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India.com
6 days ago
- Politics
- India.com
Nuclear submarines, K-6 missiles, MIRV systems...: India capable of defeating US, China in..., coward Pakistan accuses Modi govt of...
Pakistan fears the destructive power of India's nuclear-powered submarines. (File) Months after India's BrahMos missiles pulverized Pakistani military infrastructure, including inflicting critical damage to eleven airbases of the Pakistan Air Force, during Operation Sindoor, Pakistani military experts have acknowledged the power of India's destructive missile capabilities, and expressed 'concern' over New Delhi's plans to build a bunker buster bomb akin to the 30000 lbs GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) which the US dropped on Iranian nuclear facilities last month. Why Pakistan fears India's sea-based missiles? In a piece published in the Dawn, Dr. Aqeel Akhtar, visiting faculty at Islamabad-based National Defense University, termed the India's sea missile capability as a major threat to Pakistan, while also accusing New Delhi of aggressively increasing naval constructions and missile power in the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean and the Arabian Sea. 'India-led nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean has increased strategic asymmetries, significantly intensified military competition and strained strategic stability in the region. India's nuclear submarines, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) pose a major threat to Pakistan,' he wrote, adding that New Delhi's powerful sea-based nuclear deterrence development marks a major shift from a defensive to an offensive maritime stance. How India bolstered sea-based nuclear deterrence? The Pakistani academic alleged that the Narendra Modi government has 'weaponized' India's growing naval power and adopted an aggressive maritime strategy, which could upset the regional power balance as well as the global strategic balance. Akhtar pointed out that India's SSBN (Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine) program is in its advanced stage, which poses the biggest threat to Pakistan. The Dawn article also mentions INS Arihant and INS Arighat, both nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Arihant class, as the bulwark of India's sea-based nuclear deterrence, that have taken the the country's nuclear triad to the next level. The two submersibles can carry medium-range and long-range missiles such as K-15 (750 km range) and K-4 (3500 km range), and India also plans to deploy ultra long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) like K-5 (6000 km) and K-6 (8000 km) in the future. Why India can defeat China, US, or any other country in Indian Ocean? In his article, Dr Akhtar expresses 'concern' that India's maritime capabilities are rapidly approaching levels where the Indian Navy can challenge and defeat powerful foes like the China or even United States, especially in the Indian Ocean region. 'India now has the capability to keep more than 400 nuclear warheads, out of which over 100 nuclear ballistic missiles can be deployed on SSBN. With this capability, no power in the world, even US or China, can dare to fight Indian naval forces in the sea. The destruction will anything beyond what the enemy could imagine,' he writes. The report accuses India of deviating from its declared minimum deterrence policy (CMD), particularly by deploying weapons with MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle) capability, that could 'endanger strategic stability in the region'. Dr Akhtar's piece also quotes an article by Ashley J. Tellis, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in which she emphasized New Delhi's goal is to control not just China, but any other country, including the United States, that aspires to dominate the Indian Ocean region. Notably, Pakistan has urged United Nations Security Council and the US-led West to curb India's ICBM program, including the Agni-V and Agni-VI missiles, citing 'threat' to global peace.
The Diplomat
03-07-2025
- Business
- The Diplomat
China's Military Diplomacy in the New Era
As the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has modernized into a more capable global force, it has significantly expanded its international military engagement in support of China's foreign policy objectives. Drawing on a new National Defense University monograph and updated database, this analysis examines trends in PLA military diplomacy from 2002 to 2024, focusing on three key activities: senior-level visits, naval port calls, and joint exercises. The PLA has historically been inward-facing. Even after China's post-1978 opening, PLA foreign engagements remained limited, highly scripted, and more symbolic than substantive – shaped by an organizational culture of secrecy. Today, however, military diplomacy has become a vital tool of Chinese statecraft. It serves both strategic and operational aims: shaping the international environment in Beijing's favor, laying groundwork for future overseas access, and enabling intelligence gathering and operational learning from foreign militaries. Figure 1 shows PLA military diplomatic interactions from 2002-2024. PLA military engagement grew steadily from 2002 to 2008, then plateaued from 2009 to 2019 before dropping sharply during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, the PLA conducted only 26 percent of the military-diplomatic activities it had in 2019. Activity has rebounded, but has yet to return to pre-pandemic levels. A notable shift occurred around 2009 with the rise of port calls and joint exercises, even as senior-level visits remained the most frequent form of engagement. Interactions peaked in 2010 and 2015 but declined afterward – likely due to Xi Jinping's sweeping 2016 military reforms, which prioritized internal modernization over outward engagement. Geographically, Figure 2 shows that China's military diplomacy remains concentrated in Asia, reflecting the PLA's regional priorities. Approximately 40 percent of all engagements between 2002 and 