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Euractiv
5 days ago
- Politics
- Euractiv
Europe's wind farm army
Twelve nautical miles out to sea from the town of Łeba on Poland's coastline, the first of 76 new wind turbines are beginning to pierce the fog. The Baltic Power project will be one of the country's biggest offshore wind farms, generating enough electricity for 1.5 million homes. But its contribution to Europe's security goes beyond supplying power. The 120-metre towers are set to become sentinels, tirelessly scanning the brackish waters and leaden skies for hostile activity. In this new Cold War, where spying and sabotage threaten Europe's energy and communications infrastructure, and possibly even its territorial integrity, the potential of wind farms for military surveillance is lost on no one. As the Polish state secretary for EU affairs, Ignacy Niemczycki, told Euractiv on a windy boat ride out to the site: "We are looking at infrastructure differently than we were one year ago." Wake-up call When Finland and Sweden joined in 2023 and 2024, defence analysts dubbed the Baltic Sea 'Lake NATO', with members of the military alliance effectively encircling it. But after three years in which the strategically important waters have been plagued by drones, spy ships, aerial stand-offs and blatant sabotage of power and communication cables, the moniker is starting to ring hollow. There are only two strips of coastline on the Baltic that don't belong to NATO; both are Russian, and the area is becoming a geopolitical flashpoint. Now, more than three years after Russian tanks rolled across the border into Ukraine, the military alliance is looking to rally the serried ranks of offshore wind turbines, like the Baltic Power project, to Europe's defence. When the Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines were blown up in 2022, it came as a harsh 'wake-up call' to the European Union, says Julian Pawlak, a research associate at Hamburg military university (HSU). Western nations learned the hard way that they 'do not have a complete awareness of the Baltic Sea maritime domain'. The destruction last Christmas of the Estlink 2 undersea cable linking the Nordic electricity market to the Baltic power grid just before the latter cut ties with Russia was another rude awakening, and prompted NATO to set up a military operation in response. Making more off wind NATO has discussed dotting offshore energy infrastructure with surveillance tools for years. In the past, turning oil rigs into military bases has proven unfeasible for cost, security, and engineering reasons, Pawlak says. That's where wind turbines come in: They are tall, decentralised, and there are hundreds of them off the EU's Baltic coast. Already, wind turbines are equipped with bird sensors and transponders signalling their whereabouts to submarines, says Pawlak. Baltic Power – situated less than 200 kilometres from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad – is equipping its new turbine towers with radars and sensors, following a security checklist drafted by Poland's defence ministry, Marcin Godek, the wind farm's operations and maintenance manager, explained in June. "There is a perfect symbiosis between offshore wind turbines and coastal protection," says Kristof Verlinden, a reserve Belgian coast guard who runs offshore wind farms at the firm, Parkwind. For Verlinden, they are also "sentinels or forward bases looking at the situation 50 kilometres or more from the coast". More eyes Wind farms' growing importance also brings greater risk of attack. 'The threats to offshore energy infrastructure are very real,' says Giles Dickson, CEO of lobby group Wind Europe. 'Assets are being attacked physically, not just cyberattacks," he added, pointing to several cable attacks in the Baltic Sea. The Swedish government recently halted 13 offshore wind farm projects in the Baltic Sea citing 'unacceptable consequences for Sweden's military defence' and interfering with the military. And turbines themselves have previously become the target of surveillance by the Kremlin. Baltic Power mapped potential threats in the region before beginning construction. They quickly fell victim to spoofing, where boats pretend to be someone or somewhere that they are not, and incidents of signals jamming meant plans needed to be overhauled, Godek said. Faced with this new reality, WindEurope has hired ex-military personnel to liaise with NATO. 'You cannot build an offshore wind farm in Belgium now if you do not commit to high levels of data sharing with the military and also commit to host their hardware if they ask you to do so,' said Dickson. Verlinden said Parkwind has the foundations for the coastguard to install multi-use sensors and detection systems. Employees go to the offshore turbines almost daily and report back any irregularities. In Belgium, Parkwind holds joint exercises "to train, verify and demonstrate our readiness towards security threats" with the coast guard, Verlinden said. "And we are ready to share our data such as AIS data, cable DAS, give access to our seaward looking cameras." But the prospect of a web of wind turbines sharing data among themselves, their operators and governments, also raises questions. Pawlak pointed to the need for lawmakers to clarify whether operators should have access to any information they collect. Close collaboration with the military would raise legal questions that are 'not completely clear', he said. Birdwatching Edward Zakrajsek, who handles the European market at radar firm DeTect, said wind turbines have a long history of watching the surrounding area. 'Birds were the first thing, but of course 10 or so years ago private drones hit the market and everyone can fly one now,' he says. Radars are already 'monitoring even individual birds with a 10-kilometre range 24 hours a day', Zakrajsek said, adding that "drones are about the size of a bird'. The more offshore wind farms that can be networked together, the better the surveillance data will be, and Zakrajsek said, 'the further out they are the better'. (rh, vc, jp)
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First Post
07-08-2025
- Business
- First Post
By the rivers of hypocrisy: Will Nato's Rutte follow Trump to become a sanctions puppet?
