Latest news with #Non-AlignedMovement
AllAfrica
2 days ago
- Politics
- AllAfrica
'Active nonaligment' on the march in a multipolar world
In 2020, as Latin American countries were contending with the triple challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic, a global economic shock and US policy under the first Trump administration, Jorge Heine, research professor at Boston University and a former Chilean ambassador, in association with two colleagues, Carlos Fortin and Carlos Ominami, put forward the notion of 'active nonalignment.' Polity Books Five years on, the foreign policy approach is more relevant than ever, with trends including the rise of the Global South and the fragmentation of the global order, encouraging countries around the world to reassess their relationships with both the United States and China. It led Heine, along with Fortin and Ominami, to follow up on their original arguments in a new book, 'The Non-Aligned World,' published in June 2025. We spoke with Heine on what is behind the push toward active nonalignment, and where it may lead. Active nonalignment is a foreign policy approach in which countries put their own interests front and center and refuse to take sides in the great power rivalry between the US and China. It takes its cue from the Non-Aligned Movement of the 1950s and 1960s but updates it to the realities of the 21st century. Today's rising Global South is very different from the 'Third World' that made up the Non-Aligned Movement. Countries like India, Turkey, Brazil and Indonesia have greater economic heft and wherewithal. They thus have more options than in the past. They can pick and choose policies in accordance with what is in their national interests. And because there is competition between Washington and Beijing to win over such countries' hearts and minds, those looking to promote a nonaligned agenda have greater leverage. Traditional international relations literature suggests that in relations between nations, you can either 'balance,' meaning take a strong position against another power, or 'bandwagon' – that is, go along with the wishes of that power. The notion was that weaker states couldn't balance against the Great Powers because they don't have the military power to do so, so they had to bandwagon. What we are saying is that there is an intermediate approach: hedging. Countries can hedge their bets or equivocate by playing one power off the other. So, on some issues you side with the US, and on others you side with China. Thus, the grand strategy of active nonalignment is 'playing the field,' or in other words, searching for opportunities among what is available in the international environment. This means being constantly on the lookout for potential advantages and available resources – in short, being active, rather than passive or reactive. So active nonalignment is not so much a movement as it is a doctrine. Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, right, and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser attend the first Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in September 1961. Photo: Keystone / Hulton Archive / Getty Images via The Conversation The notion of active nonalignment came up during the first Trump administration and in the context of a Latin America hit by the triple-whammy of US pressure, a pandemic and the ensuing recession – which in Latin America translated into the biggest economic downturn in 120 years, a 6.6% drop of regional gross domestic product in 2020. ANA was intended as a guide for Latin American countries to navigate those difficult moments, and it led us to the publication of a symposium volume with contributions by six former Latin American foreign ministers in November 2021, in which we elaborated on the concept. Three months later, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the reaction to it by many countries in Asia and Africa, nonalignment was back with a vengeance. Countries like India, Pakistan, South Africa and Indonesia, among others, took positions that were at odds with the West on Ukraine. Many of them, though not all, condemned Russian aggression but also wanted no part in the West's sanctions on Moscow. These sanctions were seen as unwarranted and as an expression of Western double standards – no sanctions were applied on the US for invading Iraq, of course. And then there were the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the resulting war in the Gaza Strip. Countries across the Global South strongly condemned the Hamas attacks, but the West's response to the subsequent deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinians brought home the notion of double standards when it came to international human rights. Why weren't Palestinians deserving of the same compassion as Ukrainians? For many in the Global South, that question hit very hard – the idea that 'human rights are limited to Europeans and people who looked like them did not go down well.' Thus, South Africa brought a case against Israel in the International Court of Justice alleging genocide, and Brazil spearheaded ceasefire efforts at the United Nations. A third development is the expansion of the BRICS bloc of economies from its original five members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – to 10 