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Yahoo
4 days ago
- Business
- Yahoo
China Tightens Grip on Iraq's Energy Future with Massive Basra Megaproject
China's Geo-Jade Petroleum has signed a swathe of major contracts that give Beijing control over Iraq's first fully integrated energy project. This comprises a development project to increase production at the Tuba oil field from 20,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 100,000 bpd, constructing a 200,000-bpd high-specification refinery, and building a 620,000 tonnes annual capacity petrochemical plant, according to Iraq's Oil Ministry. It also includes the construction of a 520,000-tonne annual capacity fertilizer plant, developing a 650-megawatt thermal power plant, and building a 400-megawatt solar power station. All this will be done in the heart of Iraq's oil and gas industry, centred in the southern province of Basra that is also home to its key port and export hub of the same name. These projects combined will boost Beijing's already enormous influence over the country's oil and gas sectors, and related infrastructure developments at a time when the U.S. and its allies believed that they were starting to progress in their attempts to reassert their own influence across the oil and gas steady drift of Iraq towards China and away from the West began as the U.S. overstayed its welcome following its toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and it gained momentum after U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally withdraw the country from the 'nuclear deal' with Iran in 2018. China moved to position itself to occupy the vacuum that would be left in Iran and Iraq, which together remain the biggest oil and gas prize in the entire region, in addition to being at the heart of the Shia Crescent of Power that rivals the influence of Sunni Islam across the region and beyond. Iraq officially holds a very conservatively-estimated 145 billion barrels of proved crude oil reserves (nearly 18% of the Middle East's total, and the fifth biggest on the planet), according to the Energy Information Administration. Unofficially, it is extremely likely that it holds much more oil than this. In October 2010, Iraq's Oil Ministry increased its own official figure for the country's proven reserves but at the same time stated that Iraq's undiscovered resources amounted to around 215 billion barrels. Given this backdrop, China's efforts following the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal were rewarded with the 'Iran-China 25-Year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement', as first revealed anywhere in the world in my 3 September 2019 article on the subject and analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. In Iraq's case, Beijing concluded the foundation stone 'Oil for Reconstruction and Investment' agreement signed in September 2019, which allowed Chinese firms to invest in infrastructure projects in Iraq in exchange for oil. This later broadened and deepened in the equally all-encompassing 'Iraq-China Framework Agreement' of 2021. In both cases, the deals included extremely generous terms for Chinese firms that undertook exploration and development projects in both countries, with a key basic point on each being that China would get be allowed first refusal on most of the oil, gas, and petrochemicals projects that came up in Iran and Iraq for the duration of the respective relationship deals. There were multiple other benefits for Beijing too, one of which was that although the deals were often 25-years in duration they were structured so that they would not officially start until two years after the signing date, so allowing whichever Chinese firm was involved more time to recoup more profits on average per year and less upfront investment. Additionally, the per barrel payments to China were the higher of either the mean average of the 18-month spot price for crude oil produced or the past six months' mean average price, tilting the remuneration firmly in Beijing's favour. The deals' terms also included at least a 10% discount to China on the value of the oil it recovered – although in several cases with extra bonuses applied this totalled 30%. The latter was the same discount to the lowest mean one-year average market price at the key gas pricing hubs for the gas that Chinese firms captured as well. No details have yet been released on the compensation being awarded for the Integrated Energy Project. That said, securing oil and gas flows is only one positive aspect for China of building out its presence across Iraq. Oil and gas development contracts carry with them the legal right to fully secure the development sites through whatever means the developer firms think necessary, including stationing unlimited numbers of security personnel in and around the immediate sites. One notable early example of the leveraging of oil and gas agreements with Iraq by China was a pledge from Beijing for nearly IQD1 trillion (US$700 million at the time) of rail, road and ship transportation infrastructure projects in the city of Al-Zubair in the southern Iraq oil hub of Basra that has since seen a flurry of Chinese developments, including the upcoming work that forms Geo-Jade Petroleum's Integrated Energy Project. Another deal was for Chinese companies to build a civilian airport to replace the military base in the capital of the southern oil rich Dhi Qar governorate, with this region containing two of Iraq's potentially biggest oil fields – Gharraf and Nassiriya. This airport project will include the construction of multiple cargo buildings and roads linking the airport to the city's town centre and separately to other key oil areas in southern Iraq, including Basra. In the later discussions involved in the 2021 'Iraq-China Framework Agreement', it was decided that the airport could be expanded later to be a dual-use civilian and military airport. The military component would be usable by China without first having to consult with whatever Iraqi government was in