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Irish Independent
4 days ago
- Politics
- Irish Independent
I led US talks for Bill Clinton with Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak – 25 years on, Israel now has its best chance for lasting peace in Gaza
In July 2000, we were optimistic about ending the conflict. Over the preceding seven years, since the beginning of the Oslo process – which provided mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation and called for the creation of a Palestinian Authority (PA) to negotiate peace with Israel – we had produced four partial agreements: the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Interim Agreement, the Hebron Protocol and the Wye River Memorandum. But in two weeks at Camp David, even as his negotiators signalled some flexibility, Yasser Arafat, the PA president, rejected every proposal we made. At one point he told Clinton that we would be walking in his funeral procession if he accepted what the US was asking. Arafat did allow his representatives space to negotiate afterward, and in December he and I met privately. He said he could accept the ideas I laid out for overcoming the gaps on the core issues of Jerusalem, refugees, borders and security. We brought Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams to Washington to try to finalise an agreement, and when they could not, both sides asked us to present a bridging proposal that became known as the 'Clinton parameters'. The death and destruction in Gaza has soured many Arab publics on Israel – and their leaders are mindful of this While Israeli leader Ehud Barak accepted them, Arafat did not. Instead, he reignited violence and the second intifada, a five-year uprising in which thousands died on both sides. There has been no political progress between Israelis and Palestinians since then, even though Israel withdrew unilaterally from Gaza in 2005. The Abraham Accords in 2020, during Donald Trump's first term, marked the expansion of Arab-Israeli peace, with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco normalising relations with Israel. President Joe Biden sought to deepen the co-operation those accords promised. By 2023, the administration was on the verge of working out a pact with Saudi Arabia – the Saudis would get a defence treaty with the US and American support for an expansive nuclear-energy industry, in return for normalising relations and making peace with Israel. Hamas's onslaught on Israel on October 7, 2023, was motivated in part by the desire to kill the prospect of this deal. Saudi officials later told me that had Israel succeeded more quickly in defeating Hamas without destroying much of Gaza and killing so many people there, normalisation would have already taken place. But the death and destruction in Gaza has soured many Arab publics on Israel, and their leaders are mindful of this mood. At the same time, these Arab leaders are not unhappy that Israel has vastly weakened Iran and devastated its regional proxies. Iran's loss of much of its coercive capability – and its need to focus domestically on preserving the regime – creates an opportunity for peace and regional integration. Timing is to statecraft what location is to real estate: in other words, seize the moment Even with all the uncertainty in Lebanon and especially in Syria, the potential may exist to negotiate non-belligerency agreements, if not full normalisation, with Israel. Trump rightly wants to capitalise on the changed balance of power in the region to produce Saudi normalisation with Israel and expand the Abraham Accords. Timing is to statecraft what location is to real estate: in other words, seize the moment. But given Arab attitudes, nothing can happen until the war in Gaza ends and the Israeli military withdraws. Israel has already defeated Hamas as a military, but it seeks to ensure that the group no longer controls Gaza. For that, there must be an alternative to Hamas. At this point, neither the Trump administration nor prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has developed a credible 'day after' plan to prevent a vacuum in Gaza. Nor have the Arabs presented a credible plan for the demilitarisation of Gaza, despite the reality that there will be no serious reconstruction without it. No one will offer meaningful investment in Gaza if Hamas can reconstitute itself militarily, making certain that war will erupt again. Even if the current talks over creating a 60-day ceasefire are successful, nothing will change if it does not to lead to ending the war in Gaza, the release of all Israeli hostages, and the withdrawal of the IDF. If Netanyahu is to take advantage of the moment Israel's military achievements have created, he will need to accept both this and a transitional administration led by the UAE, Egypt, Morocco and the Saudis, with participation from the PA. The Arab leaders must assume the responsibility of making sure that the Palestinian Authority undergoes serious reforms: President Mahmoud Abbas assumes a ceremonial position, a newly empowered and internationally credible prime minister is appointed, and transparent financial, investment and budgeting processes are created and monitored by the World Bank. Gaza under the PA's leadership, even after a transitional period of two to three years, is an illusion without such changes. Without an end to Palestinian division and incitement, talk of a Palestinian state is little more than a slogan. Arab leaders must help deliver reforms, and a practical approach that begins to demonstrate that a Palestinian state won't be a failed state. As long as Israelis believe any Palestinian state will be dominated by Hamas or other extremists, they will be reluctant to embrace even the idea any time soon. History creates moments of opportunity, but they rarely last. With Iran and the forces that depend on conflict weakened, this is the chance to forge a new coalition of countries that favour social and economic progress instead of war. (© Bloomberg)
