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Yahoo
29-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Opinion - The nuclear deal Trump should make with Iran
Good statecraft depends on marrying objectives to means. Although this is seemingly obvious, America often fails because presidents adopt the wrong objectives. Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam and George W. Bush in Iraq failed because they did not understand what they were getting into, and the U.S. lacked the means to achieve our objectives at an acceptable price. The U.S. may have failed in these cases, but using coercion and force to achieve political ends is often necessary. Bill Clinton employed both to alter Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's calculus and produce a peace agreement in the Balkans in 1995. Can President Trump do the same to reach an agreement with Iran so that it gives up pursuit of a nuclear weapon? Trump is certainly trying to use threats to achieve that end — emphasizing that he wants diplomacy to succeed but, if it fails, there would be 'bombing' and the consequences for Iran would be 'dire.' Threats can work if they are credible, and those who we are threatening fear our use of force. In the case of Iran, regime survival has always been the first priority. Avoidance of direct conflict with the U.S. has guided its leaders for nearly 40 years. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, after declaring Iran would fight Iraq for as long it took, accepted a ceasefire in July 1988 after U.S. forces, on the scene to protect reflagged oil tankers, began to sink Iranian naval vessels, destroy Iranian oil platforms and mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian airliner. In 2003, Iranians thought they were next after U.S. forces ousted Saddam Hussein. The Islamic Republic made a far-reaching proposal in which it offered to suspend uranium enrichment and end military support for Hezbollah and Hamas. But Bush administration hardliners scuttled it. In January 2024, after three American troops were killed at Tower 22 in northern Jordan by a drone fired by Kataib Hezbollah (an Iranian proxy in Iraq), the Biden administration responded by hitting 85 different targets in Iraq. Fearing that further U.S. attacks might hit Iran directly, Esmail Qaani, the head of military's elite Quds Forces, went to Baghdad and convinced the proxy militias to stop firing at American forces for the next six months. Non-military threats that Iran's leaders viewed as costly also affected their behavior. The Iranians declared during the Obama administration that they would not negotiate while they were under economic sanction, yet the administration dramatically expanded the sanctions — and the Iranians negotiated. Now, during the Trump administration, after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected talks with the U.S., saying it was 'not honorable' to engage in them, he relented and authorized such talks. That doesn't mean reaching an agreement with the Iranians is simple. But for those who say pressure does not work with the Islamic Republic, the record indicates that it does and it can. But to what end? Trump says that 'Iran can't have a nuclear weapon,' but that it could remain a threshold nuclear weapons state and meet that standard. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz went far beyond that, saying the Iranians must completely dismantle their entire nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared there could be no negotiations if that was on the table. That Araghchi called the first round of talks 'constructive' suggests it was not part of the discussion. Steve Witkoff, Trump's negotiator, gave an interview after meeting Araghchi in Oman and suggested that verification of levels of enrichment and weaponization would be sufficient. Yes, he subsequently hardened that posture in a tweet, saying Iran had to 'eliminate enrichment and its weaponization program,' but even that objective falls well short of the Waltz statement. And, that statement — and Witkoff's tweet — do not seem to have factored at all in the Witkoff-Araghchi second meeting in Rome, with Araghchi saying afterwards that the 'negotiations are moving forward' and that he and Witkoff were able to reach a 'better understanding about a series of principles and goals.' It appears that the administration does not have a clear objective in the negotiations. The Iranians no doubt have and will be focusing on preserving as much of their existing nuclear infrastructure as they can, and there's the rub: they have built advanced centrifuges that are enriching to 60 percent, near weapons grade, and that creates the option of going for a nuclear weapon at a time of their choosing. As Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency has said, there is no