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The Hindu
22-05-2025
- Business
- The Hindu
Analysing poverty levels in India by comparing various surveys
Himanshu et al, 'Poverty Decline in India after 2011–12', The Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 60, Issue No: 15, April 12, 2025 A recent paper has estimated that poverty reduction in India slowed down significantly after 2011-12. While poverty levels of 37% in 2004-05 fell to 22% by 2011-12, it has since fallen only by 18% in 2022-23, the paper finds based on its own calculations. The paper, titled 'Poverty Decline in India after 2011–12: Bigger Picture Evidence', authored by Himanshu of Jawaharlal Nehru University, and Peter Lanjouw and Philipp Schirmer of the Vrije University in Amsterdam, noted that India hasn't had an official poverty estimate since 2011-12. In the absence of an official estimate, a number of unofficial and often contradictory estimates have been made, of which this one is the latest. Three methodologies The paper notes that the various contradictory estimates can essentially be clubbed into three broad buckets based on their methodology. The most common approach, it noted, has been to use alternative socio-economic surveys of the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO), since there are significant comparability issues between the Household Consumption Expenditure Survey (HCES) of 2022-23 and 2011-12. There are no intervening surveys, either. The HCES for 2017-18 was scrapped by the government, citing 'methodological issues'. In the NSSO's 71st round, which covered the January-June 2014 period, the government introduced a consumption expenditure measure that was derived from a single question in the survey called the Usual Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure (UMPCE). This UMPCE was used for all subsequent rounds of the NSSO surveys as well as in the Periodic Labour Force Surveys (PLFS). However, as the authors correctly note in their paper, this measure can't be compared to earlier estimates of consumption because it is based on a single question 'with no clear definition of what it comprises'. According to this method, poverty estimates range between 26-30% for 2019-20. The second approach has been used by the economist Surjit Bhalla and his colleagues in 2022 in a paper in which they used Private Final Consumption Expenditure (PFCE) estimates from the government's National Accounts Statistics (NAS) to derive consumption aggregates after 2011-12. This method basically scaled the consumption expenditure data from the HCES 2011–12 based on the implicit growth rate of PFCE after 2011-12. The third broad approach — and the one used by the authors themselves — is to use survey-to-survey imputation methods. This basically means data gaps in one survey can be filled using information from a related base survey. This method, the authors note, has occasionally been used by World Bank researchers to update the World Bank's Poverty and Inequality Platform (PIP) database. Looking at different surveys This approach is significantly prone to somewhat divergent results, based on the different surveys used to complement each other, but are useful in revealing trends in data. For example, the paper notes that one estimate by David Locke Newhouse and Pallavi Vyas used the 2011-12 HCES and the 2014-15 survey on Consumption of Services and Durables to estimate that poverty in India declined from 22% in 2011-12 to 15% in 2014-15. Similarly, Ifeanyi Nzegwu Edochie and their colleagues in 2022, used the 2017-18 survey on Social Consumption on Health to estimate poverty at 10% for 2017–18, which confirmed the trend that poverty had reduced since 2011-12. In 2025, Sutirtha Sinha Roy and Roy van der Weide used a radical approach to apply the survey-to-survey imputation using a private sector survey. They used the Consumer Pyramid Household Survey (CPHS) for 2019 by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) along with the 2011-12 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). Their estimate was that poverty was around 10% in 2019. Himanshu et al also use this survey-to-survey imputation method. However, the authors note that their strategy differs from previous attempts in three aspects. First, they have used the Tendulkar Committee's poverty lines as opposed to the World Bank's poverty lines. Second, they have used the employment surveys of the NSSO for imputation. The Employment-Unemployment Survey (EUS) is a companion survey to the 2011-12 CES, and is based on similar sampling design and survey implementation procedures. Further, the PLFS, which replaced the EUS in 2017-18, is modelled on the EUS, the authors note. What this essentially means is that the two surveys Himanshu and his colleagues used to impute data are similar in their methodology and parameters, yielding a more accurate fit in the data. Third, the authors note that, unlike the World Bank studies, their own imputation models are estimated at the State level or include State-fixed effects when estimated at the sector level. Their methodology shows that while poverty based on the Tendulkar Committee poverty lines fell sharply between 2004-05 and 2011-12 — from 37% to 22% — it subsequently has fallen only to around 18% by 2022. Based on these estimates, the authors add, the number of poor persons in India fell only slightly since 2011-12, from 250 million persons to about 225 million in 2022–23. Different trends across States State-level trends derived from their methodology suggest differing trends across States over this period. Notably, the authors find that Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous State, seems to have markedly reduced its poverty rate. 'However, in other historically poor States, such as Jharkhand and Bihar, progress was much slower,' they added. 