members. Although China and Russia are not members of the Global South, those other founding members are, and the BRICS group has promoted key issues on the Global South's agenda. The addition of countries such as Egypt and Ethiopia has meant that BRICS has increasingly taken on the guise of the Global South forum. Brazil President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, a leading proponent of BRICS, is keen on advancing this Global South agenda. All three of these developments have made active nonalignment more relevant than ever before. I'll give you two examples: Angola and Argentina. In Angola, the African country that has received most Chinese cooperation to the tune of US$45 billion, you now have the US financing what is known as the Lobito Corridor – a railway line that stretches from the eastern border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Angola's Atlantic coast. Ten years ago, the notion that the US would be financing railway projects in southern Africa would have been considered unfathomable. Yet it has happened. Why? Because China has built significant railway lines in countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia, and the US realized that it was being left behind. For the longest time, the US would condemn such Chinese-financed infrastructure projects via the 'Belt and Road Initiative' as nothing but 'debt-trap diplomacy' designed to saddle developing nations with 'white elephants' nobody needed. But a couple of years ago, that tune changed: The US and Europe realized that there is a big infrastructure deficit in Asia, Africa and Latin America that China was stepping in to reduce – and the West was nowhere to be seen in this critical area. In short, the West changed it approach – and countries like Angola are now able to play the US off against China for its own national interests. Then take Argentina. In 2023, Javier Milei was elected president on a strong anti-China platform. He said his government would have nothing to do with Beijing. But just two years later, Milei announced in an Economist interview that he is a great admirer of Beijing. Why? Because Argentina has a very significant foreign debt, and Milei knew that a continued anti-China stance would mean a credit line from Beijing would likely not be renewed. The Argentinian president was under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and Washington to let the credit line with China lapse, but Milei refused to do so and managed to hold his own, playing both sides against the middle. Absolutely. When people ask me what the difference is between traditional nonalignment and active nonalignment, one of the most obvious things is that the latter is nonideological – it can be used by people of the right, left and center. It is a guide to action, a compass to navigate the waters of a highly troubled world, and can be used by governments of very different ideological hues. Brazil President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Argentina President Javier Milei at the 66th Summit of leaders of the Mercosur trading bloc in Buenos Aires on July 3, 2025. Photo: Luis Robayo / AFP via Getty Images / The Conversation There is little doubt that the liberal international order that framed world politics from 1945 to 2016 has come to an end. Some of its bedrock principles, like multilateralism, free trade and respect for international law and existing international treaties, have been severely undermined. We are now in a transitional stage. The notion of the West as a geopolitical entity, as we knew it, has ceased to exist. We now have the extraordinary situation where illiberal forces in Hungary, Germany and Poland, among other places, are being supported by those in power in both Washington and Moscow. And this decline of the West has not come about because of any economic issue – the US still represents around 25% of global GDP, much as it did in 1970 – but because of the breakdown of the trans-Atlantic alliance. So we are moving toward a very different type of world order – and one in which the Global South has the opportunity to have much more of a role, especially if it deploys active nonalignment. The notion of active nonalignment was triggered by the first Trump administration's pressure on Latin American countries. I would argue that the measures undertaken in Trump's second administration – the tariffs imposed on 90 countries around the world; the US leaving the Paris climate agreement, the World Health Organization and the UN Human Rights Council; and other 'America First' policies – have only underscored the validity of active nonalignment as a foreign policy approach. The pressures on countries across the Global South are very strong, and there is a temptation to give in to Trump and align with US. Yet, all indications are that simply giving in to Trump's demands isn't a recipe for success. Those countries that have gone down the route of giving in to Trump's demands only see more demands after that. Countries need a different approach – and that can be found in active nonalignment. Jorge Heine is outgoing interim director of the Frederick S Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Focus Malaysia
14-07-2025
- Business
- Focus Malaysia
Has PMX's diplomatic miscalculations trigger Donald Trump's tariff hike?
