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The Diplomat
7 days ago
- Business
- The Diplomat
Is the US About to Establish a Military Base in Thailand?
In my April column for The Diplomat, I argued that Thailand has downplayed the defense dimension in its tariff negotiations with the United States, so as to dodge tough questions of strategic alignment. And so, 'the moment defense becomes overt in talks with Trump could be the moment Thailand finds itself dangerously cornered.' That gloomy reality is materializing, with Thailand's tariff rate remaining unaltered at 36 percent despite the Pheu Thai government having spent 97 million baht ($2.99 million) on lobbyists, and the state-owned energy conglomerate PTT Group having inked a 20-year agreement with Glenfarne Alaska LNG to import 2 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas annually. Murmurs about security-related concessions are growing louder. But, contrary to my anticipation of arms deals, the buzz centers around the establishment of a U.S. base within the Phang Nga Naval Base on Thailand's southwestern coast. That the buzz refuses to fade regardless of repeated denials from Thai officials reflects two contradictory trends, which are sharpened by today's U.S.-China showdown. On the question of the U.S. basing rights in Thailand, American persistence competes with unyielding Thai resistance. Thailand's stance is not only shaped by its pursuit of strategic equilibrium, but also by its first-hand experience. The heyday of the Thailand-U.S. alliance during the Vietnam War saw a massive American military stationing across seven key bases on Thai soil. The number of U.S. troops in Thailand was 46,300 in 1969, and 27,000 in 1975, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office. While the gradual troop reduction was America's doing, the catalyst for the Thai government to formally request that U.S. combat forces pack up and leave was domestic discontent. The problems around hosting the garrisoned presence of another nation are succinctly captured by the late Thanat Khoman, Thailand's esteemed diplomat and one of ASEAN's founding fathers. These include the erosion of sovereignty, direct or indirect interference in domestic politics, and the disruption of social stability, from psychological unease to the economic shocks triggered by sudden inflows and pullouts of foreign funds. Because these problems are structural in nature, even the closest, friendliest ally with shared objectives can still leave a negative footprint. One might assert further that the closer the alliance, the easier it is to overlook the problems for the host country, particularly the psychological imprint. A case in point is the U.S. deployment of the chemical herbicide Agent Orange to destroy jungle cover and crops in Vietnam. Its long-lasting health implications for the Vietnamese population and American veterans are well-recognized, rightfully so. Presumed exposure among U.S. veterans stationed in Thailand are also acknowledged. The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs specifically acknowledges compensation consideration for veterans serving 'on or near the perimeters' of U.S. bases in Thailand between 1961 and 1975, which suggests that Thai civilians living around those bases should not be ignored in the broader discourse. Yet, to date, there appears to be no real policy or research focused on the possible exposure of Thai civilians. Since the relatively smooth U.S. withdrawal in 1976, Thailand has not hosted a permanent American or other foreign military presence. All U.S. military activities in Thailand – while still substantial, with greater depth and wider scope than Thailand's military engagement with other nations – are now joint or rotational on a case-by-case basis. Uncle Sam has not been discouraged, though, and the prospect of American basing at Thailand's U-Tapao air base is a recurring discussion. An offshore military base in Thai waters is another area of U.S. interest. The request to establish one reportedly dates back to 1997. The reason for the U.S. interest is simple: Thailand's ideal geographical location. A gateway to mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand is a springboard for U.S. power projection into continental Asia, which is currently lacking. Given that U.S. ground-based cruise and ballistic missiles have a reported range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, shots fired at maximum capacity from central or eastern Thailand could threaten all of China's southern provinces (Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong) and the western Xinjiang Region. Furthermore, America's maritime dominance would be underpinned by Thailand's close proximity to both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The rumored U.S. push to secure an institutionalized foothold on Thailand's southwestern coast is most straightforwardly understood in the context of the intensifying competition