justifiable civilian purpose for enriching to 60 percent. Dismantling the nuclear program need not be the objective, but making sure that Iran can no longer preserve a nuclear weapons option must be. The 2015 Iran nuclear deal did not do that. After 15 years, there were no limits on the nuclear infrastructure Iran could build — meaning it was agreeing to defer a nuclear weapons option, not give it up. If Trump decides that Iran must demonstrably give up preserving a nuclear weapons option, even while it is permitted a civil nuclear program, Witkoff could propose that it end domestic enrichment and get its nuclear fuel from another nation. That would be the simplest and best option from a nonproliferation standpoint. But because the regime would view ending enrichment as a total surrender, it is probably not achievable absent the use of force. An alternative could be to propose scaling back the size and quality of Iran's nuclear infrastructure to the point where it no longer has a weapons option. These limitations would have either no sunset provision or be reviewable only after 25 years. Specifically, Iran would be limited to 1000 centrifuges, to include only IR-1s and IR-2s and no advanced centrifuges; enrichment to less than 5 percent; and all of its accumulated stockpile of high-enriched uranium would be removed from the country, with less than one bomb's worth of low-enriched uranium permitted. By combining these terms with intrusive verification of the entire fuel cycle and assured inspection of declared and undeclared nuclear sites, Iran would be retaining civil nuclear power, but not a nuclear weapons option. The Trump administration would be wise to present such a proposal and publicize it. That would demonstrate to the world — and to a restive Iranian public — that Iran could have a civil nuclear program even with enrichment. This would create pressure both internationally and within Iran to accept the American proposal, and do much to legitimize the use of force if the Iranian leadership rejected it. Framing objectives in a way that gains support globally certainly helps to marry objectives and means and makes for smart statecraft. Making clear that Iran can have civil nuclear power but not a nuclear weapon option can build pressure on the Iranians by isolating them — even as it raises the specter their leaders have always feared: direct U.S. military action against the regime. Dennis Ross is the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
29-04-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
The nuclear deal Trump should make with Iran
Good statecraft depends on marrying objectives to means. Although this is seemingly obvious, America often fails because presidents adopt the wrong objectives. Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam and George W. Bush in Iraq failed because they did not understand what they were getting into, and the U.S. lacked the means to achieve our objectives at an acceptable price. The U.S. may have failed in these cases, but using coercion and force to achieve political ends is often necessary. Bill Clinton employed both to alter Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's calculus and produce a peace agreement in the Balkans in 1995. Can President Trump do the same to reach an agreement with Iran so that it gives up pursuit of a nuclear weapon? Trump is certainly trying to use threats to achieve that end — emphasizing that he wants diplomacy to succeed but, if it fails, there would be 'bombing' and the consequences for Iran would be 'dire.' Threats can work if they are credible, and those who we are threatening fear our use of force. In the case of Iran, regime survival has always been the first priority. Avoidance of direct conflict with the U.S. has guided its leaders for nearly 40 years. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, after declaring Iran would fight Iraq for as long it took, accepted a ceasefire in July 1988 after U.S. forces, on the scene to protect reflagged oil tankers, began to sink Iranian naval vessels, destroy Iranian oil platforms and mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian airliner. In 2003, Iranians thought they were next after U.S. forces ousted Saddam Hussein. The Islamic Republic made a far-reaching proposal in which it offered to suspend uranium enrichment and end military support for Hezbollah and Hamas. But Bush administration hardliners scuttled it. In January 2024, after three American troops were killed at Tower 22 in northern Jordan by a drone fired by Kataib Hezbollah (an Iranian proxy in Iraq), the Biden administration responded by hitting 85 different targets in Iraq. Fearing that further U.S. attacks might hit Iran directly, Esmail Qaani, the head of military's elite Quds Forces, went to Baghdad and convinced the proxy militias to stop