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Indian Express
12 hours ago
- Politics
- Indian Express
P Chidambaram writes: That's the way the cookie crumbles
In October 2024, Candidate Donald Trump said in an interview, 'Prime Minister Modi is the nicest human being and a total killer.' Visiting President Donald Trump in February 2025, Mr Modi said 'our vision for a developed India is to Make India Great Again or MIGA. When America and India work together, that is when it is MAGA plus MIGA, it becomes MEGA — a mega partnership for prosperity.' The two leaders exhibited the gravitas of brash school boys. Where are the dosti and bonhomie? I gather that Mr Modi and Mr Trump have not spoken to each other since May 7, 2025. The most that we know is that Vice-President J D Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke to Mr Modi on the night of May 9 and urged him to stop the war. Mr Trump alluded to such conversation(s) when he posted on Truth Social that 'After a long night of talks mediated by the United States, I am pleased to announce that India and Pakistan have agreed to a full and immediate ceasefire.' That announcement at 5.25 pm on May 10 rudely awakened Indians to the reality. Mr Trump was not bluffing. The cease-fire had been agreed at 3.35 pm and had come into effect at 5.00 pm on May 10, 2025. An unsmiling Foreign Secretary confirmed the facts at 6 pm. I think it is important to explore more deeply how America claimed that it had mediated (if not muscled) a cease-fire, and why. There are many plausible reasons: 🔴 Vice-President Vance conveyed 'alarming intel' to Mr Modi on the evening of May 9. The alarming intel could only have been the threat of use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan or the role of China. Both the prime minister and the defence minister have said India will not submit to 'nuclear blackmail': why was that phrase used if there was no such threat? 🔴 On the role of China, it is absolutely clear that China had allowed Pakistan to use Chinese aircraft (J-10) and Chinese missiles (PL-15). They could not have been used without Chinese inputs and Chinese presence in Pakistan Air Force's Command Centres. (India neutralised them and repulsed the attacks.) 🔴 Two websites — and — have carried reports that Colonel-rank Pakistan Army officers had been posted in Chinese PLA's Western and Southern Theatre Commands and in the Joint Staff Command of the Central Military Commission. Chinese battlefield guidance was obviously in play. 🔴 Pakistan claimed that it had used China-made hypersonic missiles to target India's S-400 air defence system. China's official news agency Xinhua described it as the 'dawn of a new era in warfare'. (At Adampur airbase, the air defence system was intact.) Look at the four-day war and its twisted course. On May 7, India entered the era of algorithm-driven wars. No soldier crossed the land border or Line of Control. No aircraft entered the rival's airspace. The main weapons were missiles and armed drones. India had the first-mover advantage and punished Pakistan severely between May 7 and 9. At that moment of triumph, Mr Trump intervened to end the war. He cast aside his friendship with the 'nicest human being' and bullied India to stop the war. Brushing aside India's discreet protests, Mr Trump publicly claimed during his visits to Saudi Arabia and Qatar that it was his mediation and the threat of 'no trade' that brought the war to an end. It is becoming clearer by the day that the Trump family's commercial interests were the moving force behind Mr Trump's intervention. The Trump family's crypto currency firm, World Liberty Financial (WLF), had negotiated with Pakistan, met Pakistan's prime minister and army chief, and signed a deal with Pakistan Crypto Council on April 26 — barely four days after the Pahalgam terror attack. As the war intensified, Mr Trump abandoned his initial 'hands off' approach. Frenetic activity began after May 7 and concluded with Mr Trump having the last word, as he claimed. Despite the dosti, America deported Indian 'illegal' immigrants in handcuffs and leg chains. Not a word of protest from the prime minister. Steep tariffs were imposed on imports from India; not a word. The US voted in favour of IMF's loan to Pakistan; not a word. Foreign students, including Indians, were barred from Harvard University; not a word. Indian students face the threat of revocation of their visas; not a word. Student visa interviews have been suspended; not a word. The dosti lies in a shambles. The Prime Minister of India is no longer dealing with the President of the United States. Mr Modi is dealing with the head of a family that owns the multi-million dollar WLF which has concluded a commercial deal with Pakistan. He is dealing with a businessperson who will not hesitate to use the cloak, armour, resources and power of POTUS. Despite the political support within India to Operation Sindoor and despite his strong words, Mr Modi is truly stumped by the behaviour of Mr Trump. Pakistan is no longer a push over: it has China's military support and America's diplomatic support. India has to go back to the drawing board to re-draw its military strategy. India has also to go back to the drawing board to re-draw its America policy.
