Latest news with #JasonNeubauer
Fast Company
a day ago
- Sport
- Fast Company
Why so many NFL players are suddenly choosing the new F7 Pro helmet
When it comes to designing a safer football helmet, Jason Neubauer knows what he's up against. 'You can make a very safe helmet that ranks No. 1 for performance,' he says. 'But if the players don't like the way they look in it, it really doesn't matter. You're not going to protect anyone.' What Neubauer and his team at Schutt Sports have built with the F7 Pro could be one of the safest helmets ever produced. It's certainly one that players are gravitating toward. Since the F7 Pro launched this spring, it has become the fastest-adopted helmet in NFL history. While Aaron Rodgers may not be a fan, an All-Pro roster that includes Justin Jefferson, Ja'Marr Chase, CeeDee Lamb, and Travis Hunter (the two-way star taken No. 2 overall in this year's draft) will kick off the 2025 season donning the sleek F7 Pro, which earned a top-5 ranking in the NFL and NFL Players Association's rigorous 2025 helmet performance testing. 'New helmet models don't really peak in their adoption rate until about the third year,' Neubauer says. 'It takes a while for players to get comfortable with a new look.' Subscribe to the Design newsletter. The latest innovations in design brought to you every weekday Privacy Policy | Fast Company Newsletters Neubauer has spent more than 25 years developing sporting goods, focusing on extreme sports before shifting to football helmet design in 2016. He's one of the masterminds behind the F7 Pro, whose innovations fundamentally reimagine how helmets protect against the defining threats of modern football—the high-speed collisions that make highlight reels, and the thousands of smaller impacts that accumulate over a career. [Photo: Schutt Sports] What the NFL does right The NFL has caught plenty of flak for—well, almost everything. But its historical approach to player safety is high on the list. Over the past decade, however, the league has done what any smart company does in the digital age: dive into data. To better understand how and when head and neck injuries occur, the NFL compiles detailed reports on every head and neck injury sustained in practice or games. The league tracks actual on-field impacts using sensors and cameras, documenting the speed, location, and type of every hit. This information is then shared with helmet manufacturers so engineers can discern what they're building to protect against. This data-driven approach is working. Preseason concussions dropped by more than half from 2017 to 2024, from 91 to just 44. This granular data informed the F7 Pro's overall design philosophy. The information showed not just where and how hits occur, but also the timing, force distribution, and frequency patterns that traditional helmet design hadn't accounted for. Armed with this data, Neubauer's team could optimize protection at a fundamental level—rethinking everything from materials to architecture rather than just adding more padding. [Photo: Schutt Sports] F7 Pro innovation: 3D-printed lattice Traditional football helmets work like old-school steel car bumpers—solid structures that conduct the full force of impact, transferring it to the passenger. The F7 Pro works more like a modern car bumper. Its outer shell uses a custom material blend designed to flex under impact, while a layer of 3D-printed lattice beneath the shell does the real work. Research from Tulane University's physics department found that a large defensive lineman hitting a quarterback generates impact forces equivalent to a car hitting a brick wall at 18 to 20 mph. 'You've got two guys who are 220 pounds running at a very fast rate and hitting each other,' Neubauer says. 'You can't get rid of that energy, so you need to slow it down to the slowest rate you can to minimize the forces on the brain.' The F7 Pro's lattice does exactly that with a network of microscopic shock absorbers, each smaller than a pencil tip, all working together to distribute an impact across thousands of tiny columns that buckle and bend in controlled sequences. 'The physical nature of buckling and bending is what's slowing the impact down, so you don't feel all the force at once, but you feel it over that offset distance,' Neubauer explains. Instead of each hit unfolding as one blunt force, the impact is more like a controlled demolition. [Photo: Schutt Sports] F7 Pro appeal: Lighter, sleeker, safer By using 3D printing to integrate various functional elements into a unified design, the lattice eliminated eight separate plastic components that traditional helmets required. The result is a seamless design that is lighter on players' necks while enhancing protection, something traditional manufacturing couldn't achieve. advertisement Schutt developed its lattice technology in-house rather than licensing existing solutions. 