Latest news with #MainichiShimbun
The Mainichi
12 hours ago
- Politics
- The Mainichi
46% in Japan have low expectations for controversial Sanseito party: Mainichi poll
TOKYO -- Nearly half of people in Japan expect little from Sanseito, the populist party that made significant gains in the latest House of Councillors election, according to a nationwide Mainichi Shimbun survey conducted June 26 and 27. Forty-six percent of respondents did not consider the party to be promising, far more than the 19% who said they had expectations for it. Meanwhile, 34% replied "not sure." Sanseito ran in the upper house election on a "Japanese First" platform, increasing its seats from one to 14 among those up for grabs this time. While it appears to have served as an outlet for dissatisfaction with the ruling coalition, the party has also drawn criticism. For example, a newly elected candidate controversially said, "Nuclear armament is the cheapest policy," when discussing national security. The survey was conducted using the smartphone-based "d-Survey" method. NTT Docomo's "d Point Club" member base, covering about 74 million people ages 18 and up nationwide, was used to randomly select respondents. The poll received 2,045 valid responses. (Japanese original by Daisuke Nohara, Poll Office)
The Mainichi
2 days ago
- Politics
- The Mainichi
Ishiba favorite to retain Japan PM role as Cabinet support rate rises to 29%: Mainichi poll
TOKYO -- The approval ratings of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba's Cabinet rose 5 percentage points from last month to 29% in a weekend Mainichi Shimbun opinion poll, with Ishiba topping the list of the next prime ministerial hopefuls favored by respondents. The nationwide survey conducted on July 26 and 27 also found that the disapproval ratings of the Ishiba Cabinet came to 59%, remaining almost unchanged from the 61% recorded in the previous poll on June 28 and 29. When pollees were asked who would be suited as next prime minister, 20% picked Ishiba, forming the largest group. While critics have questioned his responsibility for a major setback suffered by the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito in the July 20 House of Councillors election, a good chunk of respondents supported Ishiba, stating in the survey's comment section, such as, "There is no one else," and, "It is a difficult time with the U.S. tariff issue." By party affiliation, 70% of LDP supporters and over 40% of Komeito backers approved the Ishiba Cabinet. In addition, 35% of supporters of the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), as well as 30% each of supporters of Nippon Ishin (the Japan Innovation Party) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) also approved the Cabinet. Meanwhile, 7% of supporters of the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) and Sanseito respectively backed the Cabinet, suggesting that the ratings vary among opposition party supporters. By age group, 19% of respondents in their 40s approved the Ishiba Cabinet, followed by 13% of those in their 30s and those aged 18 to 29, respectively, indicating that the younger the pollees, the lower their approval ratings. Meanwhile, 45% of those in their 70s, 41% of those in their 60s and 26% of those in their 50s supported the Cabinet. The most common reason for supporting the Ishiba Cabinet was "because there are no other suitable people or political party," picked by 49% of respondents, followed by 20% who chose "I place my expectations on the prime minister's leadership" and 14% who selected "it is an LDP-led Cabinet." Meanwhile, the most common reason for disapproving the Cabinet was "I cannot place my expectations on the prime minister's leadership" at 40%, followed by "its policies are not promising" at 38%. Asked if Ishiba should step down as prime minister in response to the upper house contest's results, 42% of respondents said he should, well over the 33% who answered he needn't do so. Among LDP supporters, 60% of pollees claimed that Ishiba doesn't need to resign, while 22% said he should step down. In regard to consumption tax cuts that opposition parties advocated for in the upper house race as a measure to tackle rising prices, 58% of respondents said the government and ruling parties should accept the policy in the wake of the upper house poll, while 22% said they needn't do so. Trailing behind Ishiba as the most favorite prime ministerial hopeful was Sanae Takaichi, who lost in the LDP presidential election last fall, chosen by 15% of respondents, followed by DPFP leader Yuichiro Tamaki at 8%, agricultural minister Shinjiro Koizumi at 8%, CDP leader Yoshihiko Noda at 5%, former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at 3%, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi at 2% and former economic security minister Takayuki Kobayashi at 2%. Thirty-one percent of respondents said they were "not sure." Asked whether they appreciate the agreement reached by the Japanese and U.S. governments over President Donald Trump's tariff policy, a mere 28% approved it, well below the 40% who disapproved. Thirty-one percent of pollees said they were unsure. By party affiliation, 19% of respondents supported the LDP (unchanged from the June survey), followed by the DPFP at 12% (9% in the June poll), the CDP at 9% (unchanged), Sanseito at 8% (6%), Nippon Ishin at 4% (unchanged), Reiwa Shinsengumi at 4% (unchanged), the Conservative Party of Japan at 3% (1%), Komeito at 3% (2%), JCP at 2% (unchanged) and Team Mirai at 2%. Team Mirai fulfilled the requirements for a political party status for the first time in the upper house election. Thirty-three percent of respondents said they have no party to support, down from the 42% in the previous opinion poll. The survey was conducted via smartphones using the "d-Survey" method. A random sample of people were selected from among roughly 74 million individuals aged 18 or over nationwide. Valid responses were received from 2,045 people.