power at the time, as also analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. In the same synergistic mould, it should be remembered that China is also still working on the 300-000 bpd Al-Faw refinery, close to Faw Port's main export terminal in Basra. According to the Iraq Ministry of Planning, the China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering Company (CPPEC)-led project will act as a storage hub and supply conduit for 3.0-3.5 million barrels of crude oil that will then either go for export out of Basra Port or will be transported to the Al-Faw refinery and through pipelines to other refineries and power plants in central and northern Iraq. It will also act as a logistical command centre for all of China's extensive oil and gas projects in Iraq and for the build-out of multiple non-oil projects connected to the 'Iraq-China Framework Agreement'. Although not all the Chinese companies involved in the direct and indirect work connected to the Al-Faw refinery have been reported by the General Company for Ports in Iraq, a source close to Iraq's Oil Ministry exclusively told that PowerChina and Norinco International are still the guiding forces behind the development. This makes sense, as these two firms signed the original contract in January 2018 to build the refinery at Al-Faw, which together with its 300,000-bpd capacity would also have a petrochemical plant attached to the development. It also perfectly aligns with Beijing's broad modus operandi in its expansion strategy across the Middle East to combine commercial ventures with a military presence, as alongside its petroleum and mineral resources exploration and development activities, Norinco is one of China's foremost defence contractors. One of Norinco's key oil subsidiaries is Zhenhua Oil, which was the company that on 2 January 2021 made a multi-billion-dollar deal with Iraq's Federal Government in Baghdad to prepay for four million barrels every month for five years to be delivered to China by Iraq's State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO). As also analysed in depth in my latest book on the new global oil market order, it was exactly the same strategy to take over Iraq's oil industry in the south as Russia had successfully used to take over the industry in the semi-autonomous northern region of Iraqi Kurdistan in 2017. By Simon Watkins for More Top Reads From this article on
News18
23-05-2025
- Politics
- News18
Three Years After Father's Beheading, Udaipur Tailor Kanhaiya Lal's Son Seeks To Serve Nation
Last Updated: For three years, he stayed barefoot as a mark of protest. Now, Kanhaiya Lal's son says he won't hesitate to wear Army boots for India Nearly three years have passed since Kanhaiya Lal, a tailor from Udaipur's Bhoot Mahal area, was attacked, dragged out of his shop, and brutally beheaded by Muhammad Riyaz Attari and Ghaus Muhammad for expressing support for the controversial remarks made by now-suspended BJP leader Nupur Sharma. The entire act was caught on a mobile camera and shared on the internet by the attackers, and was treated as a case of terrorism. A day ahead of Kanhaiya Lal's third death anniversary, a movie on the attack that shook the nation and influenced the Rajasthan Assembly election is set to be released in theatres. While Yash, Kanhaiya Lal's son, is hopeful that the film will refresh public memory about the tailor's murder, the recent Operation Sindoor seems to have given him something that had been missing from his life ever since 28 June 2022 — purpose. Yash found common ground between his personal tragedy and the recent Indo-Pakistan conflict. The NIA probe into the case revealed a Pakistan angle. Muhammad Riyaz Attari and Ghaus Muhammad — both accused — belonged to the Barelvi sect of Sunni Islam and were members of Dawat-e-Islami, a Barelvi organisation based in Karachi, Pakistan, led by Muhammad Ilyas Attar Qadri. Ghaus Muhammad had attended religious sessions organised by Dawat-e-Islami in Karachi in 2014, the NIA probe found. So when the recent conflict began, Yash envisioned a dream — to fight the same Pakistan. 'I understand the pain the families of those 26 who lost their lives in Pahalgam are going through because I, too, have been through a similar phase. That is why I feel India should impart compulsory military training, like Israel, keeping many in reserve. If the recent situation had escalated further, more boots on the ground would have been required. If given a chance, I would be happy to enroll in the armed forces in whatever capacity they deem fit," Yash told News18 with a straight face and eyes sparkling. Yash, as well as his brother Tarun, are government employees with the Rajasthan government. The movie Gyanvapi Files: A Tailor's Murder Story is slated for release on 27 June this year across 4,500 screens globally, including in the UK, the US, and Dubai, according to Amit Jani, the film's producer. 'What happened in Udaipur is nothing new—Pakistan always does this. They (Pakistan) sent a message that they will kill us in Pahalgam, Lal Chowk, Baramulla, Pulwama, and even Udaipur. They will kill us where we think we are the safest. This is the aim of Pakistan and Islamic terror. When Kanhaiya Lal's murder happened, I said back then, 'It's not the murder of a tailor but a trailer of murders.' This movie aims to expose that," Jani told News18. While Jani hopes the film may help raise public awareness and potentially fast-track justice, Yash sounds disheartened by the glacial pace of India's criminal justice system. 'Every time I meet a politician or speak to the media, I request them to help expedite the case. It is still in the sessions court. It's been three years. My depositions aren't even over yet. I only wonder how long we will have to wait for justice," Yash said. As Yash walked out, he moved barefoot. Since his father's horrific murder, he has vowed not to wear shoes until justice is served. But for the pride of serving his nation, Yash says he may reconsider his vow—if asked to, he would be willing to don army boots.