in the Indian Ocean. The regional littoral power India, and distant powers China and Russia, are all ramping up their naval presence – the latter two in apparent accordance with the classic Mahanian thinking on sea power. Although America has a forward naval presence on Diego Garcia, it is quite a distance away. American access to Singapore, meanwhile, is limited and takes place on a rotational basis under an agreement that runs through 2035. Through Thailand's Phang Nga Naval Base, then, the U.S. would have a firmer hold near the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal. If ever greenlit, a formalized U.S. access to Phang Nga would likely follow the Singapore model. When it comes to Phang Nga, however, Thailand's apprehension goes beyond geopolitical balance and deep-seated sensitivities. Phang Nga is effectively a sister province of Phuket, bound by geographical proximity and a shared economic trajectory, from tin mining in the past to today's tourism. Phang Nga's internationally known resort zone, Khao Lak, is just a 30-minute drive away from the naval base in question. It must also be highlighted that Phang Nga, Phuket, and another neighboring province, Krabi, are undergoing a wellness-focused transformation under the national development agenda. An established foreign military presence in the area is at odds with that development priority. To cite Thanat Khoman once again, 'the criteria for allowing foreign forces to remain should rest on the national interests of the host country, or at least on the concord between the former and those of the foreign party.' The answer to the first criterion is clear, but the second one is murky considering that Thailand remains a formal U.S. ally. Perhaps unnoticed by many, there exists no mutual defense treaty between Bangkok and Washington. Instead, the Thai-U.S. defense alliance draws symbolic significance from the 1954 Manila Pact, which created the now-defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. The alliance is reinforced by subsequent bilateral documents: the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communiqué, the Joint Vision Statements of 2012 and 2020, and the 2022 United States-Thailand Communiqué on Strategic Alliance and Partnership. None of these has binding provisions for basing rights. Ultimately, there is neither legal compulsion nor interest – and thus no political will – on Thailand's part to host an institutionalized U.S. military presence. More viable and desirable ways to boost the Thailand-U.S. alliance would be to expand military education and training, to co-develop or support indigenous defense capabilities, and to focus on strengthening a number of existing joint exercises, whether in bilateral or multilateral formats. The fact that there is no good outcome for Thailand on the trade front makes it even more unlikely that the ruling government would concede basing rights as part of its negotiations with the U.S. While a 36 percent tariff stands to devastate Thai exports and growth rate, Thailand offering zero tariffs on U.S. imports risks opening the floodgates to overwhelming inflows of American goods. This, combined with the already high influx of Chinese goods, will kill Thai-made products. The trickier business is determining the position of the Trump administration, which, on the one hand, has been relentless in bending others to its will. On the other hand, however, setting up a new base in Thailand seems to go against the administration's cost-saving agenda, especially as Trump himself has shown little interest in Southeast Asia. All things considered, an American base in Thailand remains a distant prospect.
Business Wire
23-06-2025
- Business
- Business Wire
Glenfarne and PTT Sign Cooperation Agreement Including Offtake From Alaska LNG
BANGKOK & ANCHORAGE, Alaska & NEW YORK--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Today, Glenfarne Alaska LNG, LLC announced that PTT Public Company Limited ('PTT'), the largest publicly traded company in Thailand, has signed a Cooperation Agreement ('Cooperation Agreement') for strategic participation in the Alaska LNG project, including for the procurement of 2 million tonnes per annum ('MTPA') of LNG from Alaska LNG over a 20-year term. Alaska LNG is held under 8 Star Alaska, LLC, a joint venture between Glenfarne Group, LLC subsidiary, Glenfarne Alaska LNG, LLC ('Glenfarne'), the majority owner and lead developer of Alaska LNG, and the Alaska Gasline Development Corporation. PTT is the publicly traded national oil and gas company of Thailand with a BBB+ investment grade credit rating. "Alaska LNG has now reserved 50 percent of its available third-party LNG offtake capacity to investment grade counterparties, and the project has overwhelming interest from additional counterparties globally.' Share The signing was witnessed by Thailand Permanent Secretary of Energy, Dr. Prasert Sinsukprasert, and the United States Ambassador to Thailand, Robert Godec. The Cooperation Agreement defines the process for Alaska LNG and PTT to move toward definitive agreements for partnership on Alaska LNG, including long term LNG offtake. 