The Mainichi
3 days ago
- Health
- The Mainichi
Japan's lifesaver association warns against swimming after drinking alcohol
TOKYO -- With summer in full swing, playing in the sea, rivers and pools makes you want to drink cold beverages, but the Japan Lifesaving Association (JLA) is calling on people not to swim after drinking alcohol. According to the JLA, approximately 20% of emergency transports from waterfronts involve alcohol consumption. The association warns, "If you drink, don't swim." Ahead of World Drowning Prevention Day on July 25, the Mainichi Shimbun asked an expert about the dangers of swimming while intoxicated. Alcohol consumption in 20% of waterfront emergencies "Alcohol intake impairs judgment. Cognitive functions decline, leading to poor decisions such as entering dangerous areas. It also affects the function of the cerebellum, causing loss of balance and unsteadiness, making one prone to drowning even in shallow waters," explains Dr. Nobuya Kitamura, 61, deputy director of Kimitsu Chuo Hospital in Chiba Prefecture and the JLA's medical director. According to the JLA, in 2024, 41 cases of emergency transport (excluding cases of CPR) were reported among 215 locations nationwide, including beaches where member clubs were active. Of these cases, nine, or 22%, involved alcohol consumption. Four cases were believed to be cardiac arrest due to drowning, with one involving alcohol consumption and later reported as a fatality. Also recently, a July 7 drowning incident at a beach in the city of Fukuoka involved a man in his 40s who was believed to be intoxicated. Alcohol bans on beaches, but not at seaside huts How are municipalities with beaches responding? Since 2014, the Zushi Municipal Government in Kanagawa Prefecture has banned alcohol consumption on Zushi Beach through an ordinance. However, drinking is permitted at beach huts. The ordinance was put in place to make beaches safer after the "clubification" of beach huts with loud music and drinking became a social issue. Apparently, it was not primarily intended to prevent drowning accidents. A city official explained that beach huts were exempt from the alcohol ban because "staff can manage the amount of alcohol consumed." The ordinance also prohibits barbecues and playing music through speakers on the sand. As a general policy, beachgoers who continue to violate the rules after three warnings are advised to leave. For beach huts, if violations such as "staff serving alcohol to outside customers" occur, warnings and violation notices are issued. If a certain number of these is reached, the municipal government will take disciplinary action such as suspending business operations. 'For the sake of your loved ones' "If a child is drowning right in front of you, an adult who has been drinking cannot help. 'If you drink, don't swim.' Let's continue to spread this message for the sake of your loved ones," urges Dr. Kitamura. At the hospital, Kitamura treats patients brought in by emergency transport and those requiring helicopter dispatch. Amid his busy schedule, he plans to volunteer as a lifeguard twice this summer.
