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The Age
28-05-2025
- Politics
- The Age
‘Be very realistic': Defence expert on the new world order – and Indonesia's rise
It's hard to overstate Hugh White's standing on issues related to Australia's national security. An emeritus professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University, White is the author of The China Choice (2012) and How to Defend Australia (2019). He was principal author of Australia's 2000 Defence White Paper, and since then has borne witness to the astonishing rise of China and the biggest shift in geopolitical power in more than 80 years. Since the end of World War II, Australia has basked in the security blanket of our large and powerful friend, the United States. Is that era now over? Yes it is, and not just because of Donald Trump. It is because we are living through a truly fundamental and historic shift in the pattern of world power. We have been able to rely on America for so long because it has been by far the strongest country in the world, and stronger by a huge margin than any country in Asia. But that is not true any more. We live in a multipolar world where several countries have great power – China of course, but also India and, before long, Indonesia, too. America no longer has the overwhelming power to keep our region stable and Australia safe. So, are we clinging to an alliance with the US now greatly weakened? Yes. We still think America can protect us from China today, just as it did when its economy was 20 times the size of China's. In fact, we're now depending on America more and more to keep China in check as it becomes less and less able to do so. Back in February, three Chinese warships entered the Tasman Sea for the first time and conducted live-fire drills. Do you see this as a message from the Chinese government about the might and reach of its navy, now the world's biggest? It certainly was a big message from Beijing! I think the Chinese wanted to remind us that they are now a great power with real maritime reach. The Western Pacific is not an American lake any more. Our leaders were low-key in their reaction and response. Did they get this right? Yes, they were right not to make a bigger fuss than they did. The Chinese naval deployment was legal under international law, and posed no threat to Australia. But it was a sign of the changing strategic realities that we'd be foolish to ignore. With the election of Donald Trump, the United States is showing signs that it's no longer serious about protecting the Western Pacific … Trump is turbocharging the underlying shift in economic and military power away from America. He is an isolationist who wants America to step back from global leadership, and is happy to accommodate the ambitions of China and Russia. It's bigger than Trump now, isn't it, with American voters' support for America First, for isolationism and for rejecting the old idea of US global leadership? Absolutely. America's policy elite – what Trump calls the 'Washington Swamp' – is still in love with the idea of US primacy. But US voters agree with Trump. They do not want to carry the costs and risks of global leadership, including the risk of nuclear war, when in today's multipolar world they can remain perfectly secure as the dominant power in their own western hemisphere. Were you surprised when Trump didn't even know what AUKUS was? Not at all. AUKUS is not Trump's idea of a good deal. He would love the idea of us sending America a lot of money, but he won't like the idea of them sending us any of their precious nuclear subs in return. And, more broadly, he'd rather America became less entangled with allies like Australia, rather than more entangled. Loading So could we regard AUKUS as the perfect symbol of our failure to respond to a changed world? With the rise of powers like China, India and Indonesia, we are living through one of the biggest shifts in international strategic setting in our history. For the first time since European settlement, Asia can no longer be dominated by outside powers like America. But AUKUS pretends this is not happening. It is all about locking in US support by backing America all the way against China. That is why Washington calls it a 'strategic marriage' between America and Australia. Our leaders want this because they do not believe Australia can make its own way in Asia. But they are wrong about that. Instead of clinging to America through AUKUS, they should be equipping Australia to make its own way in an Asia no longer dominated and made safe for us by US power. The keystone of AUKUS is the plan to buy eight nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). But these are 30 years off. Won't we need this deterrence far sooner? That's right. Even if trying to deter China's challenge made sense, AUKUS would not help. If the subs are ever delivered, which I doubt, they would arrive far too late and in numbers too small to make a difference. Though the first sub is supposed to arrive in the mid-2030s, we would not have an operationally viable nuclear submarine force until 2050 at the earliest. That is far too late to make any difference to the contest that is under way with China right now. 