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Arab News
3 days ago
- Business
- Arab News
Bosnia-Herzegovina reforms a strategic necessity
This year marks the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Agreement, a landmark accord that ended the Bosnian War of 1992-1995 and brought a fragile peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina. On this significant occasion, I had the privilege of hosting a panel of experts in Dayton, Ohio — where the agreement was originally signed — that was titled 'Next Steps After Dayton? Getting to Constitutional Reform in BiH,' referring to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The panel, convened by the New Lines Institute, featured distinguished voices including former US Ambassador to Bosnia Michael Murphy; Ensar Eminovic, minister counselor at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy in Washington; Dr. Miomir Zuzul, senior international policy adviser at Arnold & Porter; and Dr. Jasmin Mujanovic, author of the institute's recent report, 'Dayton Plus: A Policymaker's Guide to Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.' Together, we reflected on Dayton's legacy and the urgent need for reform to secure the country's future. The Dayton Agreement was a monumental achievement, halting a devastating conflict that claimed countless lives and displaced millions. It established a complex constitutional framework under Annex IV, dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina into two entities — the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska — alongside the self-governing Brcko District. However, while Dayton brought peace, it also entrenched a governance structure that has proven to be a barrier to progress. The agreement's rigid ethnic power-sharing mechanisms, designed to balance the interests of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, have fostered dysfunction, discrimination and stagnation. Today, Bosnia-Herzegovina's constitutional regime is a labyrinth of inefficiency. The tripartite presidency, entity vetoes and sectarian electoral rules exclude approximately 400,000 citizens — particularly those identifying as 'Others' (e.g., Jews, Roma or those who reject ethnic labels) — from meaningful political participation. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly struck down provisions of the constitution as discriminatory, a legal obligation the country is bound to address under its own laws, but progress remains stalled. This de facto constitutional crisis undermines Bosnia-Herzegovina's aspirations for EU and NATO membership, a goal that requires rational governance and accountability — outcomes the current system cannot deliver. The demographic reality in Bosnia-Herzegovina underscores the urgent need for reform. Since the 2013 census, which recorded a population of 3.5 million, estimates suggest that number has plummeted to under 2 million due to mass emigration, particularly among the youth. In Republika Srpska, claims of a 1.4 million population may mask a reality closer to 800,000. This exodus reflects a lack of hope in a system that denies citizens a stake in their future, perpetuating corruption and ethnic division over shared prosperity. Mujanovic outlined a clear case for reform. The current constitution promotes irrational governance, incentivizes sectarian maximalism and allows neighboring states to meddle in Bosnia-Herzegovina's affairs, heightening the risk of renewed conflict. Conversely, constitutional reform could foster accountable governance, ensure equal rights for all citizens and pave a credible path for Euro-Atlantic integration by 2040. The benefits are clear: a shift from zero-sum politics to a system that values individual rights over collective ethnic identities, reduces foreign interference and empowers Bosnia-Herzegovina to stand as a sovereign, democratic state. While the Dayton Agreement brought peace, it also entrenched a governance structure that has proven to be a barrier to progress Dr. Azeem Ibrahim However, the path to reform is fraught with challenges. Political elites, entrenched in the status quo, resist change, fearing a loss of power. The Office of the High Representative, with its expansive Bonn Powers, has intervened in the past — most notably during the 2022 Bosnia-Herzegovina election — but such external impositions are not sustainable. True reform must come from within, supported by international partners like the US and the EU, which have historically expected irrational systems to yield rational outcomes. This flawed premise has led to repeated policy failures in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as our report notes, unless accompanied by sustained international pressure. 