IT wasn't supposed to go up. After months of diplomatic back-and-forth, the Madani government had hoped the US would roll back its steep 24% tariff on Malaysian exports that was first announced in April. Instead, Washington did the opposite by raising the tariff to 25%. For a country that lives and breathes exports – from semiconductors to palm oil – that extra blow is more than just numbers on a spreadsheet. It could mean billions in losses, potential layoffs and vanishing investor confidence. And this time, it feels personal. The tariff hike reads less like a routine trade measure but more like a geopolitical message: Malaysia is being punished. So what triggered this tariff spanking? Could it be that in Washington's eyes, Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim misread the room? Cosying up to the wrong crowd Malaysia, once proud of its non-aligned posture, now looks like it's picking sides. And not the side the US is on. Anwar has been eager to position Malaysia within the BRICS orbit – a bloc made up of America's chief adversaries: China, Russia, Iran and others. He has visited Russia not once but twice. He even invited Russian president Vladimir Putin to the ASEAN Summit despite the international arrest warrant hanging over the Russian leader for war crimes in Ukraine. Anwar has also been warming up to Chinese President Xi Jinping. Bilateral visits, public praise and talk of deeper integration have raised eyebrows in Washington. Add to that of Anwar's vocal push for de-dollarisation and his hardline pro-Palestine stance, one gets a foreign policy that looks increasingly anti-West. Whether Anwar sees it that way or not does not matter. Trump's team possibly does. Malaysia isn't 'neutral' anymore We used to walk a careful line. As a small nation and founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and part of the Third World Network, Malaysia knew how to stay friendly with everyone without provoking anyone. Now, under Anwar, we're shifting into risky territory. And the US has taken notice. The tariff hike is possibly a clear sign that Washington is re-calibrating its view of Malaysia – from trusted partner to potential strategic irritant. That's why countries like Vietnam were spared but Malaysia wasn't. And here's the kicker: regional leaders like Indonesia's Prabowo Subianto, Singapore's Lawrence Wong, the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos Jr and even suspemded Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra have all had phone calls with Donald Trump. Anwar hasn't even managed a single call. High cost of power politics indulgence This isn't about ideology. It's about consequences. Every time Anwar plays geopolitical chess, it's everyday Malaysians who absorb the fallout. The fact is, exporters get squeezed by tariffs, factory workers risk retrenchment, prices rise as importers scramble to stay competitive and foreign investors hold back, unsure where we stand. This is the quiet damage of a foreign policy that wants to punch above its weight. At the end of the day, Malaysians are left to become pawns and collateral. Anwar may be trying to carve a reputation as a global leader coming in with guns blazing. But the bill is arriving at our doorstep. Even at the 24% tariff rate level, it's ordinary Malaysians who will be hit hard, let alone 25% or more. Because when a small country tries to act like a big power, it needs to remember one thing: the schoolyard bully punches back. And now, with that tariff gut-punch, the bully has just getting warmed up with everyday Malaysians bracing themselves to getting hit for the slightest of mis-step. – July 14, 2025 Main image credit: Bernama
Express Tribune
13-07-2025
- Business
- Express Tribune
BRICS declares the South is done begging
As the world frays under trade wars, resource conflicts and the US credibility unravels under the weight of its own aggressive exceptionalism, BRICS declared that the emperor has no clothes and the Global South was done waiting for crumbs from imperial banquet tables. Held under the shadow of US belligerence and amid fresh wounds inflicted by wars equipped and backed by the West, the bloc's latest summit took on the air of a reawakened Non-Aligned Movement, with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva asserting the Washington must stop 'behaving like an empire and 'begin respecting the sovereignty of others'. His response came in response to US Donald Trump's renewed tariff theatrics in the wake of the bloc's asserting of its sovereignty. The alliance's leaders reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism, sovereign equality and a restructuring of global governance to reflect a 'new multipolar reality.' In a joint declaration the bloc warned that rising protectionism threatened global trade and called for reforms of institutions like the UN Security Council and the IMF so they better reflect emerging economies. The declaration was unusually muscular and named the reality of Gaza as a 'war of aggression' and condemned tactics such as starvation sieges that even NATO countries tiptoe around. Furthermore, it strongly backed Palestinian self-determination and expressing 'grave concern' over Israel's Gaza war and reiterating support for a Palestinian state within 1967 borders. The declaration also denounced the US–Israeli bombing of Iran's nuclear sites as a 'violation of