Latest news with #DefenceWhitePaper
The Star
3 days ago
- Business
- The Star
Strong homegrown ecosystem needed
UAVs, which come in different shapes and sizes. — Wikicommons TO reduce dependence on external vendors, Malaysia must develop a strong homegrown innovation ecosystem, says Universiti Malaya's International Institute of Public Policy deputy executive director Dr Muhammad Danial Azman. He says we can begin by forming close partnerships between government, industry and academia, supported by clear policies and stable funding. Danial outlines several key components that can be explored, including public-private-academic consortia to establish defence R&D clusters that unite universities, sovereign funds and established primes. 'Co-fund projects from bench to field via matching grants, ensuring pathways to commercialisation for breakthroughs. Or host annual 'Defence Innovation Challenges' to crowdsource AI and UAV solutions from local startups,' he suggests. Also proposed is the building of defence technology sandboxes which entails the creation of regulatory zones where SMEs can test ISR sensors, autonomy software and communication links on military bases; and fast-track certification for proven prototypes, reducing red tape from years to months. 'We can use data from sandboxes to improve doctrines and operational concepts.' The concept of modular, open- architecture platforms can also be considered. Danial says open interfaces can be mandated for AI payloads and drone subsystems, enabling plug-and-play upgrades from various vendors, other than encouraging local SMEs to specialise in niche modules –such as vision processors, secure data links, or payload dispensers – rather than entire platforms. 'Use commercial off-the-shelf hardware where possible, then gradually replace critical parts with Malaysian-designed components.' When it comes to policy and procurement measures, Danial suggests the enforcement of local content requirements in defence procurement, with clear metrics on technology transfer. 'Include co-development clauses in all major contracts, ensuring primes collaborate with Malaysian entities from the start. Allocate a portion of the Defence White Paper budget exclusively for early-stage, high-risk and high-reward indigenous projects.' At the same time, building public trust in defence procurement depends on three pillars: independent oversight, tiered transparency and adaptive contracting. 'These must collaborate to illuminate budgets and schedules without revealing sensitive capabilities or restricting commanders' flexibility.' Among others, Danial says governance mechanisms for accountability may include several policy options such as the establishment of an independent defence audit commission and empowering parliamentary oversight cells with security clearance to review classified annexes.
The Star
20-07-2025
- Politics
- The Star
Editorial: Seoul's mixed messages on Pyongyang will only sow confusion
South Korean and North Korean guard posts are seen on either side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Paju between the two counntries. — AFP THE notion of a country's main enemy – or ' jujeok ' in Korean – is not just symbolic rhetoric. It is the fulcrum around which national defence policy, military readiness and diplomatic posture revolve. Yet the Lee Jae Myung administration's incoming ministers are offering strikingly divergent views on North Korea's status. In a region where miscalculation can lead to catastrophe, the lack of clarity is not a luxury South Korea can afford. During confirmation hearings this week, the country's Unification Minister nominee Chung Dong-young described North Korea not as an enemy but as a 'threat.' Labour Minister nominee Kim Young-hoon echoed that assessment, distancing himself from the 'main enemy' label. By contrast, Defence Minister nominee Ahn Gyu-back offered a resolute view, stating that the North Korean regime and military are indeed South Korea's principal adversary. This inconsistency is not merely semantic. The designation of North Korea as South Korea's main enemy first appeared in the 1995 Defence White Paper under President Kim Young-sam, following the North's threats to turn Seoul into a 'sea of fire.' While subsequent governments shifted between hard-line and conciliatory stances, most notably under Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration reinstated the enemy designation in 2022. Now, Seoul risks retreating from this stance just as Pyongyang has explicitly emphasised its own hostility. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last year formally declared the South a 'primary foe,' rejecting unification and dismantling the inter-Korean reconciliation framework. Since then, the North has accelerated weapons development, severed communication channels and deepened military ties with Russia. To overlook these developments or downplay their implications is to misread the strategic environment. Chung's statements suggest the new administration may be preparing a significant policy pivot. He proposed suspending joint military drills with the United States as a confidence-building measure, citing the 2018 model. He also raised the idea of renaming the Unification Ministry to the Ministry of the Korean Peninsula, a move he claims would signal flexibility. Yet such proposals, absent careful coordination or broad consensus, could project confusion rather than pragmatism. Strategic ambiguity has long characterised inter-Korean