firing at American forces for the next six months. Non-military threats that Iran's leaders viewed as costly also affected their behavior. The Iranians declared during the Obama administration that they would not negotiate while they were under economic sanction, yet the administration dramatically expanded the sanctions — and the Iranians negotiated. Now, during the Trump administration, after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected talks with the U.S., saying it was 'not honorable' to engage in them, he relented and authorized such talks. That doesn't mean reaching an agreement with the Iranians is simple. But for those who say pressure does not work with the Islamic Republic, the record indicates that it does and it can. But to what end? Trump says that 'Iran can't have a nuclear weapon,' but that it could remain a threshold nuclear weapons state and meet that standard. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz went far beyond that, saying the Iranians must completely dismantle their entire nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared there could be no negotiations if that was on the table. That Araghchi called the first round of talks 'constructive' suggests it was not part of the discussion. Steve Witkoff, Trump's negotiator, gave an interview after meeting Araghchi in Oman and suggested that verification of levels of enrichment and weaponization would be sufficient. Yes, he subsequently hardened that posture in a tweet, saying Iran had to 'eliminate enrichment and its weaponization program,' but even that objective falls well short of the Waltz statement. And, that statement — and Witkoff's tweet — do not seem to have factored at all in the Witkoff-Araghchi second meeting in Rome, with Araghchi saying afterwards that the 'negotiations are moving forward' and that he and Witkoff were able to reach a 'better understanding about a series of principles and goals.' It appears that the administration does not have a clear objective in the negotiations. The Iranians no doubt have and will be focusing on preserving as much of their existing nuclear infrastructure as they can, and there's the rub: they have built advanced centrifuges that are enriching to 60 percent, near weapons grade, and that creates the option of going for a nuclear weapon at a time of their choosing. As Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency has said, there is no justifiable civilian purpose for enriching to 60 percent. Dismantling the nuclear program need not be the objective, but making sure that Iran can no longer preserve a nuclear weapons option must be. The 2015 Iran nuclear deal did not do that. After 15 years, there were no limits on the nuclear infrastructure Iran could build — meaning it was agreeing to defer a nuclear weapons option, not give it up. If Trump decides that Iran must demonstrably give up preserving a nuclear weapons option, even while it is permitted a civil nuclear program, Witkoff could propose that it end domestic enrichment and get its nuclear fuel from another nation. That would be the simplest and best option from a nonproliferation standpoint. But because the regime would view ending enrichment as a total surrender, it is probably not achievable absent the use of force. An alternative could be to propose scaling back the size and quality of Iran's nuclear infrastructure to the point where it no longer has a weapons option. These limitations would have either no sunset provision or be reviewable only after 25 years. Specifically, Iran would be limited to 1000 centrifuges, to include only IR-1s and IR-2s and no advanced centrifuges; enrichment to less than 5 percent; and all of its accumulated stockpile of high-enriched uranium would be removed from the country, with less than one bomb's worth of low-enriched uranium permitted. By combining these terms with intrusive verification of the entire fuel cycle and assured inspection of declared and undeclared nuclear sites, Iran would be retaining civil nuclear power, but not a nuclear weapons option. The Trump administration would be wise to present such a proposal and publicize it. That would demonstrate to the world — and to a restive Iranian public — that Iran could have a civil nuclear program even with enrichment. This would create pressure both internationally and within Iran to accept the American proposal, and do much to legitimize the use of force if the Iranian leadership rejected it. Framing objectives in a way that gains support globally certainly helps to marry objectives and means and makes for smart statecraft. Making clear that Iran can have civil nuclear power but not a nuclear weapon option can build pressure on the Iranians by isolating them — even as it raises the specter their leaders have always feared: direct U.S. military action against the regime.