international law'. Blasting trade wars, the communique took aim at 'unilateral tariff…barriers' that 'flout WTO regulations'. One major theme at Rio was financial autonomy. Rio's leaders agreed to build out practical infrastructure for cross-border payments in local currencies and endorsed a BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative – an alternative to SWIFT – to make trade faster and safer within the bloc. The system, spearheaded by the New Development Bank (NDB), aims to interconnect national payment platforms so that goods can be settled directly in, say, rupees for goods from Brazil, or yuans for contracts with China. Climate justice and the Green South Climate change was another urgent focus, especially with Brazil hosting the upcoming COP30 climate conference. The BRICS ministers used Rio to outline a 'climate geopolitics' agenda grounded in justice and development. They insisted that environmental policy cannot be separated from social welfare. Another key demand was massive climate financing. BRICS leaders noted developed countries had pledged US$100 billion per year by 2020, but actual flows remain far below need. They cited data showing climate finance requirements have soared to about $1.3 trillion (due to worsening impacts), while only a fraction of that is funded. As Ethiopia's ambassador warned in Rio, the 2030 development goals were way off track, and 'only about 17% of the goals are on track'. His plea was blunt: rich countries caused the bulk of emissions since the Industrial Revolution, yet poor nations bear the worst consequences. The bloc cast climate change as a development and justice issue, not just an environmental problem. It demands that wealthier nations deliver on past commitments and scale them up dramatically. Looming behind all the summit talk was a critique of the existing financial order – in essence, an indictment of the Western-led model of capitalism. BRICS leaders and allied thinkers pointed out how that model has pitted developing countries on the losing end of debt, austerity and austerity. For many in the Global South, today's 'free market' prescriptions have brought crisis after crisis. Moreover, IMF and World Bank have compounded a 'polycrisis' of hunger, climate, and debt by imposing punitive conditions and surcharges on vulnerable countries. For example, the IMF's insistence on cutting subsidies or raising interest rates forced Egypt to quadruple bread prices, sparking unrest, even as the IMF simultaneously imposed 'junk fees' (surcharges) that extra-burdened already cash-strapped governments. The numbers are stark. Debt justice advocates note that over half of the world's poorest countries are now in debt crisis. Since 2013 the number of Global South nations on the verge of default has more than doubled. As of 2022, 54 countries were classified as facing unsustainable debt burdens. In these countries, interest payments are crowding out everything else, Recent research finds they now spend five times more on repaying creditors than on climate adaptation and resilience. In other words, money that could build hospitals or flood defence is siphoned off to foreign banks and bondholders. For instance, Pakistan, hit by devastating floods in 2022, was forced to divert billions from reconstruction to service external debt even as development benchmarks languished Tariffs and limits of coercion On the other, just as the declaration landed with a thud, US President Donald Trump, in a characteristically forceful social media post on 7 July 2025, declared, 'Any Country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS, will be charged an ADDITIONAL 10% Tariff. There will be no exceptions to this policy. Thank you for your attention to this matter!' On the same day, Trump dispatched his infamous tariff letters, thinly veiled as diplomatic overtures but steeped in unilateral belligerence as the outlines of a broader geopolitical reordering became visible. The letters, which rationalised arbitrary tariff hikes under the guise of 'reciprocity,' were less about trade and more about a desperate assertion of imperial prerogative. However, beneath the surface ran the unmistakable traces of failed coercion, faltering hegemony and the paranoid anxiety that BRICS was no longer merely an acronym, but a nascent counter-power. The breakdown of negotiations over the preceding three months exposed the fraying limits of American economic statecraft. The old instruments of leverage such as sanctions, tariffs and financial blackmail appeared to have fatigue, not fear. Trump's pivot from suspension to escalation in the China tariff war revealed a strategic cul-de-sac. Plagued by its own contradictions and upsetting its own allies, the administration alienated long-time partners while inadvertently catalysing an emerging geopolitical bloc rooted in the shared experience of imperial exclusion. The BRICS summit in Brazil unfolded against this backdrop. No longer the butt of Western punditry, the bloc has matured into a platform with infrastructural and political density. Ten full members, dozens of interested observers, and over fifty states engaged in formal and informal dialogue suggest a layered institutional emergence, rather than mere rhetorical alignment. Measured by purchasing power, BRICS economies account for nearly half of global GDP and over half of the global population. Their