policy, but frequent shifts weaken credibility. South Korea's defence posture cannot oscillate with each political transition. Doing so emboldens adversaries and complicates coordination with allies, particularly Washington. North Korea has repeatedly exploited policy vacillations, alternating between provocation and dialogue to gain time for weapons advancement. Calls to revive the 2018 military accord – annulled by the North and later suspended by Seoul – underscore this risk. South Korea honoured the agreement despite repeated violations by the North, including missile launches, GPS jamming and trash balloon campaigns. Restoring such an accord without preconditions could repeat a pattern of unreciprocated concessions. What is missing from the current debate is a sober reflection on the record of past engagement. Chung attributes the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in 2010 and Yeonpyeongdo shelling to the Lee Myung-bak administration's hawkish posture, yet similar provocations occurred under liberal governments. North Korea has pursued escalation to secure leverage regardless of the South's tone. This is not to dismiss the value of diplomacy. Efforts to reduce tensions must continue, but only with a clear-eyed understanding of the other side's intentions. Engagement should be mutual, measured and anchored in deterrence. One-sided overtures, whether symbolic or substantive, can be as risky as belligerence. If the Lee government intends to revise its stance toward Pyongyang, it must do so with unity, transparency and strategic rationale. Fragmented messaging – especially on foundational concepts like the main enemy – undermines trust both at home and among allies. In a geopolitical landscape marked by intensifying tensions, Seoul cannot afford ambiguity in its security doctrine. — The Korea Herald/Asia News Network
West Australian
15-07-2025
- Business
- West Australian
LATIKA BOURKE: Pentagon's MAGA-style push on AUKUS and defence spending may backfire in Indo-Pacific
Elbridge Colby, the man reviewing AUKUS inside the Pentagon, thinks he can replicate MAGA's success in scolding, berating and bullying Europe into lifting defence spending in Australia and the Indo-Pacific. But his cut-and-paste approach may not only fail, but backfire. This is because his hectoring approach fails to recalibrate for the important ways that Europe differs from Asia. Mr Colby's demands that Indo-Pacific allies raise defence spending are legitimate in Australia's case. But he is far from the first person to raise the issue. Well before US President Donald Trump appointed Mr Colby Under Secretary of Defence, the Australian authors of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, Peter Dean and Angus Houston, the former Chief of the Australian Defence Force, were urging an increase in spending from around 2 per cent of GDP to 3 per cent. Kim Beazley, former Labor Leader, defence minister and ambassador to the United States, preceded them both. And it is the same plea made by Mike Pezzullo, the former Home Affairs boss who authored the 2009 Defence White Paper for the Rudd Government, the last time Labor was in power. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should raise defence spending and match it to the capabilities that the defence review, which he commissioned, said Australia needed. Should the region become even more dangerous, he will not be remembered for his 94-seat landslide but as the Labor prime minister who ignored every siren call and left the country, negligently and dangerously unprepared. While he should not need to be bullied into doing so by the United States, it is also unwise for MAGA to be pushing the issue as hard as it is and so publicly and not leaving more of the heavy lifting to Australian voices. Mr Colby said in a social media post on Tuesday that: 'Europe's progress over the last few months is showing the wisdom of President Trump's approach.' 'We are actively applying his successful approach to enable our allies around the world to step up efforts for the common defence.' Earlier this week he said urging allies to step up their defence spending was a 'hallmark' of President Trump's strategy in Asia as in Europe, 'where it has already been tremendously successful.' 'Of course, some among our allies might not welcome frank conversations,' he said. 'But many, now led by NATO after the historic Hague Summit, are seeing the urgent need to step up and are doing so. 'President Trump has shown the approach and the formula - and we will not be deterred from advancing his agenda.' But there are good reasons for MAGA to pause, reconsider and recalibrate. Their methods might have worked at NATO, when member states agreed to lift their spending to 3.5 per cent next decade, but this is no guarantee of their success in Australia's neck of the woods. Firstly, the Indo-Pacific is not at war. Europe is. It is a statement of the obvious that being caught unprepared to deal with a nuclear-armed imperialist on your border who has rolled tanks inside the borders of an innocent country would inspire a sense of urgency, if not panic. It is true, as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has said, that US President Donald Trump's methods, including threatening the very concept of the defensive alliance, were also decisive in changing European minds about the need to start to put their shoulder to the wheel. But this is the point. Taking Europe to the edge of the cliff and forcing them to look over the edge