'Dayton Plus' proposes a model for limited constitutional reform that balances pragmatism with ambition. It suggests a single, non-ethnically designated president with ceremonial powers, elected through a two-round system to encourage moderate outcomes. Executive authority would shift to the Council of Ministers, with a redefined entity veto mechanism to prevent abuse. Unicameral legislatures at all levels, caucus-based vital national interest protections and electoral reforms like ranked-choice voting aim to dismantle the winner-takes-all mentality. These changes would not overhaul Bosnia-Herzegovina's structure entirely but would normalize constitutional reform as a routine democratic process, building momentum for future progress. Today, that reform is not just necessary — it is achievable. The original Dayton Agreement proved that, with political will, even the most intractable conflicts can be resolved. Today, the task of amending Bosnia-Herzegovina's constitution in line with European Court of Human Rights rulings is far less daunting than ending a war in 1995. What is needed now is the same determination, coupled with imagination, to chart a new course for Bosnia-Herzegovina. As we look to the future, the Euro-Atlantic community must recommit to Bosnia-Herzegovina's stability. The Western Balkans remains a geopolitical flashpoint, with Russia and China exploiting governance weaknesses to sow discord. Constitutional reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not just a domestic imperative but a strategic necessity for regional security. By supporting it in this endeavor, the US and the EU can help complete the vision of a Europe whole and free — a vision Dayton began but cannot fulfill without change. The 30th anniversary of Dayton is a moment to celebrate peace, but also to act. Bosnia-Herzegovina's citizens deserve a system that reflects their shared hopes, not their divided past. Let us work together to make that vision a reality. *Dr. Azeem Ibrahim is the director of special initiatives at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington, DC. X: @AzeemIbrahim
The Guardian
28-05-2025
- Business
- The Guardian
‘Most dangerous moment since 1995': renegade Dodik leaves Bosnia in limbo
The members of the elite Hungarian police unit crossed the border in civilian clothes, putting on their uniforms only once they had reached their destination. After arriving in Banja Luka, the capital of the Serbian half of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they posed in green fatigues with balaclava-wearing Serbian police. Officially, the Hungarians had come as trainers, but the mission was announced only after their presence was reported in the local press. The supposedly sovereign Bosnian state government in Sarajevo had not been informed that up to 300 paramilitary police officers from another country would be crossing the frontier. The timing was key: the Hungarians had arrived on the eve of a pivotal, potentially explosive, date. On 26 February, Milorad Dodik, the firebrand president of the Serb-run republic, Republika Srpska, was sentenced to a year in prison and a six-year ban from holding office for separatist actions. Dodik, who has run the entity since 2006, was convicted for having defied the envoy of the international community in Bosnia, a position created to ensure implementation of the Dayton agreement that ended the 1992-1995 war. Technically the supreme power in the country, the high representative has the power to impose or annul laws and sack officials. Responding to the ruling, Dodik told his supporters the conviction was 'nonsense' and called on them to 'be cheerful'. He then said that Bosnia and Herzegovina had 'ceased to exist' and, in an apparent move towards secession, had local laws passed that ban the presence of national law enforcement or judicial officials on Republika Srpska soil. Dodik insisted he would not appeal against the verdict as he did not recognise the court's jurisdiction, but noted he could not stop his lawyers appealing. The lawyers did so and the appeal is due to be heard in the next few months. The verdict and Dodik's response represented a moment when Bosnia's long-term dysfunction tipped into a dangerous crisis, that could split Europe. It showed that in a squeeze, the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, would actively side with Vladimir Putin and allies such as Dodik rather than Brussels. During almost two decades in power, Dodik has been a frequent visitor to Moscow, showing up there on Tuesday for the third time since March. Serbia's authoritarian president, Aleksandar Vučić, also routinely backs Dodik in his standoff with Sarajevo and western capitals. Vučić went to Banja Luka in solidarity, after what he called the court's 'unlawful, anti-democratic' verdict. The two men met again in Belgrade on Monday, as Dodik made his way to Moscow. The ruling and its aftermath also showed that, 30 years after conflict in Bosnia killed more than 100,000 people, its underlying divisions are far from being resolved. Few expect a return to war, but the country remains a flashpoint in the heart of Europe with potential for strife and violence. The war that was ended by the Dayton accords was a horrendous conflict that brought genocide back to the heart of Europe. The accords will be commemorated this week by a Nato meeting in the Ohio city