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Rudaw Net
6 days ago
- Politics
- Rudaw Net
Kurdish-German politician eyes Cologne mayorship, pushes green agenda
Also in Interview Syria begins importing Azerbaijani Gas via Turkey to boost power supply Damascus, Rojava to meet in Paris 'soon': Senior official Syria moves to revive key port, border crossings in drive for economic recovery: Official New electoral system for Syria's parliament finalized, announcement expected soon: Spox A+ A- BERLIN - A Kurdish politician from Germany's Green Party and deputy speaker of the North Rhine-Westphalia state parliament is running for mayor of Cologne, envisioning the western German city as the 'climate capital of Europe' and urging Kurdish youth to engage in political life. In an interview with Rudaw on Tuesday, Berivan Aymaz said, 'I've lived in Cologne since I was eight, after my family suddenly found themselves without a country and without hope in 1980. This city gave me and my family a home.' Originally from the predominantly Kurdish province of Cewlig (Bingol) in eastern Turkey, Aymaz encouraged Kurdish youth in Germany to "engage in political life and civic participation,' stressing the importance of staying informed about local developments. 'Go to the polls and exercise your democratic right," she told them. Aymaz outlined her key priorities for Cologne, focusing on social justice, especially at a time when municipal budgets are tight. 'We need policies that focus not on secondary projects, but on the real needs of the people,' she said. She also expressed her intent to address the housing crisis in Cologne, noting that many in the west Germany city are unable to afford to live in the city. Aymaz also told Rudaw that she envisions Cologne as the "climate capital of Europe,' vowing to focus on green infrastructure and 'gradually reducing car use and improving public transportation." She further plans to "plant 2,000 new trees in the city every year." Addressing the growing threat of racism and far-right extremism, the Kurdish-born politician urged firm action, including banning the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, whom she said must not be allowed 'to use democratic means to spread propaganda against minorities.' As a woman of Kurdish background, she sees her candidacy as a powerful reminder that "democracy looks not at where a person comes from, but at the work they do and the values they represent.' The election is set for September 14. Aymaz urged all eligible residents to vote, emphasizing her hope that her candidacy inspires others. "I would be happy if, with their votes, for the first time in German history, a Green Party politician becomes mayor of a German city of millions, especially if that politician is someone Kurdistan-born." The election is scheduled for September 14, and Aymaz called on all eligible residents to vote. 'I would be proud if, for the first time in German history, a Green Party politician were elected mayor of a city with millions of residents,' especially if that person 'was born in Kurdistan,' she said. Below is the full transcript of the interview with Berivan Aymaz. Rudaw: My first question is, how did you dare to make such a decision and nominate yourself for the post of mayor of a major city like Cologne? Berivan Aymaz: As you know, Alla, I have been living in Cologne since I was 8 years old, and I consider myself a Colognian with all my heart and soul. I sincerely thank this city. It has helped me and my family immensely. When we were suddenly left without a country and without hope in 1980, this city gave me and my family a home. The local community was very active. The trade union strongly supported my father, who was a teacher at the time. They knew he was being politically persecuted and helped change his status from a diplomatic one [to protected] on paper. Even in the 1980s, Cologne already had a large Kurdish community and a progressive immigrant network. They supported one another. Two years ago, when the party's search committee was looking for someone capable of meeting the challenges of leading a city of millions, they conducted a thorough and thoughtful process. In the end, they unanimously nominated me. They asked me to take on the role, and after giving it some thought, I said, "I gladly accept the responsibility for this beloved city." Why are you confident that you're the best choice for this position? The world is going through a difficult time. There are many conflicts and wars - especially in the Middle East and in Kurdistan, where many Kurds live. We are also witnessing the rise of autocracies. If we look at how a superpower like the [Donald] Trump[-led United States] and how the Trump influence continues to spread, we can see that populism has also reached Germany. Societies are being pulled apart. Here in Cologne, a city that values coexistence, this tension is noticeable. Cologne is a united and open city, an international city, which quickly determines its position and raises its voice against right-wing extremism and racism. But these positions have not guaranteed democracy. For me, a policy of social justice is important. At a time when municipal funds are scarce, and Cologne also has low funding, a policy should be adopted that does not focus on secondary projects, but looks at the needs of the people, pursues social justice and a long-term policy that sees the demands of different people and fosters a strong community spirit. I bring those qualities with me. I also have extensive experience in political leadership. I've served as a member of the state parliament for many years, elected directly in my constituency for the Green Party, and currently serve as the Deputy Speaker of the North Rhine-Westphalia state parliament. This political experience is vital for leading a city of millions. Leadership also means bringing people together, and I've worked toward that in my role as deputy speaker. To what extent will that experience help prepare you for the role of mayor? If you're a politician like me, you don't prepare in the traditional sense - you respond to events and developments as they come. The best preparation, as my father taught me, is to be brave, open, and willing to try new paths. You also need a strong inner compass and clear principles. You mentioned being brave. What strategic project do you have in mind for the future of Cologne? That, too, requires courage. There are many ideas, but what's most important is understanding that Cologne, like many German cities, has a limited budget. That's a major challenge. We have to prioritize and focus on the most urgent projects, according to future plans, and decide which measures we can implement. For me, the biggest issue is affordable housing. Many people can no longer afford to pay rent in the city. Students admitted to Cologne's universities often cannot study here due to high rent. I must pay attention to this and try to address the matter and I have a plan. We need a social [housing] policy. That policy must be ready for projects in the public interest and cooperative housing initiatives, much like what Vienna implemented over a hundred years ago. We should implement this in a concrete way. One goal is to build housing specifically for students. Another key issue is transportation. In light of climate change, we need to change the transport system. This means gradually reducing car use and improving public transportation - buses and trains must run reliably and on time. We also need to ensure that outer districts are better connected by bus routes. And for families and young people in the city, safe bike lanes are essential. Cologne is already considered a green city. How do you plan to make it even greener? What specific initiatives do you have? The Green Party has been shaping Cologne's policies for ten years, and in the last election, we became the city's strongest party. I have a vision to make Cologne the climate capital of Europe. We must continue working toward meeting the 2035 climate goals. That includes integrating climate standards into construction projects. As we've seen, the climate crisis is already affecting our lives - this past March was the warmest on record in Cologne and across Europe. Some public spaces became unlivable due to the heat. I plan to plant 2,000 new trees in the city every year. Berivan, you're Kurdish. Thirteen years ago when I first met you, your Kurdish wasn't very strong. Now it's excellent - you have really impressed me. How did you learn? I did not grow up speaking Kurdish fluently. I was born in