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Sky News AU
17-07-2025
- Business
- Sky News AU
Sky News host Cheng Lei warns Anthony Albanese not to be ‘naive' on China, questions why PM chose to spend ‘six days' in the country
Australian journalist Cheng Lei, who was imprisoned in China for more than three years, has warned Prime Minister Anthony Albanese not to be "naive" on China - adding he should not forget the 'fundamental differences' between the two nations. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is set to spend the last day of his six-day long tour of China in the central city of Chengdu, kicking off his day with a trip to a panda breeding and conservation centre. Mr Albanese has toed the CCP party line for the most part, avoiding discussing controversial topics including the Russia-Ukraine War and the Port of Darwin lease while accepting China's assertionthat it could conduct navy drills wherever it saw fit in international waters. The two leaders also agreed that trade would go on despite the global chaos of US President Donald Trump's sweeping tariffs, with Australia pledging to keep its vital trading relationship with China separate from its ties to the US. Sky News host Cheng Lei, who was released from a Chinese jail only two years ago after spending three years behind bars, said watching the visit had been a 'surreal' experience and pointed out that 'two years ago at this time I would have still been in the cell". Ms Lei said that while the 'content, tone and duration' of the visit had been 'warm and fuzzy," she reiterated that it 'felt quite strange, and Dr Yang is still there." Jailed Chinese Australian academic Yang Hengjun, who was given a suspended death sentence by a Chinese court in 2024 on espionage charges, has been detained since 2019. The Prime Minister has faced increasing pressure to advocate for Yang's release during his tour. Defence Minister Richard Marles said on Thursday the PM had called for Yang's release in an expansive conversation with President Xi Jinping on Tuesday, saying 'it's important that we have consistency in terms of continuing to raise this case'. 'It is also about how vengeful China is towards an individual and this is where our fundamental difference lies, that China, with all of its might and its vastness, its strong economy can feel it needs to do things to individuals,' Ms Lei said. 'It also shows that China does not care for individuals. They are just cogs in the wheel and dispensable and this is where we have to be really, really cool-headed and clear-eyed and not drink the Kool-Aid.' Mr Albanese has received criticism for embarking on a lengthy trip to China while the US-Australia alliance faces mounting stain, with Opposition Leader Sussan Ley stating the visit had failed to address substantial issues that undermine the country's national security. Speaking to reporters in Brisbane, Ms Ley said she was 'disappointed the PM didn't get assurances about Chinese warships' keeping away from Australian shores. 'It's not good enough. We want a strong, respectful relationship, but that respect has to cut both ways,' Ms Ley told the Today show. Echoing commentary from a raft of geostrategic analysts, Ms Lei asked why the PM was 'spending six days in China and not doing other visits in the region, not going to South Korea and Japan?' She also took aim at Mr Albanese's decision to not meet with Chinese dissidents and democracy activists, and said Australia should not be 'naive' in its approach to China. 'One thing I've been told by those who have escaped China is that, while they used to have to go and brief Angela Merkel time after time at the German embassy whenever she visited, and other embassies in Beijing, they never got such invitations from our embassy,' she said.
India Today
16-07-2025
- Business
- India Today
Who's the Nato chief to warn India on trade?