and contemplate a world without the United States' security blanket works because of NATO and Article 5. Article 5 is the clause that states an attack on any member state shall be considered an attack on all. It is this clause that allowed Europe to freeload off the United States under more benevolent Presidents for so long. And it is why the US and MAGA's complaints about Europe spending big on its social welfare while expecting the US to pay its security bills was so legitimate. As Vladimir Putin demonstrated, Europe had a menacing bear on its border and remains in a position where it cannot subdue the beast on its own. But these dynamics do not exist for Australia and the wider Indo-Pacific. While it is accepted that China seeks dominance of the region and control of shipping routes, war is neither current nor inevitable. While China's President Xi Jinping has said he wants his military to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027 and, with force if necessary, there are many ways he can subdue the democratic island without an invasion. At one end, this could include a blockade that may or may not be seen as an act of war by the United States. Another more worrying tactic could be China declaring a 'quarantine' of Taiwan, and claiming it is an internal matter, making it even more difficult to define whether it constituted an act of war or not. This is why expecting countries like Australia to start declaring in 2025 that they will take part in a hypothetical war with submarines we will not possess until the early 2030s, in a best-case scenario, is dangerously reductive, as it misses a vital opportunity to talk about how to push back on China's already coercive and menacing behaviour towards Taiwan, and the Philippines. The other, and perhaps most powerful element MAGA misses when it comes to the Indo-Pacific is the one of choice. Australia has a choice about how it wants to respond to the great power competition underway between the United States and China. And so far, MAGA's methods are only moving Anthony Albanese one way – in China's direction. Australians fundamentally don't like Donald Trump, but still believe in and back the alliance. However, it would be hazardous to assume these attitudes are fixed. Australia's population is increasingly migrant-based, as Mr Albanese's appeals to Indian and Chinese voters at the last election and throughout his first term underlined. It should not be assumed that this voting bloc will always have an enduring loyalty and affection to the United States. And MAGA's behaviour to date could easily provoke questions about whether the United States would have Australia's back as per our treaty alliance. All this said, it is extremely likely that were the United States to fight China in the foreseeable future, Australia would take part. Our joint intelligence facility with the US at Pine Gap, as well as the US bases on Australian soil, would make us a target at any rate and all but guarantee our involvement. There is a fundamental inconsistency, if not incoherence, to the premise of the Financial Times report that Mr Colby is demanding allies, including Australia, state whether they would fight over Taiwan, when Mr Trump – wisely — himself refuses to say, strategic ambiguity carries a deterrent effect of its own. But perhaps the greatest question, that MAGA's methods will only justify if it continues to self-righteously and sanctimoniously badger its Indo-Pacific allies, is what values and order would we be fighting for? As Richard Spencer, the former US Navy Secretary who war-gamed these scenarios, recently said, such a war would 'not pretty at all, for either side' ie. it would result in the deaths of thousands of lives. The resolve of the United States and its allies must be to avoid this at all costs. But if Xi were to make such a catastrophic mistake, like his authoritarian collaborator Mr Putin, then Australians would naturally ask, what would we be fighting for? And this is where the MAGA approach could backfire. Because the Trump Administration looks more focused on shoring up American dominance rather than a global order that protects its smaller friends. How else to read the symbolism of his first tariff-imposition letters going to Indo-Pacific allies South Korea and Japan? On top of the tariffs on Australian steel and exports, is now the threat of 200 per cent duties on pharmaceuticals. This is despite Australia and the United States having a free trade agreement. Australia is no stranger to economic coercion. It experienced the Chinese Communist Party's wrath after the pandemic when Beijing effectively killed Australian wine, lobster and barley imports overnight because the Coalition asked for an inquiry into COVID. But unwarranted duties from a treaty ally, that, at the same time has injected uncertainty into the AUKUS deal are such difficult pills to swallow, precisely because of the 'friend' who is administering them. It may well be that if faced with the poisons of a bullying, authoritarian China and a free but selfish, 'America First' mercurial United States, Australians would still prefer the latter. Our joint intelligence facility with the US at Pine Gap, as well as the US military presence on Australian soil, would highly likely make us a target and force our involvement at any rate. But Mr Colby and his MAGA friends should realise that there is a range of tactics that can engineer success, and a one-size-fits-all bully boy model may prove ultimately nihilistic.