'China will face other strong powers to balance and limit its power, including Indonesia, Japan and Russia.' The only way that China could be deterred is if US forces in the Western Pacific were massively increased, but the opposite is happening, right? Exactly. The reality is that for all Joe Biden's tough talk, successive US administrations have allowed America's military strength in Asia to be eclipsed by the remarkable growth of China's air and naval forces. Even noted 'China hawks' in Washington now acknowledge that America cannot win a war with China over Taiwan any more. That makes nonsense of all the talk of deterring China. What would the Pacific region – and our strategic position – look like without a reasonably benevolent and dependable United States? Many people fear that if America steps back from leadership in Asia, the whole region would be oppressed by an all-powerful China. But that will not happen. In today's multipolar world, China will face other strong powers to balance and limit its power, including Indonesia, Japan and Russia. Australia will sit on the boundary between Chinese and Indian spheres of influence, and if we are smart, we will keep a balance between them so that neither becomes too dominant. We will be put into a horrible spot if China invades Taiwan and the US decides to go to war to protect it. Even if we don't join the war, wouldn't the defence infrastructure in northern Australia make us a target? Australia today is hosting US combat forces on our soil for the first time since World War II, and those forces are plainly directed at China. In a war over Taiwan, they would be an obvious target. This is a big issue which the government really needs to explain frankly. Even if a military conflict is avoided, could any future Australian government be under pressure by an all-powerful China to introduce things like unlimited investment in Australia and immigration? Like all great powers, China will throw its weight around. We must learn to manage that as best we can, as middle-size powers have always had to do. Working with neighbouring countries will be key to that. And, as the last resort, we will need to be able to resist military pressure independently. That is a big challenge, but not impossible. And anyway, we have no choice because those big tides of history mean there is no way we can keep sheltering behind US power. Are we much more exposed than, say, Europe, which has the European Union and NATO to defend itself? Like us, the Europeans can no longer rely on America, but they can use the EU and NATO as foundations for a strong European strategic identity. We have nothing like that in Asia, so we will be much more on our own, and will have to build new strategic connections with our neighbours from a much lower base. You've written that in the future, it will no longer be militarily impossible for China to attack Australia directly. And not just China, but other major regional powers, such as Indonesia. China poses no direct military threat to Australia today unless we join America in a US-China war. But China, like other great powers, will be more able to attack Australia directly in future when the US is no longer here to protect us. The chances of them doing so are still low, but we do have to think carefully about how we could defend ourselves independently. We have never really done that before, and it is time we did. Loading We have a new defence agreement with Indonesia but despite this, in November last year Indonesia and Russia had their first-ever bilateral naval exercise together in the Java Sea. How do we interpret this? We need to be very realistic about Indonesia. If we play our cards right, it can be a useful partner, but it will not be a close ally. It will always remain 'non-aligned', and will never side with America against China or Russia. We need to accept that, and perhaps learn from it. It's clear that Indonesia doesn't see Russia or China as the threats we do. Is that right? Absolutely. Indonesians have a very different view of the world from Australia's. They are used to making their way without allies. They do not divide the world into friends and enemies but assess all countries as both potential problems and potential opportunities, and aim to make the best of them. During the election campaign, our drastically altered national security picture barely received a mention by both sides of politics, except for some talk about increased defence spending. Isn't it time for our political leaders to be frank with the Australian people about our changed security position in the world? This is a real problem. Both major parties say that we are facing our gravest strategic dangers since World War II, but neither side is willing to explain why that is, or do anything serious about it. They talk about more defence spending but cannot say what our forces must be able to do and what capabilities they need. We will not begin to adapt effectively to this truly historic shift in Australia's place in the world until our leaders have the courage to acknowledge that the old era of alliance dependence is over, and explain how we can make our way in Asia by ourselves. Because like it or not, that is what we have to do.
