Latest news with #IndianEvidenceAct
Hindustan Times
8 hours ago
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Guidelines to protect lawyers from summons is not immunity: Supreme Court
NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court on Tuesday said that the guidelines proposed to protect lawyers from being summoned by investigating agencies for giving legal advice would not confer immunity on legal professionals who commit a crime. A view of Supreme Court (Sonu Mehta/HT FILE PHOTO) A bench of Chief Justice of India (CJI) Bhushan R Gavai and justice K Vinod Chandran made the observation during its hearing on a suo motu petition to frame guidelines to shield lawyers from investigating agencies summoning them for giving advice to clients facing criminal prosecution. The court asked the country's two top law officers, Attorney General R Venkatramani and Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, to study the suggestions received from lawyer bodies and propose the possible directions that can be issued. The matter was taken up by the court following two instances where senior lawyers Arvind Datar and Pratap Venugopal were summoned by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) probing the grant of Employee Stock Option Plans (ESOP) by Care Health Insurance to former Religare Enterprises chairperson Rashmi Saluja. The ESOPs numbering over 22.7 million were valued at ₹250 crore. Tushar Mehta, who appeared for the ED, asked the court not to lay down any guidelines, reasoning that stray incidents such as these were condemnable but should not become the basis for the courts to establish guidelines. 'individual instances should not be sufficient to change the legal framework. As lawyers, we want to be protected. But not everyone may be discharging their duty credibly. There may be a possibility of summoning them within the framework of the law. But any future judicial legislation in this regard will make the task of investigating agencies counter-productive,' Mehta said. The bench said, 'We cannot ignore the recent instances. An eminent lawyer had been issued summons. We have made it clear that there is no protection for any crime. If somebody is assisting the client in destroying evidence, certainly they can be accused of destruction of evidence. But can that be done for giving advice?' The two lawyers' bodies of the Supreme Court - Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) and Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) submitted their suggestions to the court. Senior advocate Vikas Singh, who is also SCBA president, submitted that in cases where the investigation agency has direct evidence against a lawyer, the same can be considered by the magistrate. If the magistrate feels that the evidence is admissible, summons can be issued, Singh said. SCBA secretary Pragya Baghel, who submitted the association's submissions, traced the protection afforded under the law to lawyers that protects privileged communication between the lawyer and client under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam that replaced the Indian Evidence Act. Similar protection is also available under the Companies Act. Senior advocate Siddharth Luthra, assisting the court, pointed out that the guidelines should also address the issue of receiving fees for the legal opinion tendered to a firm or person facing criminal prosecution. Attorney General R Venkatramani, assisting the court in the suo motu proceedings, assured the court that he will examine all suggestions and report back with his observations. The court asked both AG and SG to examine the suggestions and revert on the next date of hearing on August 12, when the bench will consider passing further directions. SCAORA, which had described the ED summons to the two senior lawyers as a 'chilling signal to the legal community', told the court that the unwarranted summons to advocates to disclose information concerning clients involved in criminal proceedings undermines the sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship and poses a serious threat to the integrity of India's criminal justice system. Senior advocate ANS Nadkarni, who represented SCAORA, pointed out a recent instance from Kolkata where the laptop of a lawyer practising before the Calcutta high court was seized. 'On the laptop, there is not just information about one client but all his clients. It is the lifeline of the lawyer's practice,' Nadkarni said, expressing concern over the search and seizure of lawyers conducted by investigating agencies that need judicial oversight. The submissions handed over by the SCAORA office bearers pointed out that the Bar Council of India rules explicitly prohibit advocates from committing, directly or indirectly, any breach of the obligations to their client, breach of which amounts to professional misconduct. 'The duty to maintain confidentiality is not merely statutory but is deeply embedded in the ethical and professional framework governing advocates in India. Disclosing privileged communication without client consent may constitute professional misconduct and attract disciplinary consequences,' SCAORA said.
