Latest news with #SunniMuslims
Muscat Daily
4 days ago
- Politics
- Muscat Daily
Iran: 9 killed in attack on courthouse
Tehran, Iran – Nine people were killed on Saturday when unknown assailants launched a gun and grenade attack at a courthouse in southeastern Iran, local media reported. The assault happened in the province of Sistan-Baluchistan, near the borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan. The province frequently sees clashes between security forces and armed groups, including the Sunni group Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), which has demanded greater rights and autonomy for Iran's ethnic Baloch. What do we know about the attack? State news agency IRNA reported that the attack targeted a courthouse in Zahedan, the capital of southeastern Sistan-Baluchistan province. Zahedan lies some 1,130km (700 miles) southeast of the capital, Tehran. The province's deputy police commander, Alireza Daliri, said the attackers attempted to enter the building disguised as visitors. The assailants threw a grenade into the building, Daliri said, killing several people inside. The dead included at least six civilians – including a mother and child – and three assailants, IRNA reported. More than a dozen others were injured. Citing eyewitnesses, the Baluch human rights group HAALVSH said several judiciary staff members and security personnel were killed or wounded. IRNA said the three dead gunmen were killed in clashes with security forces following the attack. The Iranian judiciary's Mizan Online news site labelled the killings a 'terrorist attack'. Iran's Baloch ethnic minority Sistan-Baluchistan province is home to Iran's Baloch minority, who have long complained of economic marginalisation and political exclusion. The province is one of the least developed parts of Iran. Baloch are typically Sunni Muslims, whereas Iran is majority Shiite. The Baloch homeland extends into Pakistan's southwestern Balochistan province, where residents have expressed similar grievances of economic marginalisation and where the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) group has carried out numerous attacks. Who claimed responsibility? The semi-official Tasnim news agency blamed the attack on the group Jaish al-Adl. The group, which is composed mainly of ethnic Baloch members, is known for its violent attacks against Iranian security forces. Jaish al-Adl, which emerged in 2012, aims to secure greater rights and independence for the Baloch people in Iran. In a statement posted on its Telegram account, the group took responsibility for the attack. The statement urged 'all civilians to immediately evacuate the area of clashes for their safety'. In January 2024, Jaish al-Adl claimed to have assassinated three Revolutionary Guards officials, including Colonel Hossein-Ali Javdanfar, commander of the Sistan-Baluchistan Corps of the Quds Force. A few months later, the group launched coordinated attacks in the cities of Chabahar, Rask, and Sarbaz, targeting IRGC, naval, intelligence, and police facilities. Twenty-one security personnel and 18 attackers were killed. The Iranian government accuses the group of ties to foreign powers and involvement in cross-border smuggling and insurgency. DW
American Military News
4 days ago
- Politics
- American Military News
At Least 6 Dead In Militant Attack On Courthouse In Southeast Iran
This article was originally published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and is reprinted with permission. At least six people were killed and 22 injured after three Jaish al-Adl militants attacked a courthouse in Zahedan, the capital of the restive province of Sistan-Baluchistan in southeast Iran. The Iranian judiciary in a statement on July 26 called the assault a 'terrorist attack.' Jaish al-Adl, a Baluch separatist militant group that is believed to be operating out of neighboring Pakistan, claimed the attack in a statement on its Telegram channel. The group warned the judiciary's personnel that Sistan-Baluchistan is 'no longer a safe place' for them. Iranian media said all three attackers were killed in the attack. This marks the militant group's deadliest attack in Iran since October 2024, when Jaish al-Adl militants ambushed a police convoy, killing 10 officers. Jaish al-Adl, which is designated as a terrorist group by both Iran and the United States, has repeatedly clashed with security forces and Iranian border guards in Sistan-Baluchistan Province, at times taking them hostage or killing them. Members of the Baluch minority, many of whom are Sunni Muslims in Shi'ite-majority Iran, have long faced disproportionate discrimination and violence at the hands of the authorities. The area has also long been a key transit route for narcotics smuggled from Afghanistan to the West and beyond.