North Kurdistan, in Cewlig [Bingol province in eastern Turkey] and came to Germany at the age of six. I started school early and mainly spoke German there. At home, we spoke a mix of Turkish and Kurdish. My Kurdish dialect is Zazaki, which isn't as widely spoken. Later, through my work in organizing and building the Kurdish community in Germany, I connected with many Kurmanji and Sorani speakers. My language skills were limited at first, but I've always wanted to learn the language properly. I love the Kurdish language and all its dialects. During the COVID lockdowns, I spent a lot of time listening to Kurdish music, I enjoyed it very much. This helped me expand my vocabulary and fluency. No doubt, your Kurdish is now very good. Thank you very much. You mentioned music. During the exhausting election campaign period, when you want to relax or be alone, do you listen to Kurdish music? What kind of music do you enjoy? For times of rest or on the road, I really like to listen to Kurdish songs. I put on my headphones and listen. Many of the musicians are musicians from my youth. From here, I send a warm greeting to Ciwan Haco. He is not only a friend from my youth, but a great artist, and I still listen to him today. Indeed, I love Kurdish music and listen to it often. I'm especially happy to see talented young Kurdish musicians emerging on social media - some doing Kurdish hip-hop, others giving classical Dengbej music a modern twist. I often listen to Kurdish music when I travel or take breaks. Many of the musicians I listen to are from my youth. I'd like to send a warm greeting to Ciwan Haco - he's not only an artist from my youth, but also a dear friend, and I still enjoy his music today. Berivan, there are many Kurds in Germany, particularly in Cologne. They're organized and active. What can they do to support you? It's not about what they can do for me - it's about how they can engage in political life and civic participation. It's important for them to stay informed about what's happening in their neighborhoods - whether a new road is being built, a bike lane, a train station, or a playground. They should take advantage of the participatory processes available in Cologne. The election is scheduled for September 14 and 800,000 people in Cologne are eligible to vote. I urge them to do so. Many of them have a Kurdish background or migration story. My message to Kurdish youth, especially those aged 16 or 17 voting for the first time, is: go to the polls and exercise your democratic right. I would be happy if, with their votes, for the first time in German history, a Green Party politician becomes mayor of a German city of millions, especially if that politician is someone Kurdistan-born. That would be a source of pride for all of us. We wish you success. If you become Cologne's mayor, how will you promote integration among people of different nationalities? That's already happening in Cologne. In neighborhoods like Mulheim, Kalk, and Keupstrabe, you can see the vibrant life of immigrant communities. I'm proud that, after the [National Socialist Underground] NSU attack on Keupstrabe, the community created a strong culture of remembrance through the 'Birlikte' [Together] festival - an annual event that promotes coexistence. This festival annually commemorates that attack and is especially remembered as a cultural festival that says, "We all live together." I believe Cologne's strength lies in its conscious civil society. And the fact that a woman who once arrived as a child, not speaking the language, who sees the problems and opportunities of immigration, can now run for mayor - that shows what's possible. If I can convey that message, we will have already achieved a great deal. I will also work actively against racism and strive to make Cologne a discrimination-free zone. Speaking of racism - hostility toward immigrants and refugees is rising. How can you fight this? On the one hand, it is the duty of the security agencies to monitor right-wing extremist organizations and to continuously investigate and act against them. I also strongly support urgently banning the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. We must not allow the enemies of democracy to use democratic means to spread propaganda against minorities. On the other hand, we need more meeting spaces where people from different cultures and backgrounds can come together, share their stories, and become part of society - regardless of their financial situation or where they come from. This kind of interaction helps reduce prejudice. We also need a strong civic stance against racism and discrimination. For me, it is especially important that diversity is reflected in the city administration. Promoting diversity within municipal structures is essential. Cologne is a multicultural city and has become an important venue for Kurdish events. At this year's Nowruz festival, over sixty thousand Kurds gathered in Cologne and celebrated peacefully. How can you encourage Kurds to participate more actively in the social and civic life of the city? And how can the artistic and cultural contributions of the Kurdish community be better supported and made more visible? It's truly fascinating that Kurds from different countries gather here. This community is one of the best-organized and strongest. When we saw that 10,000 people were expected for Nowruz, but 60,000 showed up, it clearly showed that Kurds feel Cologne is their home. I'm proud of that. I also want people from all countries - whether Ukraine, Kurdistan, or elsewhere - to see Cologne as their home and to be able to celebrate their cultural traditions here. That will be one of my priorities as mayor: to provide space for such celebrations. I want cultural diversity not only to be visible, but to be celebrated and further developed. You come from a Kurdish family and are not of German origin. Yet here you are - as a woman, as a Kurd - running for mayor. How do you feel about being a candidate here, while in some other places Kurds still face obstacles even becoming a mayor? Yes, I came to Germany as the child of a diplomat. Before the military coup, my father was supposed to be recalled - but he refused to let his identity be erased. We became a family in exile. But this is what democracy means. Democracy provides safety to those in need of protection. It looks not at where a person comes from, but at the work they do and the values they represent. It allows a woman with a Kurdish background to lead a city of millions. I know the value of this democracy, and that's why I believe it must be defended - because even here in Germany, it is under threat. I have another question about the Kurdish language. In most German states, it's legally possible to study Kurdish. How can you help facilitate the study of Kurdish as a mother tongue, especially in schools? The inclusion of Kurdish in school curricula is a matter of state policy, not municipal policy. However, it is the city's responsibility to provide the necessary space. Often, space is the problem. So I ask: why are schools closed during holidays and after school hours? Why aren't they used for civil and community purposes in the evenings? For example, young people could play in the schoolyards, or Kurdish lessons could be held by local initiatives. Our city should open the doors of its schools for these kinds of community uses. A personal and final question. Your late father was himself a mayor in Turkey until 1977. Did his legacy influence your political path? If he were here today, what would he say about your candidacy? My father was the youngest mayor in Turkish history. He was a brave and principled man who taught us - especially me - important values. These values were the reason I wanted to raise my voice and become politically active. Both he and my beloved mother always supported me. I lost my father a year ago. He loved local politics, because he believed it is the field closest to the people. He always said that real politics is about staying close to the people and being honest. What he gave me, I now want to use. I am sure he is looking down on me with pride, and that his heart is full of joy. I am proud to be among my party colleagues. Today, hundreds of people are walking the streets of Cologne, putting up my posters and working so that we can make history - for the first time, electing a woman with an immigrant background, and for the first time, a Green Party politician, as mayor of a city with millions of residents. I am now putting on my raincoat to be close to my base and distribute my posters with them.