that gave the peace deal its name. But while Dayton stopped the killing, it also simply froze the conflict by splitting the country into two halves: Republika Srpska and a Federation of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Croats. Dayton's critics denounced it as a reward for ethnic cleansing. The bandage that stemmed the bloodshed has hardened over the decades into a straitjacket that has prevented Bosnia from developing into a functional state. It established a multi-tiered system of governance that favoured nationalist parties, paralysis and corruption. Since coming to power, Dodik, the Republika Srpska president and leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, has blocked reforms and European integration with threats of secession and a return to conflict. But there are signs he is growing politically more frail: Bosnian officials and foreign diplomats in Sarajevo confirmed reporting in the Hungarian press that said Orbán's paramilitaries had been in Banja Luka to extract Dodik if he found himself cornered and had to make a run for it. That has not happened yet, but experts say Dodik's departure remains a strong possibility: in the past few months, the Serbian leader's family has approached a senior western official to negotiate terms for his departure, the Guardian has been told.. But it is not a foregone conclusion that Dodik will choose exile. Instead, he may continue to try to defy the sentence – and international community – and cling to office behind a shield of his paramilitary police. For the country itself, the limbo is full of risk. 'It's very clearly the most dangerous moment in Bosnia since 1995,' said Jasmin Mujanović, a Bosnian political analyst. 'It's a crisis that can only end with his arrest or if he opts ultimately to flee.' There was an attempt to detain Dodik in April, after the passage of legislation deemed extreme even by his standards. The Bosnian prosecutor issued arrest warrants for him and two other Serbian officials, and six weeks later there was a tense standoff in east Sarajevo, when Serbian police prevented agents of the Bosnia State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) from arresting Dodik. The SIPA agents withdrew. The appeal judgment on the February verdict is due by the end of the year but it is generally expected by the summer. If it upholds Dodik's conviction and sentence, the ban on holding office would take effect, potentially triggering new presidential elections in Republika Srpska and the possible victory of an opposition coalition prepared to collaborate against ethnic boundaries and revive Bosnia's EU membership bid. It could also mean that another, more determined, attempt may be made to arrest him, and Bosnia could ask the small European peacekeeping force, Eufor, for at least a show of support. 'The only mystery is whether Dodik will accept the ruling and leave his premises in the presidential palace,' said Igor Crnadak, a former Bosnian foreign minister and senior member of the Party of Democratic Progress, part of the Serb opposition bloc. 'Or will he refuse to leave his position? I don't think anybody knows what he will do.' He added: 'I think that Bosnia is at the turning point.' Christian Schmidt, a German former minister serving as the current high representative, insists that, for now, it is a political rather than security crisis. 'How do we solve this kind of challenge without an escalation? I think this is something which needs a lot of diplomacy and talks behind the scenes for the moment,' Schmidt said, but he added: 'I do not see that Mr Dodik meets the requirements for a responsible member of the political leadership in this country.' Last week, Schmidt reported to the UN security council on the worsening situation and appealed for international engagement to forestall a disaster. The signs at the council meeting were not encouraging. The Russian delegation left the chamber while Schmidt was speaking, and the Serbian member currently holding the chair in Bosnia's rotating trilateral presidency, Željka Cvijanović, flew in for the occasion to try to turn the tables on Schmidt, questioning his legitimacy and accusing him of 'dictatorship' and 'repression'. At the EU level, action has also been limited. Hungary has so far blocked sanctions against Dodik, with help from Croatia. The financial pressure on Dodik is mounting, however. The US, UK, Germany, Austria, Poland and Lithuania have all taken individual punitive measures against him. His hope that Trump's restoration to power in Washington would lead to a swift suspension of US sanctions has not been fulfilled; the new administration has little interest in Bosnia. If his appeal fails, Crnadak suggested he follow the same advice Dodik once gave to the Bosnian Serb wartime leaders when they were on the run from the war crimes tribunal in The Hague: give yourself up. 'What you are doing now is directly affecting Serbian people and Republika Srpska,' Crnadak said. 'If you love your people, you will go to the court and fight for your innocence there.'