DW
4 days ago
- Politics
- DW
Iran: At least 9 killed in attack on courthouse – DW – 07/26/2025
The attack, blamed on the Sunni militant group Jaish al-Adl, took place at a court building in southeastern Sistan-Baluchistan province. Nine people were killed Saturday when unknown assailants launched a gun and grenade attack at a courthouse in southeastern Iran, local media reported. The assault happened in the province of Sistan-Baluchistan, near the borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan. The province frequently sees clashes between security forces and armed groups, including the Sunni militant group Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), which has demanded greater rights and autonomy for Iran's ethnic Baloch. State news agency IRNA reported that the attack targeted a courthouse in Zahedan, the capital of southeastern Sistan-Baluchistan province. Zahedan lies some 1,130 kilometers (700 miles) southeast of the capital, Tehran. The province's deputy police commander, Alireza Daliri, said the attackers attempted to enter the building disguised as visitors. The assailants threw a grenade into the building, Daliri said, killing several people inside. The dead included at least six civilians — including a mother and child — and three assailants, IRNA reported. More than a dozen others were injured. Citing eyewitnesses, the Baluch human rights group HAALVSH said several judiciary staff members and security personnel were killed or wounded. IRNA said the three dead gunmen were killed in clashes with security forces following the attack. The Iranian judiciary's Mizan Online news site labeled the killings a "terrorist attack." Sistan-Baluchistan province is home to Iran's Baloch minority, who have long complained of economic marginalisation and political exclusion. The province is one of the least developed parts of Iran. Baloch are typically Sunni Muslims, whereas Iran is majority Shiite. The Baloch homeland extends into Pakistan's southwestern Balochistan province, where residents have expressed similar grievances of economic marginalization and where the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) militant group has carried out numerous attacks. To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Who claimed responsibility for the courthouse attack? The semiofficial Tasnim news agency blamed the attack on the militant group Jaish al-Adl. The group, which is composed mainly of ethnic Baloch members, is known for its violent attacks against Iranian security forces. Jaish al-Adl, which emerged in 2012, aims to secure greater rights and independence for the Baloch people in Iran. In a statement posted on its Telegram account, the group took responsibility for the attack. The statement urged "all civilians to immediately evacuate the area of clashes for their safety." In January 2024, Jaish al-Adl claimed to have assassinated three Revolutionary Guards officials, including Colonel Hossein-Ali Javdanfar, commander of the Sistan-Baluchistan Corps of the Quds Force. A few months later, the group launched coordinated attacks in the cities of Chabahar, Rask, and Sarbaz, targeting IRGC, naval, intelligence, and police facilities. Twenty-one security personnel and 18 militants were killed. The Iranian government accuses the group of ties to foreign powers and involvement in cross-border smuggling and insurgency.
AllAfrica
7 days ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
Costly Afghan immigration tests Iran's neighborly hospitality
Afghan migration has fundamentally reshaped Iran's demographics, labor market and public finances. While the Iranian economy gains from lower labor costs and higher productivity, the fiscal burden of untargeted subsidies, currency outflows and hidden social costs has turned migration into a national economic challenge. Without targeted reforms, the costs will keep rising. For more than four decades, Afghan migration to Iran has created a complex and evolving social fabric. The community is deeply heterogeneous: A large majority are Sunni Muslims – mainly Pashtuns and some Tajiks – whose customs and social norms diverge from Iran's Shia-majority society. In many respects, their traditional, tribal, and rural lifestyles do not align with the rules and rhythms of urban Iran. Shia minorities, mainly Hazaras, are linguistically and culturally closer to Iranians, easing their social integration. Other groups such as Uzbeks, Turkmens, Baloch and Ismailis add further complexity. Waves of Afghan migration to Iran (1979–2025) Year Total Afghan Population (Est.) Main Migration/Return Wave & Cause Returnees/Deportees (thousand) Remaining Population After Return (million) Share of Legal / Irregular Entry (%) 1979 <0.1 Pre-Revolution, Normal Status – <0.1 Mostly legal 1983 1.5 Soviet invasion, war, instability Low 1.5 Mostly legal 1986 2.5 Intensified war, greater insecurity Low 2.5 Mostly legal 1996 3.0 Civil war, weak central government Low 3.0 Mostly legal 2001 2.8 Taliban ascendancy, religious/ethnic repression ~300 2.5 Mostly legal 2003 2.2 Taliban fall, voluntary repatriation ~600 1.6 Legal & returning 2011 1.7 Elected govt, relative stability, economic crisis Low 1.7 Mostly legal 2016 2.5 New insecurity, Afghan economic crisis Low 2.5 Legal & irregular 2021 3.0 Kabul fall, Taliban return, violence escalates Low 3.0 Sharp rise in irregular entry 2023 4.5 Fifth wave, intensified crisis, surge in irregular ~700 ~3.8 Mixed; predominantly irregular 2024 3.8 Mass deportations & repatriations begin ~1,200 ~2.6 Irregular & legal 2025 3.8 Continued returns/deportations, population control (up to 1,200–1,500) ~2.5 Mostly irregular Family-centric culture, tribal traditions and practices such as polygamy, together with a significant gap between many migrants' social codes and those of mainstream Iran, have complicated coexistence and sometimes caused friction over education, health and civic participation. Still, second- and third-generation Afghans – especially in major cities – have become