Time of India
a day ago
- Business
- Time of India
Bombay high court quashes lok adalat order that held consumer liable for high SIM card bill, upholds right to fair hearing
Mumbai: A decade after a Mumbai resident was saddled with a bill almost seven times the fixed-plan SIM card she purchased from a provider at the airport, the Bombay High Court quashed a 2017 order of a quasi-judicial tribunal body that upheld the recovery. The high court set out that even when the law provides for a summary resolution of disputes, principles of natural justice cannot be sacrificed and questioned the lack of "fair play" by a permanent lok adalat in denying the consumer, Bindu Narang, a chance to cross-examine a witness. The right of cross-examination is a part of fair play in action, the high court said. A division bench of Justices M S Sonak and Jitendra Jain on July 14 ruled that when there is a dispute, even if the law provides for a "summary" — swift — process to resolve disputes, the "tribunal is still guided by the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair play, equity, and other principles of justice. The right of cross-examination is part of fair play, and whether such a right is to be granted or not depends on the pleadings and evidence of each party with regard to facts in issue". You Can Also Check: Mumbai AQI | Weather in Mumbai | Bank Holidays in Mumbai | Public Holidays in Mumbai The adalat, in Dec 2017, directed the woman to pay Matrix Cellular (International) Services Pvt Ltd almost Rs 30,000 over a prepaid SIM dispute. In 2014, when headed to Dubai from Mumbai, she purchased the SIM from Matrix at the airport for a plan of Rs 3,500. The duration of the SIM card was from Dec 14, 2014, to Dec 21, 2014. Her lawyer, Huzefa Khokhawala, informed the high court that she was shocked to receive a bill of almost Rs 24,000 instead. When the bill was not paid, the company approached the PLA with its claim. The PLA has three members; only one rejected her plea to cross-examine a witness and directed her to pay the bill amount with interest. Through advocates Nankani Associates, she petitioned the high court to challenge the PLA order. In March 2019, the high court asked her to deposit the amount in an interim order, and in July 2019, the high court allowed her to withdraw the amount on an undertaking to pay it back if she did not succeed in the challenge. She never removed the amount, and when she succeeded and the high court quashed the adalat's order, she voluntarily decided to donate the amount entirely to a rural school. The high court said the adalat gave no reasons for rejecting her plea to cross-examine a witness for the company. The high court explained that "when the facts are not seriously in dispute, the adalat is not required to compulsorily give a party the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. It all depends upon the claims and counter-claims. If there is a serious dispute, parties shall be given the right to cross-examine the witness to test the veracity of a witness whose affidavit evidence is filed before the tribunal even though the Indian Evidence Act is inapplicable". In Narang's case, the high court said she ought to have been given a chance to test the credibility of evidence against her and thus held the adalat's order "unsustainable". Appreciating Narang's offer to donate, the high court requested its registry to send the amount and interest accrued to the Trust Padmamani Jain Shwetambar Thirth Pedhi.
Time of India
5 days ago
- Time of India
Registrar can't alter birth certificates relating to disputed paternity, rules Kerala high court
Kochi: High court has held that the registrar of births and deaths in local bodies cannot make corrections in birth certificates relating to disputed paternity, as such matters require a full-fledged trial, adjudication and judicial imprimatur. The bench of Justice C S Dias further clarified that the circular issued by local self-govt department on Dec 16, 2015, mandates that if the father's name is to be changed in the birth records, a DNA test report, an agreement attested before a notary public and an order from a competent court must be produced. HC was considering a petition by a divorced man challenging the correction made in his son's birth certificate, by which his name had been replaced with that of his ex-wife's present partner. The petitioner alleged that the registrar of Payyannur municipality had made the change without issuing notice to him or affording him an opportunity of being heard. According to the petition, the petitioner had married the woman in May 2010, and she gave birth to a child in March 2011. Post-delivery, she went to her paternal home with the child for recuperation. Later, in April 2011, she went missing along with the child. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Up to 70% off | Libas Purple Days Sale Libas Undo On a habeas corpus petition filed by the petitioner, the woman appeared and stated that she desired to live with her lover. In Dec 2011, their marriage was dissolved by mutual consent. Thereafter, the woman and her partner filed a joint application before the municipality registrar to change the father's name in her son's birth certificate, producing certain documentary evidence. Based on this, the registrar altered the entry, prompting the petitioner to move HC. Upon examining the matter, HC noted that, as per Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage, or within 280 days after its dissolution, is presumed to be the legitimate offspring of the husband, unless it is proved that the spouses had no access to each other during the relevant period. In the present case, it was an admitted fact that the child was born during the subsistence of the marriage, and there was no admission by the parties or declaration by a competent court that the petitioner was not, conclusively, the legitimate father of the child. HC further held that under the Act and the Rules governing corrections to the register of births and deaths, the registrar is empowered to correct or cancel an entry only in cases of clerical or formal errors, or where the entry has been fraudulently or improperly made. Such corrections are to be made by a marginal note, without altering the original entry. Disputed questions of paternity fall outside the scope of the registrar's powers. Quashing the altered birth certificate, HC directed the registrar to reconsider the matter after hearing all parties.
