Latest news with #Pashtuns
News18
4 days ago
- Politics
- News18
Pashtun Attire & Weapons: Why Karachi University Students' Performance Sparked Outrage
Top intelligence sources said: 'The use of traditional cultural symbols as props for a mock terrorist show highlights the state's view of an entire ethnic group." A recent seminar at the University of Karachi, where participants dressed in traditional Pashtun attire and carried weapons in a stage performance, thus inaccurately portraying them as terrorists, has led to outrage across Pakistan's academic and civil society circles. The display, deemed culturally insensitive, reinforced long-standing state propaganda by associating Pashtun identity with extremism. Top intelligence sources criticised the University of Karachi for promoting dangerous views under the guise of national security narratives. 'The use of traditional cultural symbols as props for a mock terrorist show highlights the state's view of an entire ethnic group, especially at a time when Pashtuns face ongoing discrimination and suspicion," they said. This event has not only undermined the credibility of a major educational institution but also demonstrates how educational institutions in Pakistan are being utilised for ideological conflicts, they added. Universities in Pakistan are becoming breeding grounds for radicalisation, with campaigns indirectly encouraging students to adopt extremist state-sponsored ideologies, said sources. News18 had earlier reported how the historical resentment over the merger fuelled has political instability in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for decades. Today, several separatist and militant movements continue to challenge the Pakistani government's control over the region. Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) emerged as a significant non-violent movement advocating for the rights of Pashtuns. The PTM accused the Pakistani military and government of treating Pashtuns as second-class citizens and called for the formation of a 'Greater Pashtunistan' by uniting Pashtun territories in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the largest Islamic militant group in Pakistan, remains highly active in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the adjoining tribal areas. The TTP seeks to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish Sharia law. The group intensified its attacks on military and government targets, especially after the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Baloch separatist groups have also found common ground with Pashtun rebels, forming alliances to resist Pakistani military operations. The longstanding grievances of both the Baloch and Pashtun communities reflect the broader discontent that stems from the political decisions made at the time of Partition. With Agency Inputs view comments Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
AllAfrica
24-07-2025
- Business
- AllAfrica
Costly Afghan immigration tests Iran's neighborly hospitality
Afghan migration has fundamentally reshaped Iran's demographics, labor market and public finances. While the Iranian economy gains from lower labor costs and higher productivity, the fiscal burden of untargeted subsidies, currency outflows and hidden social costs has turned migration into a national economic challenge. Without targeted reforms, the costs will keep rising. For more than four decades, Afghan migration to Iran has created a complex and evolving social fabric. The community is deeply heterogeneous: A large majority are Sunni Muslims – mainly Pashtuns and some Tajiks – whose customs and social norms diverge from Iran's Shia-majority society. In many respects, their traditional, tribal, and rural lifestyles do not align with the rules and rhythms of urban Iran. Shia minorities, mainly Hazaras, are linguistically and culturally closer to Iranians, easing their social integration. Other groups such as Uzbeks, Turkmens, Baloch and Ismailis add further complexity. Waves of Afghan migration to Iran (1979–2025) Year Total Afghan Population (Est.) Main Migration/Return Wave & Cause Returnees/Deportees (thousand) Remaining Population After Return (million) Share of Legal / Irregular Entry (%) 1979 <0.1 Pre-Revolution, Normal Status – <0.1 Mostly legal 1983 1.5 Soviet invasion, war, instability Low 1.5 Mostly legal 1986 2.5 Intensified war, greater insecurity Low 2.5 Mostly legal 1996 3.0 Civil war, weak central government Low 3.0 Mostly legal 2001 2.8 Taliban ascendancy, religious/ethnic repression ~300 2.5 Mostly legal 2003 2.2 Taliban fall, voluntary repatriation ~600 1.6 Legal & returning 2011 1.7 Elected govt, relative stability, economic crisis Low 1.7 Mostly legal 2016 2.5 New insecurity, Afghan economic crisis Low 2.5 Legal & irregular 2021 3.0 Kabul fall, Taliban return, violence escalates Low 3.0 Sharp rise in irregular entry 2023 4.5 Fifth wave, intensified crisis, surge in irregular ~700 ~3.8 Mixed; predominantly irregular 2024 3.8 Mass deportations & repatriations begin ~1,200 ~2.6 Irregular & legal 2025 3.8 Continued returns/deportations, population control (up to 1,200–1,500) ~2.5 Mostly irregular Family-centric culture, tribal traditions and practices such as polygamy, together with a significant gap between many migrants' social codes and those of mainstream Iran, have complicated coexistence and sometimes caused friction over education, health and civic participation. Still, second- and third-generation Afghans – especially in major cities – have become Persian-speaking and bicultural. They often experience dual Iranian-Afghan identity. Afghan migration has been driven by Afghanistan's political turmoil, Iran's labor needs and changing Iranian state policies. Today, this population – split between