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HKFP
8 hours ago
- Politics
- HKFP
Children of non-local talent can apply for subsidised university places only after 2-year residency in Hong Kong
The Hong Kong government has issued a new definition of 'local students' in tertiary education, saying that children of non-local talent can only be eligible for subsidised local tuition fees after residing in the city for at least two years. According to a government statement on Thursday, as a transitional arrangement, the residency requirement will be set at one year for the 2027-28 academic year, while the two-year requirement will be implemented starting from the 2028-29 academic year. Currently, a dependant visa or entry permit holder who was under 18 when first issued such a visa or permit is considered a local student and, therefore, can enjoy subsidised tuition fees at Hong Kong's public universities. A government spokesperson cited long-standing concerns that some students did not live in Hong Kong but applied for government-subsidised student places at universities funded by the University Grants Committee. 'To clarify the eligibility criteria for government-subsidised post-secondary student places and subsidies, and to ensure the proper use of public funds, the Education Bureau… considers it necessary for dependant children to reside in Hong Kong for two years before becoming eligible for government-subsidised post-secondary student places,' the spokesperson said in the statement. Under the new rule, to be eligible for local tuition fees, an applicant is required to provide proof that they are enrolled as a full-time student in a school offering a formal curriculum in Hong Kong for the two-year period ending on May 31 in the year in which their respective programme begins. Alternatively, they can obtain a record from the Immigration Department showing that they have not been absent from the city for a maximum of 90 days in each year of the two-year period. In addition, holders of full-time employment visas or entry permits for various admission schemes will no longer be eligible for government-subsidised post-secondary student places. Secretary for Education Christine Choi said in January that the government was reviewing the definition of 'local students' in tertiary education. The announcement came after the government issued hundreds of thousands of work visas. Expanded schemes Hong Kong introduced a new talent scheme, called the Top Talent Pass Scheme (TTPS), in late 2022 and also expanded various existing immigration programmes to attract talent to the city, following a wave of emigration from the city. With a lower threshold than other programmes, the TTPS contributes to a major share of work visas in Hong Kong. As of December 2024, the Immigration Department had approved over 270,000 work visas under various schemes over the past two years. One-third of them – or more than 90,000 visas – were TTPS visas. Three-quarters of the overall work visa holders were from mainland China, official figures showed. Under the TTPS, the share of mainland Chinese was much higher: a whopping 95 per cent. TTPS visa holders can apply for dependant visas for their spouses or unmarried children under 18 years old. A group of Hong Kong parents signed an online petition last year urging the government to review the definition of 'local students,' saying that some students did not even live in Hong Kong before applying for government-subsidised university places, local media reported.
Focus Malaysia
11 hours ago
- Politics
- Focus Malaysia
Of flying passports and counter-settings
THE integrity of a nation's border is fundamental to its sovereignty, security, and reputation. In Malaysia, however, recent revelations have highlighted troubling systemic vulnerabilities within immigration and border enforcement practices particularly through covert and corrupt mechanisms known as 'passport terbang' and 'counter-setting'. These practices not only compromise lawful migration processes but also facilitate serious transnational crimes, including human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants. 'Flying passport' (or 'pasport terbang' in Malay) refers to the unauthorised practice of submitting a passport to immigration authorities for renewal, visa endorsement, or extension without the physical presence of the passport holder. This contravenes official procedures which mandate in-person attendance for identity verification, often through biometric means. In many of these cases, passports are collected and transported by intermediaries on behalf of the holder in exchange for illicit fees. Counter-setting, on the other hand, involves immigration officers at entry or exit points such as Kuala Lumpur International Airport intentionally manning specific counters to facilitate the unlawful passage of foreign nationals without proper documentation or scrutiny. These activities are typically arranged through clandestine networks and are executed in exchange for bribes. Though seemingly procedural deviations, both practices signify entrenched corruption within parts of the immigration system, threatening not only Malaysia's border control efficacy but also the country's international standing in law enforcement, anti-trafficking efforts, and governance. A critical enabler of these corrupt practices is the role played by a wide range of intermediaries including employment agents, taxi drivers, freelance 'runners', and even certain members of airport staff. In trafficking-related cases, passports belonging to victims are often seized by traffickers and handed to these intermediaries, who in turn bribe immigration personnel to process renewals or extensions without the victim's awareness or consent. This shadow network enables the formal legalisation of an illegal or exploitative presence, allowing trafficked persons to remain in the country with official documentation while being subjected to labour or sexual exploitation. Victims are thus rendered invisible to protective institutions, as their legal status on paper conceals the coercion and abuse they endure in practice. These practices raise pressing legal and policy concerns because they violate several laws such as Section 55E of the Immigration Act 1959/63, which criminalises harbouring or employing undocumented migrants. It also contravene the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007, particularly where visa fraud is used to facilitate continued exploitation. In addition, these practices undermine the standard operating procedures of the Immigration Department which mandate physical presence and biometric identity confirmation, and risk compromising Malaysia's compliance with international legal instruments, including the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and the UN Trafficking Protocol. Moreover, these practices