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AllAfrica
13 hours ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
Costly Afghan immigration tests Iran's neighborly hospitality
Afghan migration has fundamentally reshaped Iran's demographics, labor market and public finances. While the Iranian economy gains from lower labor costs and higher productivity, the fiscal burden of untargeted subsidies, currency outflows and hidden social costs has turned migration into a national economic challenge. Without targeted reforms, the costs will keep rising. For more than four decades, Afghan migration to Iran has created a complex and evolving social fabric. The community is deeply heterogeneous: A large majority are Sunni Muslims – mainly Pashtuns and some Tajiks – whose customs and social norms diverge from Iran's Shia-majority society. In many respects, their traditional, tribal, and rural lifestyles do not align with the rules and rhythms of urban Iran. Shia minorities, mainly Hazaras, are linguistically and culturally closer to Iranians, easing their social integration. Other groups such as Uzbeks, Turkmens, Baloch and Ismailis add further complexity. Waves of Afghan migration to Iran (1979–2025) Year Total Afghan Population (Est.) Main Migration/Return Wave & Cause Returnees/Deportees (thousand) Remaining Population After Return (million) Share of Legal / Irregular Entry (%) 1979 <0.1 Pre-Revolution, Normal Status – <0.1 Mostly legal 1983 1.5 Soviet invasion, war, instability Low 1.5 Mostly legal 1986 2.5 Intensified war, greater insecurity Low 2.5 Mostly legal 1996 3.0 Civil war, weak central government Low 3.0 Mostly legal 2001 2.8 Taliban ascendancy, religious/ethnic repression ~300 2.5 Mostly legal 2003 2.2 Taliban fall, voluntary repatriation ~600 1.6 Legal & returning 2011 1.7 Elected govt, relative stability, economic crisis Low 1.7 Mostly legal 2016 2.5 New insecurity, Afghan economic crisis Low 2.5 Legal & irregular 2021 3.0 Kabul fall, Taliban return, violence escalates Low 3.0 Sharp rise in irregular entry 2023 4.5 Fifth wave, intensified crisis, surge in irregular ~700 ~3.8 Mixed; predominantly irregular 2024 3.8 Mass deportations & repatriations begin ~1,200 ~2.6 Irregular & legal 2025 3.8 Continued returns/deportations, population control (up to 1,200–1,500) ~2.5 Mostly irregular Family-centric culture, tribal traditions and practices such as polygamy, together with a significant gap between many migrants' social codes and those of mainstream Iran, have complicated coexistence and sometimes caused friction over education, health and civic participation. Still, second- and third-generation Afghans – especially in major cities – have become Persian-speaking and bicultural. They often experience dual Iranian-Afghan identity. Afghan migration has been driven by Afghanistan's political turmoil, Iran's labor needs and changing Iranian state policies. Today, this population – split between documented and undocumented migrants – shapes Iran's social and economic scene while posing a mounting challenge for fiscal policy. The consequences go far beyond population statistics, as detailed in the financial analysis below. Iran's economy is built on a vast, inefficient and non-targeted subsidy system – one of the world's costliest. For a large, low-income migrant population like the Afghans, this has turned a social issue into a fiscal dilemma. The analysis below examines each major line item using official Iranian sources and independent research. Energy subsidies: Fuel and energy subsidies are the largest component. State price controls and below-market energy costs lead to enormous hidden expenditures for gasoline, gas, diesel and electricity. The Parliament Research Center and the World Bank estimate Iran's annual hidden energy subsidy at up to 1,200 trillion tomans ($286 billion). While Afghan migrants – mostly from low-income deciles and generally without private cars – consume less than the average Iranian, everyone benefits via subsidized public transit and heating. The per capita annual fuel subsidy for Afghans is about 10-13 million tomans, well below the 30 million for Iranians. The undocumented sector, operating more in the grey market, creates additional fiscal pressure. Education subsidies: Iranian law requires that all Afghan children, regardless of documentation, be enrolled in