Latest news with #FiveYearPlan
Business Times
12 hours ago
- Business
- Business Times
China set to tackle petrochemicals overcapacity with overhaul
[BEIJING] The Chinese government is set to launch a sweeping overhaul of its petrochemicals and oil refining sector, phasing out smaller facilities and targeting outdated operations for upgrades, while redirecting investment to advanced materials. Remedies to curtail longstanding overcapacity in lower-value parts of the industry are likely within the next month, according to sources familiar with the matter. The detailed plan is awaiting final approval from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, they said, declining to be identified, as discussing matters that are not public yet. Under the measures proposed, petrochemicals facilities over 20 years old, or about 40 per cent of the country's total, will need retrofitting to increase their yields, according to the sources. Plants will also be encouraged to shift to speciality fine chemicals, rather than bulk materials already threatened by oversupply, they said. Chemicals that will be favoured under the new investment regime include those used in artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, biomedical devices, batteries and renewable energy, they said. The industry ministry did not respond to a request for comment. Beijing flagged its intention in March to force plants to produce less transport fuels and more petrochemicals, as electrification rapidly undermines traditional energy usage. Refining profits have only worsened since then, while Beijing's efforts to combat involution across industries has taken on greater urgency due to persistent deflationary and trade pressures on the economy. BT in your inbox Start and end each day with the latest news stories and analyses delivered straight to your inbox. Sign Up Sign Up China has long sought, though not always successfully, to curb excessive domestic refinery production, in part to clamp down on highly polluting sectors but also to limit damage to profit margins and with an eye on crude imports. The target for 2025 is to cap capacity at one billion tonnes a year. The latest plan also targets smaller oil refiners, and those with less than two million tonnes of annual capacity could be shut, the sources said. That's necessary to offset a contraction in demand for petrol and diesel, which has cut operating rates and left the sector with about 60 million tonnes of excess capacity, they said. An emerging concern that may not be directly tackled in the current overhaul is ethylene, an ingredient in textiles, rubber and plastics, which could face curbs on new permits from 2026 due to a looming glut, the sources said. This has been pitched by the industry as a priority for the coming Five Year Plan, to be unveiled in March. Ethylene is a prime example of how China is fighting a rising tide of chemicals capacity after a decade of overzealous investment. New plants are still scheduled to come online to 2028. If that supply cannot be absorbed at home, it may end up as yet another Chinese export drawing accusations of dumping from trade partners that cannot compete on price. Overcapacity is not just a problem for China. In Europe, several producers have restructured or halted their ethylene operations, according to BloombergNEF. The European Union responded last month with an action plan to help deter unfair competition from foreign suppliers, and China in particular. The EU's carbon tax from 2026 is another mechanism that's likely to penalise Chinese chemicals exporters. BLOOMBERG


The Hindu
6 days ago
- Business
- The Hindu
The Sisyphean quest to bolster manufacturing in India
78 Years of Freedom The Narendra Modi government's quest to bolster the domestic manufacturing sector is not the first time a government has tried this. In fact, the manufacturing sector has been the focus of government policy — in one way or the other — ever since 1956, to relatively modest success. At the time of Independence or thereabouts, the Indian economy looked very different from its current state both in terms of size as well as composition. At the time, agriculture was the overwhelmingly dominant driver of the economy, contributing about half of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as per data with the Reserve Bank of India. The nascent manufacturing sector, on the other hand, made up about 11% of the GDP. Now, the services sector has taken over the dominant role vacated by agriculture, while manufacturing has remained largely where it was. The first Five Year Plan (1951-56) focused on the idea of increasing domestic savings, since it was presumed that higher savings would directly translate into higher investments. This policy, however, ran into a fundamental problem: investments could not materially increase as the country did not have a domestic capital goods producing sector. The second Five Year Plan (1956-61), based on the ideas of PC Mahalanobis, and successive Plans sought to address this by increasing investments in the capital goods producing sectors themselves. The idea was to increase government investment in capital goods production, while the micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) would cater to the consumer goods market. As the economist and professor Aditya Bhattacharjea noted in a paper published in Springer Nature: 'With long-run growth being seen as the means for reducing widespread poverty, the model provided an intellectual justification for increasing investments in the capital goods sector of a labour-abundant country.' So, what followed was that growth rates of both investment in and output of the machinery, metals, and chemicals industries outpaced those of consumer goods industries. The Mahalanobis model did not incorporate specific industry-wise policies, but it had a few broad themes that came to characterise India's industrial policy over the country's first three decades since Independence. The first and most obvious theme was the huge role of the public sector. The feeling at the time was — not unlike what the Modi government felt in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic — that private sector investment would not be picking up the load for some time, and so the public sector would have to do the heavy lifting. The 1948 Industrial Policy Resolution (IPR) reserved the production of arms and ammunition for the Union government, and new investments in sectors as