Al Arabiya
08-04-2025
- Politics
- Al Arabiya
Iran-backed militias in Iraq ready to disarm to avert Trump threat
Several powerful Iranian-backed militia groups in Iraq are prepared to disarm for the first time to avert the threat of an escalating conflict with the US Trump administration, 10 senior commanders and Iraqi officials told Reuters. The move to defuse tensions follows repeated warnings issued privately by US officials to the Iraqi government since Trump took power in January, according to the sources who include six local commanders of four major militias. The officials told Baghdad that unless it acted to disband the militias operating on its soil, America could target the groups with airstrikes, the people added. Izzat al-Shahbndar, a senior Shia Muslim politician close to Iraq's governing alliance, told Reuters that discussions between Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and several militia leaders were 'very advanced', and the groups were inclined to comply with US calls for disarmament. 'The factions are not acting stubbornly or insisting on continuing in their current form,' he said, adding that the groups were 'fully aware' they could be targeted by the US The six militia commanders interviewed in Baghdad and a southern province, who requested anonymity to discuss the sensitive situation, are from the Kataib Hezbollah, Nujabaa, Kataib Sayyed al-Shuhada and Ansarullah al-Awfiyaa groups. 'Trump is ready to take the war with us to worse levels, we know that, and we want to avoid such a bad scenario,' said a commander of Kataib Hezbollah, the most powerful Shia militia, who spoke from behind a black face mask and sunglasses. Following publication, Kataib Hezbollah issued a statement denying that any of its members had spoken to Reuters, adding that official comments are made only by its named spokespersons. The commanders said their main ally and patron, Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) military force, had given them its blessing to take whatever decisions they deemed necessary to avoid being drawn into a potentially ruinous conflict with the United States and Israel. The militias are part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella group of about 10 hardline Shia armed factions that collectively command about 50,000 fighters and arsenals that include long-range missiles and anti-aircraft weapons, according to two security officials who monitor militias' activities. The Resistance group, a key pillar of Iran's network of regional proxy forces, have claimed responsibility for dozens of missile and drone attacks on Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria since the Gaza war erupted about 18 months ago. Farhad Alaaeldin, al-Sudani's foreign affair adviser, told Reuters in response to queries about disarmament talks that the prime minister was committed to ensuring all weapons in Iraq were under state control through 'constructive dialogue with various national actors.' The two Iraqi security officials said al-Sudani was pressing for disarmament from all the militias of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which declare their allegiance to Iran's IRGC or Quds Force rather than to Baghdad. Some groups have already largely evacuated their headquarters and reduced their presences in major cities including Mosul and Anbar since mid-January for fear of being hit by air attacks, according to officials and commanders. Many commanders have also stepped up their security measures in that time, changing their mobile phones, vehicles and abodes more frequently, they said. The US State Department said it continued to urge Baghdad to rein in the militias. 'These forces must respond to Iraq's commander-in-chief and not to Iran,' it added. An American official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, cautioned that there had been instances in the past when the militias had ceased their attacks because of US pressure, and was skeptical any disarmament would be long-term. The IRGC declined to comment for this article while the Iranian and Israeli foreign ministries didn't respond to queries. Shaken: Iran's axis of resistance Shahbndar, the Shia politician, said the Iraqi government had not yet finalized a deal with militant leaders, with a disarmament mechanism still under discussion. Options being considered include turning the groups into political parties and integrating them into the Iraqi armed forces, he added. While the fate of any disarmament process remains uncertain, the discussions nonetheless mark the first time the militias have been prepared to give ground to longstanding Western pressure to demilitarize. The shift comes at a precarious time for Tehran's regional 'Axis of Resistance' which it has established at great cost over decades to oppose Israel and US influence but has seen severely weakened since Palestinian group Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 tipped the Middle East into conflict. Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon have been hammered by Israel since the Gaza war began while the Houthi movement in Yemen has been targeted by US airstrikes since last month. The fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, another key Iranian ally, has further weakened the Islamic Republic's influence. Iraq is seeking to balance its alliances with both America and Iran in its dealing with the militias on its soil. The groups sprang up across the country with Iranian financial and military support in the chaotic wake of the 2003 US invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein, and have become formidable forces that can rival the national army in firepower. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth told Prime Minister al-Sudani in a phone call on March 16, shortly after the American strikes on the Houthis began, to prevent the militias carrying out revenge attacks on Israel and US bases in the region in support of their allies, according to two government officials and two security sources briefed on the exchange. The Iraqi-based militias had launched dozens of drone and rockets attacks against Israel in solidarity with Hamas since the Gaza war began and killed three US soldiers in a drone operation in Jordan near the Syrian border last year. Ibrahim al-Sumaidaie, a former political adviser to al-Sudani, told Iraqi state TV that the United States had long pressed Iraq's leadership to dismantle Shia militias, but this time Washington might not take no for an answer. 'If we do not voluntarily comply, it may be forced upon us from the outside, and by force.'
