Latest news with #MonroeDoctrine
New York Times
10-08-2025
- Politics
- New York Times
Trump's Cartel Order Revives ‘Bitter' Memories in Latin America
Just a decade ago, the era of U.S. wars, coup plots and military interventions in Latin America seemed to be ebbing when the Obama administration declared that the Monroe Doctrine, which long asserted U.S. military supremacy in the Americas, was dead. Now this cornerstone of foreign policy is roaring back to life, resurrecting fears over U.S. military interference in the region after President Trump ordered the Pentagon to use military force against certain Latin American drug cartels. Leaders in the region are still trying to decipher what Mr. Trump's order could mean. Mexico and Venezuela, two nations where the administration has designated cartels within their borders as terrorist groups, seem especially vulnerable. But up and down much of Latin America, any whisper of reviving such actions could also unleash a chain reaction resulting in a surge in anti-American sentiment. The news of Mr. Trump's order has already intensified a wariness against intervention from abroad, even in Ecuador and other countries plagued by violent drug wars in recent years. 'I'm a right-wing conservative, so I want armed citizens and the military actually shooting,' said Patricio Endara, 46, a businessman in Quito. 'But I wouldn't agree with having foreign soldiers in Ecuador.' That skepticism draws from the bitter memories left by the long record of U.S. military interventions in the region, whether through direct or indirect action, as during Colombia's long internal war. Want all of The Times? Subscribe.
The Hill
25-07-2025
- Business
- The Hill
Trump's new ‘Monroe Doctrine' is driving China out of Latin America
Chinese President Xi Jinping was noticeably absent from the recent BRICS Summit in Brazil. It was a sign of the times. China is losing ground in Latin America, and many of its companies are packing up for Africa. These events could be the result of a change in the rules of the game — or perhaps just the leadership of President Trump and his new Monroe Doctrine. The Trump administration has renewed and reinforced the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, establishing a zero-tolerance policy for interference from extracontinental powers in the Americas. These changes have forced China to reevaluate and redirect many of its multi-million-dollar projects in transportation, telecommunications, infrastructure and strategic minerals. Political setbacks also include countries seeking closer ties and stronger alliances with Taiwan, a nation that China claims as its own territory. China is losing ground in Mexico. China's BYD, the world's largest electric car company and main competitor to Tesla, announced that it has canceled the construction of a huge electric vehicle plant in Mexico. The project would have the capacity to produce up to 150,000 cars per year, generating millions of dollars for China. The company seems to recognize the Trump effect; the new U.S. leadership has led them to rethink their expansion plans in Latin America. 'Geopolitical issues have a huge impact on the automotive industry,' said Stella Li, vice president of BYD. China also suffered a massive setback in Ecuador's mining sector. The firm Terraearth Resources canceled four projects after Ecuador's government decided to suspend exploration and exploitation activities due to noncompliance with environmental regulations. The Chinese strategy for controlling supplied of lithium is also failing. BYD and Tsingshan have canceled plans to build lithium processing plants in Chile, investments worth around $500 million and generating a projected 1,200 jobs. Lithium is essential for electric vehicles and is considered a strategic material in trade matters and, more importantly, in security issues. Chile has one of the largest lithium reserves in the world, and China lost lucrative business here. The defeats and delays of Chinese firms' projects in Latin America are a result of the new and strengthened U.S. leadership. Secretary of State Marco Rubio's first international trip was not to Europe or Asia, but to Central America. A categorical message was sent: Latin America, and especially Central America, are a priority for the U.S. Rubio's visit resulted in the end of the Belt-and-Road Initiative agreement signed between Panama and China — an unprecedented defeat for the communist geopolitical game in the so-called Global South. In Panama, the telecommunications company Huawei also suffered a blow. The Chinese firm, criticized for its ties to the People's Liberation Army, had to eliminate its systems in 13 strategic locations, which were replaced with American-made technology. Costa Rica is also moving with the winds of change. The Foreign Trade Promotion Agency sent a delegation to Taiwan to explore business opportunities, particularly in the semiconductor sector, where Taipei is a world leader. Costa Rica's Intelligence and Security Office also participated in a training session in Taiwan. Both events generated strong diplomatic complaints from China. The changes in Panama and Costa Rica are not coincidental; they are strategic. These two nations are undisputed leaders in Central America and what they do influences the region. China knows it and is in panic mode. Trump's new Monroe Doctrine and leadership through strength are atypical, unpredictable, politically incorrect, but undeniably successful. China is sending clear signals of pressure and pain, reevaluating, restricting and rerouting many of its investments. It is losing the battle one day at a time. Arturo McFields is an exiled journalist, former Nicaraguan ambassador to the Organization of American States, and a former member of the Norwegian Peace Corps. He is an alumnus of the National Defense University's Security and Defense Seminar and the Harvard Leadership course.