Perth Now
15-07-2025
- Business
- Perth Now
Pentagon AUKUS pressure risks backfiring in Australia
Elbridge Colby, the man reviewing AUKUS inside the Pentagon, thinks he can replicate MAGA's success in scolding, berating and bullying Europe into lifting defence spending in Australia and the Indo-Pacific. But his cut-and-paste approach may not only fail, but backfire. This is because his hectoring approach fails to recalibrate for the important ways that Europe differs from Asia. Mr Colby's demands that Indo-Pacific allies raise defence spending are legitimate in Australia's case. But he is far from the first person to raise the issue. Well before US President Donald Trump appointed Mr Colby Under Secretary of Defence, the Australian authors of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, Peter Dean and Angus Houston, the former Chief of the Australian Defence Force, were urging an increase in spending from around 2 per cent of GDP to 3 per cent. Kim Beazley, former Labor Leader, defence minister and ambassador to the United States, preceded them both. And it is the same plea made by Mike Pezzullo, the former Home Affairs boss who authored the 2009 Defence White Paper for the Rudd Government, the last time Labor was in power. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should raise defence spending and match it to the capabilities that the defence review, which he commissioned, said Australia needed. Should the region become even more dangerous, he will not be remembered for his 94-seat landslide but as the Labor prime minister who ignored every siren call and left the country, negligently and dangerously unprepared. While he should not need to be bullied into doing so by the United States, it is also unwise for MAGA to be pushing the issue as hard as it is and so publicly and not leaving more of the heavy lifting to Australian voices. Mr Colby said in a social media post on Tuesday that: 'Europe's progress over the last few months is showing the wisdom of President Trump's approach.' 'We are actively applying his successful approach to enable our allies around the world to step up efforts for the common defence.' Earlier this week he said urging allies to step up their defence spending was a 'hallmark' of President Trump's strategy in Asia as in Europe, 'where it has already been tremendously successful.' 'Of course, some among our allies might not welcome frank conversations,' he said. 'But many, now led by NATO after the historic Hague Summit, are seeing the urgent need to step up and are doing so. 'President Trump has shown the approach and the formula - and we will not be deterred from advancing his agenda.' But there are good reasons for MAGA to pause, reconsider and recalibrate. Their methods might have worked at NATO, when member states agreed to lift their spending to 3.5 per cent next decade, but this is no guarantee of their success in Australia's neck of the woods. Firstly, the Indo-Pacific is not at war. Europe is. It is a statement of the obvious that being caught unprepared to deal with a nuclear-armed imperialist on your border who has rolled tanks inside the borders of an innocent country would inspire a sense of urgency, if not panic. It is true, as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has said, that US President Donald Trump's methods, including threatening the very concept of the defensive alliance, were also decisive in changing European minds about the need to start to put their shoulder to the wheel. But this is the point. Taking Europe to the edge of the cliff and forcing them to look over the edge and contemplate a world without the United States' security blanket works because of NATO and Article 5. Article 5 is the clause that states an attack on any member state shall be considered an attack on all. It is this clause that allowed Europe to freeload off the United States under more benevolent Presidents for so long. And it is why the US and MAGA's complaints about Europe spending big on its social welfare while expecting the US to pay its security bills was so legitimate. As Vladimir Putin demonstrated, Europe had a menacing bear on its border and remains in a position where it cannot subdue the beast on its own. But these dynamics do not exist for Australia and the wider Indo-Pacific. While it is accepted that China seeks dominance of the region and control of shipping routes, war is neither current nor inevitable. While China's President Xi Jinping has said he wants his military to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027 and, with force if necessary, there are many ways he can subdue the democratic island without an invasion. At one end, this could include a blockade that may or may not be seen as an act of war by the United States. Another more worrying tactic could be China declaring a 'quarantine' of Taiwan, and claiming it is an internal matter, making it even more difficult to define whether it constituted an act of war or not. This is why expecting countries like Australia to start declaring in 2025 that they will take part in a hypothetical war with submarines we will not possess until the early 2030s, in a best-case scenario, is dangerously reductive, as it misses a vital opportunity to talk about how to push back on China's already coercive and menacing behaviour towards Taiwan, and the Philippines. The other, and perhaps most powerful element MAGA misses when it comes to the Indo-Pacific is the one of choice. Australia has a choice about how it wants to respond to the great power competition underway between the United States and China. And so far, MAGA's methods are only moving Anthony Albanese one way – in China's direction. Australians fundamentally don't like Donald Trump, but still believe in and back the alliance. However, it would be hazardous to assume these attitudes are fixed. Australia's population is increasingly migrant-based, as Mr Albanese's appeals to Indian and Chinese voters at the last election and throughout his first term underlined. It should not be assumed