significantly erode public confidence in enforcement agencies, perpetuate a culture of impunity, and hinder the nation's efforts to combat organised crime and protect vulnerable populations. To address these challenges, a multi-pronged strategy is required which targets both systemic weaknesses and individual accountability such as mandating biometric and in-person verification for all immigration procedures. First, strict enforcement of in-person biometric verification for all passport, visa, and permit applications. Digital systems should automatically flag and suspend applications submitted without such verification. Second, implement real-time surveillance and tamper-proof digital logs. In this instance, it would be useful to install CCTV with live monitoring at immigration counters and visa-processing units. All entry and visa transactions should be recorded in tamper-proof systems accessible only to authorised personnel, with audit trails built in. Third, identify, blacklist, and prosecute facilitators and middlemen involved in these activities. In this instance, it is recommended to maintain a registry of blacklisted intermediaries suspected or convicted of engaging in corrupt immigration practices. Fourth, enforcement action should extend to all parties involved including agents, syndicates, and complicit civilians. Fifth, enforcement of a system of regular staff rotations across immigration offices and entry points to disrupt entrenched corrupt networks and prevent collusion between officers and external actors. Sixth, strengthen awareness among foreign nationals who are residing or working in Malaysia. They should be educated on lawful immigration procedures, the risks of using unauthorised intermediaries, and the legal consequences of engaging in document fraud. Multilingual outreach materials should also be made readily available. Flying passport and counter-setting are not mere administrative lapses but are manifestations of systemic corruption that threaten the rule of law, embolden transnational crime, and endanger human security. Malaysia's commitment to border integrity must be matched by the political will to root out these practices and strengthen the accountability of its immigration enforcement framework. Just as immigration officers are duty-bound to uphold the law, foreign nationals must also respect and comply with Malaysia's immigration regulations. Any attempt to bypass due process whether through bribery, fraud, or intermediary collusion undermines the legitimacy of the nation's legal system and puts both individuals and the broader public at risk. Malaysia stands at a critical juncture: ensuring that its borders are not only efficient and accessible but also just, secure, and corruption-free. ‒ July 31, 2025 Dr Haezreena Begum Abdul Hamid is a Criminologist and Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Malaya. The views expressed are solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Focus Malaysia. Main image: Unsplash/Nahrizul Adib Kadri
The Star
a day ago
- General
- The Star
Autogate glitch exposes system weaknesses
AT about noon on July 18, more than 200 Immigration autogates nationwide suddenly went offline for foreigners, causing chaos in almost all major entry points whether air, sea or land. For more than 24 hours, over 500,000 foreign passport holders, unable to clear Immigration using the autogate facility, were forced to undergo slow and time-consuming manual screenings. Since June 1 last year, visitors from 63 countries, as well as diplomats stationed in Malaysia and their families, have been eligible to use the autogate facility for quicker clearance. The disruption did not affect Malaysian passport holders, who continued to use the autogates without issues, while the QR code-based MyBorderPass system also operated smoothly. The Star was the first media outlet to report on the chaos. Images of long queues at major gateways such as KL International Airport Terminals 1 and 2, and Johor's Bangunan Sultan Iskandar (BSI) Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) and Sultan Abu Bakar CIQ (KSAB), circulated widely. Some of the visitors at BSI were forced to queue up for more than five hours to clear Immigration because weekends are the busiest with many Singaporeans coming into the country for food, leisure and shopping. Hundreds of visitors who were unable to endure the long waits, mainly the elderly, decided to turn back to Singapore. At the BSI complex, there are 39 autogates for exit and 29 for entry, while KSAB has 12 in operation. Hundreds of immigration officers nationwide were forced to work long hours during the weekend to clear the backlog of visitors. A large crowd waiting to clear immigration at Bangunan Sultan Iskandar CIQ on July 19 following the autogate system failure. — Filepic Malaysian Border Control and Protection (AKPS) director-general Comm Datuk Seri Mohd Shuhaily Mohd Zain reported that approximately 380,000 people were affected at the BSI checkpoint alone due to the autogate malfunction. AKPS said the breakdown was due to a data integration disruption, leading to cross-checking delays within MyIMMs, the Immigration Department's application system. Checks also showed that the glitch, the worse in Malaysia's history, was linked to the Interpol screening system used for foreign nationals. This server, based in Putrajaya, is used as a screening tool to check visitors if they have any red-flags or notices for criminal or terrorist activities. This incident raised critical questions: How could such an embarrassing failure occur? What has happened to the maintenance of our sensitive hardware and software? Does this mean that, for over a day, Malaysia's borders were vulnerable to international criminals or terrorists entering without proper screening? Authorities have been quick to assert that there was no element of sabotage or cyberattacks involved. This incident underscores the urgent need for agencies like AKPS and the Immigration Department to have robust backup systems or contingency plans for major system failures. It is essential to ensure that funds are properly allocated for system upgrades and maintenance, and that competent vendors and contractors are appointed to manage these systems. There should also be a postmortem to identify system weaknesses, and the agencies need to update their standard operating procedures (SOP) when it comes to crisis management. Our National Integrated Immigration System (NIISe), which is set to replace the archaic MyIMMs, also needs to be operating at top form without any hiccups. The first phase of the new system is expected to be completed next year, hopefully in time for Visit Malaysia and also Visit Johor 2026 tourism campaigns. As we get ready to welcome millions of visitors into the country, Malaysia cannot afford another embarrassing system crash like this.