'It is noteworthy that in several of the large central and southern States, such as Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, poverty reduction appears to have stagnated.' Importantly, the authors do acknowledge that 'a full resolution of the present debate' on poverty is unlikely to be forthcoming without new government data that can be compared with previous years' data. However, they also try to back up their findings using other data sources that point to the same conclusions. For example, they noted that the growth of India's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which averaged 6.9% per annum between 2004-05 and 2011-12, slowed to 5.7% between 2011-12 and 2022-23. This, they said, is consistent with a slower decline in poverty reduction after 2011-12. Similarly, they point out that the Wage Rates in Rural India (WRRI) data compiled by the Labour Bureau on real wages points to a slowdown in wage rates. It shows that the annual growth rate of wages fell from 4.13% per year between 2004-05 and 2011-12 to 2.3% per year between 2011-12 and 2022-23. Thirdly, the authors point out that while the absolute number of workers in agriculture declined by 33 million between 2004-05 and 2011-12, and by a further 33 million by 2017-18, this trend has reversed since then with 68 million workers being added to the agriculture sector since 2017–18. One consequence of the rising workforce in agriculture, the authors point out, has been the decline in the growth of agricultural productivity in recent years. Lower productivity leads to lower wages, which leads to higher poverty levels. This paper is hardly going to be the last word on poverty estimates, with many more sure to follow. However, as the authors themselves conclude, there's more than enough evidence to show that poverty reduction efforts need to be accelerated.
Mint
01-05-2025
- Business
- Mint
Himanshu: India needs official poverty data for effective policymaking
Last week, the World Bank released its latest estimates of poverty for India. According to its Poverty and Equity Briefs , poverty in India declined from 16.2% in fiscal year 2011-12 to 2.3% in 2022-23, with 171 million people lifted out of it in 11 years—or 15.5 million persons per year. These estimates are based on its $2.15-per-day poverty line used to measure extreme poverty. These numbers differ from the World Bank's estimates of poverty using the same $2.15 poverty line on its Poverty and Inequality Platform (PIP). Indian poverty, according to this, was at 22.9% in 2011-12 and fell to 13% in 2021-22, with the number of poor falling by 107 million, or 10.7 million persons per year. Not just the level of poverty, the extent of its decline also varies vastly. Part of the reason for the Bank's sharp downward revision in poverty was its use of the recently-released 2022-23 Household Consumer Expenditure Survey (HCES). However, its PIP estimates for 2021-22 were made through a survey-to-survey imputation using the 'consumer pyramids' data of the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy. The World Bank acknowledges problems in using HCES 2022-23 data for poverty and inequality measurements, given the substantial changes it underwent, but it has still used it. This is strange. The last time it found data on consumption expenditure non-comparable with past data was in 1999-00, and it did not use it for poverty estimation. None of its reports has Indian poverty estimates for 1999-00. The use of HCES 2022-23 is also responsible for the downward revision of the Bank's poverty estimates for 2011-12, the data of which is not controversial. Its new estimates as well as the PIP ones use the 2011-12 consumption survey of the NSSO and the same poverty line of $2.15. The downward revision is a result of a shift from the earlier estimates of consumption expenditure in 2011-12 that were based on a uniform recall period (URP) of 30 days to the modified mixed recall period (MMRP), which uses a mix of 7-day, 30-day and 365-day recall periods. These two sets of estimates are not comparable, with MMRP estimates pegging consumption expenditure significantly higher than URP estimates. As a result, using the same poverty line, estimated poverty using the MMRP method is only 16.2% in 2011-12, far less than 22.9% estimated earlier for the same year. The fact that there are now two World Bank estimates of poverty using the same poverty line is problematic in the context of assessing India's poverty reduction. It also raises basic questions over the World Bank's methodology of estimating poverty for countries with non-comparable data on consumption expenditure. The appropriate method would have been to use a poverty line that takes into account changes in the recall period such that the poverty estimates remain the same. After all, the number of poor in a country is a given fact and a methodology shift should not result in such a different poverty ratio. But even with the changes, both these World Bank estimates suggest a sharp deceleration in poverty reduction efforts. By its estimates, India managed to lift 175 million persons out of poverty between 2004-05 and 2011-12 using the same $2.15 poverty line. So an annual 25 million persons were lifted out of poverty. This declined after 2011-12 to only 10.7 million per year, if we go by the PIP estimates, and 15.5 million per year by the new estimates. While there are issues with the Bank's poverty estimates that stem from comparability and its choice of poverty line, as well as deflators and the implicit inter-temporal inflation used for arriving at rupee-equivalent poverty lines, these have never been relevant for policy analysis in India. India has been a pioneer in defining national poverty lines since independence. These have been used by several other countries to define and estimate poverty in their own countries. Unfortunately, there is no official poverty line for India currently, despite the Rangarajan panel that was set up to look into poverty estimation having submitted its report in 2014. Although there is consumption data available for 2022-23 and 2023-24, issues surrounding its robustness and comparability with earlier survey rounds warrant setting up a new committee to examine the data and suggest a national poverty line. With a significant proportion of India's population still living in poverty, its estimation simply cannot be left to international agencies. The country needs an official poverty estimate to aid policymaking and determine poverty trends after 2011-12. The author is associate professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University and visiting fellow at the Centre de Sciences Humaines, New Delhi.