Rudaw Net
03-08-2025
- Business
- Rudaw Net
Syria begins importing Azerbaijani Gas via Turkey to boost power supply
Also in Interview Damascus, Rojava to meet in Paris 'soon': Senior official Syria moves to revive key port, border crossings in drive for economic recovery: Official New electoral system for Syria's parliament finalized, announcement expected soon: Spox Dialogue with Damascus advancing, not yet 'formal negotiations': Rojava official A+ A- ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Syria has begun importing Azerbaijani natural gas via a newly launched pipeline through Turkey, in a development expected to significantly enhance the country's electricity supply, a senior official from the Syrian energy ministry told Rudaw on Sunday. Ahmed al-Sulaiman, director of government communications at the Syrian energy ministry, confirmed that 'the gas pipeline connecting Turkey and Syria has been opened,' and that 'Azerbaijani gas is now being imported.' The initial supply volume is 3.4 million cubic meters of gas per day, which Sulaiman said would generate between 750 and 800 megawatts of electricity. This is expected to add up to 'five extra hours of power daily,' raising the total to approximately nine to ten hours of electricity supply across the country. 'Currently, electricity generation stands at four to five hours per day,' he noted, adding that the increase 'will be felt in all Syrian regions and provinces.' Sulaiman described the pipeline as a "positive and effective step" within a broader $7 billion energy development plan. The long-term goal is to boost imports to six million cubic eters per day, potentially extending daily electricity supply to about 14 hours in the near future. Earlier in the day, the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported on the new natural gas import agreement, which involves Azerbaijan supplying gas to Syria via Turkey, and is funded by the Qatar Fund for Development. SANA further relayed a joint statement by all of Syria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Qatar which hailed the initiative as a "symbol of regional solidarity." The pipeline project 'carries strong humanitarian implications, directly contributing to revitalizing the Syrian economy,' the statement read, adding that its swift completion offers 'vital support for the reconstruction process in Syria.' The state-run Syrian agency further relayed a joint statement from all of Syria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Qatar hailing the new gas supply project as a "symbol of regional solidarity." The project "carries strong humanitarian implications, directly contributing to revitalizing the Syrian economy," and its rapid completion offers "vital support for the reconstruction process in Syria,' the statement read. In a statement on X, the Azerbaijani embassy in Damascus described the inauguration of the new gas pipeline a reflection of the country's new leadership and its 'political will.' The embassy emphasized that the project is aimed at supporting 'the reconstruction and economic development process in friendly Syria.' On the oil front, Sulaiman told Rudaw that current domestic oil production stands at around 100,000 barrels per day - down significantly from the 400,000 barrels produced daily before the Syrian conflict began in 2011. He said the government's objective is to restore output to pre-war levels once it regains 'full control of the oil fields.' Below is the full transcript of the interview with Ahmed al-Sulaiman. Rudaw: Mr. Ahmed, first of all, how do you assess the importance of the project to import Azerbaijani gas to Syria at this time? And does it represent a change in Syrian energy policy? Ahmed al-Sulaiman: Yesterday [Saturday], the gas pipeline connecting Turkey and Syria was opened. Azerbaijani gas is now being imported through this pipeline, with the support and funding of the Qatar Fund for Development. The amount is estimated at 3.4 million cubic meters of gas. Its impact will be positive for energy in Syria. It will generate 750 to 800 megawatts, which will lead to five more hours of power generation, increasing total operation to nine to ten hours per day, instead of 14 hours of rationing. God willing, we will launch other projects to increase energy production. We will also import six million cubic meters of gas from the Syrian-Turkish pipeline. Is it safe to say that the import of Azerbaijani gas as a transitional step within a broader vision of the major energy projects announced by the government, worth $7 billion? Absolutely. It is a positive and effective step in gas importation. God willing, we will reach six million cubic meters of gas, and there will be greater electricity production, in addition to other links that will increase Syria's electricity capacity. You mentioned that it was decided to increase the daily electricity supply to ten hours in some areas, after it was only three to four hours. How accurate are these figures today? Is it expected to be fixed or temporary? It will increase by five additional hours. Currently, operation is from four to five hours; it will increase by five more hours, reaching nine to ten hours of daily operation. This will be in all Syrian regions and provinces, throughout the Syrian Arab Republic, without discrimination. Distribution will be fair. Each province has a consumption capacity and will be supplied accordingly. Citizens will notice this difference across Syria. When will they start noticing the difference? Natural gas began to be pumped yesterday. The gas pipes were empty yesterday, and today they are being filled. Then the gas will be pumped to generating stations - Aleppo station, Jandar station in Homs, and Deir Ali station in Rif Dimashq [Damascus countryside]. God willing, this quantity will reach the stations and start generating electricity. At that moment, people will notice the difference in operating hours. This will happen in a few days. Regarding the distribution of electricity, Mr. Ahmed, how will it be distributed to each city and province? How many hours will electricity increase? As I mentioned, the Syrian grid is a circular network connected to all parts of Syria. Electricity generation in Aleppo affects all provinces, and the same applies to generation in Homs. Distribution will be fair to all provinces. Citizens will notice an increase in all provinces, with operating hours increasing to about ten hours per day, compared to previous rationing of 14 hours per day, God willing. Things will improve, God willing. We are aiming for 14 hours per day through upcoming projects. I f gas imports rise to six million cubic meters per day as planned, what is the expected additional improvement? Can we expect continuous supply in some areas? Absolutely. Operating hours will increase. If an additional 2.6 million cubic meters are imported, the total will be six million, and operating hours could increase to about 14 hours per day, compared to the current ten hours of rationing, God willing. Electricity will be distributed to all provinces equally; no province will always have electricity while others face rationing. All provinces will have the same operating and rationing hours. Is there a timetable to reach the peak of this project at six million cubic meters? Absolutely. After the current supply of 3.4 million cubic meters, supported by the Qatar Fund for Development, we will study or import an additional 2.6 million cubic meters to reach six million total. God willing, this increase will happen in the near future. There is also the issue of importing fuel, which supports stations that operate on fuel. All of this, God willing, benefits citizens and supports longer electricity operation hours. In recent months, there have been many meetings and discussions between the Syrian energy ministry and the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) in northeast Syria (Rojava) regarding oil and gas imports. Are these meetings ongoing? There have been no meetings except one regarding water in Aleppo province, which was held there. An agreement was made to reduce the flow of water from regions held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to Iraq. This reduction aims to preserve water behind dams in eastern Syria. These meetings were held between the energy ministry and SDF representatives in the past few months. Will the electricity supply include Hasaka province and areas in north and east Syria as well? God willing, it will be included. However, the lines connecting those regions need major maintenance. In general, connection lines across Syria require maintenance. Cables need replacement because if they are not of good quality, they cannot bear the load. According to my knowledge, there are no high-quality cables connecting north and east Syria. Maintenance and reconstruction are necessary, and the region is unsafe due to landmines. These landmines must be removed along with the maintenance of the lines. God willing, we will work on this in the coming days. How far has local oil and gas production capacity reached in Syria today? Are there figures about the actual working fields and daily production quantities? In general, nothing has changed much in Syria today. We mentioned earlier that current oil production is about 100,000 barrels per day, which is very low compared to before the 2011 revolution, when production was around 400,000 barrels per day. Today, production stands at about 100,000 barrels per day. God willing, after full control of the oil fields [by the Syrian government], we will develop these fields to restore previous production levels and increase drilling to raise daily oil output, God willing.