Persian-speaking and bicultural. They often experience dual Iranian-Afghan identity. Afghan migration has been driven by Afghanistan's political turmoil, Iran's labor needs and changing Iranian state policies. Today, this population – split between documented and undocumented migrants – shapes Iran's social and economic scene while posing a mounting challenge for fiscal policy. The consequences go far beyond population statistics, as detailed in the financial analysis below. Iran's economy is built on a vast, inefficient and non-targeted subsidy system – one of the world's costliest. For a large, low-income migrant population like the Afghans, this has turned a social issue into a fiscal dilemma. The analysis below examines each major line item using official Iranian sources and independent research. Energy subsidies: Fuel and energy subsidies are the largest component. State price controls and below-market energy costs lead to enormous hidden expenditures for gasoline, gas, diesel and electricity. The Parliament Research Center and the World Bank estimate Iran's annual hidden energy subsidy at up to 1,200 trillion tomans ($286 billion). While Afghan migrants – mostly from low-income deciles and generally without private cars – consume less than the average Iranian, everyone benefits via subsidized public transit and heating. The per capita annual fuel subsidy for Afghans is about 10-13 million tomans, well below the 30 million for Iranians. The undocumented sector, operating more in the grey market, creates additional fiscal pressure. Education subsidies: Iranian law requires that all Afghan children, regardless of documentation, be enrolled in public schools (Cabinet Resolution 2015; UNHCR 2024). The Ministry of Education and the Parliament Research Center estimate the average annual cost per Afghan student at about 4.5 million tomans. With an estimated 300,000 Afghan children in schools, this is a significant and growing burden, the same for both legal and undocumented residents. Healthcare subsidies: Healthcare access depends on insurance and residency status. About one million Afghans have public health insurance (UNHCR 2024); others use public services sporadically. Average annual health spending per Afghan is estimated at about 2-3 million tomans – comparable to the lowest-income Iranian deciles. Bread subsidies: Bread is a staple for both Iranians and Afghans, and the state's bread subsidy is among its largest fiscal commitments. Per capita, Afghans receive about 4-5 million tomans per year in bread subsidies, based on average consumption (160-180 kg) and the price gap between subsidized and market bread. Afghan households, typically larger, often consume up to 25% more than Iranian families. Even undocumented migrants have virtually unrestricted access to subsidized bread. Overall, bread subsidies remain a central – and expensive – pillar of food security for both communities. Water and electricity subsidies: In migrant-concentrated areas, water and power use per household is lower due to simpler lifestyles, but the total population puts chronic strain on infrastructure. Per capita subsidy is about 3-4 million tomans annually. Municipal services: Public transport, waste collection, green spaces, and urban services add another 500,000 tomans per person per year – low in isolation, but substantial in the aggregate in urban centers. Annual cost of Afghan migrants (2025 estimates, in millions of USD) Subsidy Estimated Annual Cost per Legal Migrant (USD) Estimated Annual Cost per Undocumented Migrant (USD) Legal immigrant population (millions) legal immigrant population (millions) Total Annual Cost Legal Migrants (m USD) Total Annual Cost Undocumented Migrants (m USD) Total Grand Annual Cost (m USD) Fuel & Energy 114 148 0.9 2.1 102.3 307.4 409.7 Education 51 51 0.3 0.3 17.2 17.2 34.4 Healthcare 34 23 0.9 2.1 34.1 54.0 88.1 Bread & Food 51 57 0.9 2.1 41.4 113.3 154.7 Water & Electricity 40 40 0.9 2.1 32.1 74.7 106.8 Municipal Services 6 8 0.9 2.1 4.9 20.1 25.0 Total 232.0 586.7 818.7 Despite these costs, Afghan migration generates tangible economic gains. Afghan workers, with lower wages and roughly 15-20% higher productivity than Iranian peers, create an annual private sector saving of about $852 million (75,000 bn tomans). These savings stabilize key industries – especially construction and agriculture – that face chronic domestic labor shortages. But the fiscal and social costs outweigh the gains. Afghans remit $1-1.5 billion annually, draining foreign currency. The state's annual outlay for subsidies and public services exceeds $819 million. Pressure on housing markets, especially in low-income areas, adds at least $34 million in annual costs for Iranian renters. Security and law enforcement related to migration adds another $57 million. Annual gains & losses (2025, in millions of USD) Item Economic Gain (m USD) Economic Cost (m USD) Wage & Productivity 852 – Currency Outflow – 1,000–1,500 Subsidies & Public – 819 Housing Impact – 34 Security Costs – 57 Total 852 1,910–2,410 Despite all positive economic effects, Afghan migration's bottom line for Iran's public finances is negative. The net annual loss – over $1 billion – could build two 500-megawatt power plants or 200 modern schools in disadvantaged regions. Each year, the government could otherwise expand national infrastructure or offer full health insurance to every uninsured Iranian. The true challenge is not just migration, but Iran's untargeted and inefficient subsidy system and lack of migration management. Without reform, these fiscal burdens will keep rising. Clear policy, targeted subsidies and robust data are essential for Iran to balance economic needs, social cohesion and national stability. A senior economic analyst and construction project manager based in Tehran, Amirreza Etasi ( has worked for more than a decade at the intersection of public finance, energy and development policy, both in executive roles and as a contributor to major media outlets in Iran and abroad.
