Latest news with #Shi'a
Yahoo
13-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Opinion - The Ayatollah's survival was no accident — it was Israel's choice, and a wise one
Israel just executed the most far-reaching decapitation strike in the history of Iran. Within hours, targeted airstrikes had eliminated Iran's top military planners — General Mohammad Bagheri, General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and General Ali Rashid. Simultaneously, missile development facilities and key military coordination nodes were targeted, severing some of Iran's communication links with proxy networks in Syria and Iraq. And yet the man at the apex of the system, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not targeted. To some observers, this omission may seem inexplicable. But martyring Khamenei would have produced explosive consequences far beyond the battlefield. Under Iran's constitution, the death of the Supreme Leader triggers an emergency succession process managed by the Assembly of Experts. Since the March 2024 elections, this body has been dominated by clerics aligned with the hardline factions. Their candidate would likely be Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader's son and behind-the-scenes enforcer. But Mojtaba faces a problem: He lacks the religious credentials necessary for the role. He has never issued a formal legal opinion, never taught in the traditional seminaries of Qom or Najaf and has never been accepted as a senior clerical authority. In Shi'a Islam, legitimacy must be earned through decades of scholarship and peer recognition — it is not inherited as with a monarchy. Had Israel killed Khamenei, this would likely have fast-tracked and legitimized Mojtaba's rise. Absent that, it would be very controversial. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq, for example, has long rejected Iran's system of having a cleric as a political ruler. As long as the Ayatollah lives to a ripe old age, Mojtaba is both too illegitimate to unify the system and too protected to be sidelined. Thus, he may stall Iran's succession process into a doctrinal stalemate — one that Israel has now made more likely by weakening his military protectors while leaving his father alive. Shi'a political theology is structured around martyrdom. The Seventh Century deaths of Ali and Hussein form the religious foundation of resistance and sacrifice. Had Khamenei been killed by an Israeli missile, it would not have been processed politically but mythologically. His death would have been viewed as a reenactment of the Karbala tragedy. That would have sanctified his son, unified Iran's factions, and legitimized violent escalation from Iran's regional proxies. These groups — Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Kata'ib Hezbollah in Iraq — see themselves as guardians of the Supreme Leader's religious authority. Iranian defectors have long hinted at internal escalation plans that treat the assassination of the Supreme Leader as a trigger for full-spectrum retaliation: coordinated missile barrages, cyberattacks on Gulf energy terminals, and asymmetric operations against U.S. targets in the region. Sparing Khamenei denies Iran that trigger. It also preserves strategic ambiguity. By targeting Iran's ability to act but not its spiritual figurehead, Israel prevents the regime from invoking an existential crisis. The message to Iran's mid-level commanders and bureaucrats is clear: Escalation is not inevitable. There is still room for recalibration. Khamenei's regime has never relied solely on brute force. At the center of this is the Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of the Supreme Leader. While nominally a clerical publishing organ, the office functions in reality as a doctrinal surveillance and enforcement bureau. Under the informal leadership of Mojtaba Khamenei, it regulates clerical discourse, curates access to the Supreme Leader, disciplines heterodox scholars, and manages a patronage economy for the seminaries. This system operates under the protection of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps senior command. The generals eliminated were the regime's enforcers of doctrinal compliance. Their presence deterred rebellion, reinforced Mojtaba's authority, and insulated the clerical apparatus from challenge. The strike helps to break this protective outer layer, leaving the regime's ideological core exposed and overextended. Israel should keep targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command. But it should not eliminate Mojtaba or high-profile hardliner clerics. That would risk martyrdom and consolidation. Instead, it should be to disrupt the infrastructure that sustains Mojtaba's influence. This includes severing the financial lifelines that fund loyalist seminaries, exposing internal contradictions within Qom's clerical elite, and quietly empowering transnational rivals — especially those aligned with Sistani in Najaf, who reject clerical political rule altogether. The goal should not be to decapitate the regime, but to delay, fragment, and deny. For the first time in decades, the Iranian religious establishment faces the threat of a vacuum of coercive insulation. In this new context, figures who once maintained quiet distance from the state may now emerge as active challengers to Mojtaba's succession, potentially leading to a schism that would dramatically affect the operations of pro-Iranian militias across the region. Their legitimacy not just to Tehran's treasury but also to the symbolic authority of the Supreme Leader. If that authority is contested — if Mojtaba is promoted without consensus — then these groups may begin aligning with other clerics or factions. Figures such as Qais Khazali or Hashem Safieddine, who combine militia leadership with religious aspirations, could become new centers of gravity. The result would be the transformation of the Axis of Resistance from a coordinated deterrent bloc into a constellation of semi-autonomous and potentially competing actors. In wars of theology, as in wars of missiles, the decisive blow is not the one that kills a man. It is the one that denies a myth. Carlo J.V. Caro is a New York-based writer who studied and lived in both Jordan and Israel. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