The Hindu
19-05-2025
- General
- The Hindu
Daily quiz: on Malcolm X
Daily quiz: on Malcolm X Copy link Email Facebook Twitter Telegram LinkedIn WhatsApp Reddit YOUR SCORE 0 /7 RETAKE THE QUIZ 1 / 7 | Born Malcolm Little, why did he change his surname to X? DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : As a symbolic rejection of the 'white slaveholder' surname and also to represent his unknown African ancestral name. SHOW ANSWER 2 / 7 | What nickname, a combination of a prominent U.S. city and a colour, was he given during his troubled teen years for the tinge of the colour in his hair? DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : 'Detroit Red' SHOW ANSWER 3 / 7 | Name the organization known for its teachings combining elements of Islam with Black nationalist ideas that Malcolm joined and the paper he founded there? DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : Nation of Islam and 'Muhammad Speaks' SHOW ANSWER 4 / 7 | Malcolm was criticised for terming which major event in 1963 as an example of 'chickens coming home to roost' as an allusion to a society bearing the consequences of violence? DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : President John F. Kennedy's assassination SHOW ANSWER 5 / 7 | Following a visit to Mecca in 1964, Malcolm X embraced Sunni Islam and changed his name to what? DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : El-Hajj Malik el-Shabazz SHOW ANSWER 6 / 7 | How are Talmadge Hayer, Norman 3X Butler and Thomas 15X Johnson connected to Malcolm X? DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : They were convicted for the assassination of Malcolm in February 1965. SHOW ANSWER
Business Mayor
18-05-2025
- Business
- Business Mayor
From caliphate to corridor: How Trump made the Gulf states great (again)
The Gulf states—long seen as energy giants and financial partners—were recast in Trump's vision as ideological and geopolitical anchors. Their influence extends beyond oil: through media, religion, investment, and regional diplomacy, they shape narratives across the Muslim world. Trump's outreach reframed them not as clients of U.S. power but as co-architects of regional stability. By getting them to become stakeholders in U.S. prosperity by investment, renewed clients of U.S.'s military complex by purchase, and important stakeholders of U.S.'s flagship projects that connect the Atlantic to the Pacific—like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)—the Trump administration aimed to pull them away from Iran, China, and Russia. This wasn't just about containment—it was about co-opting ideological leadership within Sunni Islam by his visit, friendship, and agreements. This shift became more urgent as state-backed Islamist extremism continued to evolve. The October 7 Hamas terrorist attack on Israel and the April 22 murder of Hindu tourists in India exposed a wide spectrum of threats. Iran backs proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Houthis. Pakistan, with tacit support from Turkey and China, leverages Sunni jihadist groups to pressure India. Other conflicts are ongoing and brewing in Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and Iraq—where the only containment is possible through the consolidation of the three Islamic middle powers. All these conflicts have demonstrated the ability to bring global trade and prosperity to a halt. Read More A liminal space All three have renewed their alliance with the U.S., promised large investments, and with it an implicit commitment to contain their spheres of influence to benefit U.S. foreign policy, including a guarantee to Israel's security. An important example of this was the informal meeting in Riyadh of Ahmed Al-Sharaa with the U.S. President on the intervention of Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman. Al-Sharaa, a former ISIS terrorist turned statesman, has now evolved from a radical Islamic terrorist to the poster boy of Islamic moderation. The meeting opens the possibility of bringing Syria into the Abraham Accords (possibly IMEC), recognizing Israel, and a return to Syria's centrality and leadership in Middle East politics. Meanwhile, the UAE's acquisition of port rights in Tartus—Russia's only naval outpost in the Mediterranean—suggests a recalibration of Levantine geopolitics, subtly shifting the region's center of gravity away from Moscow and toward Gulf-backed development. As China facilitated Syria's return to the Arab League, the U.S. quietly moved to reassert its influence. Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman began shaping Syria's reintegration—economically and diplomatically—through backchannel efforts. While seeking peace with Russia in an attempt to de-couple Russia and China, Trump has also cornered the Islamic Republic. Already weakened by Israeli strikes, Iran finds itself in a dire economic, political, and social situation. If the regime does not negotiate an agreement with Trump, it empowers its opposition at home; a successful agreement with the U.S. weakens it with its proxies. An effective zugzwang. Turkey is a NATO ally which draws legitimacy from the Muslim Brotherhood and is desperately trying to be a middle power while challenging all definitions of democracy. Erdoğan has long challenged the Saudi and Emirati vision of a post-extremist Sunni world. Qatar, his closest ally, continues to act as financier and safe haven for Brotherhood-linked networks. Yet even as Erdoğan projects ambition, the broader trend is clear: the Gulf states have