documented and undocumented migrants – shapes Iran's social and economic scene while posing a mounting challenge for fiscal policy. The consequences go far beyond population statistics, as detailed in the financial analysis below. Iran's economy is built on a vast, inefficient and non-targeted subsidy system – one of the world's costliest. For a large, low-income migrant population like the Afghans, this has turned a social issue into a fiscal dilemma. The analysis below examines each major line item using official Iranian sources and independent research. Energy subsidies: Fuel and energy subsidies are the largest component. State price controls and below-market energy costs lead to enormous hidden expenditures for gasoline, gas, diesel and electricity. The Parliament Research Center and the World Bank estimate Iran's annual hidden energy subsidy at up to 1,200 trillion tomans ($286 billion). While Afghan migrants – mostly from low-income deciles and generally without private cars – consume less than the average Iranian, everyone benefits via subsidized public transit and heating. The per capita annual fuel subsidy for Afghans is about 10-13 million tomans, well below the 30 million for Iranians. The undocumented sector, operating more in the grey market, creates additional fiscal pressure. Education subsidies: Iranian law requires that all Afghan children, regardless of documentation, be enrolled in public schools (Cabinet Resolution 2015; UNHCR 2024). The Ministry of Education and the Parliament Research Center estimate the average annual cost per Afghan student at about 4.5 million tomans. With an estimated 300,000 Afghan children in schools, this is a significant and growing burden, the same for both legal and undocumented residents. Healthcare subsidies: Healthcare access depends on insurance and residency status. About one million Afghans have public health insurance (UNHCR 2024); others use public services sporadically. Average annual health spending per Afghan is estimated at about 2-3 million tomans – comparable to the lowest-income Iranian deciles. Bread subsidies: Bread is a staple for both Iranians and Afghans, and the state's bread subsidy is among its largest fiscal commitments. Per capita, Afghans receive about 4-5 million tomans per year in bread subsidies, based on average consumption (160-180 kg) and the price gap between subsidized and market bread. Afghan households, typically larger, often consume up to 25% more than Iranian families. Even undocumented migrants have virtually unrestricted access to subsidized bread. Overall, bread subsidies remain a central – and expensive – pillar of food security for both communities. Water and electricity subsidies: In migrant-concentrated areas, water and power use per household is lower due to simpler lifestyles, but the total population puts chronic strain on infrastructure. Per capita subsidy is about 3-4 million tomans annually. Municipal services: Public transport, waste collection, green spaces, and urban services add another 500,000 tomans per person per year – low in isolation, but substantial in the aggregate in urban centers. Annual cost of Afghan migrants (2025 estimates, in millions of USD) Subsidy Estimated Annual Cost per Legal Migrant (USD) Estimated Annual Cost per Undocumented Migrant (USD) Legal immigrant population (millions) legal immigrant population (millions) Total Annual Cost Legal Migrants (m USD) Total Annual Cost Undocumented Migrants (m USD) Total Grand Annual Cost (m USD) Fuel & Energy 114 148 0.9 2.1 102.3 307.4 409.7 Education 51 51 0.3 0.3 17.2 17.2 34.4 Healthcare 34 23 0.9 2.1 34.1 54.0 88.1 Bread & Food 51 57 0.9 2.1 41.4 113.3 154.7 Water & Electricity 40 40 0.9 2.1 32.1 74.7 106.8 Municipal Services 6 8 0.9 2.1 4.9 20.1 25.0 Total 232.0 586.7 818.7 Despite these costs, Afghan migration generates tangible economic gains. Afghan workers, with lower wages and roughly 15-20% higher productivity than Iranian peers, create an annual private sector saving of about $852 million (75,000 bn tomans). These savings stabilize key industries – especially construction and agriculture – that face chronic domestic labor shortages. But the fiscal and social costs outweigh the gains. Afghans remit $1-1.5 billion annually, draining foreign currency. The state's annual outlay for subsidies and public services exceeds $819 million. Pressure on housing markets, especially in low-income areas, adds at least $34 million in annual costs for Iranian renters. Security and law enforcement related to migration adds another $57 million. Annual gains & losses (2025, in millions of USD) Item Economic Gain (m USD) Economic Cost (m USD) Wage & Productivity 852 – Currency Outflow – 1,000–1,500 Subsidies & Public – 819 Housing Impact – 34 Security Costs – 57 Total 852 1,910–2,410 Despite all positive economic effects, Afghan migration's bottom line for Iran's public finances is negative. The net annual loss – over $1 billion – could build two 500-megawatt power plants or 200 modern schools in disadvantaged regions. Each year, the government could otherwise expand national infrastructure or offer full health insurance to every uninsured Iranian. The true challenge is not just migration, but Iran's untargeted and inefficient subsidy system and lack of migration management. Without reform, these fiscal burdens will keep rising. Clear policy, targeted subsidies and robust data are essential for Iran to balance economic needs, social cohesion and national stability. A senior economic analyst and construction project manager based in Tehran, Amirreza Etasi ( has worked for more than a decade at the intersection of public finance, energy and development policy, both in executive roles and as a contributor to major media outlets in Iran and abroad.