13-06-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
The Ayatollah's survival was no accident — it was Israel's choice, and a wise one
Israel just executed the most far-reaching decapitation strike in the history of Iran. Within hours, targeted airstrikes had eliminated Iran's top military planners — General Mohammad Bagheri, General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and General Ali Rashid. Simultaneously, missile development facilities and key military coordination nodes were targeted, severing some of Iran's communication links with proxy networks in Syria and Iraq. And yet the man at the apex of the system, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not targeted. To some observers, this omission may seem inexplicable. But martyring Khamenei would have produced explosive consequences far beyond the battlefield. Under Iran's constitution, the death of the Supreme Leader triggers an emergency succession process managed by the Assembly of Experts. Since the March 2024 elections, this body has been dominated by clerics aligned with the hardline factions. Their candidate would likely be Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader's son and behind-the-scenes enforcer. But Mojtaba faces a problem: He lacks the religious credentials necessary for the role. He has never issued a formal legal opinion, never taught in the traditional seminaries of Qom or Najaf and has never been accepted as a senior clerical authority. In Shi'a Islam, legitimacy must be earned through decades of scholarship and peer recognition — it is not inherited as with a monarchy. Had Israel killed Khamenei, this would likely have fast-tracked and legitimized Mojtaba's rise. Absent that, it would be very controversial. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq, for example, has long rejected Iran's system of having a cleric as a political ruler. As long as the Ayatollah lives to a ripe old age, Mojtaba is both too illegitimate to unify the system and too protected to be sidelined. Thus, he may stall Iran's succession process into a doctrinal stalemate — one that Israel has now made more likely by weakening his military protectors while leaving his father alive. Shi'a political theology is structured around martyrdom. The Seventh Century deaths of Ali and Hussein form the religious foundation of resistance and sacrifice. Had Khamenei been killed by an Israeli missile, it would not have been processed politically but mythologically. His death would have been viewed as a reenactment of the Karbala tragedy. That would have sanctified his son, unified Iran's factions, and legitimized violent escalation from Iran's regional proxies. These groups — Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Kata'ib Hezbollah in Iraq — see themselves as guardians of the Supreme Leader's religious authority. Iranian defectors have long hinted at internal escalation plans that treat the assassination of the Supreme Leader as a trigger for full-spectrum retaliation: coordinated missile barrages, cyberattacks on Gulf energy terminals, and asymmetric operations against U.S. targets in the region. Sparing Khamenei denies Iran that trigger. It also preserves strategic ambiguity. By targeting Iran's ability to act but not its spiritual figurehead, Israel prevents the regime from invoking an existential crisis. The message to Iran's mid-level commanders and bureaucrats is clear: Escalation is not inevitable. There is still room for recalibration. Khamenei's regime has never relied solely on brute force. At the center of this is the Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of the Supreme Leader. While nominally a clerical publishing organ, the office functions in reality as a doctrinal surveillance and enforcement bureau. Under the informal leadership of Mojtaba Khamenei, it regulates clerical discourse, curates access to the Supreme Leader, disciplines heterodox scholars, and manages a patronage economy for the seminaries. This system operates under the protection of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps senior command. The generals eliminated were the regime's enforcers of doctrinal compliance. Their presence deterred rebellion, reinforced Mojtaba's authority, and insulated the clerical apparatus from challenge. The strike helps to break this protective outer layer, leaving the regime's ideological core exposed and overextended. Israel should keep targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command. But it should not eliminate Mojtaba or high-profile hardliner clerics. That would risk martyrdom and consolidation. Instead, it should be to disrupt the infrastructure that sustains Mojtaba's influence. This includes severing the financial lifelines that fund loyalist seminaries, exposing internal contradictions within Qom's clerical elite, and quietly empowering transnational rivals — especially those aligned with Sistani in Najaf, who reject clerical political rule altogether. The goal should not be to decapitate the regime, but to delay, fragment, and deny. For the first time in decades, the Iranian religious establishment faces the threat of a vacuum of coercive insulation. In this new context, figures who once maintained quiet distance from the state may now emerge as active challengers to Mojtaba's succession, potentially leading to a schism that would dramatically affect the operations of pro-Iranian militias across the region. Their legitimacy not just to Tehran's treasury but also to the symbolic authority of the Supreme Leader. If that authority is contested — if Mojtaba is promoted without consensus — then these groups may begin aligning with other clerics or factions. Figures such as Qais Khazali or Hashem Safieddine, who combine militia leadership with religious aspirations, could become new centers of gravity. The result would be the transformation of the Axis of Resistance from a coordinated deterrent bloc into a constellation of semi-autonomous and potentially competing actors. In wars of theology, as in wars of missiles, the decisive blow is not the one that kills a man. It is the one that denies a myth. Carlo J.V. Caro is a New York-based writer who studied and lived in both Jordan and Israel.