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First Post
a day ago
- Politics
- First Post
Operation Sindoor: How India's communication strategy is hitting its target
The government clearly intends to retain the focus on strategic and security matters for the time being, and its information management is designed to allow it to do so read more The Indian government has put to use hard-learned lessons from the aftermaths of the Uri surgical strike (2016), Balakot airstrike, and the air skirmishes that followed (2019) in its Operation Sindoor communications strategy. And despite some difficult moments and seeming reverses, so far, the strategy has served India well. A Pattern from Past Conflicts Previous Indian successes on the battlefield were undermined in almost identical ways: Pakistan stage-managed a counter-narrative following Indian action; Western media and 'analysts' on these Pakistani official tours supported the Pakistani version; the issue then became controversial in the Indian media and political opposition; and the Indian government and armed forces were pressured to release and defend their battlefield-damage assessments. In other instances, firefighting disinformation and negative news shifted focus from the armed forces' strategic goals. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The number of terrorists actually killed in the Uri strike, whether terrorists were killed at all in the Balakot airstrike, and whether a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) F-16 was shot down in air skirmishes were all called into question in this manner. In the last instance, reluctant Indian armed forces were forced to make sensitive information public to support their claims. In the same post-Balakot dogfight, Pakistan falsely claimed to have downed two Indian fighter aircraft, wrongly announced the death of an Indian pilot, and showed video footage of Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman being manhandled by civilians. This created substantial pressure on the Indian government to manage public morale. Western reportage filtering back into Indian media resulted in the opposition demanding the release of video footage of the Uri strike and proof of the Balakot strike. There was also considerable frustration with the Western media's soft-pedalling of proof provided by the Indian government or media–The Print's outstanding reporting on the downing of an F-16 in 2019 is a case in point. India's communications handicaps were clear: one, evidence of inflicted damage lay in enemy territory; two, controversies played out in hostile territory–the Western media. The media landscape, however, has changed since 2019, with many Indians now trusting domestic online analysts and commentators over conventional media sources. There is also greater awareness that Western media's hostility towards India is structural: tainted by financial incentives and their home country's strategic interests. This is visible also in the Indian government's greater willingness to call out the Western media for both condescension and bias. These experiences have likely shaped the principles of India's current communication strategy: (1) Tightly controlled information; briefings restricted to dry facts released by designated officials; (2) Silence on real-time discussion of 'operational details'; (3) Announcing successes with proof; (4) Engaging with foreign media on India's terms; (5) Communicating for and with foreign governments; (6) Tailoring messaging to outsource aspects of context-setting, analysis, and public morale management to online commentators. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Let us examine how these principles played out. Information Control Daily briefings were initially held by a team consisting of Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, Colonel Sophia Qureshi, and Wing Commander Vyomika Singh. The Press Information Bureau (PIB) and the Ministry of Defence's Additional Directorate General of Public Information (ADGPI) put out press releases and online messages. These were the only sources of information. The briefing team was aptly chosen: as Operation Sindoor was named to evoke the red vermillion worn by married Hindu women–in response to terrorists singling out and massacring Hindu men in front of their wives at Pahalgam on April 22–women military officers on the podium signified women power, professionalism, and national unity. A short intro film showing past attacks on India by Pakistan-based terrorists was also screened on the first day. That apart, the briefings were to the point, factual, and technical (with photographs or videos of strikes shown at times). STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD After the deplorable trolling of Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri (and his family) for merely announcing the ceasefire, later briefings were conducted by the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) of all three armed services. Details of some operations were now shared–perhaps as more information became available and the DGMOs were better placed to decide on disclosures. The emphasis on intelligent control of information was maintained all through. Silence on Operational Details Minutes after India announced Operation Sindoor, Pakistan claimed to have downed several Indian