Bloomberg
22-05-2025
- Business
- Bloomberg
EU Nations Mull Options to Rein In Separatist Leader in Bosnia
By Misha Savic and France and Germany have drafted a set of options to financially and politically isolate, including with sanctions, officials in Bosnia's Serb-majority region whose bid to secede has plunged the Balkan country into crisis, according to a letter seen by Bloomberg News. The key target is President of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik, who's attempted to claim further autonomy and possibly independence for the Serb-majority half of the country, recently banning Bosnia's federal institutions in the territory. The goal of the proposed measures is to compel Dodik to abandon those policies, the document read.
Yahoo
07-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Dodik Is Pushing Bosnia to the Breaking Point—Again
When armed police prevented the arrest of Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik on April 23, it marked the latest escalation in a growing crisis afflicting Bosnia, one that some warn could be an existential test for the fragile country. How could police themselves prevent an arrest? The answer lies in Bosnia and Herzegovina's notoriously complicated governing system. The security forces trying to arrest Dodik were from the central state police, SIPA, while those protecting him were from the Republika Srpska, or RS, one of two highly autonomous 'entities' created by the 1995 Dayton Agreement that brought the country's bloody four-year war to a close. The RS is a Serb-dominated region of which Dodik serves as president. The other entity, confusingly named the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is dominated by ethnic Bosniaks and Croats. Despite its complexity and deep flaws, the Dayton system, with subsequent amendments, has persisted for three decades. Arguably, it has preserved peace at the price of functionality. Now Dodik, who has frequently suggested that the RS should secede from Bosnia, threatens to tear even this system to the ground, with potentially drastic consequences. The attempt to arrest him was the latest escalation in an ongoing struggle between Dodik on one hand and state institutions and the representative of the international community on the other. In February, the Serb strongman was sentenced to one year in prison and banned from politics for six years for defying the Office of the High Representative, or OHR, an international body tasked with overseeing the Dayton arrangement. In response, the RS passed laws barring state institutions from operating in the entity and approved a draft constitution proclaiming a right to self-determination, while also announcing plans to create a separate army and judiciary. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. Meanwhile, it separately emerged that Dodik and several political allies were under investigation for allegedly attacking Bosnia's constitutional order. His failure to appear for questioning on this case led to the arrest warrant being issued. However, Dodik has continued to move freely in the RS, heavily protected by RS anti-terrorism police, and has even traveled to Russia, Serbia and Israel, in further defiance of the Bosnian state. Dodik is an inveterate brinksman who has often sparred with both Bosnian state institutions and Western powers. In January 2025, the U.S. imposed sanctions on individuals and businesses connected to him. But while he has frequently threatened secession, he has never acted on it. And in pulling back from the brink, he has often extracted concessions where possible from the international community and the Bosnian state. But there is a sense that this time he has crossed a red line. 'It is not an exaggeration to say that this is the ultimate test of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a functional state—indeed, as a state at all,' says Adnan Huskic, a political scientist at the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology. 'Nothing will be the same after this, regardless of the outcome.' In Huskic's best-case scenario, state authorities—including SIPA, the prosecutor's office and the Bosnian courts—will be able to assert themselves to permanently remove from the political scene the man he calls 'the most significant spoiler' of Bosnia's European Union aspirations: 'an outspoken Kremlin agent, a general disruptor and an autocrat who has captured all institutions in Republika Srpska and turned the entity into a financial black hole over nearly 30 years of unchallenged rule.' In the 30 years since the war ended, Bosnia has hobbled along under the Dayton formula, never breaking free of the divisive legacy of the conflict, nor lapsing back into it. But he warns that any weakness shown by the Bosnian state and its EU supporters leading to watered-down charges, or a scenario in which Dodik continues to evade arrest by moving between the RS and friendly countries such as Serbia, Russia and Hungary, could further destabilize Bosnia and the region, encouraging secessionist and irridentist movements elsewhere, at a critical time for Europe's security architecture. Ivana Maric, a Bosnian political analyst, says that this is indeed an opportunity for Bosnian institutions