turned decisively toward technocratic governance, religious moderation, and global integration. Erdoğan's neo-Ottoman aspirations increasingly look constrained—more reactive than strategic. Trump's GCC visit may isolate Erdoğan further, making him more appreciative of U.S. support. As we have crossed the centenary of the abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924 and we approach the centenary of the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, the Ikhwan al Muslimeen, the battle now is to counter the Ikhwan narrative, which spreads poison and destruction from Palestine to Kashmir and which has de-facto replaced the Ottoman Caliphate as the governing body of radicalized components of Sunni Islam. Only the three Gulf middle powers have the resources and legitimacy to do so. Trump understands this. Amid the great-power chessboard of the U.S., China, and Russia, the role of Islamic middle powers has become central from Asia to Africa. Despite nearly 650 million Muslims—one third of the ummah—concentrated in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Xinjiang), the influence of the Gulf middle powers over Islamic identity, discourse, and funding carries weight and global significance, which is key to the security of the Middle East and Asia. Trump's diplomacy recognized this leverage. By strengthening ties with the GCC and isolating Iran and Pakistan, the U.S. curbed China's economic and ideological reach in the region. India must consider the longer-term ramifications of Trump's actions. While in the short term it may seem his actions support Pakistan or hyphenate it with India, in the longer term his actions have further isolated Pakistan from the Islamic middle powers, bringing it to an existentialist question of pivot or balkanize. Despite the bravado of the Generals in Rawalpindi, the biggest sign of insecurity after the ceasefire was China's provocation on the naming of Arunachal Pradesh. If the Sino-Pakistan alliance had won the round, China would not have so quickly demonstrated a sign of weakness. As a result of Trump's diplomacy, India and Israel emerged as equal U.S. partners in a new strategic geometry—India anchoring the Indo-Pacific, Israel securing the Middle East, and the Gulf powers binding the architecture through ideological and financial capital. This is a trilateral partnership where Israel safeguards the region's western flank, India secures the east, and the Gulf states enable a shared prosperity model that undermines extremism while expanding influence—a true Indo-Mediterranean partnership. Read More The Cult of Devotion By placing Islamic middle powers at the heart of his foreign policy, Trump did more than upend the old order—he began constructing a new one. One where ideology, energy, security, and diplomacy converge through partnerships rather than patronage. And one where the balance of power is not simply about militaries and markets—but about who gets to define the future of the Islamic world.
Time of India
18-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
From caliphate to corridor: How Trump made the Gulf states great (again)
Donald Trump's presidency marked a turning point in U.S. engagement with the Islamic world. His first official trip—to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar—signaled a break from conventional diplomacy. This was no symbolic gesture. It reflected a deliberate strategy: to elevate the Islamic middle powers as pivotal players in a new U.S.-led global order. The Gulf states—long seen as energy giants and financial partners—were recast in Trump's vision as ideological and geopolitical anchors. Their influence extends beyond oil: through media, religion, investment, and regional diplomacy, they shape narratives across the Muslim world. Trump's outreach reframed them not as clients of U.S. power but as co-architects of regional stability. By getting them to become stakeholders in U.S. prosperity by investment, renewed clients of U.S.'s military complex by purchase, and important stakeholders of U.S.'s flagship projects that connect the Atlantic to the Pacific—like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)—the Trump administration aimed to pull them away from Iran, China, and Russia. This wasn't just about containment—it was about co-opting ideological leadership within Sunni Islam by his visit, friendship, and agreements. This shift became more urgent as state-backed Islamist extremism continued to evolve. The October 7 Hamas terrorist attack on Israel and the April 22 murder of Hindu tourists in India exposed a wide spectrum of threats. Iran backs proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Houthis. Pakistan, with tacit support from Turkey and China, leverages Sunni jihadist groups to pressure India. Other conflicts are ongoing and brewing in Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and Iraq—where the only containment is possible through the consolidation of the three Islamic middle powers. All these conflicts have demonstrated the ability to bring global trade and prosperity to a halt. Play Video Pause Skip Backward Skip Forward Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration 0:00 Loaded : 0% 0:00 Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 1x Playback Rate Chapters Chapters Descriptions descriptions off , selected Captions captions settings , opens captions settings dialog captions off , selected Audio Track default , selected Picture-in-Picture Fullscreen This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Opacity