Eyewitness News
27-05-2025
- Politics
- Eyewitness News
Durban man previously accused of terrorism wants to run for elections
JOHANNESBURG - A Durban man previously accused of terrorism and attempted bombings wants to run for elections. Farhad Hoomer said he was in the final stages of registering his party, the Islamic State of South Africa. Hoomer was previously arrested for running a terrorist cell in South Africa. However, all charges against him were dropped. In 2018, Hoomer was arrested along with 17 others for an attack at the Shi'a Imam Hussain Mosque in Verulam. One person died and two others were injured in that incident. Then in 2021, Hoomer was arrested for being in possession of 5,000 rounds of ammunition, an AK-47, a rifle with a scope, and a cellphone jammer. However, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) has dropped all charges against him. Now a free man, Hoomer said he wanted to contribute positively to the country. "My main reason for starting a political party is because of the injustice happening in the world. We can see we are slaves to the system. The banking system of the world has enslaved us and the only solution to free mankind from slavery is Sharia law." Hoomer said the party had already started preparing for the next local government elections.
Time of India
21-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
What does Ali Khan Mahmudabad teach at Ashoka University?
, a prominent academic at , was arrested on Sunday following a complaint filed by a leader. The arrest stems from a social media post he made in response to public praise for . The post, which has since been deleted, read: 'I am very happy to see so many right wing commentators applauding Colonel Sofiya Qureshi but perhaps they could also equally loudly demand that the victims of mob lynchings, arbitrary bulldozing and others who are victims of the BJP's hate mongering be protected as Indian citizens. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now The optics of two women soldiers presenting their findings is important, but optics must translate to reality on the ground, otherwise it's just hypocrisy.' Police confirmed that Mahmudabad was taken into custody under relevant sections of the law related to promoting enmity. The arrest has triggered sharp reactions from the academic community and civil liberties groups, who argue that criticism of state policy should not be grounds for criminal action. Courses rooted in History, Identity, and Political Thought At Ashoka University, Ali Khan Mahmudabad serves as Head of the Department of History and is an associate professor of . His academic instruction centers on the intellectual and political history of modern South Asia, with a strong emphasis on nationalism, religious identity, and communalism. He is known for guiding students through complex historical events with a critical lens and for fostering open discussions on state, identity, and belonging. His curriculum often merges rigorous historical research with contemporary political discourse, encouraging students to explore the intersections of religion, language, and law in shaping public life in India. A distinguished education across continents Mahmudabad's academic path reflects both depth and diversity. After completing primary education at La Martiniere in Lucknow, he continued schooling in the United Kingdom at King's College School, followed by Winchester College. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now He earned his undergraduate degree in History and Political Science from Amherst College, USA, in 2006. Pursuing language and regional expertise, he studied Arabic at the University of Damascus before heading to the University of Cambridge, where he earned both an MPhil and a PhD in History. His doctoral dissertation, supervised by Professor Sir Christopher Bayly and Professor Javed Majeed, examined 'Rhetorics and Spaces of Belonging among North Indian Muslims, 1850–1950.' His academic work has been widely recognized and published in journals and scholarly books focused on and Shi'a networks. Public intellectual and political commentator Fluent in Urdu, Arabic, Persian, French, Hindi, and English, Mahmudabad is also a prolific writer. He contributes a fortnightly column to The Inquilab and writes regularly for publications including The Guardian, The Straits Times, and HuffPost . His scholarly writings appear in edited volumes like The Shi'a in Modern South Asia and Lucknow: A City Between Cultures. His book, , explores Muslim conceptions of homeland and identity in pre- and post-colonial India. As a translator, he has rendered Urdu literary works into English, most notably Break of Dawn by Khan Mahboob Tarzi . Among his notable literary contributions, Ali Khan Mahmudabad translated Break of Dawn , the English version of Aghaaz-e-Sahr by Khan Mahboob Tarzi , bringing a classic piece of Urdu fiction to a wider audience. A royal lineage and political legacy Born on December 2, 1982, in Mahmudabad, Uttar Pradesh, Ali Khan Mahmudabad hails from a family deeply entrenched in the political history of the subcontinent. He is the grandson of Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan, the last ruling Raja of Mahmudabad and a significant financier of the Muslim League during India's partition. His father, Sulaiman Khan, holds the titular title of Raja of Mahmudabad, while his mother, Rani Vijay, is the daughter of the distinguished diplomat Jagat Singh Mehta.
