29-05-2025
‘Not Today' — Taiwan strives to give Xi Jinping second thoughts about attacking its island neighbour
There is a widespread belief in Taiwan that Chinese President Xi Jinping wants to invade Taiwan by 2027, the centenary of the creation of the Chinese army, and the year that Xi's current term will end.
China's President Xi Jinping wakes up every day, looks at himself in the mirror as he shaves and says, 'Okay, I want to be the greatest emperor of China. I want to conquer Taiwan. Okay, it is my job. It is my will. It is the reason [for] my existence.
'I want to conquer Taiwan. But today is not a good day. I cannot do that.'
That, at least, is the scene in Xi's bathroom that Taiwan's Deputy Foreign Minister François Chihchung Wu imagines. The vision animates Taiwan's Not Today Policy, which he says is to keep ensuring Xi has second thoughts every day about the wisdom of invading China's tiny island neighbour, which it regards as a mere 'renegade province of the People's Republic of China (PRC).
The Not Today policy largely rests on military deterrence and strong military alliances, especially with the United States, and persuading the world that Taiwan is indispensable.
Walking the streets of Taipei, it is hard to imagine why any deterrent is needed. One senses no fear of imminent attack. And why would anyone want to destroy this country of 23 million friendly, vibrant, industrious people and its flourishing, sophisticated economy, the 22nd largest in the world, with a nominal GDP of $814.44-billion, according to the International Monetary Fund?
A recent survey by Taiwan's Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) found that while 60% of Taiwanese believe China is the most important threat facing Taiwan (versus energy shortage, the plummeting birth rate, and so on), only one quarter expected an invasion during the next five years.
Liang Wen-chieh, Deputy Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, says the Taiwanese people have been living under military threat since the country was founded in 1949, and so have grown used to it. This, though, is a double-edged sword, he says. On the good side, it allows people to 'dedicate themselves to the economy'. It also avoids causing public alarm, says INDSR research fellow Ming-shih Shen.
But Liang also suggests it has made the Taiwanese complacent, though the military authorities take the threat very seriously and remain on full alert. The Mainland Affairs Council has a mandate to negotiate with the mainland. But Beijing has terminated talks.
Ordinary Taiwanese tell you that the extent of war preparedness is basically that if the government sounds an alarm, they must stay indoors until further notice. The government did, however, conduct a whole-of-society exercise in March in Tainan city, rehearsing medical and other responses to an invasion.
Xi's perceived deadline
But if ordinary people seem a bit blasé, one gathers from officials, journalists and analysts a widespread belief that Xi would like to invade Taiwan by 2027.
Wu says that is because 2027 will be the centenary of the creation of the Chinese army, and Xi wants to use the occasion to demonstrate that it has become the best army in the world, by conquering Taiwan. Liang, on the other hand, believes 2027 is the key date because that is when Xi's current term as president will end. 'So in order to stay in power, Xi will have to possibly use force against Taiwan.'
Certainly, China has been amping up the military pressure lately. Last year, it conducted two major military exercises around Taiwan. In April this year, a third called 'Strait Thunder' was conducted with 38 naval ships, including an aircraft carrier strike group.
China's military tactics included live-fire drills into the East China Sea. A Chinese military spokesperson said the drills involved 'precision strikes on simulated targets of key ports and energy facilities'.
China also launched scores of sorties by its warplanes into Taiwan's airspace. Taiwanese officials say these sorties have increased from 380 in 2020 to 3,080 last year, with a likely increase this year.
The intensified military exercises are one reason why some believe the long-feared Chinese attack against Taiwan could be 'closer than you think', as The Economist predicted in its cover story earlier this month.
It also posited that greater uncertainty about whether the isolationist and unpredictable Donald Trump would rush to Taiwan's defence and Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te's failure to decisively raise defence spending (because of opposition from the China-appeasing KMT party which has more votes in parliament than Lai's Democratic Progress Party) could very well persuade Xi, if not to invade, then at least to strangle the island into submission by a blockade or economic sanctions and quarantines.
Washington 'ambiguity'
The US has long pursued a policy of 'strategic ambiguity' towards Taiwan. This means not explicitly declaring that it would come to Taiwan's defence.
The idea is to discourage Taiwan from declaring formal independence from China, which would almost certainly provoke an immediate attack. But ex-President Joe Biden nonetheless made it clear that the US would defend Taiwan.