public schools (Cabinet Resolution 2015; UNHCR 2024). The Ministry of Education and the Parliament Research Center estimate the average annual cost per Afghan student at about 4.5 million tomans. With an estimated 300,000 Afghan children in schools, this is a significant and growing burden, the same for both legal and undocumented residents. Healthcare subsidies: Healthcare access depends on insurance and residency status. About one million Afghans have public health insurance (UNHCR 2024); others use public services sporadically. Average annual health spending per Afghan is estimated at about 2-3 million tomans – comparable to the lowest-income Iranian deciles. Bread subsidies: Bread is a staple for both Iranians and Afghans, and the state's bread subsidy is among its largest fiscal commitments. Per capita, Afghans receive about 4-5 million tomans per year in bread subsidies, based on average consumption (160-180 kg) and the price gap between subsidized and market bread. Afghan households, typically larger, often consume up to 25% more than Iranian families. Even undocumented migrants have virtually unrestricted access to subsidized bread. Overall, bread subsidies remain a central – and expensive – pillar of food security for both communities. Water and electricity subsidies: In migrant-concentrated areas, water and power use per household is lower due to simpler lifestyles, but the total population puts chronic strain on infrastructure. Per capita subsidy is about 3-4 million tomans annually. Municipal services: Public transport, waste collection, green spaces, and urban services add another 500,000 tomans per person per year – low in isolation, but substantial in the aggregate in urban centers. Annual cost of Afghan migrants (2025 estimates, in millions of USD) Subsidy Estimated Annual Cost per Legal Migrant (USD) Estimated Annual Cost per Undocumented Migrant (USD) Legal immigrant population (millions) legal immigrant population (millions) Total Annual Cost Legal Migrants (m USD) Total Annual Cost Undocumented Migrants (m USD) Total Grand Annual Cost (m USD) Fuel & Energy 114 148 0.9 2.1 102.3 307.4 409.7 Education 51 51 0.3 0.3 17.2 17.2 34.4 Healthcare 34 23 0.9 2.1 34.1 54.0 88.1 Bread & Food 51 57 0.9 2.1 41.4 113.3 154.7 Water & Electricity 40 40 0.9 2.1 32.1 74.7 106.8 Municipal Services 6 8 0.9 2.1 4.9 20.1 25.0 Total 232.0 586.7 818.7 Despite these costs, Afghan migration generates tangible economic gains. Afghan workers, with lower wages and roughly 15-20% higher productivity than Iranian peers, create an annual private sector saving of about $852 million (75,000 bn tomans). These savings stabilize key industries – especially construction and agriculture – that face chronic domestic labor shortages. But the fiscal and social costs outweigh the gains. Afghans remit $1-1.5 billion annually, draining foreign currency. The state's annual outlay for subsidies and public services exceeds $819 million. Pressure on housing markets, especially in low-income areas, adds at least $34 million in annual costs for Iranian renters. Security and law enforcement related to migration adds another $57 million. Annual gains & losses (2025, in millions of USD) Item Economic Gain (m USD) Economic Cost (m USD) Wage & Productivity 852 – Currency Outflow – 1,000–1,500 Subsidies & Public – 819 Housing Impact – 34 Security Costs – 57 Total 852 1,910–2,410 Despite all positive economic effects, Afghan migration's bottom line for Iran's public finances is negative. The net annual loss – over $1 billion – could build two 500-megawatt power plants or 200 modern schools in disadvantaged regions. Each year, the government could otherwise expand national infrastructure or offer full health insurance to every uninsured Iranian. The true challenge is not just migration, but Iran's untargeted and inefficient subsidy system and lack of migration management. Without reform, these fiscal burdens will keep rising. Clear policy, targeted subsidies and robust data are essential for Iran to balance economic needs, social cohesion and national stability. A senior economic analyst and construction project manager based in Tehran, Amirreza Etasi ( has worked for more than a decade at the intersection of public finance, energy and development policy, both in executive roles and as a contributor to major media outlets in Iran and abroad.