economic trajectories increasingly set the pace for global growth. The states also command vast shares of industrial production, energy reserves, agricultural capacity and critical minerals, locating them within the core of the material reproduction processes on which global stability depends. As the financial capital in the West remains long decoupled from productive investment, BRICS economies remain anchored in physical output and strategic sectors, grounded in systemic exchange value and deriving strength from infrastructure, energy and commodities rather than speculative cycles. The key difference is that energy in these economies is not a volatile asset class, but a prerequisite for sovereign development. Russia, Iran, Brazil, the UAE and Saudi Arabia dominate fossil fuel markets, while China leads in renewables and storage technologies. These capacities form the base of coordinated state-led planning. Unlike the credit-driven economies of the North Atlantic, where returns are chased through stock buybacks and asset bubbles, BRICS states engage in long-term provisioning. Economic derangement In the United States, financialisation has advanced to the point of economic derangement. Productive sectors have been hollowed out. Industrial investment lags behind speculative flows. Shareholder returns dictate policy. Decades of offshoring and deindustrialisation have produced sharp internal polarisation: real wages stagnate, infrastructure decays, and essential services become unaffordable for large sections of the population. On the global stage, the dollar functions less as a stabilising currency than as a mechanism of control. Washington's reliance on financial warfare – via sanctions, reserve freezes, and regulatory overreach –has exposed the fragility of this model. As volatility is offloaded onto the Global South, states have begun to seek institutional and monetary alternatives. However, the desire to delink is not ideological but comes from the structural asymmetries imposed by dollar dependency. Meanwhile, Europe grapples with its own, increasingly intertwined crises. The break from Russian energy has frayed the continent's industrial core. Politically, Europe appears unmoored. It invokes strategic autonomy while subordinating security policy to NATO. It speaks the language of multilateralism while confiscating foreign assets, invoking liberal peace while escalating militarisation and even remains silent as genocide and economic exploitations wreak havoc with its leadership staggeringly beholden to the US security umbrella. However, analysts note this is not a tactical misstep but a deeper crisis of orientation, with competing imperatives pulling the project apart. The intensification of Western hostility toward BRICS must be situated within this broader geopolitical fatigue. The confrontations are not limited to foreign policy disputes but reflect a deeper structural unease. Russia's assertion of resource sovereignty, Iran's defiance of financial blackmail and China's infrastructural ascendancy all constitute affronts to a global order increasingly unable to reproduce itself on its own terms. States that refuse to act as auxiliaries are subjected to diplomatic pressure and narrative containment. The postwar liberal consensus and its unipolar afterglow are no longer capable of securing ideological consent. Inflation, ecological crisis, inequality, and institutional fragmentation are not imported shocks; they are endogenous to the prevailing model. The externalisation of blame through sanctions and military build-ups only hastens systemic fragmentation. The BRICS configuration does not emerge from vacuum. It arises from decades of structural adjustment, resource plunder and financial dependency. Its institutional evolution – through the NDB, cross-border payment systems and currency swaps – offers both protective infrastructure and a set of alternatives. Similarly, local currency trade, infrastructure investment without neoliberal conditionalities and policy coordination on energy and technology signal a concerted attempt to reclaim developmental sovereignty. Countries across Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia increasingly view BRICS+ as a strategic space to exit from the permanent austerity logic of Bretton Woods institutions. China, in this configuration, operates not as an imperial centre but as a strategic fulcrum. Its approach remains focused on connectivity, logistics and planning capacity. However, it is important to steer clear of the old post-Cold War shallow binaries: the 'authoritarian countries' in the BRICS are intending a reversal of globalisation but calling for a redirection. With their emphasis on real economy coordination, development financing and institutional redundancy, they are preparing for strategic insulation, not isolation. The bloc reflects a wider historical motion: a world disenchanted with liberal finance and searching for new instruments of survival and cooperation. The South is no longer a passive recipient in a preordained order. The architecture being assembled across BRICS states is uneven, unfinished and fraught, but undeniably real. The West can interpret this shift as a threat or a mirror. However, the historical momentum no longer centres on its crises. It centres elsewhere – in the slow, stubborn accumulation of material capacity outside the imperial core.