Sydney Morning Herald
28-05-2025
- Politics
- Sydney Morning Herald
‘Be very realistic': Defence expert on the new world order – and Indonesia's rise
It's hard to overstate Hugh White's standing on issues related to Australia's national security. An emeritus professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University, White is the author of The China Choice (2012) and How to Defend Australia (2019). He was principal author of Australia's 2000 Defence White Paper, and since then has borne witness to the astonishing rise of China and the biggest shift in geopolitical power in more than 80 years. Since the end of World War II, Australia has basked in the security blanket of our large and powerful friend, the United States. Is that era now over? Yes it is, and not just because of Donald Trump. It is because we are living through a truly fundamental and historic shift in the pattern of world power. We have been able to rely on America for so long because it has been by far the strongest country in the world, and stronger by a huge margin than any country in Asia. But that is not true any more. We live in a multipolar world where several countries have great power – China of course, but also India and, before long, Indonesia, too. America no longer has the overwhelming power to keep our region stable and Australia safe. So, are we clinging to an alliance with the US now greatly weakened? Yes. We still think America can protect us from China today, just as it did when its economy was 20 times the size of China's. In fact, we're now depending on America more and more to keep China in check as it becomes less and less able to do so. Back in February, three Chinese warships entered the Tasman Sea for the first time and conducted live-fire drills. Do you see this as a message from the Chinese government about the might and reach of its navy, now the world's biggest? It certainly was a big message from Beijing! I think the Chinese wanted to remind us that they are now a great power with real maritime reach. The Western Pacific is not an American lake any more. Our leaders were low-key in their reaction and response. Did they get this right? Yes, they were right not to make a bigger fuss than they did. The Chinese naval deployment was legal under international law, and posed no threat to Australia. But it was a sign of the changing strategic realities that we'd be foolish to ignore. With the election of Donald Trump, the United States is showing signs that it's no longer serious about protecting the Western Pacific … Trump is turbocharging the underlying shift in economic and military power away from America. He is an isolationist who wants America to step back from global leadership, and is happy to accommodate the ambitions of China and Russia. It's bigger than Trump now, isn't it, with American voters' support for America First, for isolationism and for rejecting the old idea of US global leadership? Absolutely. America's policy elite – what Trump calls the 'Washington Swamp' – is still in love with the idea of US primacy. But US voters agree with Trump. They do not want to carry the costs and risks of global leadership, including the risk of nuclear war, when in today's multipolar world they can remain perfectly secure as the dominant power in their own western hemisphere. Were you surprised when Trump didn't even know what AUKUS was? Not at all. AUKUS is not Trump's idea of a good deal. He would love the idea of us sending America a lot of money, but he won't like the idea of them sending us any of their precious nuclear subs in return. And, more broadly, he'd rather America became less entangled with allies like Australia, rather than more entangled. Loading So could we regard AUKUS as the perfect symbol of our failure to respond to a changed world? With the rise of powers like China, India and Indonesia, we are living through one of the biggest shifts in international strategic setting in our history. For the first time since European settlement, Asia can no longer be dominated by outside powers like America. But AUKUS pretends this is not happening. It is all about locking in US support by backing America all the way against China. That is why Washington calls it a 'strategic marriage' between America and Australia. Our leaders want this because they do not believe Australia can make its own way in Asia. But they are wrong about that. Instead of clinging to America through AUKUS, they should be equipping Australia to make its own way in an Asia no longer dominated and made safe for us by US power. The keystone of AUKUS is the plan to buy eight nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). But these are 30 years off. Won't we need this deterrence far sooner? That's right. Even if trying to deter China's challenge made sense, AUKUS would not help. If the subs are ever delivered, which I doubt, they would arrive far too late and in numbers too small to make a difference. Though the first sub is supposed to arrive in the mid-2030s, we would not have an operationally viable nuclear submarine force until 2050 at the earliest. That is far too late to make any difference to the contest that is under way with China right now. 