LeMonde
15-07-2025
- Politics
- LeMonde
'Europe is under the double grip of America'
During the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 30, President Emmanuel Macron condemned "revisionist countries that want to impose −under the name of spheres of influence (…) − on free countries their foreign policy choices," lamenting the "potential erosion of longtime alliances (…) [that could usher] in a new instability." Through his comments, Macron was not just targeting Russia and China, but also the United States. Needless to say, these remarks could not have been made at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in The Hague on June 24 and 25 − a major milestone in the Trump administration's effort to turn Europe into its sphere of influence. Heirs of a 200-year-old tradition that was born with the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has long exercised an often brutal hegemony over the Western Hemisphere. But after 1945, when Europe was under Soviet threat, they established a different kind of relationship. This included an international order based on the rule of law, embodied by the United Nations Charter; a massive transfer of resources through the Marshall Plan; and the stationing of American troops at the request of Western European governments. In 1949, NATO was founded. Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad famously called this arrangement an "empire by invitation," confirmed by the eagerness of nations freed from communist rule to join the organization. After resisting the test of time for eight decades, this "benign hegemony," as it was sometimes called, suddenly lost that qualifier in the shockwave of disruption brought about by Trump's second term, the "new sheriff in town"; A double grip is beginning to take hold. Purchasing American weaponry The first operation balances upon the transatlantic security partnership embodied by NATO, the continent's only collective defense body. At a time when the Russian threat has become "existential," the United States has set its conditions: Europeans must raise their defense spending to 5% of GDP. The Hague summit endorsed this objective for 2035, with some creative accounting regarding what counts toward this envelope. Nonetheless, the American president has remained evasive about the extent of the United States' commitment to apply, if necessary, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which stipulates that if any NATO member is attacked, the others will come to its aid.
AllAfrica
10-07-2025
- Business
- AllAfrica
It's time for a US Indo-Pacific reset
As the recent struggle to pass a budget for the US government illustrates, yet again, the immutable reality of limited fiscal resources, it's time to reconsider America's vital national interests in the Indo-Pacific and maintain a laser-like focus on safeguarding its territories in the Pacific. The United States is a Pacific power with significant territorial reach: the states of Alaska, California, Oregon, Washington, and Hawaii; the inhabited territories of Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa; as well as eight uninhabited islands. In addition, via Compacts of Free Association, the US has three protectorates: Republic of Palau, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Federated States of Micronesia. Accordingly, President Donald Trump should clearly delineate a geostrategically coherent Pacific Region security envelope that encompasses these territories and stretches in an arc from Alaska to Palau to Cape Horn at the southern tip of the Americas. In effect, such a Trump Doctrine framing a Pacific Region security envelope would be a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (which acknowledged the Americas as a vital national interest). Correspondingly, President Trump should also announce the intention of the United States to terminate, in a phased manner over the remainder of his term, the existing burdensome security arrangements with countries in the Indo-Pacific region that fall outside the recalibrated Pacific Region security envelope: Taiwan, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan and Australia. These countries should adjust to the emerging multipolar world and assume the responsibility for making their own independent security arrangements to safeguard their vital national interests. Manifestly, American security guarantees have allowed these countries to neglect their own defense needs. The United States cannot afford to bear the cost of strategic altruism to the detriment of its vital national interests. Washington relies on debt to bridge the gap between insufficient revenues and excessive expenditures and is careening recklessly towards a fiscal meltdown. In Fiscal Year 2024 the US government had total debt outstanding of $35.46 trillion, which is far greater than the size of the country's economy. Interest payments now exceed defense spending. Almost 14 years ago, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned Congress: 'I believe our debt is the greatest threat to our national security.' He added, '[W]e have not been forced to be fully disciplined in our choices …. We must now carefully and deliberately balance the imperatives of a constrained budget environment with the requirements we place on our military in sustaining and enhancing our security.' Instead of heeding Admiral Mullen's prudent advice, America's decisionmakers continue to ignore the need to recalibrate and prioritize vital national interests to align them better with realistically available financial resources. Fiscal discipline and strategic discipline are inextricably linked. Just as a lack of financial discipline leads to ballooning debt, a lack of strategic discipline leads to mushrooming security burdens under the cloak of strategic ambiguity. So, without realizing that the US approach of strategic ambiguity to address the threat posed by China is tantamount to strategic profligacy, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in his speech at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue unwittingly described what the unintended result would be for Washington rather than Beijing: 'More dilemmas, more complications, more questions, more concerns, more variables, more reasons to say, 'It's not worth it'.' While strategic ambiguity may be useful for strategic flexibility, it is not a panacea. The key to strategic discipline is strategic clarity. It is essential to identify which vital national interest of the United States is put at risk by an increasingly powerful China. A vital national interest must be existential in nature – something for which the country is willing to go to war using all the power available, including nuclear weapons. Surely the paramount vital national interest of the United States must be safeguarding its territorial integrity. In the Pacific, the most vulnerable inhabited US territories are American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Marianas. Beijing is playing a brilliant game of Go to outflank these territories, which are integral parts of the United States. China has growing security arrangements with the Cook Islands, Fiji and the Solomon Islands. From a geostrategic perspective, American Samoa's defensive position is precarious: the Cook Islands are about 824 miles to the southeast, Fiji is about 836 miles to the southwest, and the Solomon Islands are about 2000 miles to the northwest. By contrast, Hawaii (the closest US state with significant military capabilities) is about 2,585 miles north of American Samoa. Safeguarding Taiwan, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan and Australia from China is an unnecessary security burden and does not enhance the ability of the US to safeguard any of its Pacific territories. It's time for an Indo-Pacific reset and refocus on US vital national interests. Samir Tata is founder and president of International Political Risk Analytics, an advisory firm based in Reston, Virginia, USA, and author of the book Reflections on Grand Strategy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).