The Diplomat
18-07-2025
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Recent Violence Underscores Problems Facing Afghanistan's Badakhshan Province
The geographic and social conditions that make Badakhshan difficult for the Taliban to control also make it difficult for any widespread unrest to spill out from the region. An early July counternarcotics operation by Taliban authorities triggered a week-long outbreak of violence in Khash District in central Badakhshan Province, resulting in as many as 15 dead. Protests and repression in the area are not new, as violence also broke out during last year's poppy cultivation season. The drug trade, competition over minerals, ethnic and religious tensions, and the presence of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) will likely continue to challenge the Taliban regime's ability to exert control over Badakhshan, a province where it historically enjoyed only limited support. Unless things escalate further, the recent unrest in Badakhshan seems unlikely to pose a threat to the Taliban's control over the country. However, the province should serve as a bellwether for the Taliban's attempts to adapt its dogmatic governance to an increasingly underserved national population. Badakhshan Province was never ruled by the Taliban during the first emirate, though the movement did enjoy some support in the area. Several key members of the Taliban are from the province, including the current Chief of Army Staff Qari Fasihuddin Fitrat. During the insurgency, the Taliban presence increased in the central districts of the province after 2014. While the Taliban lacked the manpower in the northeast to expand their base of support past a few districts, the Taliban's presence around Faizabad meant that it was only the ninth provincial capital to fall once the group began its takeover of the country in 2021. Since the takeover, the Taliban have been careful in their governance of the province, seeking to manage their lack of support in the more remote districts of the province. The ethnic disposition of the Badakhshan presents a problem for the Taliban. Tajiks and Uzbeks make up the overwhelming majority of the province's population with a limited number of Pashtuns sprinkled among the urban areas, working as traders or government officials. In an effort to accommodate local sensitivities, the Taliban has allowed Badakhshi commanders and officials to hold government posts in their local areas, something not generally allowed elsewhere in the country. However, as time as passed, there is an increasing tension between local Tajik and Uzbek Taliban members and Pashtun senior leaders from outside of the province. There are also sectarian elements to the instability in Badakhshan as the Deobandi Taliban have sought to assert control over Salafi mosques and Ismaili prayer houses and cultural centers in the province. Religious tensions in the province likely caused the killing of a local Agha Khan Foundation official on July 9 and a local Salafist Taliban leader on May 27. While it has been quiet in recent months, ISKP has a historic presence in Badakhshan, capitalizing on the area's religious and ethnic fault lines. The Taliban target ISKP cells in the province as they are identified, to mixed results. Iranian officials claimed the Islamic State's January 3, 2024 attack in Kerman was facilitated out of Badakhshan. However, ISKP only conducted four attacks inside the province in 2024, and has not claimed an attack in Badakhshan this year. Despite the group's recent decline, its actions set the stage for the current problems in the province. On June 6, 2023, ISKP killed the deputy governor of Badakhshan with a car bomb. ISKP then conducted a suicide attack on the deputy governor's funeral two days later. Recognizing the need for a firmer hand in the province, the Taliban named Muhammad Ayub Khalid, a Pashtun, to be Badakhshan's governor. Khalid's prior experience as a military commander suggests the regime is increasingly focused on security in the region. The movement of additional Pashtuns into intelligence and police positions in the province set the stage for renewed tensions with the local populace as the national government seeks to tighten its control over Badakhshan. Competition between local leaders and the national government over Badakhshan's rich mineral resources is a critical driver for instability. The province has aluminum, gold, and limestone deposits as well as jewels such as rubies and lapis lazuli. The Taliban regime awarded mining contracts in 2024 for the region's large deposits and tried to crack down on illegal mines run by the local population. Control over the province's mines is no trivial matter. The Taliban seek to exploit Afghanistan's mineral wealth in order to mitigate the pressure of Western sanctions and impact of persistent budget shortfalls. For Badakshis, the mines provide a critical revenue stream for many to meet their basic needs as the government provides only minimal services and the terrain and climate limit agricultural opportunities in the province. Conflict over the drug trade is also increasing in Badakhshan. After the Taliban banned poppy cultivation across the country, Badakhshan has emerged as the new center of the Afghan drug trade. The Taliban anti-drug efforts largely depend on deterrence of farmers, rather than aggressive eradication or interdiction campaigns. The Taliban was able to deter poppy cultivation in other parts of the country through strong networks of supporters and allies that convinced the population of the rectitude of the ban. The Taliban in Badakhshan lacked that support network. In fact, many local Taliban commanders did not enforce the ban. Further, southern Pashtun drug traffickers established connections with Badakhshi growers to refine their opium to heroin for shipment to international markets. The eruption of cultivation eventually became something Taliban senior leadership could not ignore. As the Taliban began eradication in the province in spring of 2024, they moved largely Pashtun fighters into Badakhshan from other provinces. The new troops almost immediately began fighting not only with the local population, but eventually with local Badakhshi Taliban