jets, including Rafales. PIB issued generic disclaimers about 'misinformation' and fact-checked fake posts purporting to show visuals of downed jets. Similarly, Indian embassies approached for comment merely responded 'disinformation' and no more. Even Indian diplomats interviewed on foreign television channels wouldn't be drawn into confirming or denying these rumours. Announcing Successes with Proof The DGMOs provided satellite images, videos, photographs, and other data as proof of successful hits. What about Pakistan's losses? '[W]e would not like to hazard a guess out here, I have the numbers and we are getting into technical details to establish it,' said Indian Air Marshal. Contrast this with the Pakistan defence minister getting called out on international television for citing social media posts as proof of downing Indian planes. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD This measured, professional approach may just be paying off. By the time of writing, the narrative has shifted in India's favour in several quarters, with even the perceivedly anti-India New York Times conceding that '[w]here India appears to have had a clear edge is in its targeting of Pakistan's military facilities and airfields.' Subsequently, 'sources' have revealed tactical details like India disguising drones as fighter jets to ' bait and disable Pakistan's Chinese-supplied air defence systems'. Perhaps the shaping of narrative goes on. Dealing with Foreign Media on India's Terms As detailed above, India refused to be drawn into discussions about operational matters, especially possible losses. That this is wise can easily be established by contrasting press claims country-wise (and so, vested-interests-wise): defence competitors of France like the US (which has offered to sell India F-35s); Pakistan's arms supplier and US adversary, China; and Rafale-manufacturer, France. Further, Indian diplomats, rather than politicians, were fielded to engage with the foreign press. Some diplomats' interviews were masterclasses in messaging control. The Indian High Commissioner to the UK, Vikram Doraiswami, for example, responded to a question about Pakistan downing Indian jets by asking why Pakistan was still escalating the conflict if it had indeed done so. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Indian High Commissioner to Singapore Shilpak Ambule countered a suggestion that India hadn't provided proof of Pakistan's involvement in the Pahalgam massacre, stating that India had submitted proof to the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee for years, including on the terrorist group involved, an offshoot of Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, The Resistance Force (TRF). Communicating for and with Government From the very start, India aimed its communications at the community of world governments. Operation Sindoor was lucidly framed: as a response to the Pahalgam massacre and directed at terrorists; non-escalatory, as the Pakistan Army was not targeted; designed to avoid collateral damage; and placing the choice of escalation in Pakistan's court. Indian diplomats in foreign media stuck to this line. They retained focus on Pahalgam and emphasised that the off-ramp was available to Pakistan, even while asserting that India would respond to escalation with force. Meanwhile, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, and Foreign Secretary Misri briefed counterparts around the world and envoys about India's actions and approach. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The next step was briefing 70 foreign service attaches (defence attaches) serving in India. This was a way of dealing directly with the grown-ups of the strategic world. Unlike in the media space, these military professionals would appreciate India's restraint and scale of success in strategic terms. It was also an opportunity to showcase India's defence prowess and Indian-manufactured defence technology. Trusting the Influencer Ecosystem India has a massive YouTube ecosystem of political commentators and defence analysts, with several of them being retired military, civilian, and diplomatic officials. The government appeared to trust them to declutter complex military information for their audiences and highlight successes. It was these analysts who discussed threadbare the import of Indian strikes on Pakistani airbases along with satellite images and other technical details. This was an invaluable exercise in educating the public on India's military platforms and operational successes and in effectively countering enemy disinformation. For instance, online analysts quickly debunked visuals purportedly showing Indian jets shot down by pointing out that the drop tanks and not wreckage. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD These channels also helped prepare their audiences for any possible battlefield losses by emphasising strategic goals. Overall, the online ecosystem played a major part in managing public morale. Missteps and Curveballs The real narrative curveball, however, came with President Donald Trump announcing the ceasefire and stating that the United States had brokered it. Coming as it did when India was toying with Pakistan's air defences and hitting military targets at will, the suggestion that America stopped the fighting was spun as a minor face-saver for Pakistan. India asserts, quite rightly, that the Pakistan DGMO's 'frantic' calls to his Indian counterpart were, in effect, pleas for peace. Feeling cheated out of a crushing win, there was anger amongst Indians. PM Modi's speech on May 12 addressed these concerns by announcing the following: that Pakistan had pleaded for a ceasefire; Operation Sindoor was now India's permanent policy on cross-border terrorism; the Indus Water Treaty would remain in abeyance; India would no longer tolerate 'nuclear blackmail'; there would be no talks with Pakistan until terror stopped; and when talks occurred, they would only be on terror and the return of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. In essence, PM Modi asserted that Pakistan had achieved none of its strategic goals, that there was no scope for talks or mediation, and that Pakistan was now on probation. So, at this time, it's surprising to see talk of India losing the narrative war. So who's winning? Pakistan, which has withdrawn into a delusory propaganda bubble where it claims victory? Does that claim fool anyone beyond its borders? Are political noises about the United States brokering a peace a loss? India certainly had no interest in Pakistan being handed a face-saver, but, having demonstrated its military superiority, India also had no interest in prolonging the conflict–India's restraint and leaving the escalatory off-ramp open for Pakistan to show as much. And ultimately, whose 'narrative approval' is one seeking? The Indian media and public must display the same self-confidence that their leadership has in their messaging strategy. Meanwhile, one hopes the Indian government will make this evidence-based, assertive, and professional communication approach its default. Post Script: Phase 2 Since the initial writing of this piece, the Government of India has formed seven all-party delegations of Members of Parliament (MPs) to visit and brief foreign governments about Operation Sindoor, its context, and India's policy towards terror going forward. This is the next step in India's efforts to communicate directly with foreign governments. All-party representation in these delegations is also intended to project a united front and limit political controversy about security matters at this time. A move that seems to have worked so far. Additionally, as former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal has pointed out, multi-party composition may create space for foreign media to look past any anti-BJP biases they might hold. These delegations have been remarkably on message even as MPs have brought their own flair to its articulation. In fact, opposition MPs on these delegations have been able to voice opinions on matters like the US brokering a peace deal more openly than ruling party MPs may have been able to. Meanwhile, more evidence of India's strikes has been put out, only now with added commentary and reactions from military personnel involved in the planning and execution of Operation Sindoor. Increasingly, private sources along with journalists are bringing out or confirming evidence shared by the Indian armed forces. A few opposition moves to create a controversy around the external affairs minister's comments have also not fully taken off so far, in part, because Operation Sindoor is ongoing and operational matters have not been fully disclosed. In India's democratic system, disclosures to parliament (or its committees) or the public are inevitable, and a degree of controversy will perhaps accompany them. But the government clearly intends to retain the focus on strategic and security matters for the time being, and its information management is designed to allow it to do so. In all, the Government of India's approach has held to the principles discussed in this article as it moves past the crisis-communication stage into a new normal. The writer is the published author of two novels (Penguin, India and Westland, India) based out of the San Francisco Bay Area. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
The Star
a day ago
- Politics
- The Star
China extends destroyer strike range with airborne early warning system: CCTV
China's most powerful destroyer can now strike beyond visual-range targets with pinpoint precision by linking to an airborne early warning system – the same technology used by the Pakistan Air Force in the recent Kashmir conflict – according to state broadcaster CCTV. On Sunday, CCTV confirmed for the first time that the Type 055 stealth guided-missile destroyer Lhasa could use data links to synchronise with People's Liberation Army's airborne early warning platforms, enabling it to conduct long-range anti-ship and air-defence strikes without relying solely on the ship's radars. Song Zhongping, a former PLA instructor and military commentator, said this represented a major advance in operational coordination. 'Battlefield data fusion – what we call 'situation connectivity' – means complete interoperability and seamless information sharing across domains,' he said. CCTV footage showed the Lhasa taking part in a live-fire exercise involving multi-service coordination under the PLA's Northern Theatre Command, firing missiles guided by airborne targeting cues. Shipborne helicopters and sensors fed data into the combat centre for simultaneous sea‑and‑air engagements, the report said. 