Express Tribune
07-04-2025
- Politics
- Express Tribune
Iran-backed militias in Iraq ready to disarm
Several powerful Iranian-backed militia groups in Iraq are prepared to disarm for the first time to avert the threat of an escalating conflict with the US Trump administration, 10 senior commanders and Iraqi officials told Reuters. The move to defuse tensions follows repeated warnings issued privately by US officials to the Iraqi government since Trump took power in January, according to the sources who include six local commanders of four major militias. The officials told Baghdad that unless it acted to disband the militias operating on its soil, America could target the groups with airstrikes, the people added. Izzat al-Shahbndar, a senior Shia politician close to Iraq's governing alliance, told Reuters that discussions between Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and several militia leaders were "very advanced", and the groups were inclined to comply with US calls for disarmament. "The factions are not acting stubbornly or insisting on continuing in their current form," he said, adding that the groups were "fully aware" they could be targeted by the US. The six militia commanders interviewed in Baghdad and a southern province, who requested anonymity to discuss the sensitive situation, are from the Kataib Hezbollah, Nujabaa, Kataib Sayyed al-Shuhada and Ansarullah al-Awfiyaa groups. "Trump is ready to take the war with us to worse levels, we know that, and we want to avoid such a bad scenario," said a commander of Kataib Hezbollah, the most powerful Shia militia, who spoke from behind a black face mask and sunglasses. The commanders said their main ally and patron, Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) military force, had given them its blessing to take whatever decisions they deemed necessary to avoid being drawn into a potentially ruinous conflict with the United States and Israel. The militias are part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella group of about 10 hardline Shi'ite armed factions that collectively command about 50,000 fighters and arsenals that include long-range missiles and anti-aircraft weapons, according to two security officials who monitor militias' activities. Farhad Alaaeldin, Sudani's foreign affair adviser, told Reuters in response to queries about disarmament talks that the prime minister was committed to ensuring all weapons in Iraq were under state control through "constructive dialogue with various national actors".
The National
07-04-2025
- Politics
- The National
What are the main Iran-backed militias in Iraq?
Iran's regional proxy network has come under unprecedented pressure since the war in Gaza began, with leaders and officials being killed in targeted Israeli attacks over the past year. Iran-backed militias in Iraq have been discussing future roles amid pressure to disarm, said an Iraqi source close to the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), a coalition of militias dominated by groups with ties to Iran. The militias are part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella group of about 10 hardline Shiite armed factions that collectively command about 50,000 fighters and arsenals that include long-range missiles and anti-aircraft weapons, according to two security officials who monitor militias' activities. The Resistance group, an important pillar of Iran's network of regional proxy forces, have claimed responsibility for dozens of missile and drone attacks on Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria since the Gaza war erupted about 18 months ago. "All previous governments, since the formation of the PMF by decision of the Shiite religious authority, have been subject to pressure to restrict arms to the state," the source said. Here are the Iran-backed militias you need to know about: Kataib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades) was founded in the aftermath of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and is one of the elite Iraqi armed factions closest to Iran. It is the most powerful armed faction in the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and has claimed hundreds of attacks on US forces since the Gaza war began. After its founding, the group quickly developed a reputation for deadly attacks against military and diplomatic targets in the 2000s, using a mixture of sniper, rocket and mortar attacks and roadside bombs. The US designated it as a terrorist organisation in 2009. It was led by dual Iraqi-Iranian citizen Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis until he was