News18
5 days ago
- Politics
- News18
India's Voice Is Strategic, Not Silent
To say India has 'lost its voice,' as some critics argue, is to misunderstand what that voice sounds like today. In moments of war, outrage is easy. Diplomacy is not. And in the shadow of the Gaza crisis, with bombs falling, civilians dying, and global opinion fracturing, the urge to take a moral stand can feel overwhelming, especially for a democracy like India, long seen as a voice for the voiceless. But to say India has 'lost its voice," as some critics argue, is to misunderstand what that voice sounds like today. It's not the voice of X (previously Twitter) diplomacy. It's not always loud. But it is deliberate, strategic, and deeply shaped by history. India was one of the earliest champions of the Palestinian cause. In 1974, it became the first non-Arab country to officially recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). By 1988, it had recognised the State of Palestine. This was not just foreign policy, it was an extension of India's own story: a nation born from anti-colonial struggle, standing in solidarity with others seeking the same. And while the headlines may focus on India's growing defence partnership with Israel, its support for Palestinian civilians has been steady and substantial. Since the conflict began, India has sent nearly 70 metric tonnes of humanitarian aid to Gaza, including 16.5 metric tonnes of life-saving medical supplies delivered in two separate tranches. This aid went directly to United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) and the Palestinian Ministry of Health. That's not all. In 2024 alone, India disbursed $5 million to UNRWA, matching its contribution from the previous year. These funds support education, healthcare, and emergency services for Palestinian refugees, many of whom have nowhere else to turn. India's diplomatic engagements also underscore its commitment to the Palestinian cause. In September 2024, Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on the sidelines of the Summit of the Future in New York, expressing deep concern over the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and reaffirming India's steadfast support for the Palestinian people India's policy is rooted in a clear position: firm support for a negotiated two-state solution. Since the Hamas–Israel war erupted in October 2023, the UN General Assembly has voted 13 times on resolutions related to Palestine. India voted for 10 of them. It abstained on just three. That's not indifference, it's discernment. India isn't choosing sides. It's choosing balance. In 1992, as the Cold War order gave way to new alliances and economic pragmatism, India established full diplomatic ties with Israel. India wasn't walking away from Palestine. It was stepping into a multipolar world, where relationships needed to reflect not just ideology, but national interest, security, and innovation. Israel offered what India urgently needed: advanced defence technology, agricultural innovation, counter-terror expertise. And for Israel, India became a key democratic partner in the Global South, vast, stable, and increasingly influential. Today, the relationship is multifaceted. Israel supplies India with drones, radar systems, and missile technology. Intelligence cooperation runs deep. For a country facing cross-border terrorism, complex insurgencies, and a volatile neighbourhood, this partnership is neither optional nor ideological, it is essential. India lives with the daily reality of terrorism. Its foreign policy can't be built on ideals alone, it must function in a world of asymmetric threats, complex alliances, and 1.4 billion people watching. And yet, India has not abandoned the Palestinian cause. India continues to support a two-state solution. It sends humanitarian aid to Gaza. It engages with both Israeli and Palestinian leadership. This is not fence-sitting. It's calibration. And it's exactly what a rising power is supposed to do. It has consistently called for restraint, civilian protection, and de-escalation. India's commitment to peace remains unchanged. What's evolved is its approach: quieter influence, strategic action, and diplomacy that prioritises outcomes over optics. And then there's Iran. India's ties with Tehran run deep. Strategically, Iran gives India access to Afghanistan and Central Asia through the Chabahar Port. Economically, Iran has long been a vital source of energy. India's engagement with Iran remains active and strategic, anchored by the Chabahar Port, a project critical to New Delhi's regional connectivity and geopolitical balancing. In May 2024, India