'We used data links to share battlefield awareness in real time with the early warning aircraft, significantly expanding our detection range,' Wang Mingwei, a senior sergeant on the Lhasa, told CCTV. 'It allows us to identify both air and sea threats far beyond visual range.' Song said the networked capability mirrored Pakistan's use of the same Chinese technology to shoot down Indian fighters near the disputed Kashmir region. In that engagement, Pakistan's J-10CE fighter jets fired PL-15E long-range air-to-air missiles which were guided mid-flight by a ZDK-3 airborne warning aircraft using target data relayed from a ground-based HQ-9B air defence system. This 'A-detect, B-launch, C-guide' strategy, as reported by CCTV shortly after the Kashmir clash, avoided triggering radar alarms on India's French-made Rafale jets and showed how integrated data links reduced dependence on onboard sensors. 'The Pakistani side used a Chinese-style networked strike system that fused ground, air and space-based sensors,' Song said. 'It shows that through full data link integration, platforms don't have to rely solely on their on-board sensors to prosecute engagements effectively – this is modern joint warfare in action.' Similarly, the Lhasa is equipped with the navy version of the HQ-9B system, which has an estimated range of 260km (161 miles). The US military has long assessed the system as effective against medium- and high-altitude targets but less so against low-flying, sea-skimming missiles such as the American AGM-158C long-range anti-ship missile. Song said this limitation was being addressed through newly confirmed joint operations. 'Together, they compensate for Earth curvature, providing real-time guidance for intercepting low-altitude targets hundreds of kilometres away before the enemy even knows what's happening.' He said the same battle data network 'essentially stretches the maximum range of our most lethal weapons, like the YJ-series missiles, to their true limits. With every sensor linked, the PLA can strike first, deep and precisely.' The system supports advanced missiles, such as the supersonic YJ-18 and hypersonic YJ-21, with ranges stretching from several hundred to more than 1,000km (600 miles). This extended range can only be fully exploited through external targeting support – precisely what the integration with airborne warning systems now provides. Song also drew comparisons to a US military concept proposed in 2017 which aims to connect sensors and weapons from multiple domains into a dynamic, system-of-systems modular combat network. 'What the PLA has now demonstrated with the Type 055 reflects many principles of mosaic warfare,' he said, referring to using a combination of diverse combat platforms and systems to overwhelm the enemy. The Lhasa, commissioned in 2021, is the second hull in the Type 055 class and features 112 vertical launch cells, advanced dual-band active electronically scanned array radar and a displacement of around 12,000 tonnes. - SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
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India.com
a day ago
- Politics
- India.com
‘Absolutely Incorrect: CDS General Chauhan Rubbishes Pakistans Claims on Indian Jets Being Shot Down
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan on Saturday strongly rebutted Pakistan's recent claim of "downing" of Indian jets, amid rising tensions after India's precision strikes under 'Operation Sindoor,' saying that the claim was 'absolutely incorrect.' His remarks came after Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on Wednesday reiterated claims that the Pakistan Air Force had shot down six Indian fighter jets during recent India-Pakistan tension. "I think what is important is that not the jet being downed, but why they were being downed. So the good part is that we are able to understand the tactical mistake which we made remediate, rectify it, and then implement it again after two days, and flew all our jets, again targeting at long range. Absolutely incorrect, and that is not information which I said is important. What is important is why they were downed. That is more important for us. And what did we do after that? That's more important," General Chauhan told Bloomberg TV on Saturday. — Sidhant Sibal (@sidhant) May 31, 2025 CDS Chauhan also said that despite having greater diversity than the neighbouring country, India is today ahead of Pakistan on all fronts due to its long-term strategy. CDS Chauhan pointed out that despite both countries gaining independence at the same time and Pakistan being ahead of India on various parameters, including social, economic and per capita GDP, today New Delhi is ahead of them. "Now, on the India-Pakistan relationship, we are not operating without a strategy. When we gained independence, Pakistan was ahead of us on every metric: social, economic, and GDP per capita. Today, India is ahead on all fronts: economic performance, human development, and social harmony, despite our greater diversity. That didn't happen by accident; it's a result of long-term strategy," ANI quoted Chauhan as saying. "Diplomatically, we've reached out like in 2014 when the PM invited Nawaz Sharif. But it takes two hands to clap. If all we get in return is hostility, then disengagement may itself be a sound strategy for now," CDS Chauhan added.