2024 targeted Asia. Southeast Asia alone represented nearly half of those (20 percent of the global total), followed by South Asia (10 percent of the global total), driven primarily by China's close ties with Pakistan. Southeast Asia has become an especially active arena amid intensifying China-U.S. strategic competition. Notably, even countries with maritime disputes or strategic frictions with Beijing – including Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Korea – have participated in exercises with the PLA. However, military engagement does not necessarily reflect strategic alignment; many of these countries maintain more substantive defense ties with the United States. Figure 3 shows the PLA's growing presence in multilateral forums, marking a departure from its long-standing preference for bilateral engagements. Initially wary of multilateral settings due to concerns over narrative control, China now regularly participates in and hosts these events. The PLA engages in six recurring multilateral defense dialogues, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meetings, the Shangri-La Dialogue, and ASEAN-related forums, reflecting Beijing's growing confidence and desire to shape regional security discussions on its own terms. Multilateral forums enable China to project influence more efficiently, amplify its strategic narratives, and legitimize its role in regional security architectures. Figure 4 shows trends in senior-level visits, which remain the most common form of PLA military diplomacy. As China has gained international stature, foreign militaries have increasingly accepted asymmetrical protocols – sending high-level delegations to China without demanding reciprocal visits. Between 2003 and 2009, outbound and inbound visits were balanced. After 2009, however, the PLA began hosting significantly more visits than it made, indicating growing willingness of other militaries to engage on China's terms. In recent years, the PLA has also adopted U.S.-style '2+2' meetings – combining defense and foreign affairs officials – with partners like South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia to strengthen alignment across security and diplomatic channels. The second key domain of PLA military diplomacy is naval port calls. Although fewer in number, these visits visibly demonstrate the PLA Navy's expanding reach. Regular port calls began in late 2008 and peaked at 50 visits in 2017. The establishment of China's overseas military base in Djibouti that same year reduced reliance on replenishment visits in foreign ports. Port calls declined during the COVID-19 pandemic but had partially recovered to 35 visits by 2024 – still below the pre-pandemic peak. Military exercises constitute the third pillar of PLA diplomacy, offering valuable operational experience and opportunities to learn from foreign militaries. Most exercises are bilateral (83 percent in 2024), though multilateral participation has grown since 2014. High-profile multilateral exercises include SCO Peace Mission drills, Pakistan's Aman naval exercises, and, until its 2018 disinvitation, the U.S.-led RIMPAC. These exercises often focus on nontraditional security issues, helping China project an image of cooperation and responsibility on the global stage. Over half – 53 percent – of PLA exercises have been conducted with Asian partners. A significant and growing share of exercises focus on military operations other than war (MOOTW), including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and noncombatant evacuations. MOOTW made up 41 percent of all PLA exercises over the period, and if anti-piracy and counterterrorism are included, nearly 75 percent of exercises fall under the nontraditional security category. The NDU database demonstrates that PLA military engagement is highly sensitive to diplomatic context. For instance, Singapore suspended exercises with the PLA from 2011 to 2013 due to tensions over the South China Sea. Engagement with South Korea declined following Seoul's 2016 decision to deploy the U.S. THAAD missile defense system. Australia exemplifies this dynamic: bilateral exercises grew steadily from 2012 to 2019 as Canberra sought to balance ties with the United States and economic links with China, but halted in 2020 amid tensions over COVID-19 origins and the launch of AUKUS. Although ties tentatively resumed in 2024–25, a provocative Chinese live-fire exercise off Australia's coast quickly undermined progress. China's closest military exercise partner is Russia, which accounts for 27 percent of the PLA's combat and combat-support drills. Their cooperation has deepened since Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, with 63 percent of joint activities occurring in the past 11 years. Exercises like Vostok 2018 and Joint Sea are used to enhance interoperability and signal strategic alignment. Russia is also reportedly training Chinese military personnel on lessons learned from its war against Ukraine. Nonetheless, the relationship remains one of pragmatic convergence and a partnership of convenience rather than a formal alliance. As PLA capabilities expand, China increasingly leverages military diplomacy to support its strategic objectives – shaping regional security dynamics, signaling political intentions, and building relationships for long-term operational benefits. Yet the practical returns remain limited due to rigid political control, emphasis on form over substance, lack of focus on building partner capacity, and reluctance to build real interoperability. Given this reality, U.S. conversations with allies and partners about their engagements with the PLA should focus narrowly on managing risks: preventing transfers of sensitive technologies, limiting PLA opportunities to learn military tactics, techniques, and procedures, and reinforcing the United States' comparative advantage in building partner capacity. The goal should not be to halt Chinese military diplomacy outright, but to mitigate the potential threats it poses. Thanks to CSCMA Research Intern Raina Nelson for assistance in preparing this article.