and Iran signed a 10-year agreement granting India Ports Global Ltd. (IPGL) the rights to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal. India committed $120 million in direct investment and extended a $250 million credit line to upgrade infrastructure. Jointly managed by IPGL (a JV between Jawaharlal Nehru and Kandla Port Trusts) and Iran's Aria Banader, Chabahar offers India a crucial alternative trade route to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Russia bypassing Pakistan and countering China's influence through Gwadar Port and the Belt and Road Initiative. As tensions between Iran and Israel escalate, India is closely monitoring risks to both Chabahar and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal trade network linking India to Eurasia via Iran. These tensions are not abstract for India, they are tied to real infrastructure, energy flows, and diplomatic alignments. And they sharpened dramatically after October 7, when Hamas launched a brutal attack on Israel that triggered the ongoing war in Gaza. India responded immediately and unequivocally: it condemned Hamas's actions as terrorism. But condemnation did not mean abandonment. India's support for Palestinian self-determination, anchored in decades of principled diplomacy remains intact. To some, that duality may look like fence-sitting. In truth, it's strategic autonomy: a deliberate choice in a volatile world. This is not appeasement. It's agency. India has always believed in peace but not performatively. It acts. Quietly. It evacuated its citizens from Israel and Iran during the height of tensions. It sent aid to Gaza. And it remains one of the few countries that can still speak to all sides, Israel, Palestine, Iran, the United States, the Gulf. That, too, is power. The world is not binary. India knows this better than most. To expect India to echo talking points is to ignore the reality of a multipolar world. India doesn't follow anymore. It positions. Predictably, much of the moral outrage over India's foreign policy comes not from the global South or West, but from India's own opposition benches, especially the Congress Party, which now seems more committed to performative critique than constructive diplomacy. Whether it was the Balakot airstrikes, the abrogation of Article 370, or India's engagement with Israel, Congress's pattern has remained consistent: question first, assess later. From surgical strikes to border skirmishes, Congress's instinct has been reflexive doubt, especially when national interest clashes with its preferred narrative. At best, it's ideological rigidity. At worst, it's political self-sabotage. Either way, it does not align with India's 21st-century realities. After the October 7 Hamas attacks, India unequivocally condemned terrorism. Congress chose to frame this as a deviation from India's principled foreign policy, overlooking the fact that condemning terrorism and supporting Palestinian rights are not mutually exclusive. This tendency to politicise foreign policy choices, often in the face of cross-party consensus, undermines both credibility and coherence. Moreover, by portraying strategic partnerships as ideological compromises, the party risks disconnecting from the lived realities of a rising India, one that must engage with a multipolar world on its own terms. Foreign policy isn't theatre. It's triage. India today is balancing multiple priorities, deepening ties with Israel, managing energy dependencies with Iran, building strategic infrastructure in Chabahar, and remaining a voice for de-escalation in West Asia. That balancing act is fragile. It cannot afford to be derailed by outdated moral binaries or domestic political point-scoring. top videos View all In a world that's fracturing into camps, India is refusing to be boxed in. It is doing what serious nations do, preserving space to speak to all sides. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. About the Author Natasha Jha Bhaskar Natasha Jha Bhaskar is Executive Director at Newland Global Group, Australia's leading corporate advisory firm focused on strengthening India-Australia trade and investment ties. She is also the UN Women More tags : israel-gaza war Israel-Iran tensions Narendra Modi view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: June 23, 2025, 11:55 IST News opinion Opinion | India's Voice Is Strategic, Not Silent Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. 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Middle East Eye
13-07-2025
- Politics
- Middle East Eye
PLO says Israel seeks to build 2,339 illegal settlement units in West Bank
Israel plans to build 2,339 settlement units across the occupied West Bank, Al Jazeera reported, citing a statement by the Palestine Liberation Organisation's National Office for the Defence of Land and Resistance of Settlement. The report said 1,352 of the units will be constructed in Qalqilya, 430 units in northeast Ramallah and northwest of the occupied East Jerusalem, 407 units in Bethlehem, and 150 units in the west of Ramallah. The plan also includes the establishment of the 'Samaria National Park' in the Palestinian town of Sebastia, north of Nablus. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in July 2024 that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal under international law.