Rudaw Net
03-08-2025
- Politics
- Rudaw Net
Damascus, Rojava to meet in Paris 'soon': Senior official
Also in Interview Syria begins importing Azerbaijani Gas via Turkey to boost power supply Syria moves to revive key port, border crossings in drive for economic recovery: Official New electoral system for Syria's parliament finalized, announcement expected soon: Spox Dialogue with Damascus advancing, not yet 'formal negotiations': Rojava official A+ A- DAMASCUS - The anticipated meeting between the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will be held in Paris "soon" to finalize integration talks, a senior Syrian foreign ministry official confirmed to Rudaw. Describing ties with Washington as a 'partnership,' the official highlighted regional stability as the main shared goal and Syria's role as a bulwark against 'the return of Iranian militias.' In an exclusive interview with Rudaw, Qutaiba Idlbi, director of American affairs at Syria's foreign ministry, stated on Wednesday that the new Syrian leadership supports administrative decentralization but rejects the idea of 'an army within an army and a state within a state.' Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the SDF chief Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement on March 10 to integrate all civil and military institutions in northeast Syria (Rojava) - including the SDF - under the authority of the Syrian state. Idlbi confirmed that a high-level meeting between the SDF and the Syrian government 'will be held soon in Paris' to 'complete the negotiations on the implementation of the [Abdi-Sharaa] agreement.' The meeting - reportedly to include Abdi, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, and representatives from the United States and France - was previously delayed due to "purely technical reasons," he said. Referencing the Iran-aligned Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as negative models, Idlbi stressed the need for full integration of the SDF into the national army. Syria is 'better off utilizing the SDF's expertise by deploying its fighters and commanders across all army institutions, rather than keeping them as a separate division,' he added. On the future of the Kurdish-led Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) administering Rojava, Idlbi stated the interim Syrian government aims for a 'smooth' integration, keeping local institutions and personnel intact under the national umbrella. What will change is 'the framework that is used by the institutions on a daily basis,' but the institutions 'with their people and methods of management, will remain,' he clarified. On July 13, violent clashes broke out in the Druze-majority Suwayda province between Druze fighters and Bedouin tribes, initially sparked by mutual kidnappings and escalating with the involvement of state-affiliated forces. According to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), at least 1,300 people were killed. Earlier, in March, violence also erupted in Syria's Alawite-majority coastal regions after ousted president Bashar al-Assad's loyalists attacked Damascus-aligned security forces. SOHR reported around 1,700 deaths - mostly Alawite civilians - with many casualties linked to government or pro-government forces. Idlbi blamed these incidents on Assad affiliates, acknowledging the 'natural state of fear' among Kurdish communities as a result of the violence, but urged addressing them through a political resolution while cautioning against external involvement. He also accused Israel of stoking the conflict in Suwayda and seeking to 'create this internal clash between Syrians.' On Syria's broader relationship with Israel, Idlbi noted that despite a history of hostility - including over 700 attacks on Syrian military sites since the fall of Assad - the interim government is open to resolving issues through a political framework. He dismissed reports suggesting that Washington has issued specific "demands" for Damascus to normalize relations with Tel Aviv. Idlbi characterized the relationship with the US as a 'partnership' grounded in "common interests," with regional stability as the primary shared objective. He emphasized Syria's new role as "the main barrier that prevents the return of Iranian militias and [the Iran-aligned Lebanese] Hezbollah [Movement] to the region." Below is the full transcript of the interview with Qutaiba Idlbi. Rudaw: Mr Idlbi, thank you for joining us. Let me start by asking how we can evaluate the current relations between the Syrian government and the American administration? Can we describe them as being at its all time best? Qutaiba Idlbi: Of course, thank you very much for having me today. The Syrian-American relationship today is still at its best. Since the liberation of Syria and the fall of the [Bashar] al-Assad regime, there has been a major change in Syrian foreign policy. The focus of this change has been to transition from the political blackmail that the Assad regime practiced for more than fifty years in its relations with world countries to building a relationship based primarily on partnerships. We do not look at our relations with countries today and think about what these relations will be like in a month or two. Instead, we try to build these relationships on solid foundations for decades to come. We look, think, and plan for what this relationship will be like in ten, twenty, or thirty years because this is what will truly establish strong partnerships that will positively reflect on Syria and the United States, on the Syrian people and the American people. Perhaps many American officials have asked me about this, and I tell them, we are trying to build a steel bridge between Damascus and Washington that connects the two countries and the two peoples. We are practically at the beginning of this building process, and it is in a state of continuous development. What will unfold will certainly be better than what it is today. Can we describe them as good relations? The United States also has demands from the Syrian government, including asking Damascus to join the Abraham Accords. Is the Syrian government ready for that? There are no demands from the American government to the Syrian government within the framework of this relationship. The partnership between Syria and the United States actually involves common matters that the two countries need to work on. Putting anything within the framework of "demands" is, in fact, perhaps closer to a media term. There are no demands. There are common interests that Syria and the United States are working on, foremost among them being regional stability. Today, after the withdrawal of Iranian militias, Syria is the main barrier that prevents the return of Iranian militias and [the Iran-aligned Lebanese] Hezbollah [Movement] to the region, and prevents the instability and sabotage that usually come with them. This is a fundamental matter and, of course, a priority for the United States in the region, and it is a priority for us as well. As the [Syrian] Foreign Minister [Asaad al-Shaibani] and the interim President [Ahmed al-Sharaa] have mentioned in several meetings, we want to be a bridge of connection in the region, and we do not want Syria to be a source of threat to anyone in the region. Of course, how we manage our relationship in the region depends on both parties, not just on Syria, whether it is in partnership relations or de-escalation relations. We are open to the entire world, and we are also open to the countries and powers of the region, because we believe that building any partnership requires two parties. There were talks about meetings between Syrian government officials and Israeli officials under American sponsorship. Did these meetings take place? Israel, of course, has been a key player in Syria since the liberation. From day one, as we saw, Israel has carried out more than 700 attacks on Syrian military sites, and we also saw many messages that could be described as hostile to the Syrian people in general and to the Syrian government in particular. Of course, the last thing Israel did was its aggressions and bombing of the defense ministry building in Damascus and the shelling of security forces at the interior ministry in Suwayda province two weeks ago. So, within this framework, there is a major problem with Israel today regarding its hostile actions and policies towards Syria. We fundamentally believe that there are always two paths to resolving any problem: either the path of war or the political path. We believe that the Syrian people have gone through at least 14 years of war, and I think we have had enough of the years of war and we should spare the Syrian people from more war and confrontations, and therefore we are certainly open to resolving all these problems through the political framework. Within this path, of course, there have been meetings in an attempt to de-escalate and stop the Israeli aggressions on the one hand so that there is stability in the region - because the loser from the instability in Syria is not only Syrians but the entire region - and on the other hand, so that they [Israelis] let Syrians solve their problems by themselves and do not interfere in Syria's internal problems. Regarding the US Congress, last week, it did not vote to lift all sanctions - and here I specifically mean the Caesar Act - imposed on Syria. They laid out conditions and stages for lifting these sanctions. Did you see that coming? What happened at the beginning of last week was not a full on vote. What happened was that a bill was submitted to the financial committee in the House of Representatives, the United States Congress, and this bill was passed. It is still a bill that has been passed by the committee, and it must be submitted to the armed forces committee in the House of Representatives, and then it is submitted to the full House, and then it must go to the Senate. So, there is no complete move by the Congress. There was a clear movement by the financial committee in the House of Representatives, and behind this movement, it is also clear that Israeli and pro-Israeli pressure groups were fully active in pushing this project over the past weeks. So, what we are seeing, in fact, through this resolution is a fundamental expression of the nature of the Israeli efforts in this matter in Washington and their push within this resolution. I believe that the American people have not yet spoken their word on this law, as I mentioned, because it is still in its early stages. Did we expect it you ask? In fact, we did not expect the extent of the Israeli planning and efforts in this regard, especially as it was evident in what Israel did primarily in southern Syria and also in Washington through its instruments. But as I mentioned, this does not necessarily express the direction of the American people, and I think we should also wait for the final word on this matter, which is from President [Donald] Trump, who made it clear what the American policy towards Syria is during the investment conference in Riyadh. So, I think as long as President Trump has not come out and changed this policy, but on the contrary, we see a full confirmation from the American administration of the policy that President Trump set at the Riyadh conference, I think the path is clear, and I think the word of the American people is clear in this regard. Is there a link between the US not lifting the sanctions and the events that took place in Suwayda? The process of lifting the