Reuters
16-07-2025
- Politics
- Reuters
Why Syria's sectarian mix poses a dilemma for its new rulers
July 16 (Reuters) - Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa's hopes of stitching Syria back together under the rule of his Islamist-led government are complicated by the country's mix of sectarian and ethnic groups. Syria is majority Sunni Muslim, and its religious minorities include Alawites, Christians, Druze and Shi'ite and Ismaili Muslims. While most Syrians are Arab, the country also has a sizeable ethnic Kurdish minority. Here's an overview of the Syrian ethno-sectarian mosaic: Sunni Muslims make up the majority of Syria's population of more than 20 million. Syria was for centuries part of the Sunni-ruled Ottoman Empire until it collapsed a century ago and the country became a French mandate. The group had historically dominated Syria's most powerful cities - Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and Homs. Under Assad family rule, Sunni Muslims still held some prominent roles and President Bashar al-Assad's wife Asma was from a Sunni family that gained influence until he was ousted in December. But patronage was largely skewed towards the Assads' Alawite minority after Bashar's father Hafez al-Assad seized power in 1970. In 1982, the Syrian branch of the Sunni Islamist Muslim Brotherhood launched a revolt in Hama against Hafez al-Assad. His forces crushed the rebellion, killing more than 10,000 people. Some of the most prominent factions in the insurgency against the Assads identified as Sunni Islamist, including Sharaa's Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which was an al Qaeda affiliate until cutting ties in 2016. Alawites account for around 10% of the population and follow an offshoot of Shi'ite Islam and revere Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Islam's Prophet Mohammad. They were a historically poor, rural community from Syria's mountainous coastal region. In 1920, French colonial rulers created an Alawite state along the coast, in what was seen as a divide and rule strategy. It was incorporated into the rest of Syria in 1936, before independence a decade later. Hailing from the Alawite village of Qardaha, Hafez al-Assad seized power after climbing the ranks in the military and the Baath Party. While espousing the Baath's secular Arab nationalism, the Assads recruited heavily from the Alawites for the security apparatus. Sunni fighters killed 1,500 Alawites in the coastal region in March, after a rebellion by Assad loyalists. Syria's Druze community follows a religion derived from Islam and is part of a minority group that also has members in Lebanon, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. In Syria, the community is concentrated in the Sweida region bordering Jordan, in areas adjoining the Israeli-occupied Golan, and in Damascus' Jaramana suburb. Echoing arrangements for the Alawites, French colonial authorities established a state called Jabal al-Druze centred on Sweida until 1936. After Syria's civil war erupted in 2011, Druze held protests against Assad but were spared most of the mass violence that unfolded elsewhere in the country. They faced periodic attacks from other groups - including from Sharaa's HTS and other Sunni Islamist militants who regard their sect as heretical. The Druze maintain a degree of secrecy about the practice of their faith that emerged in the 11th century and incorporates elements from Islam and other philosophies, emphasizing monotheism, reincarnation and the pursuit of truth. Friction between Druze and Syria's new authorities has broken out into fighting several times this year - notably in Jaramana and Suweida. Israel has intervened with airstrikes against Syrian government forces during the clashes with the stated aim of protecting the Druze. Kurds are Syria's largest non-Arab ethnic group at around 10% of the population and are concentrated near the border with Turkey and Iraq. They are part of a stateless ethnic group spread between Syria, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Armenia. Syria's Kurds faced systematic persecution under the Arab nationalist Baathist rule. While the Kurds are mostly Sunni Muslims, their dominant faction - the Democratic Union Party (PYD) - follows a political doctrine emphasising secular leftism and feminism and is heavily influenced by Abdullah Ocalan's Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). After the eruption of the Syrian conflict in 2011, a PYD-affiliated armed group, the People's Protection Units (YPG), established control of Kurdish-majority areas in northern Syria. Under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the YPG partnered with the United States against Islamic State. SDF-held Syria today accounts for about 25% of the country, including some Arab-majority regions. Leading Kurdish groups want to preserve regional autonomy, at odds with Sharaa's ambition of reunifying the country under central rule. While some prominent Syrian Christians joined the opposition against Assad, most Christian communities stuck by him, fearing that Sunnis would trample on minority rights if they took power. The Christians are split into a number of denominations - some of them tiny communities with ancient roots in pre-Islamic Syria. Groups include the Greek Orthodox, Maronites, Syriac Orthodox and Catholics, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Armenian Orthodox and Catholics. There also are a few Protestants.