The Mainichi
3 days ago
- Business
- The Mainichi
US-Japan: Reimagining an alliance for a fractured world
The following is a contribution to the Mainichi Shimbun from Michael Schiffer, who served as assistant administrator of the Bureau for Asia at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which was dismantled by the Donald Trump administration. In his contribution, Schiffer discusses the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance. -- In the first six months of the second Trump administration, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been rocked by renewed uncertainty. Although the July 22 tariff agreement has relieved some of the immediate pressure, the negotiations were contentious and drawn-out, with the White House's threats to impose fresh tariffs on Japanese automobiles and agriculture, coupled with demands that Tokyo increase its host-nation support for U.S. forces and step up its security commitments in the region -- demands that may have contributed to the "postponement" of a planned 2+2 meeting earlier this month -- reviving painful memories of the trade wars and alliance strains of the 1980s. Trump's public questioning of whether the United States will live up to its alliance commitments, alongside his erratic posture on Ukraine and unilateral cuts to foreign assistance programs -- including those supporting Indo-Pacific infrastructure and governance -- have further shaken confidence in the reliability of American leadership. At a time when the foundational pillars of the post-war world are cracking under the combined weight of technological upheaval, environmental crisis, demographic transformation, and a new era of great-power rivalry, these moves have undermined the sense of strategic stability that has long defined an alliance that has served as the cornerstone for peace, security and prosperity for Tokyo and Washington alike. In the face of these structural changes, alliance managers must move beyond the conceptual mainstream, and seek to imagine a new world rather than continue to act as custodians of a fading order, attempting to solve 21st-century problems with 20th-century blueprints and defending the sanctity of an alliance built for a world that no longer exists. And yet, Japan remains one of America's most capable, trusted, and forward-looking allies. With its advanced economy, technological prowess, and increasingly assertive defense policy, Japan is uniquely positioned to work with the United States on the basis of shared interests and shared values to navigate the strategic challenges of a more contested Indo-Pacific -- and the generational challenge of a more assertive and aggressive China, with its own vision for what the regional and global order should look like. Neither the U.S. or Japan are likely to be successful in this undertaking alone, and even less so if Washington and Tokyo are working at cross-purposes. Doing so will also require more than a reaffirmation of old commitments. The rapidly changing global geostrategic and geoeconomic landscapes demand a fundamental reimagining of the alliance -- across economic, technological, diplomatic, and military domains. The rise of a more assertive China -- militarizing the South and East China Seas, threatening Taiwan, weaponizing economic coercion, and seeking to shape global norms to its advantage -- has made clear that alliances anchored in Cold War-era assumptions about roles, missions and capabilities are no longer sufficient. Tokyo recognizes this: Japan has undertaken a historic defense build-up, doubled its defense budget, and committed to acquiring counterstrike capabilities, signaling a Japan that is ready to be not just a junior partner, but a co-equal shaper of regional stability. The United States must meet this moment with strategic imagination, not just a narrowly construed "America First" transnationalism. That means moving beyond instrumental debates over cost-sharing to deepen integration across defense planning, technological innovation, and economic resilience. The U.S.-Japan alliance faces a precarious security landscape, one demanding immediate and decisive action. From China's assertive military expansion and "gray zone" tactics in the East and South China Seas, particularly around the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan, to North Korea's relentless pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, the Indo-Pacific is increasingly volatile, all part and parcel of an international system that is rapidly evolving from X to Y. Given the scope and scale of these challenges, we cannot afford complacency. It is imperative that Washington and Tokyo accelerate our joint development of next-generation defense technologies -- AI-enabled command systems, autonomous platforms, cyber defense -- and fast-tracking the co-development and deployment of advanced technologies, strengthening integrated air and missile defense systems, and ensuring seamless interoperability of our forces across all domains. This will help the alliance to deter aggression and operate effectively in an era defined by multi-domain conflict. The time to act is now, not only to safeguard our shared security interests but to uphold regional stability and to set the rules for the evolving international order against growing authoritarian challenges. Economically, the alliance must focus on shaping the rules of the road for the 21st century. With the Trans-Pacific Partnership long abandoned, the U.S. and Japan should spearhead digital trade agreements, investment screening regimes, and supply chain partnerships that insulate both economies from coercive pressures. Initiatives like the U.S.