The Hindu
6 days ago
- Politics
- The Hindu
Secretly recorded conversations may be evidence, but erode spousal trust
In a landmark judgment in a divorce case (Vibhor Garg vs Neha), the Supreme Court has accepted the admissibility of secretly recorded conversations between a married couple as reliable evidence. Vibhor Garg had filed a divorce petition under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in a family court at Bathinda in Punjab on the grounds of mental cruelty by his wife, Neha. The petitioner adduced conversations between him and his wife recorded by him over a period of time without her consent and knowledge to buttress his allegations of mental cruelty. The evidence was admitted by the family court. However, on appeal against its decision, the Punjab & Haryana High Court took an opposing view, holding the secretly recorded calls violative of the fundamental right to privacy as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Justice Lisa Gill held that the conversations were in clear breach of the privacy rights, and set aside the decision of the family court. Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court, which on July 14 ruled in favour of the husband by accepting the recorded conversations, though they were made without the consent and knowledge of the spouse. Complete lack of trust The Supreme Court Bench, comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma, used the recorded conversations to conclude that the marriage in question had reached a point of a broken relationship, where one spouse was actively snooping on the other, denoting a complete lack of trust between them, the very bedrock of a marriage. In essence, the Supreme Court admitted the recorded conversations to decide on the broken marriage rather than as an absolute question of privacy laws. The court also relied on the exception provided in Section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act, which permits the disclosure of recorded marital communications in suits between married persons or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the other. The Bench observed: 'We do not think there is any breach of privacy in this case. Section 122 of the Evidence Act does not recognise any such right. On the other hand, it carves out an exception to the right to privacy between spouses and therefore cannot be applied horizontally at all.' The Family Courts Act, 1984 grants a family court discretion to admit evidence, including reports, statements, documents, information, or other matters, that, in its opinion, will assist in effectively handling a dispute, even if that evidence might not meet the admissibility benchmark under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This provision allows the family courts to consider a broader range of evidence, including recorded conversations, in deciding matrimonial disputes. The court recognised that instances of mental suffering were very private and recorded conversations assisted the family court in deciding the matter appropriately. It reaffirmed its commitment to a fair trial, an inalienable right provided by Article 21 of the Constitution. Important form of evidence Call recordings have become an important form of evidence in legal proceedings. The Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 are the primary laws related to electronic records and the admissibility of these records. The admissibility of call recordings in Indian courts has been a matter of debate and controversy for several years. The K.S. Puttaswamy judgment (2017) established privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court, in this case, has interpreted the right to privacy in the specific context of matrimonial discord, the exception provided in the Evidence Act, and the admissibility of relevant evidence in a family court proceeding to decide a case. The judgment reaffirms the admissibility of secretly recorded conversations, based on the precedent set in R.M. Malkani vs State of Maharashtra. The admissibility of recorded electronic evidence was also examined in S. Pratap Singh vs State of Punjab, in which the Supreme Court accepted an unauthorisedly obtained tape-recorded conversation between two parties. The court evaluated the evidentiary value of the tape-recorded conversation and accepted it as evidence only because it was essential to resolving the case. Some believe the judgment will promote spousal surveillance and abuse of privacy laws to be used against an unsuspecting partner in future. Research established that women are generally at the receiving end in a family or a live-in relationship. The male counterpart enjoys greater coercive control. Admission of recorded conversations between spouses will create a greater atmosphere of suspicion, a trust deficit, and an abuse of privacy laws. The admissibility of call recordings in Indian courts depends on several factors, including the authenticity, accuracy, and reliability of the recordings, the relevance and probative value of the recordings to the issue at hand, and the circumstances under which the recordings were made. As technology continues to evolve, the admissibility of electronic evidence, including call recordings, will likely remain a subject of judicial scrutiny and interpretation. The admissibility of electronic evidence, such as recorded telephone or mobile conversations and video clips, often raises concerns regarding the right to privacy. While electronic evidence is accepted in a court of law, it is not generally legal for individuals to record conversations without authorisation due to the violation of the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution. However, in Vibhor Garg vs Neha, the Supreme Court has emphasised that the use of recorded conversations as evidence is admissible only in cases involving matrimonial or family discord. Only time will tell if the courts in India will be liberal in accepting such evidence in other cases also. (The writer is a former Director-General of Police, Himachal Pradesh; view are personal)