The Wire
30-04-2025
- Business
- The Wire
World Bank Report on India's Incredible Poverty Reduction Isn't Credible
The World Bank released a poverty and equity brief for India on April 22 which began with the following text: Over the past decade, India has significantly reduced poverty. Extreme poverty (living on less than $2.15 per day) fell from 16.2 percent in 2011-12 to 2.3 percent in 2022-23, lifting 171 million people above this line. This would of course be fantastic news, if true. However, for anyone even vaguely familiar with the poverty numbers, the 2.3% headcount ratio for extreme poverty seems a little too good to be true. Furthering the confusion, the World Bank had significantly different estimates in its October 2024 brief: Following strong post-COVID-19 growth, averaging 8 percent, extreme poverty in India declined by 2 percentage points. In FY 2021/22, 44 percent of the population remained below the lower-middle-income poverty line ($3.65/day 2017 PPP), and 12.9 percent were below the extreme poverty line ($2.15/day 2017 PPP). Under the assumption that both of these reports are accurate, the 10.6% poverty reduction, from 12.9% in 2021-22 to 2.3% in 2022-23, would surely count as a world record. In the absence of a vastly underreported magical showering of wealth upon 140 million-plus people in the lowest income brackets in India, it is natural to ask what is behind the sudden change in the numbers reported by the World Bank during the last six months. The mundane answer is a switchover in the methodology for reporting poverty estimates for India. To understand the magnitude of the difference, we have to delve into some details and controversies surrounding poverty estimation in India. Despite breathless headlines about World Bank data endorsing Prime Minister Narendra Modi's claim, the first thing to understand is that the underlying data in the 2025 report come from the Indian government's Household Consumption Expenditure Survey (HCES) for 2022-2023. The World Bank only calculates poverty statistics from survey data, so ascribing results to World Bank data is misleading. Beginning in the 1950s, the Indian government used to conduct a Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) every five years, which formed the basis for poverty related calculations. In 2019, the BJP government decided not to release 2017-2018 CES data, claiming that there were 'data quality' issues, while deflecting insinuations that adverse findings were the reason for its decision. Due to this gap in the data, economists came up with creative ways of estimating poverty ratios. Two papers published in April 2022, the first by Bhalla, Bhasin, and Virmani (BBV), and the second by Roy and van der Wiede (RW), used very different techniques, and came up with dramatically different poverty headcount ratio estimates for 2019-2020 of just under 2% and 10% respectively. Briefly, BBV used national accounts statistics (basically, those used for GDP calculations) to scale up the consumption expenditure distribution from 2011-2012. On the other hand, RW used an alternative survey, the Consumer Pyramids Household Survey (CPHS), conducted by Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), a private entity. The two approaches, and the drastically different results they generated, set off a lively debate that continues to generate criticism and alternative proposals. In its October 2022 brief, the World Bank decided to adopt the RW technique. This was unusual because of its reliance on a survey conducted by a private entity, even though it had the virtue of producing a more plausible poverty headcount ratio. In April 2025, the World Bank has now switched back to using the Indian government's survey, the 2022-2023 HCES. Before thinking about the credibility of the results, it is useful to get a sense of the rupee incomes associated with various poverty lines used by the World Bank. For the conversion, we need to use the purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factor, which differs significantly from