Opaque Semi-Transparent Text Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Opacity Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Caption Area Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Opacity Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Drop shadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Mountain Gear for Extreme Conditions Trek Kit India Learn More Undo by Taboola by Taboola All three have renewed their alliance with the U.S., promised large investments, and with it an implicit commitment to contain their spheres of influence to benefit U.S. foreign policy, including a guarantee to Israel's security. An important example of this was the informal meeting in Riyadh of Ahmed Al-Sharaa with the U.S. President on the intervention of Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman. Al-Sharaa, a former ISIS terrorist turned statesman, has now evolved from a radical Islamic terrorist to the poster boy of Islamic moderation. The meeting opens the possibility of bringing Syria into the Abraham Accords (possibly IMEC), recognizing Israel, and a return to Syria's centrality and leadership in Middle East politics. Meanwhile, the UAE's acquisition of port rights in Tartus—Russia's only naval outpost in the Mediterranean—suggests a recalibration of Levantine geopolitics, subtly shifting the region's center of gravity away from Moscow and toward Gulf-backed development. Live Events As China facilitated Syria's return to the Arab League, the U.S. quietly moved to reassert its influence. Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman began shaping Syria's reintegration—economically and diplomatically—through backchannel efforts. While seeking peace with Russia in an attempt to de-couple Russia and China, Trump has also cornered the Islamic Republic. Already weakened by Israeli strikes, Iran finds itself in a dire economic, political, and social situation. If the regime does not negotiate an agreement with Trump, it empowers its opposition at home; a successful agreement with the U.S. weakens it with its proxies. An effective zugzwang. Turkey is a NATO ally which draws legitimacy from the Muslim Brotherhood and is desperately trying to be a middle power while challenging all definitions of democracy. Erdoğan has long challenged the Saudi and Emirati vision of a post-extremist Sunni world. Qatar, his closest ally, continues to act as financier and safe haven for Brotherhood-linked networks. Yet even as Erdoğan projects ambition, the broader trend is clear: the Gulf states have turned decisively toward technocratic governance, religious moderation, and global integration. Erdoğan's neo-Ottoman aspirations increasingly look constrained—more reactive than strategic. Trump's GCC visit may isolate Erdoğan further, making him more appreciative of U.S. support. As we have crossed the centenary of the abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924 and we approach the centenary of the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, the Ikhwan al Muslimeen, the battle now is to counter the Ikhwan narrative, which spreads poison and destruction from Palestine to Kashmir and which has de-facto replaced the Ottoman Caliphate as the governing body of radicalized components of Sunni Islam. Only the three Gulf middle powers have the resources and legitimacy to do so. Trump understands this. Amid the great-power chessboard of the U.S., China, and Russia, the role of Islamic middle powers has become central from Asia to Africa. Despite nearly 650 million Muslims—one third of the ummah—concentrated in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Xinjiang), the influence of the Gulf middle powers over Islamic identity, discourse, and funding carries weight and global significance, which is key to the security of the Middle East and Asia. Trump's diplomacy recognized this leverage. By strengthening ties with the GCC and isolating Iran and Pakistan, the U.S. curbed China's economic and ideological reach in the region. India must consider the longer-term ramifications of Trump's actions. While in the short term it may seem his actions support Pakistan or hyphenate it with India, in the longer term his actions have further isolated Pakistan from the Islamic middle powers, bringing it to an existentialist question of pivot or balkanize. Despite the bravado of the Generals in Rawalpindi, the biggest sign of insecurity after the ceasefire was China's provocation on the naming of Arunachal Pradesh. If the Sino-Pakistan alliance had won the round, China would not have so quickly demonstrated a sign of weakness. As a result of Trump's diplomacy, India and Israel emerged as equal U.S. partners in a new strategic geometry—India anchoring the Indo-Pacific, Israel securing the Middle East, and the Gulf powers binding the architecture through ideological and financial capital. This is a trilateral partnership where Israel safeguards the region's western flank, India secures the east, and the Gulf states enable a shared prosperity model that undermines extremism while expanding influence—a true Indo-Mediterranean partnership. By placing Islamic middle powers at the heart of his foreign policy, Trump did more than upend the old order—he began constructing a new one. One where ideology, energy, security, and diplomacy converge through partnerships rather than patronage. And one where the balance of power is not simply about militaries and markets—but about who gets to define the future of the Islamic world.