Scroll.in
15-05-2025
- Entertainment
- Scroll.in
Translated historical fiction: Shivaji and Aurangzeb's bloody battle for the control of the Deccan
'Emperor Aurangzeb has departed for the house of Allah. But internal squabbles, fear of enemy attack and other such worries have tied the hands of the administrators. Which is why the passing away of Alamgir after his illness is not being made public.' This gossip doing the rounds, along with the other drops of secret news leaking out, had robbed the denizens of the Yamuna bank of their sleep. However, Aurangzeb gave them all a rude shock by presenting himself in the flesh in a durbar organised specially for the occasion. Bearing all the marks of wear and tear that his long illness had wrought upon his person, he declared in the Deewaan-e-Aam, the hall of public audience, 'All those who were celebrating the news of my passing away will doubtless be grieved to see me here in flesh and blood. I am one with them in their grief; but the point is, why should I be in a hurry to cross over to the other world? I have already sent three of my dear brothers there with all due honour, while my ailing Abba Huzoor is conveniently living out his worldly days in incarceration at the Agra palace. Indeed, it is rightly said that there is no early relief from this world for evil people like me.' Muhi-ud-din Mohammad Aurangzeb, who had assumed the regnal title of Alamgir, was forty-four years of age. His huge empire stretched from Afghanistan in the north to Burma in the east. His durbar was bustling with envoys from Bukhara, Persia and the Arab lands, standing before him in abject servility. Aurangzeb's strict and tyrannical rule had created an atmosphere of terror across the realm. Courtesans and dancers had fled Delhi and Agra in fear for their lives. The slightest sound of music or merrymaking emerging from any locality in these cities would immediately invite a raid by the emperor's police force. Artists were belaboured like thieves, and singers had been reduced to beggary. There was strict prohibition throughout the empire and imbibers ran the risk of having their limbs chopped off. The lamp of religious tolerance and freedom of belief that Akbar had lit a generation earlier was ruthlessly snuffed out. Most of the Hindu grandees, particularly the Rajputs whom the Great Mughal had bound close to his heart, had now become objects of hate and derision. Equal hate and derision was mandated for the Shi'a, the dissident sect that had broken away from the main body of orthodox Sunni Muslims. As pious as he was fanatical, Aurangzeb would lead the recitation of the Qur'an immediately after the fast was broken in the evenings during the holy month of Ramzan, and continue with the recitation for nine hours at a stretch. A few months back, he had fallen seriously ill and would often sink into delirium. But he was alert enough to register that his beloved sister Roshanara had begun to look for a successor to his throne and had immediately tossed her out of his affections. Aurangzeb was the fourth son of emperor Shah Jahan and his wife Mumtaz Mahal. His subjects would often express astonishment in private, of course – that a person born to the most beautiful (and presumably kind) woman in the world should have turned out to be so hard-hearted and bigoted. When Aurangzeb was still a boy, a soothsayer had alerted Shah Jahan, 'The most renegade of all your princes is this Aurangzeb. One day he is going to be the cause not only of your destruction, but that of your entire lineage.' The emperor had taken this warning to heart. This boy Aurang was the fairest in complexion among the Mughal princes. The emperor would often tell his eldest son Dara Shikoh, 'Never show any mercy to this rascal. He is a white snake that has sprung from my loins. One of these days he is going to bite you and spread his poison in your blood.' The soothsayer's prophecy came true. Aurangzeb had not only enthusiastically hounded, imprisoned, tortured and finally slaughtered all three of his elder brothers, but even celebrated the event as Shabe-baaraat, the evening of joy. He had not even spared his own father, a person of no less eminence than Shah Jahan. He had disrupted the water supply to the palace in the Agra fort where he held him prisoner. He had even schemed to have him secretly eliminated. These blood-curdling deeds had created a dark aura around him and made him a dreaded figure, in whose presence the stoutest heart quaked with fear. In spite of all this, his maternal uncle Shaista Khan had managed to acquire for himself the privilege of being the emperor's close friend and confidante. Obviously, it was a colourful series of events that had earned him this entitlement. It was Uncle Shaista who had conveyed verbatim to Aurangzeb his father's message, 'Don't you ever forget, boy, that your old age will bring you more misery than you have brought into mine. Despite being a prince of the realm, you have converted the last days of your old father and king into hell on earth. This act of yours can never find favour with Allahta'ala. Even while you have the throne of the empire under your buttocks, you will wander through jungle and heath like the bears that the dervishes drag behind them by their nose-rings.' 