Toronto Star
a day ago
- Politics
- Toronto Star
Canadian immigration refusal letters will now come with officers' notes
The Immigration Department has started to include officers' notes in refusal letters to failed immigration applicants, who have long complained of insufficient information about the reasons they're refused. The change is a response to the soaring immigration applications and refusals, which have led to a significant growth in the number of access-to-information requests over the years, clogging up the Access to Information and Privacy system, as it was the only way applicants and counsel could obtain their case notes.
New Straits Times
2 days ago
- Politics
- New Straits Times
Throw them out, MACC chief says of corrupt Immigration staff
KUALA LUMPUR: Rogue Immigration Department personnel involved in counter-setting activities and the "flying passport" ruse must be thrown out, says Malaysia's top graft buster. Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission chief commissioner Tan Sri Azam Baki said if any of these personnel are found guilty of being involved in such activities, the right move to make would be to throw them out. "Stern action must be taken to ensure that these personnel at the border entry and exits conduct themselves with integrity at all times," he said. Azam said we was also looking forward to meeting with Malaysian Border Control and Protection Agency (MCBA) director-general Datuk Seri Mohd Shuhaily Mohd Zain soon. "We plan to hold a discussion with him especially on the counter-setting and the "flying passport" ruse. Counter-setting refers to the act of allowing foreigners to enter the country without proper inspection by going through designated or pre-determined lanes at Immigration entry points. The "flying passport" ruse, or ghost entries, occur when passports are scanned and recorded as having entered the country, but the passport holder never physically crosses the border, creating a false immigration record. This ruse is often used to aid fugitives, overstayers, or those under travel bans. Azam said based on information received the syndicate received between RM500 and RM2,000 depending on the country involved in the "flying passport" ruse. "The prices vary based on the level of difficulty involved," he said. "The recommendations we made previously, including that these personnel be banned from carrying mobile phones while on duty remain relevant," he said, adding that enforcement of these recommendations should be carried immediately. Meanwhile, Immigration Department director-general Datuk Zakaria Shaaban said they would cooperate with the MCBA in its investigation of these activities. "We will cooperate and share information and intelligence with them as well as the MACC. "Last year, our department cooperated with the MACC in taking action against 50 personnel believed to be involved in counter-setting activities," he said. "Since January, the MCBA has taken over the functions and control of the entry points, so monitoring is now under the agency's responsibility. "However, last year the Immigration Department did take action to address this issue, so we are ready to share information if and when needed," he said. Last year MACC recommended that Immigration officers manning counters at the country's entry points should not have access to their mobile phones. This followed a probe which found that Immigration officers, who were caught for counter-setting at Kuala Lumpur International Airport (Terminal 1) and klia2 (Terminal 2) had received information from agents on the arrival of certain foreign nationals via WhatsApp. Counter-setting refers to the act of allowing foreigners to enter the country without proper inspection by going through designated or pre-determined lanes at Immigration entry points. Investigations also found several issues which led to the occurrence of counter-setting, including the relaxation of internal controls that made it easier for officers to be approached by agents or syndicates while on duty. Duty rotations for officers at Terminal 1 and Terminal 2 were also not done systematically. It was reported that the decades-old "flying passport" ruse at the Johor-Singapore land checkpoints continues to thrive — not due to a lack of technology or protocols - but because rogue officers caught red-handed are quietly transferred instead of sacked. An immigration source told the New Straits Times that the ruse, first documented as far back as 1996, has become entrenched within the system, aided by weak disciplinary mechanisms and inter-agency silence. "It's an open secret. Officers caught facilitating ghost entries are just moved to another counter, or another state. No termination, no prosecution, just relocation," the source said. Shuhaily recently defended the transfer of officers under corruption probe, saying it is not a cover-up but a procedural step required under civil service rules.
