake of revelations made by Chief of Defence Staff Gen Anil Congress also demanded that the government take all parties and the nation into confidence and discuss India's defence preparedness and strategy after Operation Sindoor Congress general secretary, communications, Jairam Ramesh said the prime minister or the defence minister should have informed the opposition leaders in the all-party meeting what Gen Chauhan has stated in Singapore."The Chief of Defence Staff Gen Anil Chauhan has made some important statements on Operation Sindoor in, of all places, Singapore. It would have been better if the prime minister or the raksha mantri had briefed opposition leaders first in an all-party meeting.""Gen Chauhan's statements strengthen the case for the immediate convening of the Parliament to discuss larger strategic foreign policy and economic issues in the post Operation Sindoor era," Ramesh told Saturday, Gen Chauhan in Singapore said that India rectified tactics and hit deep inside Pakistani territory after suffering losses of aircraft in the recent military clashes with Pakistan. He also dismissed as "absolutely incorrect" Islamabad's claim of downing six Indian Chauhan, in an interview with Bloomberg TV, said India flew all its jets and carried out high-precision strikes to hit back at Pakistan after ascertaining the reasons for the initial said it is a matter of concern that such statements are coming from the CDS from Singapore, of all places."Why couldn't the prime minister have briefed opposition leaders?" he asked while referring to the statements of Gen Chauhan."We have been demanding all-party meetings and a special session of parliament precisely for this purpose," he also reiterated his demand for a special review committee on the lines of one set up after the Kargil war on India's defence said three days after the Kargil war ended, the then Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had set up a Kargil Review Committee headed by the father of External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and the report was tabled and discussed in Parliament asked whether such a committee was being set up now, especially in the wake of the Chief of Defence Staff's statements about the "losses."In his interview, the CDS declined to specify the losses in terms of numbers but pointed out the fact that the Indian military struck deep inside Pakistani territory, which New Delhi said, forced Islamabad to plead to stop the comments by the top military officer are the Indian military's first clear acknowledgement of losses in the four-day army clashes with the neighbouring media and publicity department head Pawan Khera said, "These issues should be discussed by calling a Special Session, taking everyone in confidence...""As America announced a ceasefire, the leaders went abroad to discuss Operation Sindoor. Who will answer the questions? The answers should not come from the armed forces, but the government," he said the armed forces are strong and they did what was required, but asked under what pressure the 'ceasefire' was done."Where are the terrorists of the Pahalgam attack? What were the conditions for the ceasefire? What CDS said was shocking. Now there should be clarity. They should call the Special Session and answer the questions," Khera asked, as he posed several questions to the Deputy Leader in the Rajya Sabha Pramod Tiwari, also said that the public deserves a cohesive answer on the latest armed conflict."The entire country is asking, the leaders are speaking differently, on the other hand, the CDS spoke otherwise abroad, accepting that our jet was downed. The government should clarify."That is why we are demanding a Special Session of Parliament for talks, and an all-party meeting can be called. The PM, on the other hand, has been bent on politicising the valour shown by the armed forces in four days," he President Mallikarjun Kharge had on Saturday accused the government of misleading the nation on the India-Pakistan also said his party demands a comprehensive review of India's defence preparedness by an independent expert committee.