In today's geopolitics, where warnings and threats have become routine, such statements rarely shock any more. But when a warning comes from a place where it shouldn't originate, ears naturally perk up. Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte on Wednesday (Indian time) issued a warning to India, China, and Brazil. He threatened "100% secondary sanctions" if they continue trading with Russia, particularly in oil and after meetings with US senators, Rutte asked these nations to pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin into peace talks with Ukraine within 50 days. He echoed US President Donald Trump's threat of "biting tariffs" on Russian export buyers."If you live now in Beijing, or in Delhi, or you are the president of Brazil, you might want to take a look into this, because this might hit you very hard," Rutte said. This provocative statement directed at sovereign nations, including India, coming from the head of a military alliance, instantly raises questions about diplomatic overreach and to top it all, the sheer threat looms over countries like India, but strangely, the hammer never seems to fall on European nations, even though they're still buying Russian oil themselves. In the third year of the Russia-Ukraine War, Europe's fossil fuel imports from Moscow dropped by just 1% year-on-year. So, who exactly needs the lecture on responsible trading?This is why Rutte's bid to dictate India's trade policies is purely IS NOT A TRADE POLICEMANMark Rutte is the Secretary General of Nato, which is a military alliance focused on collective defence, and not a body governing global warning to India, a sovereign nation with no Nato affiliation, oversteps his comments followed Trump's announcement of new weapons for Ukraine. This hints that there is an alignment of Nato with the US policy, which is not at all has seen Brics as an anti-US bloc that is trying to bring in a currency that would undermine the American to forget, the US is a Nato member, and its biggest fact, Trump has been arm-twisting other Nato members, pushing them to spend more on defence Rutte's warning actually reveal his abject surrender to Trump's threats?Trade disputes and their resolution belong in fora like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which, although, face their share of criticisms of bias, has the jurisdiction to address such issues. Nato's role is security, not economic coercion, and Rutte's foray into trade threats, parroting US President Donald Trump, confirms the NEEDS NO LECTURE ON PEACE, NON-ALIGNMENTadvertisementRutte's call for India to "make the phone call to Vladimir Putin" to push for peace is patronising and dismissive of India's diplomatic efforts. India has consistently advocated for peace, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi stating, "This is not the era of war", during global should India, China, or Brazil be the ones calling Putin? Did Trump's battering of Zelenskyy not work last time, or is the "daddy's" desperation to grab a Nobel Peace Prize getting more intense?India has balanced its strategic autonomy by abstaining from UN resolutions condemning Russia while engaging in dialogue with all parties. Rutte's allegation that India is not doing enough is not only unfounded but also insults New Delhi's proactive role in trying to foster dialogue between Russia and August 2024, Modi called up Russia's Putin, a day after he spoke to US President Joe Biden. The calls come close on the heels of his trip to a tone towards a strategic partner doesn't foster cooperation. It only alienates them. Though frankly, it's no surprise. The US and its administrations, including Trump's, have used this kind of language, or even harsher, for their own so-called "closest allies" CAN'T SANCTION. AND SHOULDN'T TRYThreatening India with sanctions for buying Russian oil, described as "slamming back in a massive way", is coercive, not diplomatic messaging. It aligns with Trump's aggressive tariff threats, but Nato certainly lacks the authority to impose increased imports of discounted Russian oil since 2022 is a pragmatic move driven by energy security, not an alarming alignment. Threatening a sovereign nation for prioritising its economic interests, especially when Western countries have historically done the same, frankly reeks of warning comes suspiciously close to the Brics summit, hosted by Brazil last week. The Brics' growing influence, expanding footprint, with discussions on alternatives to the petrodollar system gaining statement, following Trump's frustration with the Brics' "anti-American policies", appears less about Ukraine and more about countering the bloc's rising clout. This timing of the warning suggests it is also looking to tame the Brics' success, rather than a genuine call for IS STRAYING FROM ITS MANDATEThe use of Nato, a security alliance, to meddle in India's bilateral trade policies blurs critical lines between diplomacy and senators are pushing a bill for 500% tariffs on countries trading with Russia. It also hints towards a broader Western involvement in economic threats risks