'This is wonderful, Maamoojaan,' Aurangzeb happily confessed. 'Whenever I hear my father cursing in bitterness and frustration, when he tears his hair in anger and desperation, I swear, I feel that my day is made.' To ensure that he would not be obliged to visit his incarcerated father every now and then, he had ensconced himself at Red Fort in Delhi, far enough away from Agra. A pleasant, cool wind was blowing through the palace in the fort on the banks of the Yamuna. The reddish rays of the setting sun had bathed the garden behind the palace in surreal hues. The trees were laden with flowers and fruit. Deer and peacock leapt and strutted everywhere. Skillfully constructed waterfalls and gushing fountains created little streams and rivulets that gurgled pleasantly as they flowed by. The evening air was a heady mix of colour, sound and fragrance. Uncle and nephew were soaking in the atmosphere as they sat chatting under a bower. 'Shall I tell you something, Maamoojaan?' 'By all means, Alam-panaah.' 'A good four or five years have passed since I took over the reins of the empire. The heaven on earth that people call Kashmir is very much a part of our empire, but I have not been able to pay a visit to that land of roses. I have not even been able to indulge in the little bit of hunting that I enjoy so much.' 'Without a doubt, my liege, Kashmir is our own land.' For Shaista Khan, this growing intimacy with the emperor was nothing less than a blessing from Allah. When the battle for succession had flared up in Delhi during Shah Jahan's reign, it was Shaista Khan who had sent this nephew of his an urgent message, advising him to rush to the capital and jump into the fray, manoeuvre his way past his older siblings by hook or by crook, and snatch the crown for himself. Quite against character, Aurangzeb had lately been taken over by a strange whim to rebuild his bond with his old father. Not liking what he saw, Shaista Khan sidled up to his nephew and said, 'In my last meeting with Shahjahan sahib, I had told him that trying to snap the bond between father and son is like trying to bisect flowing water with a word. It can never happen.' 'So, what did Abbajaan say?' 'He said that he didn't care that Aurangzeb had caused rivers of blood to flow, but he couldn't forgive him for that one demoniacal deed –' 'Which one?' 'The sheer viciousness of sending to him, wrapped in a kerchief, the severed head of his darling son Dara Shikoh. The humiliation to which the young prince's body had been subjected, and the wicked, black-hearted joke that had been played upon a loving father! He said he would have been eternally thankful if, instead, you had blown him up with a cannon.' As Shaista spoke on, Aurangzeb's annoyance waxed. The very utterance of his father's name was now sending him into a paroxysm of rage. He had always detested the old man for his philandering nature. Jahaanara Begum, his sister who had inherited the fabled beauty of their mother Mumtaz Mahal, had remained unmarried despite being the daughter of the most powerful person of his time. Aurangzeb's grouse was that it was their father who had scuttled her prospects of marriage. The gossip doing the rounds in Delhi and other cities along the Yamuna was that the father himself had been preying upon his daughter's beauty like a wild beast. Such rumours would incense Aurangzeb beyond endurance. 'Lecherous old bastard,' he raged, 'smutty old goat! I've been seeing him from my earliest days. Who did he appoint to guard his palace? Strong, robust young soldiers? No! He had these long-legged beauties specially imported from Iran and Turan orbiting around him, so that he could lust after them. Wanton, filthy man of the first water!' 'Yes, well, there are other things I could say, but I had better hold my tongue,' Shaista muttered. 'No, no, Maamoojaan, come out with it. There's little that can shock me!' 'Well, Alam-panaah, I want to thank you.' 'What for?' 'For not missing a single opportunity to seek your revenge.' 'Why do you say that?' 'I hear that you had once tried to get a firangi doctor to administer poison to the emperor?' 'Yes, I did, but did it help? The old sinner wanted to place that apostate Dara Shikoh on the throne of Hindustan – the dream scenario of our foolish subjects, these infidel Hindus and my senile father! How could a god-fearing Muslim like me let such a catastrophe come to pass? It was my mission to exterminate my heretic brothers, eliminate my wretched father and save the empire from disaster.' Aurangzeb had proceeded to do exactly that. He had brought peace of a sort upon his empire. All internal squabbles, intrigues and rebellion had been put down with an iron hand. Across the realm, he had whipped the administration into shape and improved security arrangements. In the cities, the old narrow lanes and arches of the cities had been demolished while new battlements and gates were constructed. Protective boundary walls were built on the emperor's orders around the city of Lahore. Excerpted with permission from The Wild Warfront: Shivaji Mahasamrat – Volume 2,