In trying to impress Trump, Rutte may reduce Nato to little more than a loudspeaker for Washington's selective outrage read more (File) US President Donald Trump meets with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, DC, US, July 14, 2025. Reuters In July, Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte warned India, China and Brazil of potential '100% secondary sanctions' should they continue trading with Russia, particularly in oil and gas. Rutte — often seen as a close ally (almost a 'puppet') of US President Donald Trump — appeared not only out of touch with geopolitical realities but also displayed a degree of hypocrisy. Nato's present posture cannot be separated from its historical actions, a fact Rutte seemed willing to overlook. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Now, in his apparent quest to impress President Trump, the question remains: will Rutte mimic Trump by imposing similar sanctions on India for purchasing Russian crude? This moral high ground was notably absent in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea. At that time, India's import of Russian crude was minimal — just 0.2 per cent of its total oil purchases — while European nations heavily depended on Russian energy to power their homes and industries. Why Europe didn't stop buying Russian oil after Crimea In 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, the European Union responded with political and economic sanctions targeting individuals, banks and certain sectors of the Russian economy. However, energy exports were explicitly left out of the sanction's regime. This was a deliberate decision because European countries were heavily reliant on Russian fossil fuels, especially natural gas and oil, and feared that disrupting energy imports would lead to domestic shortages and price shocks. Consequently, energy trade between the EU and Russia continued largely uninterrupted. European dependence on Russian oil and gas even grew in some areas, with new pipelines like Nord Stream 2 under construction as late as 2021. It was only after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that the EU took meaningful action to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. In response to the 2022 war, the EU introduced sweeping sanctions on Russian oil, including a ban on seaborne crude imports, a price cap mechanism, and restrictions on refined petroleum products. This marked a significant turning point, forcing European countries to diversify their energy supplies by turning to the US, Norway, West Asian producers and increasing liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports. So, did Russia's unilateral announcement on September 30, 2022, regarding the annexation of territories in and around four Ukrainian oblasts — Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia — suddenly awaken the EU's long-dormant moral compass? Or was Crimea simply considered expendable? Where Europe's fuel comes from Europe's fuel mix is sourced from a combination of imported crude oil, domestic refining, alternative fuels and an emerging share of electricity for transport. The continent has a dense network of refineries that process crude oil into usable products like petrol, diesel and jet fuel. However, most of the crude oil processed in Europe is imported from abroad. Historically, Russia was the single largest external supplier of crude oil to the EU. Prior to 2022, Russia provided about 25–30 per cent of Europe's oil imports. Other major suppliers include Norway, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Kazakhstan and Nigeria. Even after the 2014 Crimea crisis, Europe continued purchasing Russian oil in large volumes. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In addition to conventional fuels, Europe also blends biofuels into its petrol and diesel streams, largely driven by EU renewable energy mandates. Biodiesel — produced from rapeseed, waste oils and palm oil — and bioethanol — produced from crops such as wheat and sugar beet — now comprise between 7 per cent and 10 per cent of the transport fuel mix in many EU countries. A small but growing proportion of vehicles, particularly in countries like Norway and the Netherlands, run on electricity. The electricity used in transport comes from diverse sources, including renewables (solar, wind, hydro), nuclear and fossil-fuel-based generation. However, EVs still make up a minority of the vehicle stock, meaning their impact on fuel consumption is still limited. A hollow fossil fuel moral compass Even the European Union's stand on the use of fossil fuels is nothing but hollow. According to the European Automobile Manufacturers' Association (ACEA), the European Union had approximately 285 million road vehicles in use as of 2023. This includes around 249 million passenger cars, 30 million light commercial vehicles, six million trucks and nearly 700,000 buses. These figures reflect gradual annual increases in each category, along with a modest but growing share of electrified vehicles, especially among newly registered cars. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In contrast, India's Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, via its Vahan portal and associated transport data, estimates that India has around 265 to 270 million registered vehicles as of 2024–2025. Unlike Europe, however, India's fleet is heavily skewed toward two-wheelers, which constitute roughly 75 per cent of the total. India's fleet of four-wheeled passenger cars and commercial vehicles is still smaller than Europe's. In India, two-wheelers average around 6,000 kilometres per year with a fuel efficiency of roughly 45 kilometres per litre. Given the estimated 180 million two-wheelers, this segment alone consumes about 24 billion litres of petrol annually. Passenger cars, which number around 40 million and average 12,000 kilometres annually at 15 kilometres per litre, consume approximately 32 billion litres. Light commercial vehicles or vans, estimated at 10 million units, account for another 15 billion litres. India's five million trucks, which are mostly diesel-powered and average about 60,000 kilometres a year with fuel efficiency around 4 kilometres per litre, consume an estimated 75 billion litres. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Buses, numbering around one million, add roughly 14.3 billion litres of diesel to the national total. Altogether, India's annual fuel consumption across all road vehicles is approximately 160 to 165 billion litres. In Europe, the consumption profile is shaped more by four-wheeled vehicles. Passenger cars, numbering around 249 million and averaging 12,000 kilometres per year at 17 kilometres per litre, consume approximately 176 billion litres annually. Vans, at about 30 million units, travel around 18,000 kilometres a year at 12 kilometres per litre, consuming around 45 billion litres. Europe's six million trucks, with high usage and relatively low fuel efficiency, consume an estimated 90 billion litres annually. Buses, which number approximately 680,000, consume about 9.7 billion litres. Altogether, the total estimated annual fuel consumption in Europe is roughly 320 to 325 billion litres, nearly double that of India. Europe uses nearly twice as much fuel as India Despite India's nearly comparable number of registered vehicles, Europe's road transport system consumes about twice as much fuel annually. This disparity is driven by several key factors. First, Europe's vehicle mix consists primarily of four-wheeled vehicles such as passenger cars, vans and heavy-duty trucks, which consume more fuel per kilometre than India's predominantly two-wheeler fleet. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Second, vehicles in Europe tend to be driven longer distances on average, especially in the commercial and freight sectors. Third, Europe has a higher proportion of diesel-powered vehicles, including large trucks and vans that consume significant fuel over long-haul routes. Combined, these elements result in Europe's annual road transport fuel consumption reaching over 320 billion litres, compared to India's approximately 160 billion litres. Nato's double standards on energy and ethics Nato's current posturing, exemplified by Rutte's threats of secondary sanctions, reeks of selective morality and geopolitical opportunism. It is difficult to take seriously an alliance that remained silent when its own member states continued — and even expanded — energy trade with Russia after Crimea, only finding its 'values' after 2022 when it suited their interests. Singling out countries such as India, China and Brazil now, while having profited handsomely from the very fossil fuel ties they now condemn, exposes not principled leadership but hypocrisy. Until Nato holds itself and its members to the same standards it demands of others — past and present — its rhetoric will ring hollow, and its credibility as a global moral arbiter will remain deeply compromised. The question is: will Trump's tail — Nato under Rutte — wag its tail just as eagerly?
Euractiv
28-07-2025
- Business
- Euractiv
Art of the (bad) deal: How the EU's Trump trade pact hits defence, energy, food and pharma
