Latest news with #ImranPratapgarhi
Time of India
5 days ago
- General
- Time of India
Congress picks leaders, poet to campaign for Ludhiana West bypoll.
Ludhiana: The Congress is rolling out its star power in the high-stakes Ludhiana West assembly byelection, with 40 senior members — including sitting chief ministers, Rajya Sabha MPs, and popular public figures — lined up to campaign for party candidate Bharat Bhushan Ashu. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now They even have a poet to deliver the punch. Himachal Pradesh chief minister, , Rajasthan's former deputy CM Sachin Pilot, and actor-politician Raj Babbar are among the headline names expected to hit the campaign trail. Rajya Sabha MP and noted poet Imran Pratapgarhi, famed for his fiery verse-laced speeches in Parliament, is also slated to join the campaign, in what Congress leaders hope will galvanise voters with both emotion and rhetoric. Several senior Congress members from Punjab, including former CM Charanjit Singh Channi, MLA Rana Gurjeet Singh, and former minister Pargat Singh, are camping in Ludhiana already to rally support for Ashu, as the party eyes a broader political resurgence ahead of the 2027 assembly elections. Punjab Congress president Amarinder Singh Raja Warring, state's leader of opposition Pratap Singh Bajwa, former Chhattisgarh CM Bhupesh Baghel, and Himachal Pradesh deputy CM, Mukesh Agnihotri, also feature on the star campaigner list. Other prominent figures include MPs Manish Tewari and Kanhaiya Kumar, spokesperson Pawan Khera, and Delhi-based bigwigs Alka Lamba and Sandeep Dikshit. Rana Gurjeet Singh, the bypoll in-charge for Ludhiana West, confirms that the high command has cleared the full list. "Most of them will join the campaign by next week, barring unavoidable exceptions like Bajwa-ji, who is abroad currently," he said. Imran Pratapgarhi's upcoming campaign appearance is being particularly awaited by local Congress leaders, who believe his poetic critique of the central govt could lend emotional resonance to Ashu's bid. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now The Ludhiana West bypoll has assumed outsized political significance, not only for Congress's revival hopes in Punjab but also due to Aam Aadmi Party's attempt to retain the seat via its candidate Sanjeev Arora — a Rajya Sabha MP. Opposition parties have accused AAP of seeking to vacate Arora's upper house seat to make way for Delhi's former chief minister Arvind Kejriwal. As the campaign intensifies, the bypoll is shaping up as a critical litmus test — not just for Ludhiana, but for broader alignments ahead of Punjab's 2027 battle. MSID:: 121625903 413 |
The Hindu
14-05-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
Principled criminalisation and the police as pivot
Procedural law tends to receive less attention than substantive law in criminal law discussions. A major reason for this is that procedural criminal law is seen as dealing with the prosaic question of 'how', while the more dramatic question of 'what' crimes and punishments exist are associated with substantive criminal law. But, in reality, procedure is the beating heart of action. The recent Supreme Court of India ruling, in Imran Pratapgarhi vs State of Gujarat, is a reminder of how principled criminalisation is contingent on the adherence of the police to India's criminal procedure law, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). A straightforward way of thinking about criminalisation is in terms of the exercise of state power and duty. Criminalisation is about the state's power to name a wrong/harm as 'crime' and impose 'punishment'. It is, equally, about the state's duty to address wrongdoing by holding individuals accountable publicly and administering appropriate penalties. Criminal law in a constitutional democracy seeks to ensure that this enormous authority and responsibility is exercised properly. Legal philosopher Victor Tadros suggests that the state's duty/power to criminalise wrongful conduct is part of a larger complex duty/power to criminalise, prosecute, convict, publicly condemn and punish the conduct. Within the broader normative context, criminalisation exists as part of social institutions and practices that address wrongdoing, such as families and private law. The claim, therefore (and importantly), is that criminalisation has a role independent of its effects that can be realised through the operations of the criminal law. The basis That said, the full force of criminalisation depends on criminal law and the workings of the criminal justice system. Given the powerful symbolic and concrete effects of criminalisation, legal scholars have sought to identify one (or more) 'master principle(s)' on the basis of which the kinds of behaviours that should be criminalised can be satisfactorily decided. Tatjana Hörnle makes a cogent case for three principles: conduct should be criminalised only if first, it is incompatible with important collective interests, second, it constitutes a violent attack against other persons, and third, it violates another person's right to non-intervention. These principles can be seen at the core of criminalisation under India's substantive criminal law, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). Even if the substantive criminal law structures criminalisation in accordance with pragmatic and restrictive principles, some social groups and behaviours can be over-criminalised and others under-criminalised. This is because beyond the conceptual labelling lies the actual labelling of acts and individuals as 'crime' and 'criminal' through the process of detecting, recording, arresting, charging, prosecuting, convicting and sentencing. Therefore, it is essential to pay equal, or possibly more, attention to the powers and functions of criminal justice agencies under the procedural law that governs the process. The police as the focus In this context, the focus inevitably shifts to the role of the police because they spearhead the process of criminalisation by detecting, registering, investigating crime, and, most conspicuously, by arresting suspects. There is general consensus that the police exercise considerable discretion in their daily work. As a result, the nature and the extent of criminalisation is largely shaped by how this discretionary authority is regulated and used. A case in point here is the possibility of overzealous policing of non-harmful wrongdoing (minor infractions) deflecting attention from harmful wrongdoing (serious offences). A key provision in the BNSS is Section 173(3), which ostensibly confers more discretion on the police to decide which cases to investigate, but should actually be viewed as directed towards preventing unnecessary criminalisation due