sanctions, in fact, we saw from President Trump a full lifting of all executive orders and all sanctions that were [previously] passed by executive and presidential decisions, and that happened last month. In fact, lifting the rest of the sanctions requires a legal and political process, and it naturally takes a lot of time. For example, lifting the designation of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism, which was done in 1979, requires at least six months from the time the president issues an indication to Congress that there is a change in policy towards Syria. So this naturally takes its time. The Caesar Act will also naturally take its time for deliberations and consultations within the Republican Party and also with the Democratic Party, so it will also naturally take some time. And these two laws are, in fact, the only obstacle today to the full lifting of sanctions. So, I think there is a natural path to lifting the sanctions. What happened in Suwayda, the unfortunate events, and what happened in connection to them - form the media misleading to the exploitation of these events for political purposes, especially by the Israeli side - I think it may have had an effect on slowing down the process of lifting the sanctions, but I do not think it will affect the path completely. If we move to the internal Syrian affairs, specifically what happened in Suwayda and what happened before that in the coastal regions, was the Syrian government unable to deal with these two files? And is there a danger, or as they say, fears of those events being repeated in the Kurdish regions? Regarding dealing with the files, let's start with what happened in the coastal regions, or let's start with the file of liberation in general. Of course, after the liberation, the state of stability that we saw was the result of the government's efforts primarily, but it was also the result of what can be called a collective commitment from all Syrians that this is the path that preserves all of Syria. This collective commitment is naturally critical because it does not depend on the ability of the government or the state, especially since the state is nascent, it does not depend on the ability of the government or the state to preserve it. Collective commitment means, in fact, that every person and every group must be committed to implementing this path so that the path remains on its correct course. The problem that happened on the coast, in fact, was that this path was breached. At least from the point of view of a large part of the Syrian people and a large part of society, when a group affiliated with the Assad regime set up ambushes and attacked security men and killed a large number of them, and this matter was framed as an attempted coup and a change of power, at least as these groups promoted it. This, in fact, was a signal to the entire society that there was a breach of this societal commitment and that there was an attempt to turn back the clock. It resulted in a large reaction that I do not think any government could have controlled. I think the Syrian government made great efforts, as we saw in the first days of these events, and it pushed a lot of forces and individuals who came to the coast to fight these remnants and they committed violations. It actually pushed many of these forces out of these areas, and there were even losses from the ministries of defense and interior and from these fighters as a result of pushing them out of those areas. And if we also look at the frameworks of any country after civil wars, about 90 percent of countries that emerge from civil wars return to a state of civil war immediately within months due to permanent breaches of this societal commitment. I think so far, if we compare the situation in Syria today with the situation in these cases, we are in a much better situation than the majority of cases of emerging from civil war, and this, as I mentioned, is not only due to the efforts of the government, but it is due to the cohesion and solidarity of the Syrian people today. With regards to what happened in Suwayda, what happened was similar in nature to what happened on the coast. There is a group that emerged linked to the Assad regime, which has been in Suwayda since the liberation of Syria, and did not abide by any agreements. It is still continuing, whether through Captagon networks and drug trafficking or the theft networks that the regime established even in 2023 when Suwayda came out in demonstrations against the Assad regime. The networks that are currently in Suwayda are the same ones that Louay al-Ali and Ali Mamlouk and other intelligence chiefs established to tamper with Suwayda. These networks are still present today in Suwayda. The problem is that since the liberation and until now, these networks - similar to what happened in the coastal region - are trying, after the cloak of the Assad regime has fallen from them, to entrench themselves in a sectarian cloak, and they committed breaches, as we saw, as a result of clashes with the Bedouins that led to the bloody events we witnessed. The question today, in fact, is: can the state with its current resources, with its current size, with its current age, really be a stopping barrier and stop any bloody events of this matter? In fact, this is what the Syrian government did; it tried to stop things before they deteriorated, and the messages were clear even to community leaders in Suwayda from day one that let's work together so that these events do not escalate and get out of control, and so that, God forbid, what happened in the events on the coast is not repeated, and so that the wrong signals are not sent to society. These messages were clear from day one, and there was great cooperation from community leaders in Suwayda with [the Druze spiritual leaders] Sheikh [Hammoud] al-Hinnawi and Sheikh [Youssef] al-Jarbou and many leaders of the [armed] factions in Suwayda, not only [Laith] al-Balous but even Sulaiman Abdel Baqi and others. What happened, in fact, was that a party, especially affiliated with [Druze spiritual leader] Sheikh [Hikmat] al-Hajari, was not satisfied with the state of support that occurred in the province around the state's option to end this military situation, so it called on the Israeli side. Of course, in the first hours of the Israeli intervention, there were no Syrian army forces or defense ministry forces inside the city of Suwayda. In fact, the government withdrew the defense ministry forces and deployed security immediately to avoid any unnecessary confrontations or any violations; because in the event of the army entering civilian sites in any case, there is always a possibility of any indirect clash or any violation. So, the state or the government took the initiative, fundamentally, from day one to withdraw the army forces and deploy the internal security forces. In fact, was that the forces and factions affiliated with Hajari, whether he agreed to that or not, called on the Israeli side, and we saw the Israeli side's attacks not only on the internal security forces in the city of Suwayda, but on the deployment of the internal security forces, in fact, around the province, which left Suwayda open and vulnerable to attacks from everyone, not only from the [spontaneous mobilization] 'faza'at' whether from Bedouin forces or tribes, but we even saw a real activity of [Islamic State] ISIS groups that flocked in from the [Syrian desert] Badiya. If you look at the map of Suwayda province, 70 percent of its borders are with the Badiya, and they are administrative borders, in fact, that are impossible to control without a large military and security presence. This military and security presence that was protecting the province was hit by the Israeli enemy, and thus it deprived the government of the ability to protect the province effectively, and I think this is what the Israeli side was seeking from day one; it did not seek to protect the Druze, it was actually seeking to create this state of internal clash between Syrians, and what happened, happened. Of course, we move today to the situation of the Kurdish community, as you mentioned, is there a state of fear? I think there is a natural state of fear for sure. For a regular person who does not know or does not follow the details of these matters day by day will surely say: "Look at what happened to the Alawites, look at what happened to the Druze, it is natural for me to be afraid." What I am saying in this situation is that this fear is natural, but the government was and still is, as I mentioned at the beginning, extending its hand to everyone, saying: let's solve our problems through political solutions, and do not involve external parties in any conflict. And this is the path that we are reiterating today to everyone: Let's sit at the negotiating table and work to reach a political solution. I understand the fears as you mentioned, but even I, as a Kurd, say: there is a unique Kurdish experience today in Syria. Kurds are not new to Syria, Kurds have been in Syria for hundreds of years, if not more than a thousand years, and they have an excellent experience. We in Syria today, ever since the establishment of the Syrian Republic, have had three heads of state, presidents and prime ministers, who were Kurds. The presence of Kurds in Syria is not new, and their experience within the [Syrian] society is not new, so let's learn from this experience and let's sit down and really prioritize the interests of the Kurdish people and the interests of the Kurdish communities instead of personal interests. Delving deeper into the [Kurdish] dossier, there was a March 10 agreement between the Syrian presidency [represented by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa] and [Mazloum Abdi] the commander of the SDF. The agreement comprised eight items, and it was expected that there would be a meeting in Paris between the Syrian government and a delegation from the SDF with French and American presence. Why was this meeting postponed? The Paris meeting was postponed for a purely technical reason; initially it was arranged at the last minute. In fact, the invitations for the meeting were sent only a few days before its date and it was prepared for somewhat unilaterally by the mediators in the midst of the events in Suwayda. So, the postponement, in fact, happened primarily because it overlapped with the events in Suwayda, and the focus of the Syrian government and the Syrian leadership was primarily on a ceasefire and de-escalating the crisis for fear that fighting would resume again, and on the other hand, there was not enough time, in fact, to prepare for the meeting. As was announced, the meeting will be held soon in Paris between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian government to complete the negotiations on the implementation of the [Abdi-Sharaa] agreement. Has a specific date been set for this meeting? A specific date has been set preliminarily and will be announced soon. Can we announce it now? You will hear about it soon. Regarding the Kurdish issue, the Kurds agreed among themselves and held a conference in Qamishli, and they had demands and called for decentralization. Does the Syrian government reject all forms of decentralization? Certainly not. First of all, there are two things: first, in the meeting that took place in Qamishli, I think there was a gathering of many Kurdish parties and groups. Of course, there is always a question that is asked: do these Kurdish parties