'Out there in the world right now, there are quite a few different lattice technologies that companies could choose from,' Neubauer says. 'It's literally like a drop-down menu. That would have been a lot easier for us to do. But we found that we were able to get a better-performing, lighter-weight result by doing it ourselves.' Weight reduction is critical because players' heads and necks endure thousands of impacts over a season, and every ounce of helmet weight adds to fatigue and long-term neck strain. But it also allows for a sleeker profile, addressing something equally important: The helmet looks damn good. Players have to want to wear it, and when stars like Jefferson and Chase sport the low-profile design in prime time, other players notice. It's functional vanity at its finest—safety technology that doesn't make you look like you're wearing a fishbowl. [Photo: Schutt Sports] A new era of customization In 2021, helmet manufacturer Vicis—which had been acquired by Certor Sports, Schutt's parent company—introduced the first position-specific helmet, the Trench model, designed for linemen. It focuses on protecting against the thousands of smaller hits that accumulate from play after play in the trenches. Schutt followed up with quarterback models that prioritize back-of-head protection because quarterbacks are frequently slammed to the turf when sacked and can't brace themselves. The F7 Pro's variants optimize protection based on real impact data. And as the data gets more intuitive, new position-specific helmets will likely enter the market, with Schutt and Vicis leading the way. Its OctoFit system lets players customize foam pod combinations based on their unique head shapes. So a process that once required custom ordering and waiting for delivery now occurs in the locker room in real time. Its AiR-Lock system is activated by a small push button located on the back of the helmet. Remember the old Reebok Pumps? The AiR-Lock is similar. Players can pump their helmets up for a tighter game fit, then release pressure to be more comfortable in practice or during walk-throughs, adjusting helmet security without using tools or having to leave the field. This combination of position-specific protection with real-time fit adjustment represents where helmet design is heading: equipment that adapts to how players get hit based on how they experience the game, while catering to their individual comfort preferences. The future of protection Virginia Tech has an independent helmet testing lab that serves as the industry's safety standard, evaluating helmets and assigning star ratings that guide consumers. When the university updated its protocols in July 2025, 77% of helmets that previously received five-star ratings were downgraded (from 26 to just 6), signaling that safety standards are evolving at every level. And as the NFL helmets evolve, high school and youth gear will follow. Schutt is partnering with national youth and varsity organizations to gather impact data similar to what the NFL provides, studying how younger players get hit and what protection works best for developing bodies. 'The types of impacts that kids aged 8 take are very different from an NFL athlete,' Jeremy Erspamer, CEO of Certor Sports, says. 'And we as helmet manufacturers need to understand that and develop technologies that specifically keep players at each level safe.' Schutt is set to launch a new youth helmet this fall, according to Erspamer, which will also be five-star rated. The number of concussions in the NFL decreased 17% from 2023 to 2024, reaching a historic low last season, while preseason concussions fell more than 50% from 2017 to 2024. The F7 promises to continue that momentum in 2025 toward a safer game for players at all levels. 'We believe it's the best helmet out there at the elite level,' Erspamer says. 'But what we also know is that in three years, we're going to have even better technology. So we're excited about where we are, but we're even more excited about where we continue to go.'
Ammon
3 days ago
- General
- Ammon
Titan implosion that killed all five on board was 'preventable', says report
Ammon News - The US Coast Guard has determined the implosion of OceanGate's Titan submersible that killed all five people on board was "preventable", citing the company's "critically flawed" safety practices. A damning 335-page report from Coast Guard investigators states that OceanGate, the company that owned and operated the Titan, failed to follow maintenance and inspection protocols for the deep-sea vessel. "There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside of the existing regulatory framework," Jason Neubauer, the chair of the Coast Guard Marine Board, said in a statement. The Titan submersible disappeared in the Atlantic Ocean while descending to the wreckage of the Titanic on 18 June 2023.