'China will face other strong powers to balance and limit its power, including Indonesia, Japan and Russia.' The only way that China could be deterred is if US forces in the Western Pacific were massively increased, but the opposite is happening, right? Exactly. The reality is that for all Joe Biden's tough talk, successive US administrations have allowed America's military strength in Asia to be eclipsed by the remarkable growth of China's air and naval forces. Even noted 'China hawks' in Washington now acknowledge that America cannot win a war with China over Taiwan any more. That makes nonsense of all the talk of deterring China. What would the Pacific region – and our strategic position – look like without a reasonably benevolent and dependable United States? Many people fear that if America steps back from leadership in Asia, the whole region would be oppressed by an all-powerful China. But that will not happen. In today's multipolar world, China will face other strong powers to balance and limit its power, including Indonesia, Japan and Russia. Australia will sit on the boundary between Chinese and Indian spheres of influence, and if we are smart, we will keep a balance between them so that neither becomes too dominant. We will be put into a horrible spot if China invades Taiwan and the US decides to go to war to protect it. Even if we don't join the war, wouldn't the defence infrastructure in northern Australia make us a target? Australia today is hosting US combat forces on our soil for the first time since World War II, and those forces are plainly directed at China. In a war over Taiwan, they would be an obvious target. This is a big issue which the government really needs to explain frankly. Even if a military conflict is avoided, could any future Australian government be under pressure by an all-powerful China to introduce things like unlimited investment in Australia and immigration? Like all great powers, China will throw its weight around. We must learn to manage that as best we can, as middle-size powers have always had to do. Working with neighbouring countries will be key to that. And, as the last resort, we will need to be able to resist military pressure independently. That is a big challenge, but not impossible. And anyway, we have no choice because those big tides of history mean there is no way we can keep sheltering behind US power. Are we much more exposed than, say, Europe, which has the European Union and NATO to defend itself? Like us, the Europeans can no longer rely on America, but they can use the EU and NATO as foundations for a strong European strategic identity. We have nothing like that in Asia, so we will be much more on our own, and will have to build new strategic connections with our neighbours from a much lower base. You've written that in the future, it will no longer be militarily impossible for China to attack Australia directly. And not just China, but other major regional powers, such as Indonesia. China poses no direct military threat to Australia today unless we join America in a US-China war. But China, like other great powers, will be more able to attack Australia directly in future when the US is no longer here to protect us. The chances of them doing so are still low, but we do have to think carefully about how we could defend ourselves independently. We have never really done that before, and it is time we did. Loading We have a new defence agreement with Indonesia but despite this, in November last year Indonesia and Russia had their first-ever bilateral naval exercise together in the Java Sea. How do we interpret this? We need to be very realistic about Indonesia. If we play our cards right, it can be a useful partner, but it will not be a close ally. It will always remain 'non-aligned', and will never side with America against China or Russia. We need to accept that, and perhaps learn from it. It's clear that Indonesia doesn't see Russia or China as the threats we do. Is that right? Absolutely. Indonesians have a very different view of the world from Australia's. They are used to making their way without allies. They do not divide the world into friends and enemies but assess all countries as both potential problems and potential opportunities, and aim to make the best of them. During the election campaign, our drastically altered national security picture barely received a mention by both sides of politics, except for some talk about increased defence spending. Isn't it time for our political leaders to be frank with the Australian people about our changed security position in the world? This is a real problem. Both major parties say that we are facing our gravest strategic dangers since World War II, but neither side is willing to explain why that is, or do anything serious about it. They talk about more defence spending but cannot say what our forces must be able to do and what capabilities they need. We will not begin to adapt effectively to this truly historic shift in Australia's place in the world until our leaders have the courage to acknowledge that the old era of alliance dependence is over, and explain how we can make our way in Asia by ourselves. Because like it or not, that is what we have to do.