diverse as iron and steel, aircraft, ships, telephone, telegraph and wireless equipment were kept as the exclusive domain of central public sector enterprises. The 1956 IPR, which came after the historic Avadi session of the Indian National Congress in 1955, expanded the reserved list to 14 sectors. The driving ideology was that the government and the public sector would assume the 'commanding heights' of the economy. The second and equally significant theme of this thought process was the use of licensing as a means to ensure that scarce resources were allocated to priority sectors. Third, the belief was that the domestic industry would need to be protected from international competition, and this protection took the form of high tariffs — something U.S. President Donald Trump seems to have a problem with even today — and import licensing. By 1980, the share of manufacturing in India's GDP had grown to about 16-17%. According to some economists like Pulapre Balakrishnan, the real growth in the manufacturing sector took off from here, and not from the 1991 liberalisation, as is often assumed. This, they said, was due to a few policy changes enacted by the government of the time: allowing up to 25% automatic expansion of licensed capacities, allowing manufacturing licences to be used to produce other items within the same broad industrial category, and significant relaxation of price controls on cement and steel. The 1991 reforms and the resultant end of the 'licence raj', the opening up of the economy to the private sector and international competition further helped things, with the manufacturing sector growing strongly and contributing a steady 15-18% of a rapidly-growing GDP till about 2015. Steep fall That year saw a marked change, however, with the share of manufacturing in GDP consistently falling for the next decade. A major reason for this change was the non-performing assets (NPA) crisis in the banking sector. Profligate lending by banks in the 2009-14 period led to a build-up of bad loans, which came to light in 2015-18 following an Asset Quality Review of the banking sector. Such was the crisis and its fallout that bank lending to large industry virtually dried up. This, coupled with the loan-fuelled over-capacity that had been created during the 2009-14 period meant that companies did not need to invest in additional capacity to meet demand, and could not find adequate credit even if they wanted to invest. Underpinning all of this was the increased reliance on imports from China, which virtually converted large parts of Indian manufacturing into assembly and repackaging units. Of course, the COVID-19 pandemic also severely hampered both demand and investments in India. The Modi government's Make in India efforts, thus, could not prevent the share of manufacturing in GDP falling from 15.6% in 2015-16 to 12.6% in 2024-25 — the lowest share in 71 years. Another problem faced by the Modi government, something all previous governments also faced, was that a lot of the reforms to drive manufacturing were needed at the State level. So, while the Union government has put in place the framework for land and labour reforms that could potentially increase the scale of Indian manufacturing, they are held up as most State governments are not cooperating. The services sector, on the other hand, has gone from strength to strength on the back of the IT boom. So, where services made up 37% of the GDP in 1950, this grew to 42% by 1996-97. Thereafter, the acceleration was rapid, with the sector now making up nearly 58% of the GDP. So, 78 years after Independence, the manufacturing sector remains an also-ran in India's growth story, despite fervent attempts by government after government. The services sector, on the other hand, has blossomed outside the government's focus.


The Diplomat
08-08-2025
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Damming the Climate for Rights in Tibet
It's not just the new mega-dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River. For years, Tibetans who draw attention to environmental damage have faced detention and lengthy jail sentences. On July 8, Tsongon Tsering, 30, a Tibetan environmental defender, was released from the Ngaba County Detention Facility in Sichuan Province. Reportedly emaciated and in poor health, he had completed an eight-month sentence on baseless charges of 'inciting social unrest' and 'subverting the state.' What had actually prompted this detention? In October 2024, he posted a video documenting illegal sand and gravel mining that identified the company responsible for the environmental degradation. The video went viral, and Tsongon Tsering was arrested. His detention prompted a January 2025 intervention by United Nations human rights experts on the environment, free speech, and human rights defenders to Chinese authorities. The authorities responded, insisting Tsongon Tsering had been arrested for an unrelated scuffle – but also asserting that the company whose illegal mining he had helped expose had been fined. Although his formal sentence is over, Tsongon Tsering remains under close surveillance. Just days after Tsering Tsongon's 'non-release release,' on July 19 Chinese Premier Li Qiang traveled to Nyingtri, near the Tibet-India border, to oversee the groundbreaking for the Yarlung Tsangpo mega-dam. The Chinese government identified this and other dams as priority clean energy projects in the 2021-2025 Five Year Plan, and Chinese President Xi Jinping recently reiterated his view of renewable energy as central to addressing the climate crisis. When finished, the dam is expected to be the largest in the world, generating not just power but also an economic boost. At the opening ceremony, Li referred to the dam as 'the project of the century.' But he didn't mention what mattered most to local residents: the prospects of submerging two dozen Tibetan villages or the staggering risks to cultural heritage such as monasteries, not to mention wildlife and the environment. He had nothing to say about the project's lack of a publicly-available environmental impact assessment. He did not respond to retired geologist and environmentalist Fan Xiao, who in early 2024 described this dam as 'not feasible' given the 'geological and environmental risks.' Li's disinterest in the consequences of the dam for the local population is consistent with the Chinese government's general disdain for human rights. Ordinary citizens like Tsongon Tsering