The Herald
3 days ago
- General
- The Herald
Titan sub disaster was preventable, US finds in scathing report
The catastrophic implosion of the Titan submersible that killed five people in 2023 could have been prevented, a US coast guard investigative board found on Tuesday, calling the vessel's safety culture and operational practices 'critically flawed'. The Titan vanished during a descent to the Titanic wreck on a tourist expedition, losing contact with its support ship. After a tense four-day search, its shattered remains were discovered strewn across the seabed 488m from the bow of the legendary ocean liner that sank in 1912, claiming more than 1,500 lives. OceanGate, the US-based company that managed the tourist submersible, suspended all operations after the incident. A company spokesperson said on Tuesday the company again offered its deepest condolences to the families of those who died 'and directed its resources fully towards co-operating with the coast guard's inquiry through to its completion'. The chair of the US coast guard marine board of investigation, Jason Neubauer, said the accident was preventable. 'There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside the existing regulatory framework,' he said in a statement with the release of the 300-page report. Chloe Nargeolet, whose father, French oceanographer Paul-Henri Nargeolet, died on the submersible, said she was satisfied with the investigation. 'The OceanGate boss didn't do his job properly and obviously my father didn't know that,' she said. 'It was not random or bad luck, it came from something. It could have been avoided.' The board determined the primary contributing factors were OceanGate's 'inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection process for the Titan'. It also cited 'a toxic workplace culture at OceanGate', an inadequate regulatory framework for submersibles and other novel vessels and an ineffective whistle-blower process. The report added: 'For several years preceding the incident, OceanGate leveraged intimidation tactics, allowances for scientific operations and the company's favourable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny.' The board found OceanGate failed to investigate and address known hull anomalies after its 2022 Titanic expedition. It said data from Titan's real time monitoring system should have been analysed and acted on during the expedition. It also criticised OceanGate for failing to properly store the Titan before the 2023 Titanic expedition. The report faulted the absence of a timely occupational safety and health administration investigation into a 2018 OceanGate whistle-blower's complaint combined with a lack of government co-operation, calling them a missed opportunity and added 'early intervention may have resulted in OceanGate pursuing regulatory compliance or abandoning their plans'. Reuters
Axios
3 days ago
- General
- Axios
Coast Guard report: Titan submersible implosion that killed 5 "preventable"
The Titan submersible implosion that killed five people occurred in large part because operator OceanGate had failed to follow "established engineering protocols for safety, testing, and maintenance" of the vessel, a U.S. Coast Guard report finds. The big picture: OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush may have faced criminal charges if he hadn't been killed during the "preventable tragedy" that occurred during a June 2023 diving trip to the wreck of the Titanic, according to the damning report that was published Tuesday. The incident in the North Atlantic Ocean sparked a massive search and rescue operation for the tourist submersible. Remains were later found and taken to St. John's in Newfoundland, Canada. Zoom in: The investigation found the key contributing factors to the tragedy were OceanGate's "inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection process for the Titan," according to the Coast Guard. Other factors included "a toxic workplace culture at OceanGate" and "an ineffective whistleblower process." The Coast Guard accuses OceanGate of failing to properly investigate and address "known hull anomalies" following a 2022 expedition to the Titanic. What they're saying: "This marine casualty and the loss of five lives was preventable," said Jason Neubauer, chair of the Coast Guard's Marine Board of Investigation, in a statement accompanying the report. "The two-year investigation has identified multiple contributing factors that led to this tragedy, providing valuable lessons learned to prevent a future occurrence." Of note: The report includes 17 safety recommendations that the Coast Guard says are "aimed at strengthening oversight of submersible operations, improving coordination among federal agencies and closing gaps in international maritime policy."