tarnishing its credibility as a security-focused entity, and casts Rutte as a mouthpiece for Washington's trade office rather than one of the security ENERGY POLICY IS NOBODY'S TO DICTATERutte's, in the warning, perhaps assumes India's energy policy is overly reliant on Russia. It is misleading. India has diversified its oil imports, sourcing from the Middle East, Africa, and the US. Meanwhile, it leverages discounted Russian oil to stabilise domestic prices. That's India's pragmatic approach of balancing economic interests with global India to abandon this strategy to align with Western demands ignores its energy security needs and the realities of a multipolar world is no longer unipolar, it's not even bipolar any more. We're clearly heading toward a multipolar warning to India is a clear violation of diplomatic boundaries. It is a condescending tone toward a sovereign nation, and a misuse of Nato's authority. It misreads India's independent global posture and its balanced approach to the Russia-Ukraine as it has for decades, acts responsibly. It prioritises its energy security and advocates for peace without succumbing to external pressure. As the External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has, on multiple occasions, pointed out, the world must engage with India as an equal partner, not issue ultimatums through inappropriate channels. He said India did not need preachers, but statement wasn't just disrespectful. It was the wrong message, delivered in the wrong way, by absolutely the wrong person.- Ends
Sky News AU
16-07-2025
- Entertainment
- Sky News AU
China serenades Prime Minister Anthony Albanese with warmth, respect and Australian rock during state visit to Beijing
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has been serenaded with warmth, reverence and classic Australian rock music in Beijing, but critics have warned the tune is off key. Since arriving in China, Mr Albanese has been treated to a choreographed show of hospitality by the Chinese Communist Party, and loudly applauded by state media. His six-day, three-city visit marks an important global moment as China seeks to position itself as a credible alternative partner to the United States under Donald Trump. Mr Albanese has toed the CCP party line for the most part, avoiding discussing controversial topics including the Russia-Ukraine War and the Port of Darwin lease. In response, he has received the 'full kit and caboodle' from President Xi Jinping, including musical performances and loud public applause. Speaking at the Great Wall of China on day four of his visit, Mr Albanese detailed the 'warmth' and 'respect' with which the Chinese delegation has treated him. He described his private dinner with President Xi as a 'splendid occasion' and 'very warm'. 'The band there in the Great Hall played a different version of Paul Kelly's To Her Door, of Midnight Oil's Power and the Passion, of a range of songs as well," he said. "That obviously took them a long period of time, and those gestures matter. Respect matters between countries. 'They did it very well, I must say, as well. Powderfinger as well — they did the full kit and caboodle. So, it was a splendid occasion.' The feeling appears to be mutual as the state media continues to heap praise on Mr Albanese. Beijing's leading English state media outlet, China Daily, applauded the significance of the bilateral and trade relations between Mr Albanese and President Xi on Tuesday. 'Albanese's visit shows that the Australian side has a clearer… understanding of China than it had under the previous Scott Morrison government,' China Daily said. Another state-run publication, Global Times, commended Mr Albanese for adopting a 'pragmatic and rational approach to China policy'. However there has been some tension beneath the surface, but it has remained largely unaddressed by either leader. "The opportunity to sit down and have a meal and talk about personal issues, talk about things that aren't necessarily heavily political, is really important," Mr Albanese said. 'One of the things that my government does is engage in diplomacy. We don't shout with megaphones, we engage in diplomacy. That is in Australia's interest.' The Chinese read-out of Mr Albanese's meeting with President Xi Jinping on Tuesday claimed that he had opposed 'Taiwanese independence'. Asked whether that was an accurate representation of the closed-door meeting, Mr Albanese distanced himself from the claim, saying he hadn't seen the report. 'I agreed that Australia has had a long-standing bipartisan position that has supported the One China policy. That is our position,' Mr Albanese said. When asked if he discussed the controversial topic of the Chinese firm Landbridge's 99-year lease of the Port of Darwin, Mr Albanese said it never came up with President Xi. 'No, it wasn't raised. I can't be clearer than that… I don't need to (raise it),' Mr Albanese told reporters in Beijing. But while the renewed civility between the Albanese government and the Xi regime appears to hold, critics have warned it masks deeper strategic failures.