The Print
a day ago
- Business
- The Print
All about J-35A, the Chinese fifth-generation stealth fighter Pakistan plans to acquire
Pakistan, the reports suggest, placed its official order in December 2024, with delivery of over 30 fighters anticipated between August 2025 and early 2026. Islamabad is said to have finalised the purchase of up to 40 of these stealth fighters from China. If the delivery takes place, it will mark the first international export of the aircraft which was unveiled in Zhuhai Air Show in November last year. New Delhi: The Chinese imprint on Pakistan armed forces is set to deepen further as reports suggest that Beijing is fast-tracking the delivery of its fifth-generation J-35A stealth fighter jet to its long-time ally. The deal is being hailed in the two countries as a game-changer for the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). The aircraft will complement and enhance the PAF's modernisation drive, which includes recent inductions of the JF-17 Block III and J-10CE fighters. Currently, India is pursuing its own project to develop a fifth-generation stealth fighter jet–the advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA). On Thursday, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh announced the approval of the AMCA programme execution model. Developed by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC), a subsidiary of the state-owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), the J-35 is a twin-engine stealth multirole fighter evolved from the FC-31 Gyrfalcon prototype—a once privately funded project aimed at the export market after SAC lost the J-XX program bid to Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group. First introduced as the 'F-60' at a Beijing innovation contest in September 2011, the FC-31 took to the skies on 31 October 2012. Although initially outside China's official military development stream, growing interest from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the PLA Navy prompted the FC-31's transformation into two formal variants: a land-based J-35A for the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and a carrier-based version for the PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF). As of now, China is the only country besides the US (F-22 and F-35) to field two operational fifth-generation stealth fighters—the Chengdu J-20 'Mighty Dragon' and the Shenyang J-35. While the J-20 is tailored for long-range air superiority, the J-35A offers multirole versatility with a lighter footprint and greater export potential. Also Read: From non-delivery of fighters to constant delays & 'black sheep', IAF chief speaks out Copy cat? The J-35A is reported to come with next-generation avionics, sensor fusion systems, and a weapons payload capacity of up to 8,000 kg—2,000 kg internally and 6,000 kg externally. What catches the eye is the striking similarity it shares with the F-35 that often led to the accusation of the Chinese copying the American stealth fighter, a charge that has stuck with the Asian powerhouse given its notoriety of cloning technology either borrowed or stolen from Russia and the West. While both the J-20 and J-35A feature stealth and advanced avionics, they serve distinct roles. The J-20, with its larger airframe, more powerful WS-10C or future WS-15 engines, and extensive sensor suite, is designed for long-range air dominance. In contrast, the J-35A offers multirole agility and is tailored for medium-range missions. The J-20 remains China's flagship stealth platform, while the J-35A opens new possibilities for China's defense exports and allied force multipliers. The arrival of the J-35A in Pakistan will be a defining moment in South Asia's military landscape. Analysts suggest that the new stealth fleet could give the PAF a 7–14 year advantage in fifth-generation capability over India, depending on the AMCA timeline. The platform's success will depend heavily on seamless integration with Pakistan's existing infrastructure and China's continued support in training, logistics, and maintenance. Once operational, the aircraft will not only elevate Pakistan's aerial combat abilities but also underscore China's growing influence as a global defense supplier and stealth aircraft innovator. Aditya Shrikhande is an intern who graduated from ThePrint School of Journalism. (Edited by Tony Rai) Also Read: In wake of Jamnagar crash, a look at chequered legacy of IAF's SEPECAT Jaguar