to assert themselves by apprehending Dodik, rather than relying on the OHR, the EU or the U.S., to which domestic leaders have appealed during previous crises. She says it is inevitable that Dodik and his companions will be brought in for questioning. She emphasizes the farcical nature of the situation, with SIPA and other state institutions still operating in the RS, despite the supposed ban. Perhaps more importantly for Dodik, his physical and political room for maneuver are narrowing. He and his party have long retained significant popular support in the RS, and secession has wider appeal among Bosnian Serbs than many international figures would like to admit. He has been feted by populist nationalist Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and broadly supported by Serbia. He also talks warmly of his meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin. For many—probably most—Serbs in Bosnia, the RS is the protector of their rights and freedoms in a country in which they are outnumbered by Bosniaks. Dodik may also have seen a window of opportunity presented by the return to the White House of U.S. President Donald Trump, who looks more kindly on the likes of Orban and Putin, and is less enthusiastic about engagement with Europe. Yet on March 8, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio accused Dodik of 'dangerous and destabilizing behavior' that is 'undermining Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutions and threatening its security and stability.' Closer to home, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, another populist strongman, has offered limited support, while Bosnian Croat leader Dragan Covic, who has regularly found common cause with Dodik, has condemned his actions and called on him to respect state institutions. Meanwhile, says Maric, the most vocal opposition comes not from Bosniak parties—which Dodik often uses as foils to shore up support, and vice versa—but rather from RS opposition parties, as within the RS, disquiet is rising. 'People are deeply unsettled,' says Aleksandar Trifunovic, a journalist and commentator based in Banja Luka, the entity's de facto capital. 'Since Dodik's conviction, tensions have risen sharply.' Trifunovic says a new draft RS Constitution that has been announced would, if adopted, 'effectively usher in a dictatorship—and that's putting it mildly.' Luka says Dodik often seeks to create chaos and project the illusion that he is in control as part of his strategy. 'But what makes this moment truly dangerous is that he is not in control,' he adds. 'Not of the situation, nor of its possible outcomes.' Trifunovic says that even Dodik himself does not know his next move. But external actors—namely, the U.S. and EU—are distracted, if they have not given up on the country altogether. 'The international community has for decades now had only one real expectation from Bosnia and Herzegovina: don't start another war. That's it,' he says. 'It's clear that a society which, 30 years after the war, has failed to move toward the European Union—a society trapped in perpetual conflict and one that continues to elect politicians who thrive on division and exclusion—no longer interests anyone.' In these circumstances, one cannot rule out further escalation. Yet in the 30 years since the war ended, Bosnia has hobbled along under the Dayton formula, never breaking free of the divisive legacy of the conflict, nor lapsing back into it. 'The curiosity of Bosnia and Herzegovina is that we have problems that are presented as unsolvable, crises that look like a war will break out tomorrow, conflicts after which you would think that there is no way for these parties and politicians to sit down at the same table again,' says Maric. 'And then everything is solved or forgotten overnight, and everyone pretends that nothing happened.' The current crisis shines a harsh light on the reality that Bosnia's political classes of all ethnicities, as well as the country's international guardians, have failed to both overcome the grim legacy of the war, and reform or replace the structures put in place to end it. After 30 years, what are the chances of them doing so now? 'Bosnia is a persistent problem that constantly threatens to boil over, but never seems to explode,' says James Ker-Lindsay, an academic focusing on Southeast Europe. 'With so many other immediate crises on the agenda, there's just no sense that this is an immediate problem that requires high-level political bandwidth.' With international officials having all but given up, and repeated attempts at internationally brokered reform having stalled, Ker-Lindsay says the country is 'stuck in deep political deadlock.' Those predicting Bosnia's imminent collapse have been proven wrong repeatedly over the past three decades. But this crisis need not be terminal to do real damage to Bosnia, the region and Europe as a whole. Andrew MacDowall is an independent consultant and writer. He is the founding director of the strategic consultancy Toros Advisory and has written extensively for publications including the Financial Times, The Guardian and Politico Europe. The post Dodik Is Pushing Bosnia to the Breaking Point—Again appeared first on World Politics Review.