current exchange rates. The interpretation of the PPP conversion factor of Rs 20.15/$ is that, given different cost structures in India and the US, people can obtain the same level of goods and services for Rs 20.15 in India that they can in the US for $1. World Bank Poverty Thresholds (PPP conversion factor ₹20.15/$) Per person per day (2017 PPP) Per person per month Family of four per month Extreme Poverty Line $2.15 Rs 1,300 Rs 5,199 Lower-middle-income Country Poverty Line $3.65 Rs 2,206 Rs 8,826 Upper-middle-income Country Poverty line $6.85 Rs 4,141 Rs 16,563 Source: World Bank; table a ssumes 30 days per month. So, the 2.3% headcount ratio in the April 2025 brief refers to families living on less than Rs 5,200 per month. This is an absurdly low level of consumption. The very same World Bank report mentions that if we look at the $3.65 per person per day threshold, the poverty rate is 28.1%, which unfortunately is not as headline friendly. Economist S. Subramanian has provided a thorough analysis of the 2022-2023 HCES data. He computes a headcount ratio of 3% for 2022-2023 using the Tendulkar Committee poverty line, updated to 2022-2023 prices, a number that is comparable to the number in the 2025 World Bank brief. This rules out the possibility that the World Bank calculation methodology is the reason for the low poverty ratio. Very low poverty lines – which are clearly useful devices to arrive at low poverty headcount ratios – are not confined to the World Bank alone. India's poverty line based upon the 2009 Tendulkar committee recommendation has been long criticised for being too low. The 2014 Rangarajan committee recommended higher thresholds, but those were not adopted. These thresholds, updated to 2022-2023 prices, are shown below. India (2022-2023 values) Per person per month Family of four per month Rural Urban Rural Urban All India Tendulkar Committee Poverty Line Rs 1,500 Rs 1,866 Rs 6,000 Rs 7,464 Rs 6,527 Rangarajan Committee Poverty Line Rs 1,794 Rs 2,720 ₹7,176 ₹10,880 ₹8,509 All India values calculated by author as weighted averages of rural and urban numbers assuming 64% of the population is rural. Source: S. Subramanian There are plenty of reasons to find the 2.3% headcount ratio to be implausible. Briefly, the steep drop of 14 percentage points in 11 years is difficult to digest given several macroeconomic events and indicators in this period. There were large shocks to the economy: the infliction of demonetisation and the affliction of the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result of the pandemic and lockdown induced contraction, there was a massive loss of employment and significant reverse (urban-to-rural) migration. Agriculture's share of output has remained more or less constant for the last two decades, and manufacturing's share has declined, so service sector jobs and wages have to be responsible for improvements in standards of living. This, of course, may have occurred for people in well-paying professions like software development, finance, health care etc. but it is hard to see it having an impact on the incomes of millions of people close to the poverty threshold, especially in rural India. Post-pandemic consumption expenditure patterns were reported to be 'K-shaped' (high-end goods selling well, consumer goods sales flattening or declining), indicating stressed budgets among lower income groups. Urban unemployment, according to the government's quarterly survey data, averaged around 7% in 2022-2023. Given all this, what was the source of the incomes necessary for large scale poverty reduction? These are all issues that are easy to obfuscate behind opaque data, bad faith argumentation, shifting goalposts, technical skullduggery and relentless propaganda aided by pliant media and a chronically attention-deficit plagued public. So, here's the simple takeaway: if you choose a very low poverty line, you get a very low poverty rate. Not too surprising that about 2% to 3% of the population lives in households with income levels of less than Rs 5,200 per month.