Otago Daily Times
07-07-2025
- Politics
- Otago Daily Times
Where are the peacemakers in the holy land?
Will the war-torn holy land ever be peaceful again? Joss Miller asks. In 1982, my wife Dawn and I spent a couple of weeks travelling around Israel. We were keen to get a sense of this country, whose inception as a state in 1948 was relatively recent. There had been major wars with Arab neighbours in 1956, 1967 and 1973 that had a profound effect in shaping its security framework and high level of militarisation. Tel Aviv was a modern, vibrant and bustling city. Jerusalem was easily accessed from there by bus and had all the hallmarks of a special city for many cultures and religions. One could sense though a certain fragility and impermanence, given the turmoil of numerous invasions and conquests that had taken place there over the centuries. Southwards lay the starkness of the Negev desert, with arid, gaunt hills surrounding it. Eilat, a coastal resort situated on the Red Sea, was a mecca for those seeking sun and relaxation. The Jordanian border was visible from there, but a no-go area at that time. Israeli military personnel were always present. To the north, a sense of peace and tranquillity could be found in Galilee where life appeared slower and less hectic. Not far from here was Capernaum, a quiet place where Jesus once lived. We were fortunate to be taken to the top of the Golan Heights, an important strategic point that was annexed from Syria following the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Druze villages dotted the hillsides where families farmed on small plots of land. Also visible was the road to Damascus in Syria where in late 1918 Lawrence of Arabia would have been leading Arab forces, in the hope of securing a better future for them following the defeat of the Turks and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The British and French colonial powers, though, had other plans which since have all played a part in sowing some of the seeds for Middle East conflict. We observed Israeli tanks mobilising near the Lebanese border with a full-scale invasion of that country taking place a few weeks later, directed at the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The drums of war have returned there recently involving Hezbollah and resulting in more death and destruction. Tension in the West Bank and Gaza has been a constant for decades, regularly spilling over into violence: 20 months ago, the militant Hamas group in Gaza launched a violent attack on Israel, sparking an overwhelming military response that has resulted in huge numbers of Palestinian deaths and injuries, allied with immense grief and suffering. This horrific tragedy continues to unfold daily. Only a few days ago Israel and Iran were both under serious attack: that has fortunately resulted in a ceasefire. It is a travesty that peace continues to remain elusive in what is often referred to as the holy land despite significant efforts over the years to achieve this. Extraordinary and inspired new leadership in Israel and its various neighbours is critical: acrimony and grievances need to be set aside. There must be a genuine attempt to work together for the goal of enhancing the welfare of all citizens and rebuilding mutual trust, respect and co-operation. In particular, the circumstances of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank urgently requires a solution providing them with autonomy, dignity and security so they and Israelis can attain a peaceful future, with each under wise leadership. Maybe then the holy land will truly become holy again. — Joss Miller is a retired Dunedin lawyer.