New Straits Times
18-05-2025
- Business
- New Straits Times
NADI advances Malaysia's defence ambitions
KUALA LUMPUR: National Aerospace and Defence Industries Sdn Bhd (NADI) is positioning itself as a national champion and regional leader in defence technology to strengthen Malaysia's sovereign capabilities through innovation, partnerships, and talent development. Its group president Datuk Edron Hayata Ahmad said NADI, originally established in 1983 as Aerospace Industries Malaysia (AIM), has evolved into a strategic partner for the government. The company's activities now span aerospace manufacturing, systems integration, and indigenous technology development. "This mirrors Malaysia's broader defence transformation, shifting from reliance on imports to building sovereign capabilities," he said. NADI's current mission is to act as a catalyst for national defence readiness, aligned with the Defence White Paper and the push for self-reliance. "We aim to reduce external dependency by investing in indigenous research and development, workforce development, and critical technologies, ensuring Malaysia can defend its interests with locally sustained capabilities," he said. Edron said the company is actively investing in advanced manufacturing, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), robotics, mission-critical systems, and obsolescence management. "NADI has partnered with local universities and global original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to co-develop intellectual property within Malaysia. "Our subsidiaries are producing solutions for fighter jets and transport aircraft. We are driving programmes to transition Malaysia from a service-based defence industry to one that assembles, manufactures, designs, and engineers its own capabilities," he said. Among NADI's key initiatives includes its subsidiary Airod, which leads aircraft upgrade and life-extension programmes for the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) and international clients. "ATSC's aircraft Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), developed in-house and in collaboration with the RMAF and local firms, exemplifies our engineering capabilities," he said. Another subsidiary, SME Aerospace (SMEA), delivers around two million aerospace parts annually and co-produces structural components for global OEMs. NADI is also engaged in joint ventures focused on regional maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) hubs, and technology transfer agreements to enhance Malaysia's export potential and regional supply chain integration. A key partnership was with France's Satys, aimed at enhancing Airod Subang's aviation painting capabilities to serve future aircraft for both military and commercial sectors. In the area of unmanned systems, Edron said NADI is collaborating with US-based Ghost Robotics on its quadrupedal unmanned ground vehicle (QUGV), the Vision 60, and with Korea's Nearthlab to explore AI capabilities for defence drones. "These collaborations with proven global OEMs are being brought into Malaysia and will be featured at the upcoming Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace (Lima '25)," he said. Beyond engineering, NADI also supports the armed forces and national security agencies with end-to-end lifecycle services, including spare parts, inventory management, upgrades, and round-the-clock technical support. "We manage logistics for strategic assets and ensure mission readiness with rapid deployment of maintenance teams, especially in remote operational theatres," he said. To cultivate a future-ready defence workforce, NADI works with the Aviation Design Centre (ADC) and local universities to provide accredited technical training and specialised aerospace programmes. "These initiatives prepare job-ready graduates and offer upskilling pathways for current personnel. We're building a talent pipeline that supports both present defence needs and future innovation," he said. NADI is also reinforcing export readiness through certified standards, strategic alliances, and proprietary technologies. Edron said NADI's branding is built on reliability, sovereign capacity, and cost-effective innovation. This, he said as NADI has an active presence in global defence exhibitions and industry associations to attract contracts and technology transfers. Edron added that NADI is also a founding member of the Coalition of Defence Industry (CDI), a platform for capability-building among local defence players. "Our long-term vision is to build a vertically integrated, innovation-driven enterprise that supports Malaysia's defence autonomy and contributes to economic resilience through high-value exports. NADI aspires to be the cornerstone of a future-proof, sovereign defence ecosystem," he said.