The Print
30-04-2025
- Business
- The Print
Thali has gotten more expensive since 2020—2.3% of Indians can't afford 2 veg meals a day
With the release of the Household Consumption Expenditure Survey (HCES) 2023–24, we now have updated data based on actual household-level expenditure. This allows us to assess food affordability more accurately, not just by price, but by what households are actually able to spend. Using the same methodology and thali composition as outlined in the Economic Survey 2019–20, three key findings emerge. In the original Thalinomics, the thali components included 300g of cereals (rice and wheat), 150g of vegetables, and 60g of pulses (or meat, egg, or fish for non-vegetarian thalis), based on the 2011 dietary guidelines for Indians by the National Institute of Nutrition. Prices also included cooking oil, fuel (LPG or firewood), and commonly used spices. This provided a consistent, price-based estimate of the cost of a basic, nutritious meal. The Economic Survey 2019–20 introduced Thalinomics to track food affordability through the cost of a basic plate of food, or thali. It showed that the average price of a vegetarian thali declined between 2015–16 and 2019–20, suggesting improved access to meals across the country. Also read: Cost of a veg Indian thali has jumped 42% since 2015. That too without curd, tea, and fruits Thali prices have risen The original Thalinomics from the Economic Survey 2019-20 estimated a national decline in the price of a vegetarian thali from about Rs 27 in 2015–16 to Rs 24 in 2019–20. In contrast, non-vegetarian thali prices rose steadily over the same period—from around Rs 35 to nearly Rs 38 by 2019–20. Using unit value data from HCES 2023–24, we estimate thali prices for each state. Compared to the national average reported in 2019–20, current prices are significantly higher. Current rural vegetarian thali prices range from: Rs 25–Rs 28 in Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan Rs 32–Rs 34 in Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh Rs 45–Rs 51 in Puducherry, Lakshadweep, and Andaman & Nicobar Islands Current rural non-vegetarian thalis cost: Rs 33–Rs 36 in UP, Odisha, Bihar Rs 50–Rs 53 in Mizoram, Puducherry, and Andaman & Nicobar Islands These increases reverse the earlier trend and reflect post-pandemic inflation in food items beyond just cereals. Compared to the Economic Survey's 2019–20 average of Rs 24 for a veg thali, this represents a significant increase. Who can afford two meals a day? To measure affordability, we compare the monthly cost of two thalis per person per day (for 30 days) to the monthly per capita food expenditure reported in HCES. A household is considered food-unaffordable if its per capita expenditure is less than this benchmark. Key findings: 4.7 per cent of households cannot afford two non-veg meals per day. cannot afford two non-veg meals per day. 2.3 per cent cannot afford two vegetarian meals. cannot afford two vegetarian meals. In Jharkhand , these numbers rise to 18 per cent (non-veg) and 11 per cent (veg) . In rural Jharkhand, the non-veg thali unaffordability reaches 20.4 per cent. , these numbers rise to and . In rural Jharkhand, the non-veg thali unaffordability reaches High unaffordability is also observed in Odisha, Meghalaya, and Manipur. This indicates that a basic plate of food is still out of reach for many low-income households, particularly in eastern and northeastern states. This map shows that thali unaffordability is concentrated in eastern, central, and northeastern India—states with lower per capita gross state domestic product and more nutritional vulnerability. Many underspend on nutrition Affordability does not imply nutritional adequacy. Many households that can afford two meals a day still spend less than what is required to consume a nutritionally balanced thali, as defined in the Economic Survey's dietary assumptions. By comparing actual food expenditure to the cost of a 'healthy' thali consumed twice a day, we find: 46 per cent of Indian households spend less than what is needed for a basic, nutritious diet. spend less than what is needed for a basic, nutritious diet. In states like Jharkhand, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh , this figure exceeds 60 per cent. , this figure exceeds Even in states like Karnataka and Maharashtra, over 40 per cent of households fall below this nutritional spending threshold. This highlights the prevalence of nutrient-poor diets, even in households that consume enough calories. Address affordability The original Thalinomics highlighted falling food prices. But the updated analysis using HCES 2023–24 suggests that food access remains limited for a significant share of Indian households. Prices have increased, affordability gaps persist, and nutritional under-consumption is widespread. Food security policy must now go beyond cereals. There is an urgent need to address affordability and access to pulses, vegetables, cooking oils, and fuel, which are central to a balanced diet. A thali is more than a price tag — it reflects whether citizens can eat adequately, regularly, and with dignity. The author is Assistant Professor of Economics and Sustainability, IMT Ghaziabad. Views are personal. (Edited by Theres Sudeep)
The Print
22-04-2025
- Health
- The Print
Prisoners eat healthier than one-third of Indian households. Eating defines the new poor