killed in a US drone strike at Baghdad International Airport in 2020, along with Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. It views US troops in Iraq as foreign occupiers and has called for their forceful expulsion. The US has struck Kataib Hezbollah positions, bases and training and logistics hubs several times over the years. The group fought alongside other Shiite militias against mostly Sunni rebels during Syria's civil war and has continued to operate in Syria since. Kataib Hezbollah has thousands of fighters and an arsenal of drones, rockets and short-range ballistic missiles, Iraqi officials and members of the group say. The Al Nujaba Movement (or Hezbollah Al Nujaba) is led by Akram Al Kaabi, who after 2003 was part of the Jaish Al Mahdi militia, before joining Asaib Ahl Al Haq and then travelling to Syria to establish Al Nujaba in around 2013. By 2014, many of its personnel had returned to Iraq and joined the new PMF movement. In 2008, the US Treasury sanctioned Al Kaabi for involvement in attacks against the US-led coalition. In 2019, the US State Department designated Al Nujaba as a terrorist group. Kataib Sayyid Al Shuhada (KSS, Battalion of the Master of Martyrs) is an Iraqi Shiite paramilitary group formed in 2013. It is funded, trained and equipped by the IRGC's Quds Force and Hezbollah. The group has been described as an Iranian proxy, and is one of the original militias that formed the PMF in 2014. It was also active in Syria, where its main focus was the protection of the Sayyidah Zaynab Mosque in a southern suburb of Damascus. It militarily supported the Syrian government and participated in the Syrian civil war. On November 17, 2023, the US government designated KSS as a foreign terrorist organisation. A splinter of Moqtada Al Sadr's Jaish Al Mahdi militia that broke away in 2005-2006 with support from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and Lebanese Hezbollah. Formed to undertake anti-US operations in Iraq under the leadership of senior Sadrist religious student Qais Al Khazali, his brother Laith Al Khazali, and Sadrist commander Akram Kaabi. The group undertook a January 2007 attack on the US base at the Karbala police centre that resulted in the kidnapping and murder of five American soldiers. Qais and Laith Al Khazali were detained by the US-led coalition from 2007 to 2010, until their release was brokered for the return of a Western hostage and the bodies of executed Britons. After the US withdrawal in 2011, the group tightened its ties to the IRGC-QF's axis of resistance and sent a contingent to fight in the Syrian civil war under the IRGC-QF's operational control. After 2014, Asaib Ahl Al Haq became a central component of the PMF, while facing accusations that it had committed human rights violations against Sunnis. In January 2020, the group was designated by the US as a terrorist organisation. Also in the same year, Qais and Laith Al Khazali were put on a terror list. Imam Ali Brigades was established in June 2014 under the leadership of Shibl Al Zaidi, a former Mahdi Army commander. In the war against ISIS, the group deployed forces in Iraq (beginning in 2014) and Syria (2015). The US Treasury designated Al Zaidi as a terrorist in 2018 for allegedly acting as a financial co-ordinator between the Quds Force, Iraqi paramilitaries and Lebanese Hezbollah. It established the Professionals for Reconstruction Party, winning one seat in the 2018 elections, when it also joined the Al Fatah coalition. As of 2018, Imam Ali Brigades had an estimated 7,000 fighters, although it has reportedly become less active as a paramilitary force since around 2020. The group was originally formed as a militia during the 1991 Iraqi uprisings, with help from Iran. The group came back to prominence after regrouping in Iraq to fight against ISIS in 2014, when it participated in the liberation of Jurf Al Sakhar, helping take back control of the area from the group. In 2017, the group, along with six other groups, formed the PMF. Initially emerged as a political group in 2013 under the name Kayan Al Sidq Wal Ataa (Entity of Honesty and Giving). In 2014, it joined the PMF under the name Ansar Allah Al Awfiya. It has also reportedly been active in Syria. Some media outlets blamed the group for killing dozens of Syrians in Deir Ezzor province in 2021. The US accused Ansar Allah Al Awfiya of killing of three US servicemen in January 2024 and designated it as a terrorist group. In the 2018 election, the group aligned itself with the Fatah coalition. Since 2023, the group claimed attacks on Israel, most of which have not been verified.