to police overreach. Under the provision, when the officer in charge of a police station receives information relating to the commission of a cognisable offence punishable for three years or more but less than seven years, they need not immediately register a First Information Report (FIR) and investigate. Rather, they have the option to conduct a preliminary inquiry within 14 days to check whether a prima facie case exists to proceed in the matter. The case in question In Imran Pratapgarhi, the Court has interpreted such a preliminary inquiry as a positive obligation on the police where an offence covered under the provision is allegedly committed in the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court quashed a first information report against Mr. Pratapgarhi, a Member of the Rajya Sabha, for posting what was alleged to be an inflammatory poem on a social media platform. The Court found that the police had gone overboard by launching an investigation without complying with the provision that enables them to first conduct a preliminary inquiry. Referring to Section 173(3), the judgment notes that '[t]he intention appears to be to prevent the registration of FIRs in frivolous cases….' Principled criminalisation is no doubt central to the legitimacy of the state's power to criminalise. Also, it is as crucial for substantive law to be defined by judicious principles as it is for procedural law to be able to control the actual effects of criminalisation. But none of this works unless the police show a commitment to responsible criminalisation and are held accountable. Pupul Dutta Prasad is an IPS officer with a PhD in Social Policy from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is currently working as Professor of Practice, Lloyd Law College, Greater Noida, on deputation. The views expressed are personal
The Wire
02-05-2025
- Politics
- The Wire
State of Satire or Satire of the State? Notes on FIR Against ‘Ms. Medusa'
The latest FIR against Twitter personality 'Ms. Medusa' for a polemical and satirical video in the wake of the Pahalgam terrorist attack is yet another example of the misuse of the criminal law. The FIR, a copy of which I have perused, makes no concrete allegations. All the FIR alleges is that her videos are attacking India's unity, integrity, and sovereignty through posts on her X (formerly Twitter) handle (@ms_medusssa). The posts have been described as an alleged threat to peace and order, with the potential to incite riots, and produced with the alleged purpose of being shared by Pakistani media. Ms. Medusa is also accused of using supposedly hateful terms like 'Saffron-terrorist' on social media. The FIR invokes Sections 197(1) (imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration), 353(2) (statements conducing to public mischief), 196(1)(a) (promoting enmity between groups), 352 (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace), 302 (uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings), and 152 (acts endangering sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Samhita, 2024 ('BNS'), as well as Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (power to block public access to information). From a bare perusal of the FIR and her videos, it is evident that none of the offences are made out. Note here that there is nothing in the videos uploaded that deal with any religion, caste or language. Nor do the videos refer to any persons belonging to any religion. Further, it would be foolish to say that the videos promote enmity between different groups, much less that the statements are detrimental to national unity. Nor has the complainant shown any causal link between the posts and the alleged consequence. Much was said about the new laws being 'decolonised' from the baggage of the British era criminal laws which had stood us in good stead for over 150 years. We were told that crimes like sedition would no longer be crimes, and instead that they were replaced by other forms like 'Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration'. Clearly that was a façade to replace sedition with a far more nefarious, wide and ambiguously drafted provision which is prone to misuse. Recently when similar sections were invoked against Member of Parliament Imran Pratapgarhi , the Supreme Court came down heavily on the Gujarat police for filing the FIR and held that this was done as a 'mechanical exercise' and was clear 'abuse of the process of law' (2025 INSC 410). The present FIR also fits the description. Section 173(3) of the BNS also allows the investigating officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case even exists before filing an FIR. It is clear that the investigating officer has failed to do this here, even as the Supreme Court in Imran Pratapgarhi clearly stated that the officer must do so. The Court also held that the standard to be applied would be that of 'reasonable, strong- minded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on the standards of people with weak and oscillating minds. The effect of the spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of the standards of people who always have a sense of insecurity or of those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position.' The Supreme Court has come down several times against such FIRs being filed. Yet , this practice continues unabated. When the new criminal laws were enacted, several lawyers, former judges, members of the civil society and human rights groups had raised concern over the vaguely worded drafting of these laws. While the initial belief was that the same was a result of shoddy drafting, it appears now that far from a bug, this drafting was a feature of the new laws. What can one do but lament when the chickens have come home to roost. At the heart of the right to free speech is the liberty to speak one's mind, however uncomfortable that mind may be to the prevailing pieties. Free speech and satire are the very bedrock upon which a free society is built, and a bulwark against the creeping tide of tyranny. Pratapgarhi, Kunal Kamra, Neha Rathore, and Ms. Medusa are just few of the several victims of men with fragile egos. Their sharp satire mocks the mighty and exposes the absurdities of the condition of our republic. To criminalise such expression and to throw the cloak of criminality over the delicate sensibilities of those who cannot bear to be scrutinised or laughed at is to commit the constitutional sin of inviting the heavy hand of the criminal process as a censor. The health of the body politic of a liberal democracy is measured by its capacity to withstand the jibe, the jest, and the inconvenient truth spoken aloud. It is clear that our democracy is sick. This article was first published on The Leaflet.