Reuters
16-07-2025
- Politics
- Reuters
Why Syria's sectarian mix poses a dilemma for its new rulers
July 16 (Reuters) - Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa's hopes of stitching Syria back together under the rule of his Islamist-led government are complicated by the country's mix of sectarian and ethnic groups. Syria is majority Sunni Muslim, and its religious minorities include Alawites, Christians, Druze and Shi'ite and Ismaili Muslims. While most Syrians are Arab, the country also has a sizeable ethnic Kurdish minority. Here's an overview of the Syrian ethno-sectarian mosaic: Sunni Muslims make up the majority of Syria's population of more than 20 million. Syria was for centuries part of the Sunni-ruled Ottoman Empire until it collapsed a century ago and the country became a French mandate. The group had historically dominated Syria's most powerful cities - Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and Homs. Under Assad family rule, Sunni Muslims still held some prominent roles and President Bashar al-Assad's wife Asma was from a Sunni family that gained influence until he was ousted in December. But patronage was largely skewed towards the Assads' Alawite minority after Bashar's father Hafez al-Assad seized power in 1970. In 1982, the Syrian branch of the Sunni Islamist Muslim Brotherhood launched a revolt in Hama against Hafez al-Assad. His forces crushed the rebellion, killing more than 10,000 people. Some of the most prominent factions in the insurgency against the Assads identified as Sunni Islamist, including Sharaa's Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which was an al Qaeda affiliate until cutting ties in 2016. Alawites account for around 10% of the population and follow an offshoot of Shi'ite Islam and revere Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Islam's Prophet Mohammad. They were a historically poor, rural community from Syria's mountainous coastal region. In 1920, French colonial rulers created an Alawite state along the coast, in what was seen as a divide and rule strategy. It was incorporated into the rest of Syria in 1936, before independence a decade later. Hailing from the Alawite village of Qardaha, Hafez al-Assad seized power after climbing the ranks in the military and the Baath Party. While espousing the Baath's secular Arab nationalism, the Assads recruited heavily from the Alawites for the security apparatus. Sunni fighters killed 1,500 Alawites in the coastal region in March, after a rebellion by Assad loyalists. Syria's Druze community follows a religion derived from Islam and is part of a minority group that also has members in Lebanon, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. In Syria, the community is concentrated in the Sweida region bordering Jordan, in areas adjoining the Israeli-occupied Golan, and in Damascus' Jaramana suburb. Echoing arrangements for the Alawites, French colonial authorities established a state called Jabal al-Druze centred on Sweida until 1936. After Syria's civil war erupted in 2011, Druze held protests against Assad but were spared most of the mass violence that unfolded elsewhere in the country. They faced periodic attacks from other groups - including from Sharaa's HTS and other Sunni Islamist militants who regard their sect as heretical. The Druze maintain a degree of secrecy about the practice of their faith that emerged in the 11th century and incorporates elements from Islam and other philosophies, emphasizing monotheism, reincarnation and the pursuit of truth. Friction between Druze and Syria's new authorities has broken out into fighting several times this year - notably in Jaramana and Suweida. Israel has intervened with airstrikes against Syrian government forces during the clashes with the stated aim of protecting the Druze. Kurds are Syria's largest non-Arab ethnic group at around 10% of the population and are concentrated near the border with Turkey and Iraq. They are part of a stateless ethnic group spread between Syria, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Armenia. Syria's Kurds faced systematic persecution under the Arab nationalist Baathist rule. While the Kurds are mostly Sunni Muslims, their dominant faction - the Democratic Union Party (PYD) - follows a political doctrine emphasising secular leftism and feminism and is heavily influenced by Abdullah Ocalan's Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). After the eruption of the Syrian conflict in 2011, a PYD-affiliated armed group, the People's Protection Units (YPG), established control of Kurdish-majority areas in northern Syria. Under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the YPG partnered with the United States against Islamic State. SDF-held Syria today accounts for about 25% of the country, including some Arab-majority regions. Leading Kurdish groups want to preserve regional autonomy, at odds with Sharaa's ambition of reunifying the country under central rule. While some prominent Syrian Christians joined the opposition against Assad, most Christian communities stuck by him, fearing that Sunnis would trample on minority rights if they took power. The Christians are split into a number of denominations - some of them tiny communities with ancient roots in pre-Islamic Syria. Groups include the Greek Orthodox, Maronites, Syriac Orthodox and Catholics, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Armenian Orthodox and Catholics. There also are a few Protestants.