Trump has been far more ambiguous. Da-nien Liu, deputy director at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research in Taipei, told visiting international journalists last week that he was 'shocked' when Trump declared recently, after the US and China ended their trade war, that this truce would be good for 'peace and unification'. Liu said that made Taiwanese suspect that Trump would not defend them.
Liang observes that Taiwan is still trying very hard to understand the real attitude of the Trump administration towards Taiwan and China. Taipei is concerned that Trump 'is actually turning the past allies into foes', referring to his threats to annex Canada, for example
On the other hand, Taipei notes that top US officials such as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio are 'more aligned with the Biden administration' (ie ready to defend Taiwan).
Taiwan's pillars of deterrence
Deputy Foreign Minister Wu, however, says that despite all the indications that Xi wishes to invade by 2027, this will not happen because of Taiwan's 'Not Today Policy'. He says it rests on three pillars of deterrence.
The first is that Taiwan is increasing its defence spending significantly. It now constitutes more than 16% of the national budget – greater, proportionately, than that of the US, whose defence spending constitutes 12% of its budget. Wu says Lai has already announced that defence spending will increase from 2.45% to 3% of GDP – or 20% of the national budget.
The second pillar is the deterrence provided by Taiwan's military allies, notably the US. He says that the US, Germany, France, Canada, Italy, Japan, Turkiye, Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands have all sent warships to Taiwan in recent years. For Japan, that was the first time since World War 2.
That in part is because about half of global trade passes through the narrow Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and China, and these countries don't want that thoroughfare to be interrupted by war.
The third pillar, Wu says, is that Taiwan is trying hard to show the world that it is vital to the international community and so should be allowed to join international organisations.
Wu notes that Taiwan alerted the World Health Organisation (WHO) as early as December 2019 to the Covid-19 pandemic brewing in China.
The WHO ignored the warning because Taiwan was not a member, allowing the pandemic to take off before it was eventually officially acknowledged.
To these deterrents, the 'silicon shield' should be added: Taiwan's global superiority in manufacturing semiconductors, or advanced computer chips, which are vital to almost every industry, including motor vehicles and weapons.
Wu says about 60% of all semiconductors and 95% of advanced chips are made in Taiwan, while 100% of the even more sophisticated chips are manufactured in his country. He says most of the most advanced chips in America's frontline fighter jet, the F-35, are made in Taiwan.
Last week, many Western nations attended the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain Forum in Taipei, underscoring the importance of the country to their hi-tech manufacturing industries.
For Wu and Liang, though, the dominant factor determining whether China will invade Taiwan 'is a clear calculation on whether they can secure victory rapidly, before interference from the US', as Liang says.
'So now we know that the reason why Putin decided to invade Ukraine was because he thought that he could take Ukraine and end the war within seven to 10 days.
'And if China thinks this way, then there is a high possibility that there would be a war.
'So what we are trying to do is to prevent China from thinking this way.'
China justified its recent military drills off Taiwan as 'a stern warning to and powerful deterrent against separatist forces agitating for Taiwan independence.'
Some still believe that the ruling Democratic Progress Party is more likely to provoke a Chinese attack than a government led by the opposition KMT, which is less vocal about independence.
Liang disagrees. He notes that while Xi's predecessors were content to leave Taiwan alone as long as it did not declare independence, Xi is very different, because he is striving to achieve the unification of the two Chinas, regardless.
Asymmetrical warfare
Ming-shih Shen, research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, says that Taiwan is no match for China militarily, even though Taipei is trying to upgrade rapidly by acquiring more modern fighter jets and other weapons. But he says Taiwan is pursuing a strategy of asymmetrical warfare, concentrating on defensive weaponry such as anti-aircraft, anti-ship and other missiles, drones and submarines.
He notes that China is also still too short of vital equipment such as landing craft, and its marine corps is too weak to conduct a full-scale invasion now.
Like most analysts, he believes that Taiwan's reliance on outside energy sources is its Achilles heel. That would probably enable it to withstand an invasion or blockade for no more than two weeks. However, he notes that Taiwan has signed a supply contract with a US company to supply liquid natural gas to Taiwan.
'If the United States can send its coast guard or navy ships to protect this liquid gas ship, no problem.'
Otherwise, he also says plans are under way to build a gas pipeline from Alaska via Japan to Taiwan.
There are a lot of ifs in all of that, but Wu nonetheless concludes that 'with this Not Today Policy, 2027 will not be the year that China will be able to conquer Taiwan, even if they want to'. DM