-Japan Economic Policy Consultative Committee (EPCC) should be scaled up into a formal economic dialogue akin to the 2+2 defense framework, driving coordination on geoeconomic strategy. While headlines may be dominated by tariffs and calls for economic rebalancing, it's crucial to recognize these discussions as echoes of a bygone era. While there are valid arguments for rebalancing, obsessing over trade deficits and protectionist measures risks diverting our focus from the true challenges and opportunities of the 21st century. The global economic landscape has fundamentally shifted, and our attention must pivot from the battles of the past to the imperative of co-leading the future. This means looking beyond traditional trade in goods to foster deeper collaboration and shared investments in areas like the governance of emerging technologies, resilient supply chains, and the green economy, ensuring our alliance is not just economically balanced but future-proofed. Finally, Japan and the United States should jointly invest in regional capacity-building -- from infrastructure finance to maritime domain awareness to climate resilience. This means reconsidering cuts to foreign assistance and treating development as a strategic instrument. Japan's extensive development networks and America's innovation ecosystem can be combined to offer a robust alternative to China's Belt and Road. To meet the test of this moment, the U.S.-Japan alliance must become more than a security arrangement. It must be a platform for shared strategy, innovation, and governance in the Indo-Pacific. The future of the U.S.-Japan alliance hinges on our willingness to confront the present with clear eyes and bold action. This isn't a moment for nostalgia; it's a demand for strategic reimagining. We must move beyond outdated notions of stability and influence to rebuild an alliance fit for a fragmented and fast-moving world. This means prioritizing investment beyond military modernization to include the governance of emerging technologies. It requires us to fully integrate climate adaptation and economic competitiveness as core pillars of national security. And critically, it compels us to evolve the institutions and coalitions -- both formal and informal -- that are essential for managing geopolitical volatility and for competing effectively with the PRC. The past six months have been challenging for Tokyo and Washington. But we have an opportunity to seize the moment to forge an alliance that is not just resilient, but truly transformative for the 21st century. Profile: Michael Schiffer has served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, senior advisor and counselor on the Democratic Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and assistant administrator of the USAID Bureau for Asia. His areas of expertise include U.S. foreign and defense policy, and security in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Mainichi
4 days ago
- Business
- The Mainichi
Why are some in Japan calling to dismantle Finance Ministry?
The Mainichi Shimbun answers some common questions readers may have about why some people in Japan have called for dismantling the Ministry of Finance. Question: I hear there are people calling for the dismantling of the Finance Ministry? Is this true? Answer: Yes. The Ministry of Finance ("Zaimu-sho" in Japanese), which manages national taxes and their allocation, is facing such calls online. A book that criticizes the state of the public being "brainwashed" by the ministry's ideas, labeling it "Zaimu Shinrikyo," likening it to a cult, has become a bestseller, and some people are even staging protests. Q: What criticisms are being leveled against it? A: The concept of fiscal rehabilitation, aimed at curbing wasteful government spending, increasing tax revenue and reducing government debt, is being blamed for stalling the Japanese economy. There are accusations that the Finance Ministry uses influential politicians and the media to steer the nation in that direction. Additionally, there is a lot of criticism without clear evidence, such as claims that retired ministry officials are distorting economic policies through "amakudari," the practice of securing postretirement jobs in private companies. Q: Would it really be OK to dismantle the ministry? A: The national budget is based on tax revenue, and while funds are limited, elected politicians tend to favor policies that are popular among the public, like tax cuts. The debt used to cover budget shortfalls continues to grow, and sometimes the Ministry of Finance needs to play the unpopular role of tightening the national purse strings. Q: What can the ministry do to avoid calls for its dismantlement? A: A steady effort to alleviate public distrust is essential. This involves providing thorough explanations to the public not only about the tax system and Japan's fiscal condition but also about the current state of "amakudari," thereby enhancing transparency.