as well. As they seek to smooth over ethnic and religious turbulence and improve control, the Taliban have made significant investments in Badakhshan. The government has built canals and bridges in addition to a terminal for international cargo handling. The most notable, and ambitious, infrastructure project is a road through the Wakhan Corridor to connect the province with China. A road project to better connect Badakhshan to Panjshir and Nuristan is also underway. These roads serve to improve the security forces' access to restive parts of the country and increase the government's ability to establish additional mines in Badakhshan and elsewhere in the northeast. With the transportation network improving and Pashtuns now firmly entrenched in key positions in the province, the Taliban are gradually moving to bring governance in Badakhshan in line with Afghanistan's other provinces. Since Khalid's installation as governor, local officials have begun floggings for moral offenses, removing women from educational positions, seizing weapons, and regulating holiday celebrations, things that started long ago in other parts of the country. These moves have further exacerbated popular grievances. When Taliban forces showed up in Darayim and Argo districts in 2024 and in Argo, Jurm, and Khash districts in May and July this year to eradicate local poppy crops, violence was an extraordinarily likely outcome. The Taliban seem to be developing a playbook for such disturbances: withdraw the offending troops and reconstitute, flood the zone with reinforcements, cut off local access to internet, arrest any complicit local commanders, and employ senior Badakhshi Taliban leaders like Fitrat and others to mediate. Little has been done to address core grievances in Badakhshan, so additional violence next May, June, and July is likely as Taliban forces again eradicate poppy ahead of the harvest. Leaders of the anti-Taliban resistance, like General Jalaluddin Yaftali and Vice President Amrullah Saleh, were quick to encourage Badakhshan's population to expand the revolt. It was not to be. The geographic and social conditions that make Badakhshan difficult for the Taliban to control make it difficult for any widespread unrest to spill out from the region. Badakhshan will remain turbulent, though it might be possible for unrest to challenge the regime's ability to control the neighboring portions of Takhar and Panjshir provinces. Unless there is a substantial deterioration in conditions, it is likely the Taliban will do just enough to keep northeastern Afghanistan under control. However, Badakhshan should be watched closely for any further challenges to Taliban authority.
The Diplomat
30-06-2025
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Anatomy of an Insurgency: Balochistan's Crisis and Pakistan's Failures
Balochistan is Pakistan's largest province, comprising 44 percent of the country's territory, yet it has a relatively small population of approximately 14.8 million. Of this population, only 5.9 million are ethnic Baloch, with Pashtuns forming the other significant demographic group. The province has been engulfed in an insurgency since 2006, but the conflict has recently undergone a dramatic transformation. What began as a tribal resistance movement has evolved into a formidable insurgency with separatist ambitions, complemented by a broader peaceful political movement. Recent escalations demonstrate both the insurgents' growing operational capabilities and the Pakistani state's persistent reliance on heavy-handed military responses that continue to alienate Baloch society. Federal Overreach: The Catalyst for Modern Insurgency The roots of contemporary unrest, according to Baloch nationalists, trace back to Pakistan's founding when in 1948 the State of Kalat was forcibly incorporated into the federation despite local resistance. However, the current insurgency was catalyzed by then-President General Pervez Musharraf's unilateral decision to construct Gwadar Port, bypassing constitutional structures including the National Assembly, Council of Common Interest, and the Balochistan Provincial government. This decision came despite ongoing negotiations through a Senate Committee led by Senator Mushahid Hussain, then the secretary general of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (Q), that had nearly achieved consensus. Akbar Bugti – a veteran political leader and Tumandar of the Bugti tribe who had served as chief minister, governor, and federal minister of state – had opposed the Gwadar project due to concerns about demographic changes from nationwide migration and the lack of guarantees that locals would benefit from development. Musharraf's handling of political disagreements with Baloch leaders was marked by intimidation, and when security forces initiated operations against protests surrounding the port's construction, Bugti and his supporters retreated to the mountains where military forces killed him in August 2006. Bugti's death transformed him from a collaborator with Islamabad into a nationalist hero, reinvigorating independence demands that had largely lain dormant since General Zia-ul-Haq's rapprochement with Baloch dissidents in the 1980s. Bugti's death became a rallying point for the insurgency. The August 2024 surge in insurgent violence coincided with his death anniversary, demonstrating the enduring symbolic power of the event. It is critical to understand that Balochistan is treated by the center as a repository of resources. The federal government has frequently disregarded constitutional and legal norms to impose its will, through presidential decrees in the case of Gwadar Port or the current use of the Special Investment Facility for granting mining concessions in Reko Diq and elsewhere in Balochistan. This pattern remains consistent across administrations. The province has been subjected to resource extraction, yet locals and the provincial government receive minimal benefits or returns, despite the fact that mining and energy extraction is constitutionally designated as a provincial and not a federal subject. Consequently, Baloch insurgents view Chinese and other foreign investors as co-conspirators in the plunder of the province's resources.