and groups represent the entire Kurdish community? I think this is a matter that the Kurds themselves must answer. As a Syrian Kurd, I do not, in fact, see in many of the existing Kurdish groups and parties any representation for me, and there are many like me, especially when you look at the communities of Kurds whom some Kurdish hardliners call 'Arabized Kurds.' If you look at the communities of Kurds in Hama, Latakia, Aleppo, and Damascus, which represent the majority of Kurds in Syria, you do not find any representation for them in these parties, and you do not find any communication with them. Regardless of this matter, after this meeting took place [in Qamishli], of course, there was a lot of talk about decentralization. The Syrian state's or the Syrian government's dealing today with governance, especially local governance, is based a lot on the principle of decentralization, especially administrative decentralization. So, I do not believe that there is, in fact, a discussion or points of disagreement about the issue of administrative decentralization. The problem of centralization in Syria was not a legal problem, but a political problem. The Assad regime did not want to apply any form of decentralization that is in fact mentioned in the Syrian law, and it wanted, of course, as a totalitarian dictatorial regime, to hold all the strings in its hand. We say today: we are not the Assad regime, and we are not the Baath Arab Socialist Party, and we are not Arab nationalists, because when we start from the standpoint of the Syrian government, we do not start from an Arab nationalist standpoint, but we start from a Syrian national standpoint that brings all Syrians together. So the problems that the Assad regime created because of its political nature and because of its political perspective must also be solved through politics. We do not need to solve them by creating new legal frameworks that we do not need in the first place. For example, within Syrian law, Law 107 for local administration gives extensive authority for administrative decentralization. In fact, today, as a Kurdish person, how do I see my representation within the Syrian state? And how do I see the representation of my culture within the Syrian state? If I can go or send my children to school and they can learn the Kurdish language alongside the Arabic language, I see that as a representation of me and my culture. If I can open a Kurdish cultural center, I also see that as a representation of me. If I am, for example, in a Kurdish village, and I see the use of the Kurdish language within this village, this also has representation for me. If I can go to an official institution to get my official papers and my Arabic is weak, but there is a person who speaks Kurdish and can help me issue these papers, like what most developed countries do, this is also a representation for me. So, these are, in fact, the demands that matter to the normal Kurdish person in their place, not those who try, as you mentioned, to get personal, factional, or political gains at the expense of the cause of the ordinary Kurd. Within this context, the Syrian government says: this is originally our starting point in dealing with the Kurdish issue, and not only with the Kurdish issue, but with the issue of all Syrians; that they must see their representation and culture within their local communities, this is a very natural matter and should not even be a starting point for negotiation. If we talk about the Syrian Democratic Forces, in many interviews, the leaders of the Syrian Democratic Forces told us that they would be part of the defense system in Syria or the interior ministry, and they also talked about integrating approximately 100,000 fighters into the defense ministry, but they also have conditions, which is to join with their current formation into the defense ministry. What is the American opinion on this? I think what matters first is the opinion of Syrians on this matter before the American opinion. But I tell you that the Syrian government and the American government agree on a fundamental matter, which is that there cannot be an army within an army and a state within a state. We have seen this experience before; we saw it in Lebanon with Hezbollah, and we saw it in Iraq with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militias, and we saw it in other places. An army within an army cannot create a sound, healthy, and stable state, and this will always reflect in more strife and instability for the entire state. What we are putting forward clearly is that there is room for everyone in the state in all its joints. And as is the existing experience today in the Syrian army, which started from an alliance of different factions that liberated Syria and then a number of factions joined it, this alliance of these factions that created this army and included other factions did not itself create a bloc within the army, even though it was the one which established this existing era today. So, just as we worked on this basis from the beginning, we also say that groups cannot be established within the army. So the challenge today is how can we benefit from the expertise that exists with the Syrian Democratic Forces, but at the same time create a sound situation on which armies are built. And I think this sound situation is built, in fact, through the full integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into the Syrian army. What does that mean? I'm sorry, let me finish my thought. What does that mean? Today, General Mazloum Abdi says that the Syrian Democratic Forces have a lot of expertise that they accumulated during the last era, and I agree with him on that. What we are saying today is: let's benefit from this expertise in all institutions of the Syrian army. Why do we want to limit this expertise to one division? For the state to benefit from this expertise, it must be fully deployed within the divisions according to specialties. So, on the one hand, the Syrian state can then fully benefit from the expertise that the Syrian Democratic Forces have built and from the expertise of the Kurdish fighters, and on the other hand, I avoid, God forbid, after a period of time, having an army within an army and a state within a state like other countries that used this model and we saw how they failed or entered a state of instability from which they will not be able to get out. There is an experience on the ground in the Kurdistan Region, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces are part of the Iraqi defense system, but they are not integrated into the Iraqi defense ministry, they are affiliated with a separate ministry in the Kurdistan Region. Can't we apply that model in Syria? We are generally open to learning from the experiences of others, whether they succeeded or failed, and this is a very important matter. But in the end, the Syrian experience and the Syrian component have very different natures and characteristics from the natures of other experiences, whether in the nature of the Syrian components, or in their culture, or in their relationship with each other historically and during the recent period. Therefore, we start primarily from understanding the experiences of others and where they succeeded and where they failed, but we need to build on our experience as it is. As I mentioned, we as Syrians, especially during the past eight months, have had a somewhat successful experience, it has its flaws and needs some reform, but we have a successful experience in this regard. How, in fact, do we integrate the state of factionalism into a military institution? As I mentioned, it is not complete and not at its peak, it needs a lot of development and work, but we have an experience in the state of transitioning from the state of factionalism to the state of thinking on the country level, the national state, and thinking about the homeland. And with this, we want to protect Syria from returning to a state of division, fragmentation, and factionalism, but also, as I mentioned, to benefit from all the expertise that all Syrians have built, whether they were in civil society organizations and the state of expatriation or in the state of factionalism and military groups in northern and eastern Syria. There is a self-administration in north and east Syria, [the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES)] . It has its security and service institutions. Does the Syrian government want to end the self-administration and maintain administrative decentralization with its conditions and with few authorities? Administrative decentralization means, as I mentioned, that the parties manage themselves regarding their daily interests and people's lives, this is administrative decentralization. As for the continuation of the self-administration, we say that government or institutional work is linked to people first, and is not linked to models. A state cannot have several models for institutions; there must be one model for institutions, while the people who transfer their experience can be in these institutions. So, in fact, the state of integrating the self-administration means that we use the people who are in water management; they can remain to manage water in that area. The people who are in civil registry management and others can remain in the same framework under the umbrella of the Syrian state. So, in fact, the state of transition is, in fact, a very smooth state, no one is talking about firing employees, this did not even happen in Damascus for it to happen in the areas of northern and eastern Syria. What will change, in fact, is only the framework that is used by the institutions on a daily basis, but the institutions with their people, their areas, and their way of management will remain the same. In the end, providing services to people, in general, and especially when we talk about administrative decentralization, remains the same, in fact, whether you wear a green or blue uniform, the service is the same one you provide to people. So, what are the disagreements between the Kurds and the Syrian government? As a Kurd, I do not believe there is a disagreement between the Kurds and the Syrian government. I think perhaps there is not a complete meeting of views yet between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian government. What is being talked about now and what we hope to achieve is how we can accelerate and set a practical plan to implement the March agreement that took place between General Mazloum Abdi and [interim] President Ahmed al-Sharaa. So today, I think for different circumstances and for the absence of mechanisms for building trust, there were no diligent efforts to try to implement the agreement completely. What we hope for today first is that there will be positive efforts to build trust regarding the implementation of the agreement, so that there is no room for misunderstanding, and so that there is no factor of instability whether in the areas of northeast Syria [Rojava] or elsewhere. This is what we hope to achieve, and then there will be a practical and realistic plan with a clear timeline for implementing the agreement, so that we can turn any page of disagreements, and so that all of Syria, including north and east Syria, can move towards more investment, developing infrastructure, and creating job opportunities. And this is, in fact, what Syrians want in the end, whether they are Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, or other components.