The Hindu
12-07-2025
- Business
- The Hindu
From the margins to the centre
The idea of the Global South historically referred to the grouping of countries primarily in Asia, Africa and Latin America that shared a history of colonialism and ongoing struggles against global inequalities. They sought to transform a historically Western-dominated world order through 'South-South cooperation' — a set of practices and organising concepts that these nations aim to use to achieve development through mutual assistance and increased solidarity among themselves. This aspiration has roots in landmark initiatives such as the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which sought to foster economic and cultural cooperation while promoting human rights and establishing a New International Economic Order (NIEO). These movements aimed to counteract the vertical power relations between former colonies and their colonisers, advocating for fair trade relationships, sovereignty over natural resources, and the right to nationalise key industries. Also Read | Global South's voice key to contemporary world's progress: PM Modi tells Ghana's Parliament The Global South has never been monolithic. Its diversity — vastly different histories, economies and political systems — has been both a potential source of strength and a cause of internal divisions that complicate efforts to form unified positions on global issues. However, the BRICS grouping has emerged as a more solidified possibility, representing a formalised attempt to advance many of the Global South's aims, even if it doesn't entirely embody its full aspirations or overcome all its inherent contradictions. The recent BRICS summit held in Rio de Janeiro exemplified this challenge, with members navigating different relationships with both the U.S. and Russia, particularly regarding the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, where most BRICS members have sought a middle ground in contrast to Western positions. Institutional voice BRICS began as an economic acronym coined by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill in 2001. It has now evolved into a substantial intergovernmental organisation comprising 35% of the global economy and almost half of the world's population — surpassing the G7's 30% economic share as of 2024. The bloc's primary objectives centre on fostering economic, political, and social cooperation among members while increasing their collective influence in international governance. This includes advocating for greater representation in global bodies, coordinating economic policy, and reducing reliance on the U.S. dollar. Initiatives such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) were designed to offer alternatives to Western-dominated financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Also Read | G7 summit: Will highlight priorities of Global South in G-7, says PM Modi The Rio summit demonstrated both the potential and limitations of this approach. The declaration's strong language on Gaza and Iran reflected genuine consensus on critical geopolitical issues as opposed to the West's view, while India's successful inclusion of condemnation of the Pahalgam terror attack showcased the bloc's capacity to address diverse security concerns. The summit also endorsed expanded roles for India and Brazil in the UN Security Council, advancing a long-standing demand for greater Global South representation. Significantly, the summit introduced a new 'partner countries' category, extending associate status to nations including Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. This institutional innovation suggests BRICS is evolving beyond its original membership structure to accommodate broader Global South participation. Priorities and realities The Global South's diversity becomes particularly apparent when examining BRICS members' different regional contexts and priorities. Brazil's focus on environmental issues and sustainable development reflects its role as a guardian of the Amazon rainforest, while also serving its agribusiness interests. India's emphasis on technology and services reflects its emergence as a global IT powerhouse, even as it maintains significant agricultural and manufacturing sectors. China's Belt and Road Initiative represents perhaps the most ambitious attempt at South-South cooperation, yet it has also generated concerns about debt dependency among recipient countries. Russia's inclusion in BRICS, despite its geographical location largely in the Global North, reflects how the grouping wants to transcend simple geographical boundaries for shared interests in challenging Western hegemony. Intra-BRICS trade has grown at a faster pace than that of G7 countries, demonstrating tangible shifts in global economic activity. Trade between Brazil and China increased fiftyfold in 20 years, and China-India trade rose 28 times in the same period. The NDB has begun providing alternative funding for sustainable development and infrastructure projects, addressing perceived gaps left by traditional financial institutions. Yet, the path to challenging Western economic dominance faces significant obstacles. The U.S. dollar remains entrenched as the world's principal reserve currency, used in the vast majority of global trade transactions. While BRICS advocates for lesser dependence on the dollar, creating a workable alternative currency system faces enormous technical and political hurdles. Internal Contradictions A critical examination of BRICS reveals inherent contradictions that mirror broader challenges in South-South