Yahoo
25-06-2025
- Science
- Yahoo
Mosquito-sized drone is designed for Chinese spy missions — military robotics lab reveals incredibly tiny bionic flying robots
When you buy through links on our articles, Future and its syndication partners may earn a commission. This super tiny drone, put together by a team from China's National Defense University of Science and Technology, is akin to something out of a spy movie. The team, based in Hunan Province, China, recently shared a new drone they have developed, which is small enough to fit between your fingers. It's as small as a mosquito, and it looks like one, too. This pesky little spy device first buzzed on our radar shortly after its debut on CCTV state TV channel CCTV 7. This was picked up by the South China Morning Post, which highlighted Liang Hexiang, a student, showing off the tiny drone by holding it in between his fingers. This tiny mosquito-sized drone was designed specifically to help with information reconnaissance, essentially making it a spy drone. There are several iterations of the design, but we get a good look at two in particular. Both have a long body with wings attached. One has just two wings, while the other has four and is controllable using mobile devices, such as a smartphone. It's not clear exactly what hardware is onboard and what sort of data it can collect, but it's safe to say the hardware is incredibly small and likely limited in capacity. Remote technology like this isn't just used for spy-related tasks. They can also be resourceful tools for recovering people and equipment from dangerous areas without risking additional bodies. Drones like the ones featured here can be highly flexible and useful in various military applications. Another key component in using remote devices like these is power. The unit needs to have enough charge to perform its task and bring itself back, or otherwise transmit the data it recorded before it completely dies. So far, there is no confirmation that the Chinese military is actually using these in the field. It appears to be a research project at this time. If the thought of an extra tiny mosquito drone piques your interest, you should check out this custom 3D-printed winged VTOL drone. Both of these projects demonstrate how a little ingenuity can result in an incredible final design. Follow Tom's Hardware on Google News to get our up-to-date news, analysis, and reviews in your feeds. Make sure to click the Follow button.
Nikkei Asia
15-06-2025
- Politics
- Nikkei Asia
The myth of multipolarity: Are we descending into a new dark age?
Michael Miklaucic recently retired as a senior fellow and editor-in-chief of PRISM at National Defense University. He currently teaches at the University of Chicago and at the University of Sao Paulo, and is a senior fellow of the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia, Bulgaria. Multipolarity is all the rage today. But those who promote multipolarity most enthusiastically are either disingenuous or delusional. The unipolar moment of U.S. hegemony is certainly over. What is emerging, however, is not multipolarity but rather an old form of bipolarity. Not the bipolarity of the Cold War, during which the U.S. and Soviet Union led two rival camps competing for global dominance, but a more ancient and what might be called primordial bipolarity.
GMA Network
02-06-2025
- Politics
- GMA Network
Teodoro dismisses Chinese officers' ‘questions' as propaganda in public forum
Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. rebutted questions posed by some Chinese military officials regarding the West Philippine Sea as 'propaganda' during a defense forum in Singapore. In Ivan Mayrina's Monday report on '24 Oras,' Teodoro made the statement at the Shangri-La Dialogue after a Chinese military official asked why the Philippines could not be like its neighboring countries, citing Malaysia and Vietnam, which engaged in dialogue on territorial issues and instead engaged in what he said were confrontations. 'Why can't the Philippines do the same? Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar (Ibrahim) mentioned he, otherwise, your President to engage dialogue and communication with… China. So, will the Philippines follow his advice and change his current approach to the South China Sea issue or that the Philippine intent to act as a proxy for external powers?' said Senior Colonel Qi Dapeng, a professor at the National Security College and National Defense University in China. 'The United States is sending more arms to this region and setting up more military bases in the Philippines. Are you concerned that a proxy war in Asia might be launched?" asked Senior Colonel Zhang Chi, an associate professor at the same school. In response, Teodoro said, 'Thank you for the propaganda spiels disguised as questions. Let us not forget that while we are members of (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), we are sovereign countries, each with its own territorial integrity and sovereignty. And I'm sure that if what China is doing to the Philippines is done to Malaysia or to any ASEAN country, you would see a different reaction." Members of the audience applauded the defense secretary. 'I would like to reiterate that the Philippine position on the West Philippine Sea is not a function of Sino-American strategic rivalry. Instead, it is caused, no doubt, by the overreach of the Chinese Communist Party of which the most glaring evidence is the nine, 10 or 11-line that has absolutely no basis in international law,' Teodoro maintained, rebutting the Chinese narrative that the Philippines is the United States' proxy and lackey. The Filipino official stressed that trust is needed to engage in a dialogue with China with regards to the issues of the West Philippine Sea. No official high-ranking delegates from Beijing attended the defense forum. Instead, Teodoro accused Beijing of sending intelligence agents posing as journalists. Earlier, Teodoro and Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff General Romeo Brawner Jr. slammed a report by Chinese media that the AFP official avoided their questions, and called it propaganda. —Mariel Celine Serquiña/RF, GMA Integrated News