Malay Mail
19-06-2025
- Politics
- Malay Mail
Homeland insecurity: Expelled Afghans risk reentry to Pakistan to escape Taliban rule
PESHAWAR (Pakistan), June 19 — Pakistan says it has expelled more than a million Afghans in the past two years, yet many have quickly attempted to return — preferring to take their chances dodging the law than struggle for existence in a homeland some had never even seen before. 'Going back there would be sentencing my family to death,' said Hayatullah, a 46-year-old Afghan deported via the Torkham border crossing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in early 2024. Since April and a renewed deportation drive, some 200,000 Afghans have spilled over the two main border crossings from Pakistan, entering on trucks loaded with hastily packed belongings. But they carry little hope of starting over in the impoverished country, where girls are banned from school after primary level. Hayatullah, a pseudonym, returned to Pakistan a month after being deported, travelling around 800 kilometres south to the Chaman border crossing in Balochistan, because for him, life in Afghanistan 'had come to a standstill'. He paid a bribe to cross the Chaman frontier, 'like all the day labourers who regularly travel across the border to work on the other side'. His wife and three children — including daughters, aged 16 and 18, who would be denied education in Afghanistan — had managed to avoid arrest and deportation. Relative security Hayatullah moved the family to Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and a region mostly populated by Pashtuns — the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. 'Compared to Islamabad, the police here don't harass us as much,' he said. The only province governed by the opposition party of former Prime Minister Imran Khan — who is now in prison and in open conflict with the federal government — Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is considered a refuge of relative security for Afghans. Samad Khan, a 38-year-old Afghan who also spoke using a pseudonym, also chose to relocate his family to Peshawar. Born in eastern Pakistan's Lahore city, he set foot in Afghanistan for the first time on April 22 — the day he was deported. 'We have no relatives in Afghanistan, and there's no sign of life. There's no work, no income, and the Taliban are extremely strict,' he said. At first, he tried to find work in a country where 85 per cent of the population lives on less than one dollar a day, but after a few weeks he instead found a way back to Pakistan. 'I paid 50,000 rupees (around RM767) to an Afghan truck driver,' he said, using one of his Pakistani employees' ID cards to cross the border. He rushed back to Lahore to bundle his belongings and wife and two children — who had been left behind — into a vehicle, and moved to Peshawar. 'I started a second-hand shoe business with the support of a friend. The police here don't harass us like they do in Lahore, and the overall environment is much better,' he told AFP. Afghan refugees wait in a queue at a registration centre, after arriving from Pakistan, in Takhta Pul district of Kandahar province on April 13, 2025. It's hard to say how many Afghans have returned to Pakistan, as data is scarce. — AFP pic 'Challenging' reintegration It's hard to say how many Afghans have returned, as data is scarce. Government sources, eager to blame the country's problems on supporters Khan, claim that hundreds of thousands of Afghans are already back and settled in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa — figures that cannot be independently verified. Migrant rights defenders in Pakistan say they've heard of such returns, but insist the numbers are limited. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) told AFP that 'some Afghans who were returned have subsequently chosen to remigrate to Pakistan'. 'When individuals return to areas with limited access to basic services and livelihood opportunities, reintegration can be challenging,' said Avand Azeez Agha, communications officer for the UN agency in Kabul. They might move on again, he said, 'as people seek sustainable opportunities'. — AFP