cooperation. While the rhetoric emphasises solidarity and mutual benefit, the pursuit of national interests by individual members can overshadow collective goals. For example, China's domination within the grouping has resulted in lopsided economic engagement with other developing nations, leading to what some critics have termed 'near-colonial patterns of trade', where raw materials are exported to China in exchange for manufacturing goods. Brazil's advocacy for fairer global trading systems, while simultaneously pursuing the interests of its competitive export-oriented agribusiness sector, exemplifies how national economic interests can complicate collective solidarity. Russia's recent actions in Ukraine negate the idea of South-South cooperation as a legacy of former colonised nations. Besides, Western powers have not remained passive observers of BRICS' growth. Donald Trump, responding to the bloc's criticism of unilateral tariffs and military strikes on Iran, threatened that any country 'aligning itself with' what he termed 'the Anti-American policies of BRICS' would face an additional 10% tariff. This marked an escalation from his earlier threats of 100% tariffs if BRICS countries attempted to replace the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. Moreover, Western institutions have shown capacity to adapt and co-opt rising powers. The emergence of the G20 can be seen as a response designed to give emerging economies a seat at the table, even if decision-making remains largely influenced by dominant Western powers. Beyond National Interests: A People-Centered Vision As India prepares to assume BRICS leadership next year with its theme of 'Building Resilience and Innovation for Cooperation and Sustainability', the bloc stands at a crossroads. As the world's largest democracy and a major economy with complex relationships with both China and the U.S., India may be uniquely positioned to bridge internal divisions within BRICS. However, ongoing border tensions with China and India's growing strategic partnership with the U.S. through initiatives such as the Quad complicate its role as a unifying force. BRICS undoubtedly represents the most viable institutional expression of Global South aspirations, offering developing nations unprecedented collective economic leverage and political voice in global affairs. However, its current trajectory risks becoming merely another arena for great power competition rather than genuine transformation. The bloc's ultimate promise lies not in replacing Western hegemony with a new form of elite-driven multipolarity, but in evolving into a platform that prioritises the developmental needs and democratic aspirations of the Global South's peoples.
Hindustan Times
12-07-2025
- Business
- Hindustan Times
Modi's tour of Africa, Caribbean and S. America: Key takeaways
The 3,900 km long trip, the longest undertaken by Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi, took him to five countries on two continents in seven days (July 2-9). The careful choice of destinations, the fine details of the VVIP programme, the range of issues discussed, and the flawless execution of highly complex arrangements involved in State and official visits are all indicative of the new sophistication and aspiration of India's diplomacy. What the unparalleled visit achieved needs a critical examination. PM Narendra Modi(X/ @narendramodi) It was a tour with five phases. It began in Ghana in West Africa. Thereafter, Modi moved to Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean region. From there, he and his delegation went to the farthest point on their itinerary – Buenos Aires, the capital of Argentina. The fourth and central segment involved a stay in Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia for participation in the 17th BRICS summit and a state visit to Brazil. Finally, on the way home, the PM paid a State visit to Namibia. It is notable that a visit by the Indian PM to Ghana took place after three decades, to Namibia after 27 years, and to Trinidad and Tobago after 26 years. The three-fold goal was to exchange views and cement relations with important nations of the Global South, participate in the BRICS summit, and underline India's expanding worldview and the emerging global role. Ghana, which played a founder's role during the time of Kwame Nkrumah in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, remains a significant player in West Africa. President John Dramani Mahama, who secured a landslide victory in January, played the gracious host for the State visit. While the dialogue between the two leaders was wide-ranging, it focused on expanding economic cooperation, especially as Ghana has been going through a deep economic restructuring process at present. Four bilateral agreements were signed on cultural cooperation, enhancing standardization, traditional medicine, and the establishment of a joint commission to institutionalise high-level dialogue. Defence and cooperation in critical minerals emerged as areas of mutual interest. While in Accra, the PM addressed the parliament. The visit to Trinidad and Tobago coincided with the celebrations marking 180 years of the arrival of Indian immigrants to the country. By remarkable coincidence, both its President and PM are women, lawyers, and take pride in their Indian heritage. The visit enabled both sides to review the entire range of relations and devise ways and means to expand the development partnership further. A close look was accorded to the growth of ties in areas such as pharma, tertiary care, renewable energy, and