that this voting bloc will always have an enduring loyalty and affection to the United States. And MAGA's behaviour to date could easily provoke questions about whether the United States would have Australia's back as per our treaty alliance. All this said, it is extremely likely that were the United States to fight China in the foreseeable future, Australia would take part. Our joint intelligence facility with the US at Pine Gap, as well as the US bases on Australian soil, would make us a target at any rate and all but guarantee our involvement. There is a fundamental inconsistency, if not incoherence, to the premise of the Financial Times report that Mr Colby is demanding allies, including Australia, state whether they would fight over Taiwan, when Mr Trump – wisely — himself refuses to say, strategic ambiguity carries a deterrent effect of its own. But perhaps the greatest question, that MAGA's methods will only justify if it continues to self-righteously and sanctimoniously badger its Indo-Pacific allies, is what values and order would we be fighting for? As Richard Spencer, the former US Navy Secretary who war-gamed these scenarios, recently said, such a war would 'not pretty at all, for either side' ie. it would result in the deaths of thousands of lives. The resolve of the United States and its allies must be to avoid this at all costs. But if Xi were to make such a catastrophic mistake, like his authoritarian collaborator Mr Putin, then Australians would naturally ask, what would we be fighting for? And this is where the MAGA approach could backfire. Because the Trump Administration looks more focused on shoring up American dominance rather than a global order that protects its smaller friends. How else to read the symbolism of his first tariff-imposition letters going to Indo-Pacific allies South Korea and Japan? On top of the tariffs on Australian steel and exports, is now the threat of 200 per cent duties on pharmaceuticals. This is despite Australia and the United States having a free trade agreement. Australia is no stranger to economic coercion. It experienced the Chinese Communist Party's wrath after the pandemic when Beijing effectively killed Australian wine, lobster and barley imports overnight because the Coalition asked for an inquiry into COVID. But unwarranted duties from a treaty ally, that, at the same time has injected uncertainty into the AUKUS deal are such difficult pills to swallow, precisely because of the 'friend' who is administering them. It may well be that if faced with the poisons of a bullying, authoritarian China and a free but selfish, 'America First' mercurial United States, Australians would still prefer the latter. Our joint intelligence facility with the US at Pine Gap, as well as the US military presence on Australian soil, would highly likely make us a target and force our involvement at any rate. But Mr Colby and his MAGA friends should realise that there is a range of tactics that can engineer success, and a one-size-fits-all bully boy model may prove ultimately nihilistic.
Euractiv
14-07-2025
- Business
- Euractiv
France positions itself as ‘driving force' behind Europe's rearmament
France has reaffirmed its leading role in driving Europe's defence ramp-up, counting on Germany as a strategic ally and backing new EU defence funding instruments. On Monday, the French prime minister's office published a 100-page strategic review outlining the country's priorities until 2030 in response to a 'changing strategic context'. France aims to strengthen Europe's role within the NATO alliance – historically led by the United States – while advancing the continent's strategic autonomy amid Washington's gradual disengagement from Europe, according to the document. Paris believes the best way to achieve this is by reinforcing the 'essential role' of the Franco-German partnership. 'F rance and Germany will jointly contribute to strengthening Europe's integration, capacity for action and defence capability', the strategy lays out. Other key bilateral partnerships cited include the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain. Poland – Europe's largest NATO spender – ranks only fifth in importance. More funding President Emmanuel Macron announced on Sunday that France's defence budget would increase by €3.5 billion in 2026, followed by a further €3 billion in 2027, in addition to the military planning bill already aimed at boosting defence spending through to 2030. Macron said the increase should be driven by "more activity and more production", not by further debt. H owever, it remains unclear where the additional funding will come from. Prime Minister François Bayrou is expected to present the 2026 budget bill on Tuesday, which should outline how the additional defence spending will be financed. The proposal, however, is likely to be rejected by all opposition parties, and French media report that the ensuing parliamentary debate could threaten Bayrou's position in the autumn. France currently has a budget deficit of 5.4% of GDP – more than 2% above the EU's 3% limit. So far, 16 EU countries have requested to activate the Commission's national escape clause , allowing them to exceed the deficit ceiling and borrow up to an additional 1.5% of annual GDP for defence over the next four years. Asked by Euractiv how the Commission views France's proposed defence spending, a spokesperson said such increases "should be done without undermining fiscal discipline". European funding tools On the EU side, the strategic review expresses support for new European funding options, citing the Commission's Defence White Paper, which outlines a €150 billion envelope for joint procurement – dubbed SAFE – green-lit by member states in May. As of now, France still has not made clear whether it will take part in SAFE. EU countries have until December to submit joint projects to the Commission. France could chip in on projects including space communications, surface-to-air defence, and tactical and strategic air transport, the strategy notes. (aw)