try to use their rights – guaranteed under international law and China's constitution – to free speech, a healthy environment, prior consent, and participation in political life to mitigate the damage to their communities. Representatives of the state literally, figuratively, and legally respond by bulldozing those concerns. Tibetans routinely grapple with Beijing's pervasive repression as authorities relentlessly try to control all aspects of their identity. Tibetan Buddhism is a key target: not content to wrongfully imprison untold numbers of monks and nuns on trumped-up charges for decades, or try to control faith through 'management' of religion, Beijing also seeks to control the selection of the next Dalai Lama. In a horrifying effort to break familial and linguistic ties, Tibetan children as young as four are now compelled to attend state-run boarding schools whose staff and curriculum teach almost entirely in Chinese and deny opportunities to learn Tibetan culture. For thousands of years, Tibetan herders and pastoralists have herded and survived on the plateau, adapting to its climatic demands. Authorities have now largely forced them to move to fixed settlements, ironically in the name of Beijing's campaign of 'ecological civilization.' Tsongon Tsering isn't alone in facing state persecution for exposing environmental damage. In June 2025, Sherab and Gonpo, senior monks at Yena monastery in a Tibetan area of Sichuan Province, were slapped with sentences of four and three years, respectively, for having publicly opposed the Gangtuo dam in 2024. In 2023, United Nations human rights experts pressed Beijing for information about nine Tibetan environmental activists detained for exposing illegal mining and protesting harms to sacred sites in Tibetan areas of Qinghai and Sichuan, and in what the Chinese government disingenuously calls the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). The detentions took place between 2010 and 2019, leaving these people vulnerable to torture and ill-treatment for years. At times, these environmental protests directly implicate China's own vision of clean energy. In 2013 and 2016 Tibetans faced repression for protesting new mines tapping into vast supplies of lithium – an element essential to the production of electric vehicles. A pillar of addressing climate change is the concept of a 'just transition' to renewable energy and away from fossil fuels in which affected communities are consulted, have a say in decision-making, and share in any benefits. But those questioning projects like the Yarlung Tsangpo dam are treated as enemies or, worse, criminals. In a truly just transition, Tsongon Tsering's concerns would have been received and acted on consistent with international and Chinese law. Premier Li Qiang would be visiting Nyingtri to listen to – and pledge to take seriously – local concerns about new hydropower projects. Critics would be released from prison, and compensation would be paid. These cases show the inseparable relationship of human rights and climate change. If Beijing's claims to climate success rest on rampant human rights violations, it is a long way from a 'just transition.'


South China Morning Post
07-07-2025
- Business
- South China Morning Post
China's trade war strategy? Bet on Guizhou, long one of its poorest provinces
The 2025 trade war launched by the United States is shaping up to become a watershed moment for Chinese policymakers. While the country's economic resilience and role at the centre of global supply chains helped secure a 90-day truce with Washington, Beijing is digging deep to fight a protracted conflict. The forthcoming Five-Year Plan – China's signature development blueprint – is expected to fortify the domestic economy in the pursuit of global leadership. Provincial leaders are seizing opportunities to align with the national strategy, as the 2026-2030 development plan, officially released in March 2026, promises to reshape the nation's economic and industrial landscape. Guizhou, a mountainous province in Southwest China, 400 kilometres from the nearest coast, has barely felt the shock waves from Donald Trump's unprecedented tariff blitz. Instead, officials have identified opportunities as Beijing strategically pivots to the domestic market and renews its focus on economic security. 'We must fully play up our comparative advantages to serve the national strategy,' said Xu Lin, Guizhou's party chief, at a preparation conference for the Five-Year Plan on May 28. Guizhou now counts on the 'strategic hinterland strategy', introduced during a policymaking conference in December 2023.


Zawya
07-07-2025
- Business
- Zawya
Oman: MoHT plans to develop Al Jabal Al Sharqi site
MUSCAT: The Ministry of Heritage and Tourism (MoHT) reiterated in a statement its keenness to address appeals and calls to improve and expand services in Al Jabal Al Sharqi in the Wilayat of Al Hamra, as part of its ongoing efforts to upgrade key tourism sites across the Sultanate of Oman. In coordination with the Governor's Office of Al Dakhiliyah Governorate and relevant authorities, the ministry confirmed that the Governorate recently floated a tender for the construction of Al Jabal Al Sharqi Oasis project. The initiative, which was announced in April this year, will help enhance basic public services in the area in line with the ministry's tourism development strategies. The ministry also stated that efforts are underway in collaboration with the Governorate to implement elements of the 11th Five-Year Development Plan. These include comprehensive service frameworks aimed at meeting the needs of major tourist sites and landmarks across the governorate, in parallel with the ministry's broader tourism development agenda. The ministry stressed its commitment to transforming Al Jabal Al Sharqi into a high-quality tourism destination with integrated tourism elements, while ensuring a delicate balance between tourism growth, environmental sustainability and preservation of the area's natural features. It also underlined the need for relevant stakeholders to accelerate the implementation of agreed-upon development projects, and noted that it would take the necessary legal steps, including land reclamation measures for investment plots that remain undeveloped or have failed to meet the intended development projects. 2022 © All right reserved for Oman Establishment for Press, Publication and Advertising (OEPPA) Provided by SyndiGate Media Inc. (