Barely a day after Ursula von der Leyen signed a trade pact with Donald Trump, it looks less like she averted a trade war and more like she surrendered in one. While the deal immediately avoids the prospect of 30% US blanket tariffs being slapped on the bloc's products next month, it will still make tariffs an undeniable status quo in trade ties across the Atlantic as a less onerous, but still stinging, levy of 15% on everything from cars to wines comes into force. If you find yourself asking where the wins are for the continent's businesses in the deal closed in Scotland on Sunday, the bloc's trade chief, Maroš Šefčovič, says there's more than just commerce at stake. It remains crucially unclear whether the EU can even deliver on some of its promises. Euractiv breaks down the most puzzling parts: Energy The EU would make 'significant purchases of US LNG, oil and nuclear fuels,' von der Leyen said – taking a page from her predecessor Jean-Claude Juncker who made the same pledge to Trump back in 2018. However, a senior Commission official admitted on Monday that "it is not the European Union that buys this energy." The deal for the EU to buy an extra $250 billion worth of US energy each year has already been mocked by most of the energy commentariat, as this would mark a nearly fivefold increase on the $64 billion the bloc imported from the US last year. Meanwhile, not all European refineries are keen to work with even larger quantities of American crude because of its distinctive chemical composition. When Juncker charmed his US counterpart with promises to import large bounties of LNG, the ploy worked – Trump focused his ire on the Russian Nord Stream 2 pipeline instead. It remains to be seen whether Brussels can get away with a similar strategy again. When asked on Monday whether he feared US retaliation once the jig was up, trade supremo Šefčovič dodged the question. Health On the pharmaceutical front, von der Leyen caused confusion on Sunday by stating that EU products were included in the EU-US deal, implying that they would be subject to 15% tariffs. However, a senior Commission official clarified on Monday that pharmaceuticals are exempt from the 1 August deadline. Nevertheless, there is a high possibility of US tariffs due to the ongoing Section 232 investigation by the US administration into whether foreign pharmaceutical products pose a national security risk. A similar investigation is also ongoing for semiconductors. The Commission has now said that if tariffs are imposed, they will not exceed 15%. However, this is something Trump has not publicly guaranteed. Another contentious issue is von der Leyen's pledge of €600 million in investments in the US, which didn't come with any kind of plan. Several MEPs, including members of her own political group the European People's Party, told Euractiv that von der Leyen has no mandate to commit to investments on behalf of the private sector. Lastly, many view the investment pledge as contradictory to the EU's ongoing efforts to retain pharmaceutical production within the bloc and to resist pressure from Trump to relocate operations to the US. Agriculture and food As part of the agreement, Brussels is removing trade barriers on US agricultural imports like soy and nuts – deemed non-sensitive, while also sweetening the deal with an extended lobster clause. While the US will likely keep selling lobster to European diners duty-free, European food will still face a 15% blanket import tariff to the US with no plans to exempt any specific EU products. In response, Brussels is now trying to protect two major exports, spirits and wine, from the fallout. An EU official confirmed that negotiations on alcoholic drinks are ongoing and insisted that they 'stayed firm on agriculture' during the talks. So far, there aren't any clear agri-food wins for the EU. Defence Defence trade between will remain tax-free, Trump said. It is, however, unclear at this stage whether steel and semiconductor chips, which are subject to tariffs, will also be exempt if destined for use in defence equipment production, hence not entirely answering the industry's questions on the tariffs' impact. While Trump said on Friday that Europeans will purchase "vast amounts" of US weapons, arms purchases are not part of Sunday's tariffs agreement. The reason is that the Commission, which negotiated the tariffs, has no authority over how EU capitals manage arms procurements using their national budgets. This remains a matter of national sovereignty and EU capitals already have billions of euros worth of air defence systems and other armaments on order. Tech Despite the Commission's own admission that the EU will likely fail to hit its target of producing a fifth of the world's semiconductors by 2030, von der Leyen served Trump a big political win on the chips. EU-made semiconductors will face a 15% tariff under the deal, while European chip-making equipment – critical for the production of the most advanced AI chips by US chip giant Nvidia – will remain tariff-free. This arrangement benefits US producers while hurting European businesses. Notably, the EU is home to ASML, a Dutch company that is the world's sole supplier of extreme ultraviolet lithography machines, which are essential for producing artificial intelligence chips. Reporting by Angelo Di Mambro, Aurélie Pugnet, Nikolaus J. Kurmayer, Sarantis Michalopoulos, Sofia Sanchez Manzanaro, and Théophane Hartmann. (jp, cs)
Euronews
03-07-2025
- Business
- Euronews
EU now imports more LNG than pipeline gas: Is it bad for the climate?