Rudaw Net
30-07-2025
- Business
- Rudaw Net
Syria moves to revive key port, border crossings in drive for economic recovery: Official
Also in Interview New electoral system for Syria's parliament finalized, announcement expected soon: Spox Dialogue with Damascus advancing, not yet 'formal negotiations': Rojava official Washington should help SDF reach deal with Damascus: Former US diplomat EU MP urges Turkey to embrace peace talks with PKK A+ A- ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Syria is ramping up efforts to revitalize its port infrastructure and border operations, securing major investment deals with global logistics giants, a senior official from the General Authority for Land and Sea Border Crossings told Rudaw. However, significant challenges persist at land border crossings, particularly in areas outside full government control. In a Tuesday interview, Mazen Alloush, Director of Public Relations at the General Authority, highlighted recent progress in attracting global logistics players. He noted that French shipping giant CMA CGM and Dubai-based logistics firm DP World are now involved in long-term development projects for Latakia and Tartous ports, respectively. CMA CGM recently secured a 30-year concession for Latakia Port involving an estimated investment of $260 million, while DP World's 30-year concession for Tartous Port is valued at approximately $800 million. Alloush mentioned ongoing efforts 'with another major international operator' regarding 'a new port operation agreement [that] is expected to be signed in the coming weeks," and pointed to plans to develop the Baniyas Port, 'currently used only for oil shipments, into a commercial port soon.' The General Authority also oversees ten Free Zones across Syria. According to Alloush, there are "extensive investment plans" in place to modernize and expand these zones into "internationally competitive hubs." Regarding Syria's land border crossings, Alloush confirmed that 11 out of approximately 20 are currently operational. These include six crossings with Turkey, three with Lebanon, one with Jordan, and one with Iraq. He mentioned plans to reactivate additional crossings, including the al-Tanf-al-Waleed crossing with Iraq and the al-Dabbousiyah crossing with Lebanon. Border traffic has also increased significantly. "From the beginning of the year until today, we have received over five million travelers through our border crossings - three million arrivals and two million departures,' Alloush stated. Despite these developments, he acknowledged the ongoing challenge posed by border crossings located in northeastern Syria (Rojava), particularly in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). However, he expressed optimism that the implementation of the key March 10 agreement - signed between Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF chief Mazloum Abdi to integrate civil and military institutions in Rojava under state control - 'will allow us to assume control' and have all border crossings 'be under unified national administration." Alloush also addressed the Semalka border crossing with the Kurdistan Region, calling it 'our most strategic crossing,' through which 'a large volume of goods enters Syria.' He further pointed to communication between the Syrian foreign ministry and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) regarding management and coordination of the crossing's operations. Below is the full transcript of the interview with Mazen Alloush. Rudaw: How do you assess the current situation of Syrian land crossings? How many land border crossings are currently operating in Syria, and how many are out of service? Mazen Alloush: Syria has approximately 20 border crossings, of which 11 are currently operational. Some crossings are undergoing work to be brought back into service, while others remain outside the control of the Syrian government. Currently, we have six operational crossings with Turkey under our control: Jarablus, al-Rai, al-Salameh, al-Hammamat, Bab al-Hawa, and Kasab. With Lebanon, three border crossings are operational: Jdeidat Yabous, al-Arida, and Jousiyeh. Additionally, three other crossings with Lebanon are under maintenance and rehabilitation with the aim of returning them to service. We also have one border crossing with Jordan, the Nassib crossing. And with our brotherly Iraq, the only operational crossing at present is the Albu Kamal-al-Qaim. God willing, there are future plans to reopen several other crossings. As for those that remain outside our control, they are located in areas governed by the [Kurdish-led] Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). What about the plans for reopening or opening new border crossings? What are your plans? Regarding the Lebanese borders, since the liberation, we have reopened the Jdeidat Yabous, also known as the al-Masna' border crossing, which remains our most active. Later, in March, we reopened the Jousiyeh crossing in northern Lebanon, and two months ago - just two days before Eid al-Adha - we reopened the al-Arida crossing, which links Tripoli governorate in northern Lebanon with Tartous province in northwestern Syria. In the near future, we plan to begin rehabilitation and maintenance work on the al-Dabbousiyah crossing, located between the two other crossings in northern Lebanon. As for the border with Iraq, the Directorate of Facilities and Maintenance is currently preparing reconstruction and rehabilitation plans for the al-Tanf-al-Waleed border crossing on the Iraqi side. Work at this crossing will begin in the coming weeks. These are the main crossings we are currently focused on. In the future, pending progress in coordination between the Syrian government and the SDF, we hope to reactivate the crossings in northeastern Syria [Rojava]. How many travelers have passed through Syrian border crossings since the beginning of this year? From the beginning of the year until today, we have received over five million travelers through our border crossings - three million arrivals and two million departures - across the eleven operational crossings I mentioned earlier. Additionally, after the liberation period, beginning December 8th and up to the start of 2025, an additional half a million travelers crossed into Syria. You mentioned the al-Qaim crossing with Iraq. What is its current status, and what is the volume of daily passenger and goods traffic? Regarding the Albu Kamal-al-Qaim border crossing, immediately after the liberation, we deployed our staff to the site. Unfortunately, the crossing had been destroyed and looted, requiring extensive maintenance. We completed an initial phase of rehabilitation and equipped it for basic operations. For the first six months, it only served Syrian refugees in Iraq who wished to return voluntarily to Syria, as political discussions with the Iraqi side had not yet reached a point where full reactivation was possible. However, in mid-June, we reached a joint decision with the Iraqi brothers to fully reactivate the crossing. Passenger, freight, and commercial traffic has since resumed. Activity is still shy, but it is increasing steadily. We are now working on expanding and modernizing the crossing by constructing new passenger and customs halls and expanding the facility overall. During the first half of 2025, approximately 35,000 travelers passed through, with 23,000 arriving and 12,000 departing. About 17,000 of those were Syrian refugees in Iraq who returned voluntarily to resettle in Syria. What about daily movement of goods and commercial exchange? Honestly, it remains modest - just dozens of trucks per day. The reason is because many traders had shifted to other crossings since this crossing was not operational and considering the condition of the roads leading to it. However, the situation is improving steadily. Additionally, I would like to highlight that the Iraqi government has provided a significant wheat grant to Syria. For the past two months, around 60 to 70 trucks of wheat