Epoch Times
23-04-2025
- Business
- Epoch Times
Australia's Defence Budget Up Just 0.8 Percent in Real Terms Over the Last Decade: Analysis
Australia's defence spending over the last 10 years has stagnated, and new funding commitments unlikely to make a difference for years to come, a new report says. The federal government's latest defence budget announcements listed an 'additional $50.3 billion' of spending over the next 10 years with an 'additional $10.6 billion invested over the forward estimates.' In addition, $1 billion of spending would be brought forward 'to enable Defence to acquire capabilities faster,' making a total of $57.6 billion over the coming decade. Defence Minister Richard Marles said the pledge was in contrast to the previous Coalition government, which had 'secretly ripped' $20 billion out of the defence budget. But an analysis by Strategic Analysis Australia (SAA) shows that under both Labor and Coalition governments, the real buying power of the funds has been eroded by inflation, and in real terms only equate to a 0.8 percent increase. And while it raises the proportion of defence spending from 2.03 to 2.05 percent of GDP, that's still well short of the government's National Defence Strategy (NDS) target of 2.4 percent by 2033/34. Related Stories 4/1/2025 3/24/2025 The funding analysed is allocated to the Department of Defence, the Australian Signals Directorate, and the Australian Submarine Agency. Despite acknowledging that, "over the next two decades, we face greater security uncertainty and complexity, globally," the 2016 Defence White Paper made no funding provision for dealing with it, according to a report from Strategic Analysis Australia. The 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP) outlined 10-years funding up to 2025/26 with the Morrison government's 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU) extending that until 2029/30, essentially at the same rate of growth. 'By and large, both Coalition and Labor governments have delivered the funding set out in those documents,' the SAA report, titled, 'Defence 2025: Dollars and Decisions,' says. 'Using the last Budget year before the 2016 DWP as our starting point, the defence budget has grown from $31,151 million to $58.989 million in nominal terms, or 89.4 percent. 'Real growth, which takes inflation into account, is a better way of assessing the scale of growth and is still a substantial 41.5 percent. Defence funding has also grown from 1.88 to 2.05 of GDP.' But over that period, governments have regularly reassigned funding to new priorities. 'Changing priorities is the prerogative of governments,' SAA says, 'But most of them require Defence to fund the new measures out of its existing resources, and we rarely hear what's been given up to find the money.' This argument was mirrored by retired Major General Adam Findlay, who said the extra $50 billion headlined by Labor, was only a gradual increase in funding and that within the Australian Defence Force funding has Additional ADF priorities also include military support for Ukraine and efficiency dividends. The 2023/24 Budget included $924 million for Pacific engagement, and the 2024/25 estimates included $972.8 million for workforce retention measures. Australia's Minister of Defence Richard Marles (C) and Minister of Defence Industry and Capability Delivery Pat Conroy (R) announce the accelerated delivery of Australia's first High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) at the Australian International Airshow in Avalon on March 24, 2025. The country's acquisition of the HIMARS system was accelerated after a 2023 Defence Strategic Review. Photo by WILLIAM WEST/AFP via Getty Images 'The most substantial measure over the past decade was the REDSPICE cyber program contained in the previous Coalition government's final Budget in March 2023,' the report says. 'That transferred nearly $1 billion per year ... from the Department of Defence to the Australian Signals Directorate to enhance cyber capabilities. 'This may be a good use of the money, but REDSPICE's impact is $981.4 million in 2024/25 and $974.9 million in 2025/26 that isn't available to acquire or operate military capabilities. The cumulative effect of those changes is now considerable.' Inflation Not Adequately Accounted For Aside from having to do more within the budget they're given, the Defence Force—like the rest of Australia—has also been affected by inflation and 'hasn't been compensated for that.' The 2016 White Paper was developed on the assumption that inflation would be within the Reserve Bank's target zone of 2 to 3 percent per annum. But since the pandemic, inflation has been significantly higher, and that has eaten into the value of every dollar allocated to defence. The impact of inflation on the defence budget (A$, 2019–20 real dollars) 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22 2022/23 2023/24 2024/25 2025/26 2026/27 Pre-COVID buying power 39,246 40,882 43,334 45,792 48,318 50,079 50,912 52,077 Current buying power 39,246 41,199 42,856 43,371 45,015 46,676 47,069 48,060 Buying power loss ($) 0 316 -478 -2,421 -3,303 -3,403 -3,843 -4,017 Buying power loss (percent) 0.0 0.8 -1.1 -5.3 -6.8 -6.8 -7.5 -7.7 The current year's funding shortfall is 7.5 percent, or a $3.8 billion annual loss in buying power, and a cumulative $13.1 billion since 2019/20. 'Those aren't small numbers, and Defence receives no budget adjustments to compensate for inflation,' Strategic Analysis Australia says. 'Even if inflation returns to historical norms—as the Budget papers predict—that loss of buying power will continue.' While the current government has increased defence funding by $50.3 billion over the decade, nearly all of it was 'dedicated to the funding gap between the cancelled Attack-class submarine program and the nuclear-powered submarine enterprise [AUKUS], plus some going to the government's new general-purpose frigate program. Only $1 billion of the $50.3 billion was for new capabilities.' And most of that is planned for well into the future. 'Defence got only $400 million of new money in 2024/25,' SAA points out. 'That was essentially the only new funding for that year since the 2016 DWP and represented a mere 0.7 percent increase.' A decade of increased expectations from government, inflation, and the costs of AUKUS meant the new funding was insufficient, and 'something had to give. $72.8 billion in previously planned projects were cancelled or delayed over the coming decade. 'Nothing has changed significantly since 2016,' the report concludes. 'It's only when we get to 2027/28 (the back end of the next term of government) that we see any noticeable divergence between the old and new plans. That's when the $3.8 billion (now down to $3.6 billion) cuts in. For now, we're still stuck in a spending plan that dates back to an earlier, very different era.'