The first quarter of 2025 has marked a significant shift in EU gas imports. For the first time, the bloc seems to be importing more liquefied natural gas (LNG) than natural gas through pipelines: 8.4 million tonnes compared with 8.2 million tonnes, according to Eurostat data. The quantity of LNG imports soared by 12%, compared to Q1 2024, which also meant a sharp increase in money spent on these imports. This figure soared by 45%, totalling €5.3 billion. This shift was driven by the recent expansion or reactivation of LNG regasification facilities in countries like Poland, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, Croatia, Italy, Belgium and Greece following the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. More expensive and questionable environmentally: the dark side of LNG LNG implies higher upfront operational costs because it needs to be frozen to -162°C to be transported, becoming 600 times smaller in volume before it's regassified. Also, transporting it requires specially equipped trucks or cargo ships, which have a much bigger environmental impact than common pipelines. A study by New York's Cornell University quantified LNG's carbon footprint as 33% higher than coal. "The emissions of methane and carbon dioxide released during LNG's extraction, processing, transportation and storage account for approximately half of its total greenhouse gas footprint," says the study's author, Robert Howarth. Compared to pipeline gas, the International Energy Agency claimed LNG has a 67% larger carbon footprint (12 g CO2/MJ pipeline vs 20 g CO2/MJ). However, the International Energy Agency (IEA) insisted that there's room to bring emissions down by about 60% by reducing leaks and flaring, as well as using carbon capture. Why was the EU forced to resort to LNG? LNG is an extremely flexible resource, due to the possibility of signing short-term contracts, allowing for quicker adjustments to market downturns and volatility. The fact that importing LNG doesn't require pipelines also makes it more resilient to logistical issues like infrastructural damage or blockades, mitigating the impact of geopolitical shocks. The EU used to import a lot of natural gas from Russia via pipeline, but that dramatically changed after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. First, Moscow shut down its Nord Stream 1 pipeline to Europe, which was also badly damaged, later, in an underwater sabotage by unknown attackers, along with Nord Stream 2 (which was never launched). Additionally, almost no Russian gas is coming to Europe through Ukraine, as Kyiv didn't renew the necessary transit contracts in January. Russia remains the EU's second LNG provider after the US The share of Russian natural gas in total EU energy imports fell dramatically from 41% in 2021 to around 18% in 2024, according to EU Commission data. Faced with pipeline cuts, the EU was forced to pivot to liquefied gas. In 2025, the US continues to be the EU's largest LNG partner, accounting for just over half of all imports in value (50.7%), followed by Russia (17%) and Qatar (10.8%). Russia's imports, however, are still relevant, and the EU can't afford to cut them completely just yet. The bloc opted for sideline measures like a ban on future investments in LNG projects in Russia as well as a ban on the use of EU ports for the transhipment of Russian LNG, and on the provision of goods, technology and services for Russian LNG projects. Recently, the EU set 2027 as its deadline to stop all Russian energy imports, including LNG. Whether it will meet it or not, member states are rushing to diversify their gas partners, primarily boosting pipeline imports from Norway — which sells the EU over half of its natural gas imports — Azerbaijan and Algeria. Germany backs extraction agreement with the Netherlands "Energy prices are higher in the EU than in most other industrialised economies, presenting a fundamental competitiveness challenge," a recent Bruegel report read. Countries like Germany and Romania are responding by launching plans to boost gas extraction. On Wednesday, Berlin backed a cross-border agreement with the Netherlands for cross-border extraction in the North Sea. Bucharest is headed to the Black Sea with an ambitious project called Neptun Deep. This marks Romania's biggest energy project in two decades, and should become operational in 2027, to exploit the estimated 100 billion cubic meters of gas reserves. In Q1 2025, the EU spent 19% more on natural gas imports compared to the same period last year, although it bought 12% less in quantity. Regarding all energy imports, Eurostat notes that costs "increased slightly by 0.3%, while the volume decreased by 3.9%".
Reuters
27-06-2025
- Business
- Reuters
Germany considers law reform to block Russian-owned Nord Stream takeover
BERLIN, June 27 (Reuters) - Germany is considering changing its foreign trade law to prevent the company running the Nord Stream 2 pipelines from being taken over, a document showed on Friday, as part of Berlin's efforts to prevent any resumption of Russian gas imports. For decades Germany relied on cheap Russian gas, but since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, it has sought alternatives. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has said he will ensure Nord Stream 2, which the country once backed, would not go into operation, but for now the country has no legal means to prevent a sale of the assets, owned by Russian giant Gazprom ( opens new tab. The Nord Stream pipeline system comprises two double pipelines across the Baltic Sea to Germany and was the biggest route for Russian gas to enter Europe, capable of delivering 110 billion cubic metres of gas a year. The second link Nord Stream 2 was completed in 2021. It never became operational due to deteriorating relations between Russia and the West and was hit by unexplained explosions in 2022 that left one of its two lines intact. Swiss-based Nord Stream 2 has been going through insolvency procedures that could lead to asset sales. In November, The Wall Street Journal reported that U.S. investor Stephen P. Lynch was attempting to acquire Nord Stream 2, a report the Russian government denied. In a parliamentary response dated June 24, the German Economy Ministry said the government was discussing a possible amendment during this legislative period to the foreign trade law as it does not currently provide for any investment review in the event of a takeover. Der Spiegel magazine first reported the news. Former economy ministry state secretary and Green lawmaker Michael Kellner said the government must close this loophole. "Pipelines in Germany or Europe do not belong in the hands of Russian or American companies," he told Reuters. Gazprom did not reply to a request for comment.