This comparison is not intended as a direct equivalence but serves to highlight the limited food spending capacity of a substantial proportion of households. It also raises important questions regarding the adequacy and nutritional quality of diets across different population segments. The 2022–23 HCES dataset is used as it ensures temporal consistency with other major recent surveys, such as the National Family Health Survey (NFHS, 2019–21). It also captures key post-COVID trends in evolving food expenditure patterns. While newer data (2023–24) may exist, the corresponding inmate food expenditure figures for that period are not yet publicly available. Data from the Household Consumption Expenditure Survey (HCES) 2022–23 shows that approximately 32 per cent of households report monthly per capita food expenditure lower than Rs 1,512 per month. That's the average amount the government spent monthly on food per prison inmate, according to a Lok Sabha reply by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2021. Around a third of Indian households spend less on food per person than the government spends feeding a prisoner. Also Read: Why regular, updated dietary guidelines are important as non-communicable diseases rise in India What the numbers show The Rs 1,512 benchmark is derived from a parliamentary response indicating that in 2020–21, the government spent Rs 1,004.98 crore on food for 5,54,034 prison inmates. This amounts to approximately Rs 1,512 per inmate per month. When compared with household food spending captured by the HCES 2022-23, it is observed that roughly one-third of households fall below this threshold. Importantly, this includes: Over 50 per cent of households covered under Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY), a scheme providing subsidised foodgrains to the poorest of the poor About 39 per cent under the Below Poverty Line (BPL) category. It is important to note that these figures may be somewhat overestimated in terms of deprivation, as many of these households receive subsidised food through the Public Distribution System (PDS) or free food items from other sources. The HCES methodology accounts for this by imputing the value of free food—estimating how much a household would have spent if those items were purchased at market prices. However, purchases made at discounted rates under PDS are not imputed in the same way, meaning that subsidised purchases can still result in low reported food expenditure—even when households receive sufficient quantities. Also, PDS mostly covers only essential items such as rice, wheat, coarse grains, pulses, sugar, salt, and edible oil. It does not include nutritionally important foods like fruits, vegetables, dairy, eggs, and fish. These items are often costlier, and less expenditure on food suggests that for lower-income households, it is more difficult to access them. Even if we ignore households receiving PDS benefits, it is noteworthy that nearly 24 per cent of Above Poverty Line (APL) households also reported monthly food spending below Rs 1,512, underscoring the broader issue of limited food expenditure across socio-economic categories. It can be seen that around 30 per cent of rural APL card holders are spending less on food compared to the government's spending on prison inmates' food. Beyond quantity: What are households eating? This pattern of low food expenditure reflects a broader, ongoing shift in household consumption. The share of food in total household spending has been steadily declining—in rural India, it dropped from 63 per cent in 1993 to 46 per cent in 2022. But it's not just this. The composition of food expenditure is also shifting in troubling ways. Spending on processed, packaged, and non-nutritive items is rising, even as spending on nutritious foods remains stagnant or falls. Let's look at the shift: In urban India, more than one-fourth of the food budget now goes to beverages, snacks, and packaged items. In rural areas, that share has tripled over the past three decades. This processed food surge may be driven by convenience, aspiration, or aggressive marketing—but it may be displacing protein-rich, micronutrient-dense foods. The hidden hunger line India's official poverty line has traditionally been linked to minimum caloric intake. However, current expenditure patterns point to a different concern. Not only are many households spending less on food overall, they are gravitating toward low-nutrition, processed items. This shift is especially pronounced in the bottom deciles. For many households, chips replace fruits, sugary tea replaces milk, and biscuits substitute for meals. This is what some researchers call 'status calories'—food chosen not for health, but for social image or convenience. As a result, even if caloric needs may be met, dietary quality and nutritional adequacy remain compromised. This concern is reflected in persistent child health indicators. Despite some improvement between the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) rounds of 2015–16 and 2019–21, the decline in undernutrition among children under five has been limited, while the proportion of overweight children has risen from 2.1 to 3.4 per cent. The table below highlights this trend: Also Read: Food makes up less than half of an Indian household's monthly bill, a first since Independence Poor, but not in the old way India's progress in poverty reduction is well recognised. However, the HCES findings show that significant variations in food expenditure and nutritional quality persist across households. Ensuring access not just to enough food, but to nutritionally adequate and diverse diets, remains a key development priority—particularly as consumption patterns evolve and new forms of food insecurity emerge, both within and beyond traditionally defined poverty groups. The author is an assistant professor of Economics and Sustainability at the Institute of Management Technology, Ghaziabad. Views are personal. (Edited by Asavari Singh)