Spectator
19-06-2025
- Politics
- Spectator
Only regime change will solve the problem of Iran
The Middle East currently stands at a crossroads. The future geopolitical balance and perhaps also the historical direction of the region depend on the outcome of the war currently underway between Israel and Iran. With the US poised on the cusp of possible intervention, it's important to grasp the nature and dimension of what is at stake. To understand the weight of the present moment, it is necessary to accurately define the nature of the current conflict and its roots. This is a war not only or primarily between states. It is a conflict between systems of governance and between rival visions of the region. The objective needs to be the decapitation of the regime On one side, the Islamic Republic of Iran and its various militia allies are committed to a particular conception of political Islam. Their vision mandates the subversion of regional states by the insertion of political/military proxies of Tehran. These forces, as witnessed in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, then seek to turn the area in question into a space from which Iran can continue to advance its project. The goal: Iranian hegemony, Islamist rule, and perpetual war until victory over Israel, the US and western-aligned regional states is achieved. On the other side, Israel is the sole regional power with the military capacity to effectively counter this ambition. It is also the only non-Muslim majority state in the Middle East. In its recent diplomatic advances, in particular with the United Arab Emirates, one may glimpse the outline of a rival vision for the region, one based on economic development, modernity, pluralism. For all these reasons, Israel has been singled out for destruction by the regime in Tehran since the earliest days of the Islamic Republic. The Israeli embassy building in Tehran was among the first to be sacked by the mob during the revolution. A Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) office was later opened in its place. The particular brand of Shia Islamism espoused by the late Ayatollah Khomeini had a special contempt for the Jews and their state. Khomeini referred to Israel in 1979 as the 'cancerous Zionist tumour in the body of Islamic countries'. Tehran has conducted a long war intended to result in the demise of the Jewish state since the early 1980s. This effort has been based on three components. The creation and sponsorship of Islamist political-military organisations was one element. The skills of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in this area, combined with actions by rival powers and lucky circumstances, have delivered dividends for Tehran. On the eve of the current war, they had brought Iran effective control of Lebanon and a dominant stake in Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian movement. All this, combined with an alliance with Assad's Syria, gave Iran effective control of the entire landmass between the Iraq-Iran border and the Mediterranean Sea on the eve of the conflict, as well as a major stake in the Palestinian struggle against Israel (via Hamas) and the ability to strike directly at Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea shipping route (through the Houthis). It was a commanding position in the region, and Iran intended to use it as a springboard for further advances. The two other components of Tehran's power projection are its ballistic missile array, the largest in the region, and, most importantly, its clandestine nuclear program. As a result of Hamas's premature firing of the starting gun for conventional war with Israel, Iran's emergent regional empire now lies in ruins. Iran chose in a partial and piecemeal fashion to mobilise its proxies and launch them against Jerusalem. Hezbollah is now weakened, Assad is gone, and Hamas's Gaza fiefdom is reduced to a pile of rubble. These circumstances created a chance for Israel to cripple the Iranian nuclear programme and its missile array, and to strike at Iran's structures of governance. This chance was limited in time. With the exception of Assad in Syria, all of Iran's losses are reversible. The opportunity needed to be used or lost. The statement by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran is in violation of its commitments vis a vis the nuclear non-proliferation treaty added greater urgency to the moment. The running down of the clock on the 60 days of negotiations to which the US administration had committed itself made action feasible. In the early hours of the morning on 13 June, Israel chose to act. Until now, the results have been encouraging. Nuclear facilities at Natanz, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Arak have been targeted and severely damaged. A wide range of individuals and targets associated with regime governance have also been eliminated, including two military chiefs of staff, a series of senior IRGC commanders and a number of nuclear scientists. The regime has been set back years in the nuclear arena and elsewhere. None of this, however, yet resembles anything like victory. The Fordow uranium enrichment facility, embedded in the mountains near the Shia holy city of Qom, remains intact. It is immune, according to a recent article by former Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, to the IDF's current capacities. The US appears poised to intervene to address the matter of Fordow. It remains to be seen if President Donald Trump will give the order. But if he does, and the US action is limited to this one strike, or indeed if he does not, there is a possible negative outcome of which Israel should be aware. If Israel just keeps pounding away at Iranian targets, damaging but not destroying them, it risks being drawn into a war of attrition which will play to Tehran's benefit, not Jerusalem's. Potential shortages in Israel's Arrow 3 interceptors render this issue more acute. If, following such a slogging match, Israel at a certain point declares victory and leaves, what will remain will be a damaged but not destroyed regime with an obvious incentive to race towards the bomb. This would be the worst possible outcome. It's therefore imperative that Israel, the US, or some combination thereof commit to the intensification of the pace and scale of current operations, and the expansion of the target list to include the regime's most senior figures. The objective needs to be the decapitation of the regime. Iran's folly in sending its proxies against Israel in 2023, and then initiating direct attacks in April 2024 has created an opportunity. The Islamic Republic of Iran has cast a shadow over the Middle East for nearly half a century. It's time that this shadow be lifted.