The Diplomat
15-07-2025
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Ian Storey on Russia's Turn to Southeast Asia
Over the past decade, under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has taken steps to expand its economic, political, and security relations with Southeast Asia. This has involved efforts both to build upon the historical influence of the Soviet Union in the region, particularly in Indochina, and to forge new partnerships with rising middle powers such as Malaysia and Indonesia. In a new book, 'Putin's Russia and Southeast Asia: The Kremlin's Pivot to Asia and the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War,' Ian Storey charts the course of this policy toward Southeast Asia and ASEAN since Putin was elected president in 2000, and especially since the beginning of his third presidential term in 2012. The first major study of Russia-Southeast Asia relations since the end of the Cold War, Storey's book examines both the causes and outcomes of Russia's increasing engagement with Southeast Asia, and the impact that the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had on this trajectory. Storey, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore and the co-editor of its journal 'Contemporary Southeast Asia,' spoke with The Diplomat's Southeast Asian Editor Sebastian Strangio about how the Kremlin's policy has shifted during Putin's long tenure, and the sources and limits of Russian influence in Southeast Asia. In the Introduction to your book, you write that Russia has 'the smallest economic footprint in Southeast Asia, the least geopolitical influence, and the lowest strategic significance,' which accounts for the dearth of academic writing on Russia's relations with the region since the end of the Cold War. What made you decide to study this topic in depth? As I argue in the Introduction, while Russia is not a major player in the region, it is a player nevertheless and has some undeniable strengths that make it worthy of scholarly attention. While Russia cannot be considered a great power in Southeast Asia, most of the ASEAN member states recognize that at the global level, it does have certain great power attributes, including its size, population, nuclear arsenal and vast natural resources. Moreover, from a geopolitical perspective, Russia is a member of the U.N. Security Council and is an influential player in many regions of the world, including the post-Soviet space (especially Central Asia), Europe, the Arctic, the Middle East and Africa. Moscow also has an increasingly consequential strategic partnership with China, retains some influence on the Korean Peninsula and, since 2022, has reinvigorated its alliance with North Korea. Until the mid-2010s, Russian defense companies sold billions of dollars of equipment to regional states, including Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Myanmar. Russia has important energy interests in Southeast Asia, including in the South China Sea, and is a major exporter of food and fertilizers to the region. Russia is also a dialogue partner of ASEAN, albeit a problematic one at times (it has tried to block Western countries from becoming observers to the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus observer groups). In sharp contrast with the West, Russia has a relatively benign image in Southeast Asia, isn't perceived as a threat by any country, and people have a generally positive impression of President Putin. In some parts of Southeast Asia, Putin's image is that of a strongman standing up to the West, and this resonates well. Interestingly, despite its brutal war in Chechnya, Russia is perceived by the Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia as being Islamic-friendly, largely due to its long-standing support for Palestinian statehood. Yet despite these factors, not one single-authored book on Russia and Southeast Asia had been published since the end of the Cold War. In 2021, I decided to close that important gap in the academic literature. In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine and that event, and how Southeast Asian countries responded to it, made the task all the more timely and important. How did Russia's influence in, and approach toward, Southeast Asia evolve between President Vladimir Putin rise to power in 2000 and his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022? Where, and in which countries, do you think Russia made the most significant inroads? When Putin became president in 2000, he felt that his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, had neglected Southeast Asia, especially Russia's Cold War allies Vietnam and Laos. He put bilateral relations with both of those countries back on track, and encouraged Russian defense companies to sell more arms to regional states. Under Putin, Russia also sought a closer relationship with ASEAN even though it was not seen as a very important multilateral forum. But the real change came in 2012, when Putin began his third term as president and introduced his 'Turn to the East,' or Asia Pivot. Although China remained at the center of the Kremlin's Asia policy, Russia did make some important gains in Southeast Asia over the next decade: two-way trade with the ASEAN-10 began to grow, Russia started to attend the East Asia Summit and ASEAN-Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus, persuaded Vietnam and Singapore to sign free trade agreements with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and appeared on the verge of winning some major defense contracts, including with U.S. allies, the Philippines and Thailand. After the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, Russia forged close ties with the junta. But as I argue in the book, from the mid-2010s, it began to lose ground: two-way trade with the ASEAN-10 peaked, its arms sales dropped off a cliff due to Western sanctions and its vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic was a flop. Then came the war. You began working on this book prior to the Ukraine invasion, an event that you write 'would complicate my endeavor, but make it much more interesting, timely, and relevant.' How has the war changed Putin's view of Southeast Asia and his policy towards it? Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Southeast Asia's importance to Russia has increased significantly. In terms of regional responses to the invasion, I think the Kremlin can be fairly satisfied with the region's responses. While only Myanmar endorsed the invasion, Singapore was the only country that condemned Russia by name and imposed financial sanctions. All of the other ASEAN states took an essentially neutral position. Russia's closest friends in the region, Vietnam and Laos, abstained on votes at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) which condemned the attack on Ukraine, while the other ASEAN states (and Timor-Leste) more or less voted consistently in support of the resolutions but went no further. Western attempts to portray Russia as an international pariah have clearly failed in Southeast Asia, as since February 2022, six regional leaders have met with Putin in person, and in June 2024, the Russian leader paid a state visit to Vietnam. In addition, the Russia-Ukraine War has barely impacted Moscow's dialogue partnership with ASEAN, even though the invasion violated all of ASEAN's core principles, which are enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and which Russia endorsed in 2004. Putin must also have been pleased that Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam all became BRICS partners in 2024 during Russia's chairmanship. The biggest hit Russia has taken in Southeast Asia has been to its arms sales, which in some ways was its most lucrative interest in the region. As Western countries tightened sanctions against Russia, Southeast Asian countries began to question Moscow's reliability as an arms seller. Consequently, sales have fallen from a peak of $1.4 billion in 2014 to less than $100 million last year. It's highly doubtful if Russia's defense sector can recover in Southeast Asia, as regional states can buy from traditional suppliers in the U.S. and Europe, and newcomers such as South Korea and Turkey. Given Moscow's pariah status in the West since 2022 (and to some extent since 2014), what do you think explains the decision of so many Southeast Asian governments to maintain, even to deepen (in the case of Malaysia, Indonesia, and others) their relations with Russia since 2022? What does this say about Southeast Asian strategic inclinations, and their views of how the United States and other Western countries have sought to frame the Ukraine war? As I mentioned earlier, most Southeast Asian countries have adopted a neutral position towards the Russia-Ukraine War for several reasons. They don't want to get embroiled in the disputes of the major powers, especially over an issue in which they do not believe their own interests are directly at stake. There is also a degree of empathy towards the Russian narrative that it was provoked into attacking Ukraine due to NATO's eastward expansion, and that Ukraine is simply a proxy of the U.S. More importantly, perhaps, a number of Southeast Asian countries, and especially the Muslim-majority states Indonesia and Malaysia, have accused the West of hypocrisy, pointing out that the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s. These accusations of double standards have been greatly amplified since Israel invaded Gaza in October 2024. Political leaders in Indonesia and Malaysia have asked why it is that the West was so quick to condemn Russian atrocities in Ukraine, but less keen to do so when it comes to Israel's actions. Most Southeast Asian countries voted in support of the UNGA resolutions, which condemned Russia, but that is the limit of their actions against Russia. The majority of ASEAN member states want to move on and engage Russia on issues that they consider important, especially trade, despite Moscow's shallow economic footprint in the region. Indonesia and Malaysia, in particular, seem keen to strengthen their countries' professed non-aligned stance by pursuing a more balanced foreign policy, and especially closer ties with both Moscow and Beijing. That may include arms purchases from Russia and China. Indonesia is looking to Russia to help improve its food security, including stepping up imports of Russian wheat, cooking oil and fertilizers. Several Southeast Asian countries, such as Myanmar, Vietnam, and Indonesia, are considering partnering with Russia to establish civilian nuclear power programs. In a nutshell, what is Putin's 'pitch' to the region? Putin's pitch to the region is sixfold. First, Russia is a great power and no problem in any part of the world can be resolved without it. Second, in the escalating strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, Moscow represents a 'third pole' of equal rank to Washington and Beijing. Third, Russia is a valuable source of advanced technology (especially nuclear power, weapons, and space). Fourth, Russia's Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) can provide a beneficial framework of cooperation among the EAEU, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and ASEAN. Fifth, Russia can help promote the voices of the Global South through platforms such as BRICS. And sixth, among the great powers, only Russia and China truly respect ASEAN centrality. But in many respects, Russia's pitch is hard to sell to Southeast Asian leaders. Few ASEAN member states perceive Russia to be a great power in the region because trade links are insubstantial and Moscow cannot provide significant investment or developmental assistance. Nor is it a major security provider. As such, no Southeast Asian leader places Russia on a par with the US and China. ASEAN as an organization has been lukewarm towards the idea of a free trade agreement with the EAEU as well as the GEP because, unlike China's BRI, there's no money supporting the initiative. When it comes to arms, nuclear power and space cooperation, Southeast Asian states have many other countries they can choose to partner with, and Russia is seldom their first choice (except for Myanmar, which basically has to choose between either Russia or China). And while four Southeast Asian countries have joined BRICS, and three others have expressed an interest in joining, the main motivation is China's economic heft, not Russia's.