Time Magazine
25-06-2025
- Politics
- Time Magazine
J.D. Vance Defines the ‘Trump Doctrine'
First, the U.S. denied involvement in Israel's strikes against Iran. Then President Donald Trump took credit for them. Trump insisted he wasn't working toward a ceasefire and would take two weeks to consider attacking Iran. Then he bombed Iran's nuclear facilities two days later and, two days after that, announced a ceasefire. His top officials said they were not seeking 'regime change,' then he said: why not? before declaring yesterday that regime change causes 'chaos' and he doesn't want that. Some supporters say he's a master of misdirection. Critics liken it to 'schizophrenia.' J.D. Vance calls it the Trump Doctrine. 'We are seeing a foreign policy doctrine develop that will change the country (and the world) for the better,' the Vice President posted on X on Tuesday, before giving a more detailed elucidation of a foreign-policy approach Trump himself has often distilled into the three-word phrase 'peace through strength.' 'What I call the Trump doctrine is quite simple,' Vance elaborated at the Ohio Republican Dinner on Tuesday night. 'No. 1, you articulate a clear American interest, and that's—in this case—that Iran can't have a nuclear weapon. No. 2, you try to aggressively diplomatically solve that problem. And No. 3, when you can't solve it diplomatically, you use overwhelming military power to solve it, and then you get the hell out of there before it ever becomes a protracted conflict.' Former President James Monroe is credited with starting the trend of presidential doctrines, the core principles underlying a President's foreign policy. The Monroe Doctrine, according to the Office of the Historian at the State Department, focused on three main pillars: 'separate spheres of influence for the Americas and Europe, non-colonization, and non-intervention.' Since then, numerous Presidents have outlined their own doctrines, though rarely as explicitly as Vance has done for Trump. Observers struggled to interpret Joe Biden's doctrine. Following Trump's first-term 'America First' withdrawal from global forums, some suggested Biden hinted at his own doctrine in a line from a Washington Post op-ed before his first foreign trip to Europe in 2021: 'realizing America's renewed commitment to our allies and partners, and demonstrating the capacity of democracies to both meet the challenges and deter the threats of this new age.' In a Foreign Affairs article titled 'What Was the Biden Doctrine?' published in August, former Carnegie Endowment for International Peace president Jessica T. Matthews wrote that 'four years is too little time to establish a foreign policy doctrine' but that Biden's approach seemed 'to eschew wars to remake other countries and to restore diplomacy as the central tool of foreign policy…proving that the United States can be deeply engaged in the world without military action or the taint of hegemony.' For Barack Obama, many distilled his foreign-policy outlook to 'don't do stupid sh-t,' a guiding principle that some critics called overly simplistic and naive and supporters described as appropriately cautious given a history of costly, hubristic U.S. interventions abroad. 'The Obama Doctrine is a form of realism unafraid to deploy American power but mindful that its use must be tempered by practical limits and a dose of self-awareness,' wrote Post columnist E.J. Dionne Jr. in 2009. TIME described George W. Bush's doctrine in 2007 as putting 'a primary emphasis on the projection of American military power.' Syndicated conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer first tried to define the Bush Doctrine in June 2001, before 9/11, as a 'new unilateralism' that 'seeks to enhance American power and unashamedly deploy it on behalf of self-defined global ends.' After 9/11, observers often pointed to a National Security Strategy document released by the White House in 2002 that emphasized combatting terrorism as central to U.S. foreign policy. 'We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants,' it said. 'We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. … America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists—because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization.' Bill Clinton's doctrine is often pinned to a line from a speech he delivered in San Francisco in 1999, when he said: 'The United States has the opportunity and, I would argue, the solemn responsibility to shape a more peaceful, prosperous, democratic world in the 21st century. … We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so.' While Vice President Vance has helpfully spelled out the Trump Doctrine, some observers had already seen it starting to become clear. Foreign Policy columnist Matthew Kroenig outlined in April a similar three-pillar worldview that underlies the President's seemingly erratic and unpredictable foreign-policy approach: 1) America First; 2) stop America from being ripped off—from trade to immigration to NATO; and 3) escalate to deescalate. 'As Trump writes in The Art of the Deal, his preferred negotiating strategy revolves around making threats and extreme demands to throw one's negotiating partner off balance and ultimately bring them crawling to the table for a deal,' Kroenig wrote of the third pillar in what turned out to be a remarkably prescient analysis of Trump's handling of the Israel-Iran war. Whether the Trump Doctrine, which is certainly disruptive to some, is ultimately successful in changing the U.S. and the world for the better, however, is a question that remains to be answered.