Forbes
06-04-2025
- Business
- Forbes
Can Europe Re-Arm In Time To Stop Russia?
TOPSHOT - A Russian battle tank T-72 drives outside the town of Sudzha on August 8, 2024. Ukraine's ... More incursion into Russia, which entered a third day on August 8, 2024, appears to be an unprecedented assault which experts say could aim to draw Russian resources away from other areas or to undermine morale. Russia has given only scarce updates as it seeks to strike a balance between denouncing the escalation and avoiding panic. (Photo by ANATOLIY ZHDANOV / Kommersant Photo / AFP) / Russia OUT (Photo by ANATOLIY ZHDANOV/Kommersant Photo/AFP via Getty Images) Last month the EU launched its Defence WhitePaper, which sets out how the bloc will defend itself, primarily in the face of Russian aggression and a possible withdrawal of the US from Europe. The report was launched by the relatively new EU defence and space commissioner Andrius Kubilius, who was twice prime minister of Lithuania – a country very much in the cross-hairs of Russia. The report coincided with the approval by the Bundestag of a waiver of the German debt brake for defence spending, above 1% of GDP) and follows the announcement of potentially Eur 800bn in funding for European defence infrastructure. Politically the report is careful to state that NATO remains the organisation to provide defence coordination across Europe, but practically the report focuses on building out common EU defence capabilities (heavy transport aircraft, radar and signals) and in particular seven capabilities 'gaps' are flagged – such as air defence and space infrastructure as it relates to satellites, intelligence gathering and communications. Oddly for an EU document, the onus for implementation is delegated back to national defence chiefs – and the EU defence industry (in terms of equipment led solutions), and in proposing collective arms purchases across EU countries. The report is not perhaps sufficiently detailed on the potential relaxation of merger/anti-trust rules to help build scale, labour market issues, talent recruitment and innovation – though these topics are perhaps slightly beyond its scope. The report flags a range of defence threats – from the Arctic to the Middle East and is vocal on the threats posed by China to the world order. Behind the scenes there were some efforts to name and shame counties like Spain that are perceived not to invest sufficiently in their defence (Spain and Italy had objected to the 'Re-arm' titling of the initiative). A few sources have flagged to us how individual states are now re-examining procurement and training relations with the DoD and American weapons suppliers US given the new approach by the Trump administration to Europe. Also, one focus of negative feedback was the apparent prohibition on arms purchases from the UK (with EU funding), a messaging error some thought harsh in the light of UK/EU defence cooperation. The EU defence White Paper stands out in comparison to policy papers in other fields in the sense that – it has strong political backing, capital and is pragmatic in implementation. In that sense it is an echo with some of the financial remedies applied to the euro-zone economy in 2012. My understanding is that much of the report (begun last November) was written before the Munich Security Conference, and as such the language does not reflect the EU view on recent pronouncements from the White House. However, while the assessment is a complete one it also highlights the near-term vulnerability of the EU.