Nahar Net
16-07-2025
- Politics
- Nahar Net
Israel strikes Syrian forces as Damascus declares ceasefire in Druze city
by Naharnet Newsdesk 15 July 2025, 11:12 Israel's military said it was striking military vehicles belonging to government forces in the Sweida area of southern Syria, after Syrian state media reported a new strike on the Druze-majority city. "A short while ago, the (Israeli army) began striking military vehicles belonging to Syrian regime forces in the area of Sweida in southern Syria," a military statement said, shortly after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz said they had ordered the army to "immediately strike regime forces and weaponry that were brought into the Sweida region in the Druze mountains in Syria in order to carry out operations against the Druze." Syria's defense minister meanwhile declared a ceasefire in Sweida. Fighting erupted earlier in the day as troops advanced into the southern city, which had been under the control of various Druze factions. The escalation came after contradictory statements from Druze religious leaders, most of whom urged fighters to lay down their arms. "To all units operating within the city of Sweida, we declare a complete ceasefire after an agreement with the city's notables and dignitaries," Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra posted on X. "We will respond only to sources of fire and deal with any targeting by outlaw groups," he added. An AFP correspondent at the city's edge reported that gunfire had since subsided. Earlier, the correspondent described intense clashes as government forces fought their way in. "We will begin handing over neighborhoods in Sweida city to the Internal Security Forces as soon as the combing operations are completed," Abu Qasra said. Authorities had initially announced a curfew in the city to contain the unrest. Syrian state-run news agency SANA later reported Israeli air strikes on Sweida as government forces were advancing. Israeli Defense Minister Katz had warned Damascus against targeting the Druze on Monday. The violence began on Sunday when Bedouin gunmen abducted a Druze vegetable vendor on the highway to Damascus, prompting retaliatory kidnappings. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights war monitor said members of Bedouin tribes, who are Sunni Muslims, had sided with security forces during earlier confrontations with the Druze. It reported 102 people killed in the fighting -- 61 Druze, including four civilians, 18 Bedouin fighters, 16 security personnel, and seven unidentified people in military uniforms.
The Independent
16-07-2025
- Politics
- The Independent
Israel threatens to escalate involvement in Syria as a ceasefire collapses
Clashes raged in the southern Syrian city of Sweida on Wednesday after a ceasefire between government forces and Druze armed groups collapsed and Israel threatened to escalate its involvement in support of the Druze religious minority. Syria's Defense Ministry blamed militias in Sweida for violating a ceasefire agreement that had been reached Tuesday, causing Syrian army soldiers to return fire and continue military operations in the Druze-majority province. 'Military forces continue to respond to the source of fire inside the city of Sweida, while adhering to rules of engagement to protect residents, prevent harm, and ensure the safe return of those who left the city back to their homes,' the statement said. A rebel offensive led by Islamist insurgent groups ousted Syria's longtime despotic leader, Bashar Assad, in December, bringing an end to a nearly 14-year civil war. Since then, the country's new rulers have struggled to consolidate control over the territory. The primarily Sunni Muslim leaders have faced suspicion from religious and ethnic minorities. The fears of minorities increased after clashes between government forces and pro-Assad armed groups in March spiraled into sectarian revenge attacks in which hundreds of civilians from the Alawite religious minority, to which Assad belongs, were killed. Reports of killings and looting in Druze areas The latest escalation in Syria began with tit-for-tat kidnappings and attacks between local Sunni Bedouin tribes and Druze armed factions in the southern province, a center of the Druze community. Government forces that intervened to restore order have also clashed with the Druze, while reports have surfaced of members of the security forces carrying out extrajudicial killings, looting and burning civilian homes. No official casualty figures have been released since Monday, when the Syrian Interior Ministry said 30 people had been killed. The U.K.-based war monitor Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said more than 250 people had been killed as of Tuesday night, including four children, five women and 138 soldiers and security forces. The observatory said at least 21 people were killed in 'field executions.' Israel has launched a series of airstrikes on convoys of government forces since the clashes erupted, saying that it is acting to protect the Druze. The Druze religious sect began as a 10th-century offshoot of Ismailism, a branch of Shiite Islam. More than half the roughly 1 million Druze worldwide live in Syria. Most of the other Druze live in Lebanon and Israel, including in the Golan Heights, which Israel captured from Syria in the 1967 Mideast War and annexed in 1981. Israel threatens to scale up its intervention In Israel, the Druze are seen as a loyal minority and often serve in the military. In Syria, the Druze have been divided over how to deal with the country's new leaders, with some advocating for integrating into the new system while others have remained suspicious of the authorities in Damascus and pushed for an autonomous Druze region. On Wednesday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said in a statement that the Israeli army 'will continue to attack regime forces until they withdraw from the area — and will also soon raise the bar of responses against the regime if the message is not understood.' Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a statement Tuesday night that Israel has 'a commitment to preserve the southwestern region of Syria as a demilitarized area on Israel's border" and has "an obligation to safeguard the Druze locals.' Israel has taken an aggressive stance toward Syria's new leaders since Assad's fall, saying it doesn't want Islamist militants near its borders. Israeli forces have seized a U.N.-patrolled buffer zone on Syrian territory along the border with the Golan Heights and launched hundreds of airstrikes on military sites in Syria.