digital infrastructure. Six new agreements were signed, and the PM made nine announcements on forging closer cooperation. A joint statement was issued. PM Modi addressed the parliament, emphasising the connection between the history, democracy, and people of the two nations. The visit to Argentina was PM Modi's second visit to the country. He was there earlier in 2018 for the G20 summit. Its significance lay in a series of indications given earlier that Argentina was keen to deepen cooperation with India. Information technology, digital healthcare, and energy cooperation emerged as having significant potential. Argentina holds the world's second-largest shale gas reserves and the largest shale oil reserves, besides substantial conventional oil and gas deposits. While bilateral trade has been on a stable trajectory, the two sides needed to work on the diversification of the trade basket. The two governments also discussed the expansion of the India-MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement. As a journalist put it, this visit was to the land of 'minerals and Maradona.' Modi noted in his departure statement, 'Argentina is a key economic partner in Latin America and a close collaborator in the G20.' The stay in Brazil was the pièce de résistance, imbued with immense significance, both from the perspective of BRICS and bilateral India-Brazil relations. In the absence of the presidents of China and Russia, media attention concentrated on the three leaders of the Global South at the BRICS summit – Brazil, India, and South Africa, as well as the president of the newly admitted member, Indonesia. Concerning the highlights of the summit's outcome, three points are notable. One, the summit produced a detailed declaration reflecting consensus on key issues of the reform of global governance institutions, peace and security, economic cooperation, and the climate crisis. It demonstrated that, despite its internal divergences, BRICS is more united than the G7 today. Two, BRICS has emerged as the most visible platform for projecting the needs and concerns of the Global South. Three, Brazil as the present chair and India as the next chair, were working closely to guide this grouping to attain new heights. PM Modi's State visit to Brazil was an honour for India. He visited Brazil earlier on three occasions in 2014, 2019, and 2024. The dialogue on this occasion with the Brazilian leadership focused on expanding bilateral partnership, covering trade and investment, agriculture, health, space, defense, and people-to-people relations. There was a joint decision to increase bilateral trade from the present level of $12 billion to $ 20 billion in the immediate future. The list of six bilateral agreements signed on terrorism and renewable energy, among others, was indicative of the areas where greater attention would be paid. A ministerial mechanism was set up for monitoring cooperation in trade, commerce, and investment. The joint statement entitled 'India and Brazil: Two Great Nations with Higher Purposes' revealed the full contours of a special transcontinental partnership. A one-day sojourn in Windhoek, the capital of Namibia, was the cherry on the cake. It revealed India's serious interest in an important, friendly nation in Southern Africa. It enabled Modi to hold an in-depth dialogue with President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, who took office in March. Their discussion would certainly mould what the two governments do in the future to expand and diversify economic and development cooperation, as well as cooperation in information technology and the defense domain. As a resource-rich country, Namibia is of interest to industries that need critical minerals. The visit resulted in two agreements and three announcements, including on Namibia joining the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) and the Global Biofuels Alliance. During the entire tour, PM Modi received four highest civilian honours. He delivered addresses at three different parliaments. He enunciated India's perspective on terrorism and several other issues of global and regional importance. In addition, at least three takeaways may be mentioned here. First, India's diplomacy has been moving in high gear in a fast, robust, but pragmatic manner. Developing countries perceive India as a natural partner, given its rising economy, technological progress, political stability, and charismatic leadership. Second, India is no longer relying on advancing large credits to its external partners. Instead, the focus now is on sharing proven experience and expertise in specific areas where the Indian development model has achieved success. Third, despite geopolitical conflicts and tensions, New Delhi remains confident of its ability to manage contradictions and balance its relationships with the North and the South. It sees no contradictions in India's membership of BRICS and Quad, and its presence as a regular guest at the G7. The government remains determined to dialogue with different groupings in the quest for finding an acceptable solution to global challenges, while promoting India's national interest. In the end, the results of PM's ambitious tour would be measured by the ability of India and its interlocutors to ensure optimal implementation of the agreements signed and the understandings reached. A positive impression has been created all around, and now it is time to carry the decisions to their logical conclusion. This article is authored by Rajiv Bhatia, Distinguished Fellow, Gateway House and former Indian ambassador.