The Star
3 days ago
- General
- The Star
Series of mistakes caused Titan sub disaster, US Coast Guard says
The Coast Guard's final report on the submersible that imploded during a dive to the Titanic concluded that the fatal disaster resulted from a series of safety and design failures. 'This marine casualty and the loss of five lives was preventable,' said Jason Neubauer, who led the two-year inquiry for the Marine Board of Investigation, which issued a more than 300-page report on Aug 5. The submersible, known as the Titan and operated by a company called OceanGate, disappeared in June 2023 on a trip to view the wreck of the Titanic ocean liner. It lost contact an hour and a half into the dive, and prompted a sprawling search effort in the dark depths of the Atlantic Ocean. The craft's remains were discovered on the fourth day by a remotely operated vehicle. The submersible's operator and four passengers were killed. Numerous investigations, hearings and news reports have documented failures in the submersible's construction and operation, which were echoed by the Coast Guard report. 'The board determined the primary contributing factors were OceanGate's inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection process for the Titan,' the investigative board said in a news release. The five people killed in the implosion were the operator, Stockton Rush, as well as explorers Hamish Harding and Paul-Henri Nargeolet and two members of a wealthy Pakistani family, Shahzada Dawood and Suleman Dawood. Here are takeaways from the report. The Titan's final moments seemed normal. The Titan's final voyage on June 18, 2023, proceeded largely without incident until the submersible nearly reached the ocean floor, the report found. At 10.47am, as the submersible was approaching the seabed, the report said it 'followed standard procedure by releasing ballast weights to slow its descent'. Seconds later, at a depth of 10,978 feet, the Titan transmitted its location for the final time. Within moments, the submersible's carbon fiber hull gave way, catastrophically imploding under the immense pressure, the report found. The board's report said the passengers 'were exposed to approximately 4,930 pounds per square inch of water pressure' when the vessel imploded, 'resulting in the instantaneous death of all five occupants.' The implosion was heard at the surface. Seconds after the submersible imploded, OceanGate employees aboard the submersible's support ship, the Polar Prince, heard a 'bang' from the ocean's surface, the board found. After hearing the noise, the leader of the submersible's communications and tracking team turned to another OceanGate employee and asked, 'What was that bang?' according to the report. Subsequent messages to the Titan's crew went unreturned. 'With the benefit of hindsight, I now believe I felt the Polar Prince shudder at around the time communications were reportedly lost, but at the time we thought nothing of it,' the master of the Polar Prince later wrote to the board. He added that the disturbance 'was slight'. OceanGate pilots lacked adequate training. The report found that OceanGate lacked adequate protocols to ensure its submersible pilots, including Rush, were sufficiently trained to lead undersea expeditions. OceanGate's former director of operations told the board that there was 'no official documentation' required for OceanGate's submersible pilots, and that the company didn't have a dedicated manual for pilots operating the Titan submersible, the report said. Additionally, the board found no evidence showing that Rush had completed any training programme specific to the submersible that would have met the company's standards for its highest pilot training certification. OceanGate gave false information to the Coast Guard. At the time of the Titan's final dive, Rush possessed a credential issued by the US Coast Guard that permitted him to operate vessels of a certain volume on inland waters. That credential was based on falsified information, the report said: In 2020, OceanGate exaggerated the volume of the Titan in a letter to the National Maritime Center so that it would appear as if Rush had the requisite time at sea needed to earn the credential. The Titan was damaged in previous dives. On multiple occasions, OceanGate failed to adequately investigate damage suffered by the Titan during previous dives, the report found, including one that resulted in the vessel becoming entangled with the wreckage of the Titanic. During a dive in July 2022, the Titan entered the Titanic's wreckage and became briefly caught in debris near the ship's main stairwell, a mission specialist told the board. During the submersible's ascent, crew members reported hearing a loud noise they feared indicated damage to the hull. A contractor told the board that Rush later brushed aside those concerns. It wasn't the first time an OceanGate submersible became entangled in a shipwreck, according to the report. In an interview with the board, the OceanGate director of operations described a dive in which an earlier OceanGate submersible, the Cyclops 1, became stuck beneath the bow of the Andrea Doria shipwreck near Nantucket, Massachusetts, with Rush at the controls. In response, Rush had a 'meltdown,' the director of operations said, adding that when he asked Rush to relinquish the controls Rush threw the controller at him. – ©2025 The New York Times Company This article originally appeared in The New York Times.