Mint
16-07-2025
- Politics
- Mint
Nimisha Priya Case: How Sheikh Abubakr Ahmad intervened to defer Kerala nurse's execution in Yemen
Nimisha Priya Case: The execution of Kerala nurse Nimisha Priya, who has been on death row in Yemen since 2020, was deferred on July 15, a day before the scheduled date. This confirmation came a day after Kanthapuram AP Aboobacker Musliyar, the general secretary of the All India Sunni Jamiyyathul Ulama and chancellor of Jamia Markaz, initiated a new mediation effort through his long-time friend and Yemeni Sufi Islamic scholar Sheikh Habib Umar bin Hafiz. The 94-year-old Musliyar, who is officially known as Sheikh Abubakr Ahmad and is revered as 'Grand Mufti of India,' held talks with religious authorities in Yemen, who were in contact with the family of Talal Abdo Mahdi, the Yemeni national she allegedly killed in 2017. On Tuesday, Abubakr announced, a press statement, that the scheduled execution has been officially postponed following his humanitarian intervention. The statement detailed the series of diplomatic and religious efforts undertaken to halt the execution. The initiative began after he was approached last Friday by Chandy Oommen, the Congress MLA from seeking assistance in the Nimisha Priya execution case due to the cleric's longstanding ties with leading Sufi scholars in Yemen. "With a deep sense of national responsibility and humanitarian concern, I decided to act upon this request," the 'Grand Mufti' said in the statement. Given the limited diplomatic ties between India and Yemen, he chose to activate alternate channels of influence through spiritual and tribal leaders. One of the pivotal figures in the mediation process was Habib Umar bin Hafeez, a renowned Sufi scholar from Tarim, Yemen. Upon being contacted, Habib Umar promptly began mobilising his network and initiated high-level discussions with the deceased's family, legal experts, and Yemeni judicial authorities, according to the statement. 'An emergency meeting was recently convened in North Yemen under Habib Umar's guidance, bringing together key figures including senior government officials, the Chief Judge of the Criminal Court in Sanaa, the victim's family representatives, and tribal leaders. During these discussions, the victim's family signaled openness to further dialogue before finalizing their decision,' it read. Abubakr is based in Kerala, the home state of 37-year-old Nimisha Priya. He is a revered figure among Sunni Muslims in India and across South Asia. He is widely known as the 'Grand Mufti of India', though the title is not official. Further negotiations took place this morning in Dhamar, the home region of the deceased, involving tribal leaders and the victim's legal committee, the statement said. 'Notably, Justice Mohammed bin Ameen—a senior judge, Shura Council member, and relative of the deceased—joined the mediation at the request of Habib Umar and played a crucial role in persuading the family to formally request a stay of execution,' it said. The Yemeni Special Criminal Court issued an official order, signed by Judge Rizwan Ahmed Al-Wajri and Prosecutor Swari Mudeen Mufaddal, postponing the execution originally scheduled for July 16, 2025 until further notice. "This case has been deeply sensitive and emotionally complex within the tribal society of North Yemen," noted Sheikh Abubakr. 'Until recently, even establishing communication with the victim's family was impossible. The breakthrough in dialogue now offers renewed hope for a peaceful resolution.' Abubakr confirmed that all recent developments have been formally communicated to the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi. The statement said this intervention marks a critical step toward clemency in a case that has drawn national and international attention and underscores the impact of religious diplomacy and cross-border humanitarian solidarity. According to sources quoted by news agencies, blood money negotiations have taken place, and the details were conveyed to the concerned parties in Kerala. "Islam has another law. If the murderer is sentenced to death, the family of the victim has the right to pardon. I don't know who this family is, but from a long distance, I contacted the responsible scholars in Yemen,' he told news agency ANI. 'I made them understand the issues. Islam is a religion that places a lot of importance on humanity.' Under Shariah law, as applied in Yemen, blood money is a legally recognised financial compensation paid to the family of a person who has been killed. It is a legally sanctioned alternative to capital punishment in Islamic jurisprudence. 'After I requested that they intervene and take action, the scholars (in Yemen) met, discussed, and stated that they would do what they could. They have officially informed us and sent a document stating that the date of execution has been postponed, which will help facilitate the ongoing discussions," he said. Nimisha Priya, hailing from Palakkad district in Kerala, was sentenced to death in 2020, and her final appeal was rejected in 2023. She is currently imprisoned in a jail in Sanaa, the capital of Yemen. Centre informed the Supreme Court that the government could do "nothing much" in the case of the nurse facing execution on July 16. Islam is a religion that places a lot of importance on humanity. Attorney General R Venkataramani informed a bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta that the government was doing "utmost possible".