enter daily via the Albu Kamal crossing. On top of that, 20 to 30 commercial trucks cross in both directions daily. We expect this number to double by next month, as the crossing continues to develop. Are there any efforts to reopen the Rabia-Yaarubiyah border crossing? At this time, the Rabia-al-Yaarubiyah crossing remains outside our control; it is currently held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This also applies to the Qamishli, al-Darbasiyah, and Ain al-Arab crossings. Our most strategic crossing in the northeast is the Semalka crossing with the Kurdistan Region, which is our most important crossing in the meantime, it is also under SDF control. We, as the General Authority for Land and Sea Border Crossings, are awaiting the implementation of the March 10 agreement signed between [Syrian interim] President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF chief Mazloum Abdi. Once implemented, it will allow us to assume control and integrate these crossings to thus have the Syrian border crossings be under unified national administration. We have already prepared our staff to administer these crossings and laid out the necessary plans, and we are ready to take over once the implementation of the [March 10] agreement is complete. Have any discussions taken place between your committees and the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) committees regarding crossing management? No, not yet. Although the agreement was signed [on March 10], the Syrian Democratic Forces have so far tried to evade implementing it, and they continue to place obstacles in its way. No joint plans have been implemented so far. Of course, more critical issues - such as the army, internal security, and administrative governance - must be agreed upon [between Damascus and the SDF] first. The matter of the border crossings will follow naturally. Until this date, no sessions have been held [between the relevant committees in this regard.] Until those core matters are resolved, we cannot move forward on operational issues like the crossings. You spoke about the importance of the Semalka crossing. Are there communication channels with the Kurdistan Regional Government [KRG]? Indeed, communication exists between our foreign ministry and the Kurdistan Regional Government. However, as a border authority, we do not have direct communication. All coordination with foreign parties is handled through the foreign ministry. Of course, Semalka is a very important crossing through which a lot of goods enter. But we face a serious issue - there are no official borders between us and the SDF-controlled areas. Many traders bring in goods via Semalka and then attempt to move them into Syrian internal markets illegally. We deal with dozens of smuggling attempts daily by trucks that had primarily entered northeast Syria [Rojava] via the Semalka crossing. These attempts are carried out by greedy traders who are trying to avoid customs duties. To counter this, we've deployed customs police detachments across Syrian territory - from Manbij in the northwest to the Albu Kamal crossing in the east. These units are constantly seizing smuggled trucks, including from Semalka. Ultimately, we want all crossings to be unified under national control so we can eliminate smuggling and reduce the burden on our forces. You recently visited Turkey. Are there any updates on the Nusaybin-Qamishli crossing? Is there any coordination with Turkey to reopen it? Indeed, we have discussed all crossings with the Turkish side. Just two weeks ago, we visited the Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain crossings in the al-Salam Spring area. These two crossings are under Syrian government control but were not previously under our direct administration. We are now working with Turkey to bring them under our full authority. There are still three other crossings with Turkey-Ain al-Arab, al-Darbasiyah, and Qamishli-Nusaybin, which is the most important. The Turkish side is ready to hand over their side of these crossings, but from the Syrian side, these three crossings are still under SDF control. These five crossings, including al-Yaarubiyah-Rabia and Semalka, will ultimately come under our administration once the [March 10] agreement with the SDF is implemented. How many active seaports are currently operating in Syria, and which are the most important for commercial shipping? We currently have two main seaports: Tartous Port and Latakia Port. Both are fully operational and integrated into commercial shipping routes. We have signed international investment agreements for their development. At Latakia Port, we have signed a major investment contract with [French shipping giant] CMA CGM, one of the world's largest container terminal operators. Two weeks ago, we also signed a significant investment agreement for Tartous Port with [the Dubai-based global logistics and trade giant] DP World. A large technical team from DP World arrived just yesterday to begin rehabilitation planning, and the agreement will come into effect accordingly. CMA CGM is also implementing its part of the agreement in the container terminal. We are also in talks with another major international operator, and a new port operation agreement is expected to be signed in the coming weeks. In addition to these, we have about eight smaller local ports, including Arwad Island, Ras al-Basit, Ras ibn Hani and others. These ports are dedicated to fishing, ship maintenance, and recreation, There is also the Baniyas Port, which is currently used only for receiving oil shipments, but we plan to develop it into a commercial port soon. Lastly, I'd like to mention that the Free Zones in Syria fall under the jurisdiction of the General Authority for Land and Sea Border Crossings. We currently manage ten free zones across the country, including in Damascus, Daraa, Homs, Latakia, and even Idlib and al-Yaarubiyah near the Rabia crossing. We've prepared extensive investment plans for these zones, aiming to transform them into internationally competitive hubs. We also plan to establish several dry ports in locations such as Idlib, Aleppo, and Homs. We have many other plans and agreements that will see light in coming months. We pledge to our people to do everything we can to wheel the country's economy forward and contribute to its recovery.
Rudaw Net
04-07-2025
- Politics
- Rudaw Net
KRG blames PMF for drone attacks in Erbil
Also in Kurdistan Yazidi survivor says ISIS banned Kurdish language Erbil court issues warrant for ex-MP President Barzani worked for years to facilitate Ankara-PKK peace process: Spox Explosive-laden drone intercepted near Erbil airport A+ A- ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) interior ministry on Friday blamed the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, or Hashd al-Shaabi) for the recent drone attacks in Erbil, accusing the group of attempting to destabilize the Kurdistan Region. 'Last night, a drone crashed in a deserted area near Erbil. These attacks are being carried out by some groups affiliated with Hashd al-Shaabi with the intention of creating chaos. It is necessary for the relevant parties in the federal government to set limits on these destructive acts and take legal measures against the perpetrators,' the ministry said in a statement late Friday. It denied claims that an Israeli base was hit in the drone attack, reiterating that no Israeli bases exist in the Region. An explosive-laden drone was intercepted near Erbil International Airport on Thursday, but 'did not cause any casualties or material damage,' the Directorate General of Counter Terrorism (CTD), which is part of the Kurdistan Region Security Council (KRSC), said. The renewed drone activity follows the US-brokered ceasefire that went into effect on June 24, ending the 12-day war between Iran and Israel. During the conflict, numerous drones and rockets flew through the airspace of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, where several drones fell or were intercepted.