'Glenfarne and Alaska LNG are pleased that PTT and the Thai government have realized the strategic security, cost, and stability advantages offered by the Alaska LNG project,' said Adam Prestidge, President of Glenfarne Alaska LNG, LLC. 'With today's agreement and previously announced agreements, Alaska LNG has now reserved 50 percent of its available third-party LNG offtake capacity to investment grade counterparties, and the project has overwhelming interest from additional counterparties globally.' Alaska LNG's economic and shipping fundamentals allow it to deliver LNG into Asia at prices that are lower than Henry Hub pricing from the U.S. Gulf Coast. Additionally, the project's fully permitted status, close proximity, energy security benefits, and robust federal, state, and local stakeholder support further enhance the value proposition for Asian LNG buyers. 'Recent events in the Middle East once again underscore the significant need for Alaska LNG that comes from a secure, stable, and abundant source without traversing through potentially contested waters,' said Brendan Duval, CEO and Founder of Glenfarne. 'This agreement with PTT further symbolizes Alaska LNG's tremendous momentum, well on its way to becoming a reality that will solve Alaska's natural gas shortage while providing jobs, business opportunities, and increased economic development for Alaska residents, businesses, and military facilities.' The Alaska LNG project consists of an 807-mile 42-inch pipeline capable of transporting enough natural gas to meet both Alaska's domestic needs and supply the full 20 MTPA Alaska LNG export facility. Further accelerating the project's execution, the pipeline will be built in two independent, financially viable phases. Phase One will deliver natural gas approximately 765 miles from the North Slope to the Anchorage region. Phase Two adds compression equipment and approximately 42 miles of pipeline under the Cook Inlet to the Alaska LNG Export Facility in Nikiski, which will be constructed concurrently with the LNG export facility. Glenfarne is actively engaged with pipeline contractors and partnering with Worley to complete the final engineering to support a final investment decision ('FID') for the domestic pipeline portion of the project. Glenfarne also continues to progress its strategic partner process for Alaska LNG, including partnerships related to equipment and material supply, services, investment, and customer agreements. Glenfarne Group, LLC is the owner of Texas LNG, which recently announced that its capacity is fully sold out, and an FID is expected later this year. Glenfarne Group, LLC's other affiliates include the largest importer of LNG into Colombia and Magnolia LNG, a late-stage LNG export project located in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Beyond LNG, Glenfarne Group, LLC owns 60 operating assets in the energy sector across five countries. Together with Alaska LNG, its permitted LNG portfolio totals 32.8 MTPA of capacity under development. About Glenfarne Group, LLC Glenfarne Group is a privately held developer, owner, and operator of energy infrastructure assets based in New York, New York and Houston, Texas, with offices in Anchorage, Alaska; Panama City, Panama; Santiago, Chile; Bogota, Colombia; Barcelona, Spain; and Seoul, South Korea. Through its subsidiaries, Glenfarne currently owns and operates over energy infrastructure assets through three core businesses: Global LNG Solutions, Grid Stability, and Renewables. The company's seasoned executives, asset managers, and operators develop, acquire, manage, and operate energy infrastructure assets throughout North and South America. For more information, please visit
Reuters
03-06-2025
- Business
- Reuters
Glenfarne announces over $115 billion strategic partner interest for Alaska LNG project
June 3 (Reuters) - Glenfarne said on Tuesday that its unit, Glenfarne Alaska LNG, has completed the first round of its strategic partner selection process with over 50 companies who have formally expressed interest for over $115 billion of contract value for the Alaska LNG project. The 807-mile 42-inch pipeline project is capable of transporting natural gas to meet both Alaska's domestic needs and supply the full 20 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) Alaska LNG export facility, the company said. Phase One is expected to deliver natural gas about 765 miles from the North Slope to the Anchorage region. Additionally, the Phase Two will add nearly 42 miles of pipeline under the Cook Inlet to the Alaska LNG export facility in Nikiski, which will be constructed simultaneously with the LNG export facility. Glenfarne expects a final investment decision on the domestic portion of the Alaska LNG pipeline by the end of the fourth quarter this year.