The Diplomat
09-07-2025
- Business
- The Diplomat
South Korea's New Leadership in the Trump Era
Trans-Pacific View author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Soo Kim –former CIA analyst and geopolitical risk consultant – is the 469th in 'The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.' Identify the top geopolitical priorities facing South Korea's newly elected President Lee Jae-myung. President Lee assumes office at a time of friction, both at home and abroad. His top geopolitical priorities likely will include stabilizing the Peninsula, recalibrating Seoul's alliance with the U.S., and securing Seoul's role and place amid several ongoing global contingencies, including the Russia-Ukraine War, tightening U.S.-China competition, and the Middle East crisis. Lee's challenge lies not only in balancing Seoul's international act, but calibrating this against the situation at home, where political divisions need to be resolved and economic challenges – including improving the livelihoods of the population – remain front and center. Analyze Lee's likely approach to managing trade and security relations with the Trump administration. We remember that during the snap presidential election campaign, Lee perpetuated the image of a pragmatic leader. Should that truly be the case, we would expect the South Korean president to handle relations with the U.S. – including the delicately intertwined issues on trade and security – because of Seoul's long-term interests. That Lee has branded himself as a pragmatic leader, if played well and judiciously, could translate into a relationship that is nuanced and preempts potential friction with the Trump administration. This may include affirming Seoul's defense contributions while resisting excessive, heavy-handed demands for cost-sharing. The South Korean public may perceive trade negotiations as having more immediate, palpable impact on their daily lives. Lee, cognizant of such domestic concerns, may push back against protectionist measures; however, he may frame such efforts as defending the Korean population rather than outright resistance to U.S. pressure. Examine how Lee might balance the ROK's strategic position vis-à-vis the U.S.-China tech war and more broadly, U.S.-China strategic competition. The challenge Lee, like his predecessors, faces as South Korea's president lies in preserving Seoul's economic relationship with China while avoiding strategic drift from the U.S. alliance. If Lee were sensitive to perceptions in both Washington and Beijing, he may be inclined to take a strategically ambiguous approach. For instance, perhaps he would resist overt alignment with U.S. export control regimes – unless Seoul's national security is directly in peril while discreetly complying and cooperating in areas that could jeopardize the interests of Korea's powerhouses, such as Samsung, SK Hynix, or other industries' access to Western markets. Lee may also look to emphasize regional cooperation and coalitions to soften any perceptions of leaning too 'skewed' towards either Washington or Beijing, enhancing supply chain coordination with other regional actors in Asia. The key for Lee – and South Korea – lies in preserving the country's maneuvering space without triggering a backlash from either side. This clearly requires diplomatic dexterity – akin to pragmatism. Explain how Lee's administration might work with China in managing North Korea. Lee has vowed to open communications with North Korea again and establish peace on the Korean Peninsula through talks and cooperation. Given his emphasis on reengagement and dialogue with Pyongyang, Lee may view China as a critical key in jump-starting inter-Korean relations. Rather than prioritizing the U.S. channel, Lee may consider diplomatic coordination with Beijing to nudge inter-Korean relations to rapprochement. His administration may consider reopening trilateral South Korea-China-North Korea channels in parallel with U.S.-centered efforts to diversify Seoul's approach to Pyongyang. Assess the broader implications of Lee's leadership on Northeast Asian regional security risks and opportunities in the Trump era. The region is far from being isolated from the geopolitical turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. As such, it's critical for like-minded countries to find points of convergence and cooperation with the view of protecting their common interests of stability and international order. The role of a regional balancer, if played judiciously, could be instrumental in recalibrating dynamics and preventing one power from holding disproportionate sway over the region. For instance, a skilled, truly nuanced dealing with Beijing could create a channel for de-escalation. At the same time, an 'autonomous' foreign policy stance may not only frustrate the U.S. and China, the major powers; it could also complicate and impede U.S.-Japan-Korea coordination, especially if Seoul hesitates support on critical issues, such as intelligence sharing or joint military drills. In sum, a truly 'pragmatic' South Korean presidency could create an opportunity for regionally-driven stability initiatives. Success hinges largely upon Lee's ability to maintain Washington's trust while pursuing his independent overtures as well as communicating Seoul's strategic value to both the U.S. and China without tipping the balance – a mammoth order.