Indian Express
21-07-2025
- Indian Express
How Bombay HC flagged the ‘torture' of accused to ‘extort' confessional statements as key ground to deflate ATS case
Acquitting the 12 accused in the train blasts case, the Bombay High Court on Monday flagged the torture inflicted upon them to 'extort' their confessional statements and found it to be one of key reasons that discarded and vitiated prosecution's case. 'The accused succeeded in establishing the fact of torture inflicted on them to extort confessional statement,' the HC said. The HC said that confessional statements were 'not found truthful and complete on various grounds, including some portions of the same were found to be similar and copied.' The lawyers representing the accused including senior advocate S Murlidhar (former Delhi HC judge) had argued that the accused persons were languishing in jail for nearly 18 years based on confessional statements taken by the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) through 'torture' in the form of beating, threatening and inducement and lost their prime years of lives in incarceration. The accused claimed that their torture was corroborated by medical evidence to 'very substantial degree,' which should render their confessions irrelevant in law under Section 24 of Indian Evidence Act. The HC observed that one of the accused, Mohammad Sajid Margub Ansari was 'fainting' while he was taken for medical examination on October 24, 2006 and he was advised Rantac tablet, ORS and glucose water. It is significant to note, the HC said that the report of the said date was before recording Part-1 of Ansari's confessional statement which mentioned that he was fainting while being examined. 'This remark speaks volume about the physical and mental condition of accused just before recording of Part-I of his confession. Therefore, the evidence discussed above casts serious doubt on the likelihood that torture was inflicted on accused to extort confession,' the court observed. It added that prosecution was 'not able to effectively refute' defence's allegations of torture and evidence of accused 'remained unshaken.' 'Thus, in view of language of Section 24 of Indian Evidence Act, we are of the opinion that the confessional statement of the accused is inadmissible in law,' the HC held. The court also perused medical evidence of doctors of KEM and Bhabha Hospital related to accused Mohamad Majid Mohamad Shafi and noted that it 'sufficiently hinted at the possibility of torture being inflicted on the accused to extort a confession.' The HC also referred to 'torture inflicted' on other accused while recording their confessional statements. The HC observed that before recording confessional statements, the authority has to ascertain whether any torture or inducement was done to the accused and should insist for medical examination and look into the medical reports. The bench refused to accept prosecution's argument that medical evidence of torture was available only for some and not all accused and same will not detract from strong suspicion that all confessions were obtained under torture. 'If so many accused have been tortured, the threat of torture will loom large for all the accused and be sufficient to vitiate their confession under Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act,' the HC said. Justice Anil S Kilor, who authored 671-page judgment for the bench which also consisted of Justice Shyam C Chandak observed that one of the many grounds based on which confessional statements were rendered 'inadmissible' was that Part-I and II of some of the statements were 'identical.' The HC also said that variations in mentioning of offences in correspondences made by the concerned Deputy Commissioners of Police (DCPs) before or after recording a confession was also questionable. The court further emphasised on 'absence of certificates mandated under the MCOC Rules to establish voluntariness of confessions.' Moreover, it said that 'there was no relevant material available with the authority to reach a subjective satisfaction about the compliance of prerequisites for grant of prior approval' of designated authority, which was mandatory under MCOCA before recording the statements and the same suffered from 'non-application of mind.' The HC also noted that S K Jaiswal, who was then Deputy Inspector General (DIG), who granted prior approval, 'did not enter into the witness box to prove the contents of the letter of prior approval, and mere identification of Jaiswal's signature did not prove the approval and therefore, confession statements were 'inadmissible.'
